Patna High Court
Bihar State Housing Board vs State Of Bihar And Ors. on 19 January, 1993
Equivalent citations: AIR1995PAT131, 1994(42)BLJR984, AIR 1995 PATNA 131, (1994) 2 BLJ 315 1994 BLJR 2 984, 1994 BLJR 2 984
Author: S.B. Sinha
Bench: S.B. Sinha
JUDGMENT S.B. Sinha, J.
1. In this application the petitioner has prayed for issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing the order passed by the Additional District Judge, 1st Court Gaya whereby he enhanced the amount of compensation in Land Acquisition Case No. 7 of 1983 as also for a writ of or in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent No. 4 to reopen the proceeding and determine the amount of compensation after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.
2. The petitioner is a body-corporate established in terms of Section 3 of the Bihar State Housing Act, 1982 and thus is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India.
3. The State of Bihar, allegedly at the instance of the petitioner issued a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). On 5-12-1974 declaring its intention to acquire a large tract of land situated at village Mustafabad in the district of Gaya. A declaration under Section 6 of the said Act was issued on 1-7-1975 and the possession of the land had also been taken in the year 1975.
4. The respondent No. 4 whose land had been acquired being dissatisfied with the award made by the Collector filed an appropriate application for a reference for enhancement in the quantum of compensation to the Land Acquisition Judge, in terms of Section 18 of the said Act.
5. The petitioner has comended that in the said reference case no notice had been issued to it but notice was only issued to the respondent No. 2.
6. The petitioner has submitted that in some similar matters this Court directed issuance of notice and stayed further proceeding in the execution cases levied (sic) for executing the awards passed in the Reference case.
7. It is one of such cases where a statutory authority has shown a gross in different attitude.
The petitioner in the writ petition has merely annexed a copy of the letter dated 12-1-1993 issued by the Collector Gaya to Shri Sudhir Kumar Rakesh, Managing Director of petitioner Board wherein it has been stated that for non-payment of amount of compensation, the properties of the State may be put on auctions. It was further pointed out in the said letter that auction may take place on 15-1-1993.
8. The petitioner in this writ application has not stated as to what action was taken by it pursuant to the said letter of the Collector of Gaya District dated 5-10-1991 and the subsequent reminders thereto.
9. The petitioner has also not annexed a copy of the award made in the reference case which is the subject matter of challenge in this writ petition and thus in absence thereof, no writ of certiorari can be issued by this Court.
10. The petitioner in the writ application has also not stated the foundational facts as to the nature of the acquisition and other relevant facts. Even the notification under Section 4 of the Act has not been annexed.
11. The petitioner has also not disclosed the other relevant facts vize the date of the award made by the Land Acquisition Officer, the date of the reference and the date of the award made by the respondent No. 4.
12. It has also not been stated as to when the execution of the award was levied. Even the number of the execution case and the Court where it is pending for disposal has not been disclosed.
13. The petitioner in the writ application has also not disclosed as to whether it had ever made any enquiry as to whether any reference under Section 18 of the Act had been made or not. Evidently the petitioner has also not filed an application for intervention in the said reference case.
14. Mr. Arshad Alam, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, when questioned, upon verification of his records stated that the award by the Respondent No. 4 was made by the respondent No. 4 in the year 1987. It appears that the reference was made in the year 1983 as is evident from the number of the reference case i.e. 7 of 1983.
15. In view of the gross delay, laches and conduct on the part of the petitioner, in our opinion, it is not a fit case in which we would exercise our discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as it would be inequitable to do so, inasmuch as apart from the facts as noticed hereinbefore, even the possession of the lands had been taken from the respondent No. 5 as far back as in the year 1975.
16. Mr. Arshad Alam, however submitted that as no notice had been served upon the petitioner for whose benefit the lands were acquired, the entire award made in the reference case by the respondent No. 4 must be held to be vitiated in law.
The learned counsel in support of the said contention relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Neelagangabai v. State of Karnataka reported in AIR 1990 SC 1321. Victoria Zavier v. Greater Cochin Development Authority reported in AIR 1993 Ker 95 and Gujarat Housing Board v. Nagajibhai reported in AIR 1986 Guj 81 (FB).
In Gujarat Housing Board's case (AIR, 1986 Guj 81) (supra) it has merely been held that the Housing Board is a person interested and thus was entitled to file an application under Order 1, Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
In this case the petitioner has also not filed such an application. The decision of the Gujarat High Court is also therefore, not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case.
17. In Neellagangabai's case (AIR 1990 SC 1321) (supra) the Supreme Court was dealing with a matter arising out of a case of acquisition of land by the State of Karnataka.
Section 20 of the Land Acquisition Act had been amended by the State of Karnataka by reason of Land Acquisition Act (Mysore Extension Amendment Act, 1961) and in terms of Clause (c) of Sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act as amended, notice is necessary to be given "if the acquisition is not made by the Government to the person or authority for whom it is made," No such amendment has been made by the State of Bihar.
18. In Victoria Zavier's case (AIR 1993 Ker 95) (supra) an application was filed by the respondent authority for intervention in the reference case in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 50 of the Act. It was held by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court that it was entitled to do so.
Such is not the position here.
Section 20 of the Land Acquisition Act provides for issuance of notice to the following persons namely:
(a) the applicant;
(b) all persons interested in the objection, except such (if any) of them as have consented without protest to receive payment of the compensation and
(c) if the objection is in regard to the area of the land or to the amount of the compensation, the Collector.
19. There cannot be any doubt that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court of India in Himalayan Tiles and Marble (P.) Ltd. V. Francis Victor Coutinho reported in AIR 1980 SC 1118, the words 'person interested' should be construed liberally. However, such person interested is not only entitled to prefer an appeal against any award made, but also may be entitled to interfere in the proceeding in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 50 of the Act (assuming that he said provision was attracted).
20. Prior to coming into force of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1982 acquisition could be made for public purpose. As the petitioner deliberately or intentionally had not annexed a copy of the notification under Section 4 of the Act as also the declaration under Section 6 thereof, it is not possible for this Court to arrive at a definite conclusion as to whether in terms of the said notification, the compensation amount was required to be paid by the petitioner, or not; although there may be an internal arrangement in relation thereto between the State and the petitioner Board to that effect.
21. The petitioner has also not stated the foundational facts in the writ application so as to enable it to contend that it is a local authority. Prima facie it is not a local authority. However, it is not necessary for us to go into this question as at present advised.
22. As indicated hereinbefore, even if Section 50(2) of the said Act is applicable in the case of the petitioner, the petitioner could have appeared and adduced evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. Evidently it did not take any such step.
23. The petitioner also did not file an application for impleading itself as a party in terms of Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
24. Even if the petitioner had come to learn about the making of the award by the respondent No. 1 at a later stage. Still it could have preferred an appeal after obtaining leave from the Court in terms of Section 54 of the Act and even if the said appeal was barred by limitation, an application for condonation of delay upon furnishing sufficient cause therefore, could have been filed.
25. Evidently reference was made in the year 1983 and the award was published in the year 1984 as has been disclosed in the counter-affidavit. The petitioner's writ petition cannot thus be entertained after a period eight years. The petitioner has not explained the gross delay and laches on its part.
26. In Bhoop Singh v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1992 SC 1414 it has been held as follows (Para 8):
"There is another aspect of the matter. Inordinate and unexplained delay or laches is by itself a ground to refuse relief to the petitioner, irrespective of the merit of his claim. If a person entitled to a relief chooses to remain silent for long, he thereby gives rise to a reasonable belief in the mind of others that he is not interested in claiming that relief. Others are then justified in acting on that behalf. This is more so in service matters where vacancies are required to be filled promptly. A person cannot be permitted to challenge the termination of his service after a period twenty two years, without any cogent explanation for the inordinate delay, merely because others similarly dismissed had been reinstated as a result of their earlier petitions being allowed. Accepting the petitioner's contention would upset the entire service jurisprudence and we are unable to construe Dharmpal in the manner suggested by the petitioner. Article 14 of the Principle of non-discrimination is an equitable principle and, therefore, any relief claimed on that basis must itself be founded on equity and be alien to that concept. In our opinion, grant of the relief to the petitioner. In the present case, would be inequitable instead of its refusal being discriminatory as asserted by learned counsel for the petitioner."
(Underlining is mine of emphasis.)
27. In Sahdeo Jha v. U.O.I., reported in 1992(1) Pat LJR 125 (SC) the Supreme Court again dismissed an application on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioner.
28. Reference in this connection may be made to Ram Naresh Singh v. State of Bihar reported in 1992 (1) Pat LJR 400.
29. For the reason aforementioned we are of the view that this Court should not exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in favour of the petitioner.
30. In the result, this application is dismissed but without any order as to costs.
R.N. Prasad, J.
31. I agree.