Karnataka High Court
J Rudramuni vs M/S Karnataka Food And Civil Supplies on 22 January, 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 22ND DAY OF JANUARY, 2024
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
WRIT PETITION No.37164/2018 (L-RES)
BETWEEN:
J. RUDRAMUNI
S/O. LATE SRI JANGALI THIPPANNA
SINCE DECEASED BY LRs.
(i) SMT. RUKMINI,
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
W/O. LATE SRI J. RUDRAMUNI,
(ii) SMT. J. MALINI,
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS,
D/O. LATE SRI J. RUDRAMUNI,
W/O. SRI RAVISHANKAR B.N.
(iii) SRI J. THIPPESWAMY,
AGED ABOUT 27 YEARS,
S/O. LATE SRI J. RUDRAMUNI,
ALL ARE RESIDING AT NO.41/18,
SUBBREDDY K. BUILDING,
KEMPANAYAKANAHALLI,
BANNERGHATTA POST,
ANEKAL TALUK,
BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT,
PIN: 560 083.
... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI KRISHNA MURTHY R., ADVOCATE)
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AND:
M/S. KARNATAKA FOOD AND CIVIL
SUPPLIES CORPORATION LTD.,
NO.16/1, MILLERS TANK BED AREA,
BANGALORE - 560 052
REPRESENTED BY ITS
MANAGING DIRECTOR.
... RESPONDENT
(BY SRI KAVEESH SHARMA, ADVOCATE FOR
SRI S.R. KAMALACHARAN, ADVOCATE)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE
ORDER DATED 16.12.2017 IN APPLICATION NO.7/2016 PASSED
BY THE HON'BLE PRESIDING OFFICER, PRINCIPAL LABOUR
COURT, BANGALORE WHICH IS SUBMITTED AS ANNEXURE-M;
DIRECT THE RESPONDENT TO PAY THE FOLLOWING SERVICE
BENEFITS AND MONETARY BENEFITS TO THE PETITIONER FOR
THE PERIOD FROM 03.07.2001 TO 18.09.2014: a.REGULAR
ANNUAL INCREMENTS; b.BENEFITS OF REVISION OF PAY SCALES
WHICH WAS GIVEN TO OTHER EMPLOYEES DURING THE PERIOD
FROM 2001 TO 2014; c.10 YEAR, 15 YEAR AND 20 YEAR TIME
BOUND ADVANCEMENTS; d.PROMOTION TO THE GRADE OF
SENIOR ASSISTANT FROM THE DATE HIS IMMEDIATE JUNIOR
WAS PROMOTED; AND ETC.
THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
ON 12/01/2024 FOR ORDERS AND COMING FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER THIS DAY, THE COURT
PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
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ORDER
Petitioner in this writ petition is seeking for the following prayers:
"1) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, quashing the order dated 16-12-2017 in Application No.7/2016 passed by the Hon'ble Presiding Officer, Principal Labour Court, Bangalore which is submitted as ANNEXURE-"M";
2) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, directing the respondent to pay the following service benefits and monetary benefits to the petitioner for the period from 3-7-2001 to 18-9-2014:
a. regular annual increments;
b. benefit of revision of pay scales which was given
to other employees during the period from 2001 to 2014;
c. 10 year, 15 year and 20 year Time Bound Advancements;
d. promotion to the grade of Senior Assistant from the date his immediate Junior was promoted;
-4-e. Earned Leave and Half Pay Leave benefits from time to time by crediting the same to his Leave Accounts;
f. Surrender Leave Encashment Benefit for the block years 2002-2003, 2004-2005, 2006-2007, 2008- 2009, 2010-2011, 2012-2013 and 2014-2015 on the basis of his salaries as on 1-1-2002, 1-1- 2004, 1-1-2006, 1-1-2008, 1-1-2010, 1-1-2012 and 1-1-2014, respectively;
g. leave salary after retirement calculated on the basis of the salary drawn by him as on the date of his retirement viz., 30-4-2015;
h. gratuity for the period from 1984 to 2015 (31 years) on the basis of his salary as on 30-4-2015;
i. 100% salary for the period of suspension from 3- 7-2001 to 16-9-2003 minus the subsistence allowance paid;
j. 30% of salary for the period he was out of service due to dismissal (i.e., from 17-9-2003 to 28-10- 2009 minus amount already paid on this score;
k. 100% salary for the period from 29-10-2009 to 17-9-2014;
-5-(2) directing the respondent to pay compound interest on the entire amount of the monetary benefits at 14% per annum, compounded every quarterly;
(3) directing the respondent to give such other benefits to the petitioner as may be deemed necessary in the circumstances of the case, including the costs of this litigation."
2. The parties herein are referred to as the workman and the Corporation for the sake of convenience.
3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent.
4. The petitioner-workman is assailing the legality and correctness of the order dated 16.12.2017 in application No.7/2016 on the file of the Principal Labour Court, Bangalore (hereinafter to referred to as the Labour Court for short), whereby, the application under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ('the ID Act' for short) was rejected as not maintainable and the petitioner is also seeking for further reliefs as stated supra.
-6-5. The workman joined the Corporation as a Junior Assistant, for the misconduct, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the workman, the Disciplinary Authority dismissed the workman from service, appeal preferred by the workman before the Appellate Authority came to be dismissed. The workman preferred W.P. No.18927/2005 and this Court held that the order of dismissal has to be set at naught and in which event, this Court held that the petitioner is entitled to 30% of his salary as compensation for the period that he remain out of service from the date of dismissal. The writ appeal preferred by the Corporation was dismissed affirming the order of the learned Single Judge.
6. Contempt initiated by the workman came to be closed as the order of the learned Single Judge was complied. Pursuant to the proceedings, representation was given by the workman stating that after reinstatement to duty, the workman is entitled for several benefits as stated in the representation. According to the workman, since the -7- representation was not considered, application under Section 33C(2) of the ID Act was filed before the Labour Court.
7. The application under Section 33C(2) of the ID Act by the petitioner is seeking the following prayers "1. Directing the respondent to pay the following service benefits and monetary benefits to the applicant for the period from 3.7.2001 to 18.9.2014:
a) regular annual increments:
b) benefit of revision of pay scales which was given
to other employees during the period from 2001 to 2014:
c) 10 year, 15 year and 20 year Time Bound Advancements;
d) Promotion to the grade of senior assistant from the date his immediate junior was promoted:
e) Earned leave and Half pay Leave benefits from time to time by crediting the same to his Leave Accounts:
f) Surrender Leave Encashment Benefit for the block years 2002-2003, 2004-2005, 2006-2007, 2008-
2009, 2010-2011, 2012-2013 and 2014-2015 on -8- the basis of his salaries as on 1.1.2002, 1.1.2004, 1.1.2006, 1.1.2008, 1.1.2010, 1.1.2012 and 1.1.2014 respectively;
g) Leave salary after retirement calculated on the basis of the salary drawn by him as on the date of his retirement viz.. 30.4.2015:
h) gratuity for the period from 1984 to 2015 (31 years) on the basis of his salary as on 30.4.2015;
i) 100% salary for the period of suspension from 3.7.2001 to 16.9.2003 minus the subsistence allowance paid.
j) 30% of salary for the period he was out of service due to dismissal (i.e. from 17.9.2003 to 28.10.2009 minus amount already paid on this score:
k) 100% back wages for the period from 20.10.2009 to 18.9.2014;
2. directing the respondent to pay compound interest on the entire amount of the monetary benefits at 14% per annum, compounded every quarterly;
3. directing the respondent to give such other benefits to the applicant as may be deemed necessary -9- in the circumstances of the case, including the costs of this litigation."
8. The workman in order to substantiate the claim under Section 33C(2) examined himself as A.W.1 and got marked documents at Ex.A.1 to A.9. There was no evidence on behalf of the Corporation.
9. The Labour Court framed the following points for determination:
"Whether the application filed on behalf of the applicant under section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 directing the respondent to give service benefits and monetary benefits, regular annual increments, benefit of revision of pay scales, Time bound Advancements, promotion, Earned leave and Half pay leave benefits, Surrender Leave Encashment benefit, leave salary after retirement, gratuity, 100% salary for the period of suspension from 3.7.2001 to 16.9.2003 and his subsistence allowance 30% of salary for the period was out of service, 100% back wages from 20.10.2009 to 18.9.2014 with compound interest is maintainable?"
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10. The Labour Court by the impugned order taking note of the application filed under Section 33C(2) held that the application seeking the said prayers is not maintainable and accordingly, rejected.
11. The sum and substance of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that in light of the order passed in W.P. No.18927/2005, the workman is entitled for 30% of the wages for the period during which he was out of service from the date of dismissal and in view of allowing of the writ petition, the petitioner is entitled for entire service benefits including full back wages from the date of suspension till the date of his dismissal and from the date of dismissal to 28.10.2009, his backwages are restricted to 30%.
12. This Court in W.P. NO.18927/2005 at paragraph Nos.15 and 16 held as under:
"15. In any event, the punishment imposed against the petitioner is disproportionate and
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premature, as there is no material placed on record in having arrived at the findings by the Enquiry Officer.
The contention that there are findings of fact and that this Court ought not to interfere even if the same are erroneous, is a principle that is stated off- handed. It is well within the power of this Court to examine the adequacy of findings in having arrived at the findings and imposing an extreme punishment of dismissal on the petitioner.
Hence, the order of dismissal would have to be set at naught, in which event the petitioner being entitled to back-wages is a question that requires to be considered. Though the action of the respondent have been illegal in terminating the services of the petitioner and the petitioner having preferred an appeal and thereafter approached this Court by way of writ petition in the year 2005 and the same having remained on Board without being considered for final disposal and only now being taken up, would impose a burden on the respondent if they were directed to pay back-wages for the entire period for which the petitioner has remained out of service. However, it would be reasonable to grant some amount of compensation, notwithstanding, that the petitioner has not rendered services to the respondent in the interregnum.
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16. Hence, the petitioner is held entitled to 30% of his salary as compensation for the period that he has remained out of service from the date of dismissal. The respondent shall pay the same. While the respondent shall also take into consideration for the purpose of his service and pension, the period that the petitioner has remained out of service and the respondents are also afforded an opportunity that in the event that there are findings arrived at in the criminal proceedings or in the civil Court, which would warrant a fresh enquiry against the petitioner, to initiate the same in accordance with law."
(emphasis supplied)
13. Section 33C(2) of the ID Act reads as under:
"33C. Recovery of money due from an employer.--
(1) x x x (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules 59 that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf
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by the appropriate Government within a period not exceeding three months:
Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit."
14. It is well settled law that the proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the ID Act are in the nature of proceedings based on any award, settlement order or decree and the application filed by the workman is directing the Corporation to give service benefits and monetary benefits, regular annual increment benefits, revision of pay scales, time bound advancement, promotion, earned leave and half pay leave, 75% salary, the age of superannuation on which he would have retired and for the period from 08.10.2004 to 31.08.2010 minus (-) already the amount paid on this score, surrender leave, encashment benefits, leave salary after retirement, gratuity with compound interest. The said prayer
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sought is beyond the scope and ambit of Section 33C(2) of the ID Act.
15. The Apex Court in the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. vs. The Workmen & another1 (Central Inland Water Transport Corporation) at para Nos.11 to 16 has held as under:
"11. The only question which arises for determination in this Court is whether the Labour Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate on the issues referred to it under Section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Sub-section(2), which is part of section 33C dealing with "the recovery of money due from an employer" reads as follows:
"(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government."1
1974 (4) SCC 696
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12. It is now well-settled that a proceeding under section 33C (2) is a proceeding, generally, in the nature of an execution proceeding wherein the Labour Court calculates the amount of money due to a workman from his employer, or if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the Labour Court proceeds to compute the benefit in terms of money. This calculation or computation follows upon an existing right to the money or benefit, in view of its being previously adjudged, or, otherwise, duly provided for. In Chief Mining Engineer East India Coal Co. Ltd. v. Rameshwar, (1968) 1 SCR 140 = (AIR 1968 SC 218) it was reiterated that proceedings under Section 33C (2) are analogous to execution proceedings and the Labour Court called upon to compute in terms of money the benefit claimed by workmen is in such cases in the position of an executing court. It was also reiterated that the right to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between an industrial workman and his employer.
13. In a suit, a claim for relief made by the plaintiff against the defendant involves an investigation directed to the determination of (i) the
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plaintiff's right to relief; (ii) the corresponding liability of the defendant, including, whether the defendant is, at all, liable or not; and (iii) the extent of the defendant's liability, if any. The working out of such liability with a view to give relief is generally regarded as the function or an execution proceeding. Determination no. (iii) referred to above, that is to say, the extent of the defendant's liability may sometimes be left over for determination in execution proceedings. But that is not the case with the determinations under heads (i) and (ii). They are normally regarded as the functions of a suit and not an execution proceeding. Since a proceeding under section 33C (2) is in the nature of an execution proceeding it should follow that an investigation of the nature of determinations (i) and (ii) above is, normally, outside its scope. It is true that in a proceeding under Section 33C (2), as in an execution proceeding, it may be necessary to determine the identity of the person by whom or against whom the claim is made if there is a challenge on that score. But that is merely 'Incidental'. To call determinations (i) and (ii) 'Incidental' to an execution proceeding would be a perversion, because execution proceedings in which the extent of liability is worked out are just consequential upon the determinations (i) and (ii) and represent the last stage in a process leading to final relief. Therefore, when a claim is made before the
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Labour Court under Section 33C(2) that court must clearly understand the limitations under which it is to function. It cannot arrogate to itself the functions - say of an Industrial Tribunal which alone is entitled to make adjudications in the nature of determinations (i) and (ii) referred to above, or proceed to compute the benefit by dubbing the former as 'Incidental' to its main business of computation. In such cases determinations (i) and (ii) are not 'Incidental' to the computation. The computation itself is consequential upon and subsidiary to determinations (i) and (ii) as the last stage in the process which commenced with a reference to the Industrial Tribunal. It was, therefore, held in State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. R.L. Khandelwal, (1968) 2 Lab LJ 589 (SC), that a workman cannot put forward a claim in an application under Section 33C (2) in respect of a matter which is not based on an existing right and which can be appropriately the subject matter of an Industrial Dispute which requires a reference under Section 10 of the Act.
14. The scope of Section 33C (2) was illustrated by this court in Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P.S. Rajagapalan, (1964) 3 SCR 140 = (AIR 1964 SC
743). Under the Shastri Award, Bank clerks operating the adding machine were declared to be entitled to a special allowance of Rs.10/- per month. Four clerks
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made a claim for computation before the Labour Court. The Bank denied the claim that the clerks came within the category referred to in the award and further contended that the Labour Court under Section 33C (2) had no jurisdiction to determine whether the clerks came within that category or not. Rejecting the contention, this Court held that the enquiry as to whether the 4 clerks came within that category was purely 'incidental' and necessary to enable the Labour Court to give the relief asked for and, therefore, the court had jurisdiction to enquire whether the clerks answered the description of the category mentioned in the Shastri Award, which not only declared the right but also the corresponding liability of the Employer bank. This was purely a case of establishing the identity of the claimants as coming within a distinct category of clerks in default of which it would have been impossible to give relief to anybody falling in the category. When the Award mentioned the category it, as good as, named every one who was covered by the category and hence the enquiry, which was necessary, became limited only to the clerks' identity and did not extend either to a new investigation as to their rights or the Bank's liability to them. Both the latter had been declared and provided for in the Award and the Labour Court did not have to investigate the same. Essentially, therefore, the assay of the Labour Court was in the nature of a function of a court in execution
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proceedings and hence it was held that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to determine, by an incidental enquiry, whether the 4 clerks came in the category which was entitled to the special allowance.
15. It is, however, interesting to note that in the same case the court at page 156 gave illustrations as to what kinds of claim of a workman would fail outside the scope of section 33C (2). It was pointed out that a workman who is dismissed by his employer would not be entitled to seek relief under section 32C (2) by merely alleging that, his dismissal being wrongful, benefit should be computed on the basis that he had continued in service. It was observed:
"His..........dismissal may give rise to an industrial dispute which may be appropriately tried, but once it is shown that the employer has dismissed..........him, a claim that the dismissal..........is unlawful and, therefore, the employee continues to be the workman of the employer and is entitled to the benefits due to him under a preexisting contract, cannot be made under S. 33C (2)."
By merely making a claim in a loaded form the workmen cannot give the Labour Court jurisdiction under Section 33C (2). The workman who has been dismissed would no longer be in the employment of
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the employer. It may be that an industrial tribunal may find on an investigation into the circumstances of the dismissal that the dismissal was unjustified. But when he comes before the Labour Court with his claim for computation of his wages under Section 33C (2) he cannot ask the Labour Court to disregard his dismissal as wrongful and on that basis compute his wages.
16. In such cases, a determination as to whether the dismissal was unjustified would be the principal matter for adjudication, and computation of wages just consequential upon such adjudication. It would be wrong to consider the principal adjudication as 'incidental' to the computation. Moreover, if we assume that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to make the investigation into the circumstances of the dismissal, a very anomalous situation would arise. The Labour Court after holding that the dismissal was wrongful would have no jurisdiction to direct reinstatement under Section 33C (2). And yet if the jurisdiction to compute the benefit is conceded it will be like conceding it authority to pass orders awarding wages as many time comes before it without being reinstated. Therefore, the Labour Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 33C (2) has got to be circumspect before it undertakes an investigation, reminding itself that any investigation it undertakes is, in a real sense, incidental to its computation of a
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benefit under an existing right, which is its principal concern."
(emphasis supplied)
16. The Apex Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Ganesh Razak and another2 (Ganesh Razak) at para Nos.8, 12 and 13 has held as under:
"8. Reference may be made first to the Constitution Bench decision in Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P.S. Rajagopalan on which Shri Rao placed heavy reliance. That was a case in which the question of maintainability of proceedings under Section 33- C(2) of the Act was considered in a claim made by the workmen on the basis of the Sastry Award. The employer disputed the claim of the workmen on several grounds including the applicability of Section 33-C(2) of the Act. It was urged that since the applications involved a question of interpretation of the Sastry Award, they were outside the purview of Section 33-C(2) because interpretation of awards or settlements has been expressly provided for by Section 36-A. This objection was rejected. This Court pointed Out the difference in the scope of Section 36- A and Section 33- C(2) indicating that the distinction lies in the fact that Section 36-A is not concerned with the implementation or execution of the award whereas 2 (1995) 1 SCC 235
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that is the sole purpose of Section 33-C(2); and whereas Section 33-C(2) deals with cases of implementation of individual rights of workmen falling under its provisions, Section 36-A deals merely with a question of interpretation of the award where a dispute arises in that behalf between the workmen and tile employer and the appropriate Government is satisfied that the dispute deserves to be resolved by reference under Section 36-A. In this context, this Court also indicated that the power of the Labour Court in a proceeding under Section 33-C(2) being akin to that of the Executing Court, the Labour Court is competent to interpret the award or settlement on which a workman bases his claim under Section 33- C(2), like the power of the Executing Court to interpret the decree for the purpose of execution. Relevant extract from that decision is as under: (SCR pp. 154-155) "Besides, there can be no doubt that when the Labour Court is given the power to allow an individual workman to execute or implement his existing individual rights, it is virtually exercising execution powers in some cases, and it is well settled that it is open to the Executing Court to interpret the decree for the purpose of execution. It is, of course, true that the Executing Court cannot go behind the decree, nor can it add to or
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subtract from the provision of the decree. These limitations apply also to the Labour Court; but like the Executing Court, the Labour Court would also be competent to interpret the award or settlement on which a workman bases his claim under Section 33-C(2). Therefore, we feel no difficulty in holding that for the purpose of making the necessary determination under Section 33-C(2), it would, in appropriate cases, be open to the Labour Court to interpret the award or settlement on which the workman's right rests."
This decision itself indicates that the power of the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) extends to interpretation of the award or settlement on which the workman's right rests, like the Executing Court's power to interpret the decree for the purpose of execution, where the basis of the claim is referable to the award or settlement, but it does not extend to determination of the dispute of entitlement or the basis of the claim if there be no prior adjudication or recognition of the same by the employer. This decision negatives instead of supporting the submission of learned counsel for the respondents.
x x x
12. The High Court has referred to some of these decisions but missed the true import thereof. The ratio of these decisions clearly indicates that
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where the very basis of the claim or the entitlement of the workmen to a certain benefit is disputed, there being, no earlier adjudication or recognition thereof by the employer, the dispute relating to entitlement is not incidental to the benefit claimed and is, therefore, clearly outside the scope of a proceeding under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. The Labour Court has no jurisdiction to first decide the workmen's entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. It is only when the entitlement has been earlier adjudicated or recognised by tile employer and thereafter for the purpose of implementation or enforcement thereof some ambiguity requires interpretation that the interpretation is treated as incidental to the Labour Court's power under Section 33-C(2) like that of the Executing Court's power to interpret the decree for the purpose of its execution.
13. In these matters, the claim of the respondent-workmen who were all daily-rated/casual workers, to be paid wages at the same rate as the regular workers, had not been earlier settled by adjudication or recognition by the employer without which the stage for computation of that benefit could not reach. The workmen's claim of doing the same kind of work and their entitlement to be paid wages at
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the same rate as the regular workmen on the principle of "equal pay for equal work" being disputed, without an adjudication of their dispute resulting in acceptance of their claim to this effect, there could be no occasion for computation of the benefit on that basis to attract Section 33-C(2). The mere fact that some other workmen are alleged to have made a similar claim by filing writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution is indicative of the need for adjudication of the claim of entitlement to the benefit before computation of such a benefit could be sought. Respondents' claim is not based on a prior adjudication made in the writ petitions filed by some other workmen upholding a similar claim which could be relied on as an adjudication enuring to the benefit of these respondents as well. The writ petitions by some other workmen to which some reference was casually made, particulars of which are not available in these matters, have, therefore, no relevance for the present purpose. It must, therefore, be held that the Labour Court as well as the High Court were in error in treating as maintainable the applications made Linder Section 33- C(2) of the Act by these respondents."
17. The Apex Court in the cases of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation and Ganesh Razak stated supra has laid down the proposition that where the very
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basis of the claim or entitlement of the workman to a certain benefit is disputed, there being no earlier adjudication or recognition by the employer, the dispute relating to entitlement is not identical to the benefit claim and is therefore outside the scope of proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the ID Act and the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to first decide the workman's entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on the basis of the exercise of its power under Section 33C(2) of the ID Act.
18. The law is well settled that proceeding contemplated by Section 33C(2) are analogous to execution proceedings and the Labour Court, like the Executing Court in the execution proceedings governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, the power of the Executing Court is only to implement the adjudication already made by a decree and not to adjudicate upon the disputed claim which requires adjudication for its enforcement, in the form of a decree. The claim of the workman as could be seen from the application and the prayer in the writ petition is without adjudication
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and beyond the scope and ambit of Section 33C(2), the Labour Court was therefore justified in dismissing the application filed by the workman warranting no interference by this Court. Accordingly, this Court pass the following:
ORDER i. writ petition is dismissed.
ii. Impugned order passed by the Labour Court stands confirmed.
SD/-
JUDGE S*