Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Komireddy Venkata Narasamma vs Kondareddy Narasimha Murthy on 15 September, 2005
Equivalent citations: AIR2006AP40, 2005(6)ALD152, 2006(1)ALT621, AIR 2006 ANDHRA PRADESH 40, 2006 (2) ALL LJ NOC 380, 2006 (1) AJHAR (NOC) 265 (AP), 2006 A I H C 1097, (2006) 37 ALLINDCAS 176 (AP), 2006 (37) ALLINDCAS 176, (2006) 1 ANDH LT 621, (2006) 2 CIVLJ 867, (2006) 2 HINDULR 117, (2005) 6 ANDHLD 152
Author: L. Narasimha Reddy
Bench: L. Narasimha Reddy
JUDGMENT L. Narasimha Reddy, J.
1. The unsuccessful plaintiff in O.S. No. 62 of 1989, in the Court of District Munsif, Kothapeta, filed this second appeal. Her suit was dismissed by the trial Court, through judgment and decree dated 28-10-1996. Thereupon, she filed A.S. No. 82 of 1996, in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Razole. The appeal was also dismissed on 24-10-2000. The dispute related to the devolution of property, held by one Chewuri Veera Swamy. His wife is Seshamma. They did not have any issues. The appellant, who was the daughter of Seshamma's brother, was brought up by them. Her marriage was also performed by that couple. Veera Swamy executed a deed of settlement, dated 23.1.1961, marked as Ex.A-2, whereunder, he reserved life interest in himself, in respect of Ac.0-60 cents of land at Narendrapuram Village, and created vested remainder, in favour of the appellant.
2. Veera Swamy executed a will, dated 19-3-1963, marked as Ex.A-1, in respect of Ac.0-12 cents of land in R.S. No. 252, covered by a thatched house. Under this will, life interest was created in favour of his wife, Seshamma, who was impleaded in the suit, as first defendant, and after her death, the property was to devolve absolutely, in favour of the appellant. After the death of Veera Swamy, his wife, Seshamma, executed a deed of settlement dated 11-11-1983, marked as Ex.B-1, in favour of the sole respondent herein (defendant No. 2 in the suit), covering the suit schedule property, and some other items. Seshamma retained life interest in her favour, and created vested remainder in favour of the sole respondent. On coming to know about this development, the appellant got issued a notice, dated 30-11-1983, marked as Ex.A-3, and the respondent replied through Ex.A-4.
3. The suit was filed for the relief of declaration that the appellant has vested remainder in the suit property, and that the same would come into effect, on the death of Seshamma. Seshamma died during the pendency of the suit, and no legal representatives were brought on record. The suit was contested by the sole respondent herein, who got the suit schedule property, through Ex.B-1.
4. The relationship of the parties and the execution of various deeds, referred to above, were not in dispute. To prove her case, the appellant examined PWs-1 to 4 and filed Exs. A-1 to A-5 On behalf of the respondent, DWs-1 to 3 were examined, and Exs. B-1 and B-2 were marked. The controversy turned around the issue, as to whether the life estate created in favour of Seshamma, under Ex.A-1, enlarged into an absolute right, by operation of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, for short "the Act". The trial Court, as well as the lower appellate, took the view that the life interest, created in favour of Seshamma, enlarged into an absolute right, and the deed of settlement, Ex.B-1, executed by her creating rights in favour of the respondent herein, is lawful and valid.
5. Sri V.L.N.G.K. Murthy, learned Counsel for the appellant, submits that the Courts below did not properly understand the scope and ambit of Section 14(1) of the Act. He contends that Seshamma was already provided with sufficient means, by her husband Veera Swamy, to maintain herself, and she was granted at the most a right of residence, under Ex.A-1, and the same cannot enlarge into an absolute right, in respect of the property, under Section 14(1) of the Act. He submits that the facts of the case attract sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act, and that there was no basis for the Courts below, in applying Sub-section (1). He sought to maintain a distinction between a mere right of residence to a Hindu woman, by her husband or any other person, who is under obligation to maintain her, on the one hand, and creation of limited estate to provide maintenance, on the other hand.
6. Placing reliance upon the judgment of Gujarat High Court in Kusumgauri v. Umiben and Ors., AIR 1975 Guj. 126, the learned Counsel submits that the condition precedent, for invoking Section 14(1) of the Act, is that the property must have accrued to a Hindu female, in recognition of right, title or interest, and that the right of a Hindu widow, to reside in a house left by her husband, is a general right, as distinguished from a right of maintenance. He contends that where a testator had made separate provisions for the maintenance of his widow, and thereafter, created vested remainder, in her favour, through a will, in respect of a different item of property, Section 14(1) of the Act does not apply, as regards the latter. He has relied upon certain other judgments also.
7. Sri M. Rammohan, learned Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that residence is always treated, as a facet of maintenance, and even where a limited right, restricted to the one of residence, is created, in favour of a Hindu woman, by a person who is under obligation to maintain her, it enlarges into an absolute right. He submits that once right to residence is traceable to right of being maintained, it makes little difference whether any other provision was made in favour of that very woman, in the context of application of Section 14(1) of the Act. He submits that in several decisions, the Supreme Court had explained the purport of Section 14(1) and (2) of the Act.
8. The only question, that falls for consideration in this second appeal is, as to whether the limited right created, in favour of Seshamma, under Ex. A-1, had enlarged into an absolute right, by operation of Section 14(1) of the Act. The relationship of the parties has already been referred to, and there is no dispute about it. Inasmuch as the claim of the appellant herself is under the will, Ex.A-1, there is no controversy as to proof of that document. The basis, on which the appellant seeks to restrict the right of Seshamma under Ex.A-1, is that it was only a right of residence, and not a full fledged right of maintenance, that was provided for, under the will.
9. The obligation for a Hindu male, to maintain his wife, existed under the Shastric, as well as Codified Hindu Law. It is apt to refer to a passage in a judgment of the Supreme Court, in Raghubar Singh and Ors. v. Gulab Singh and Ors., , in this regard.
"The obligations under the Shastric Hindu Law, to maintain a Hindu widow out of the properties of her deceased husband received a statutory recognition with the coming into force of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937. The law on the subject was, thereafter, consolidated and codified by the Hindu Married Women's Right to Separate Maintenance and Residence Act, 1946, which came into force on April 23, 1946. The right to maintenance of the Hindu widow, as a pre-existing right, was thus recognized by the two statutes referred to above but it was not created for the first time by any of those statutes. Her right to maintenance existed under the Shastric Hindu Law long before statutory enactments came into force."
Under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, the term "maintenance" is defined under Section 3(b), as under :
"3(b) "maintenance" includes-
(i) in all cases, provision for food, clothing, residence, education and medical attendance and treatment;
(ii) in the case of an unmarried daughter, also the reasonable expenses of and incident to her marriage;" Section 18 of that Act, recognizes the right of a wife to be maintained by her husband, during her life time. In addition to that, a widow, is recognized as one of the dependants, under Section 21 of the said enactment, so long as she does not remarry.
10. Disposition of any property, irrespective of the means, in favour of a Hindu woman, in recognition of her right to be maintained, assumes significance, from the point of view of Section 14 of the Act. Sub-section (1) thereof, mandates that any limited right, created in favour of a Hindu woman in recognition of her right, shall enlarge into an absolute right. Explanation to this provision further elaborates this. Subsection (2) thereof, carves out an exception, to the effect that if the disposition was otherwise than by way of recognition of a pre-existing right, the enlargement provided for under sub-section (1), does not take place.
11. Learned Counsel for the appellant laid much emphasis upon the distinction between maintenance and residence. According to him, what was provided for under Ex.A-1, was only a right of residence pure and simple, and having regard to the fact that Seshamma was provided with other properties, to take care of her maintenance, Section 14(1) of the Act does not get attracted. However, the recitals in Ex.A-1 do not support this contention. They are to the effect that Seshamma was conferred with the right to enjoy the suit schedule property, during her life time, but without any right of alienation. A right to enjoy a property, is not the same, as the right to reside in it. The former is larger in its scope, than the latter. While the right to reside enables a person in whose favour it is conferred to reside in a property, and to do nothing more, the right to enjoy enables such person, not only to reside, but also to put to any other use, as may be beneficial to him or her. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that Seshamma was conferred only with a right of residence in the suit schedule property.
12. Assuming that right of residence alone was conferred upon Seshamma, under Ex.A-1, it has to be examined whether such a disposition would attract Sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 14 of the Act. In Kusumgauri's case (supra), the Gujarat High Court dealt with a case, in which the succession opened in the year 1931, much before the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act 1937 and the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 were enacted. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, a distinction was maintained between the general right of residence, on the one hand, and allocation of the property to a Hindu woman, in lieu of her right of residence, on the other hand. On facts, it was held to be the former, and Section 14(1) of the Act was held, not applicable. The facts of the present case are substantially and radically different. The right to enjoy, not merely to reside, was conferred upon Seshamma, under Ex.A-1.
13. In Balwant Kaur and Anr. v. Chanan Singh and Ors., 2000 (4) ALD 36 (SC) : 2000 (3) Supreme 505, Justice Majmudar had illustrated the situations, in the context of application of Sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 14 of the Act, in the following manner:
"It is easy to visualize that if the testator had created a life interest to the extent of 1/ 3rd of his property in favour of his maid servant or a female cook who might have served him during his life time, then such female legatees could not have claimed benefit of Section 14(1) of the Act and their claim would have confined only to Section 14(2) as they would not have any pre-existing legal right of maintenance or dependency qua the estate of the deceased employer but appellant No. l, as a destitute widowed daughter of the testator, stands on entirely a different footing. The will in her favour does not create for the first time any such right as might have been created in favour of a maid servant or a cook. In fact, the will itself recognizes her pre-existing right in express terms and provides that even after his death, his other legatee brothers have to look after the welfare of his widowed daughter. Under these circumstances, Section 14(1) can legitimately be pressed in service by learned Senior Counsel for the appellants on the basis of legal right flowing to her under the relevant provisions of the Maintenance Act."
14. Recently, the Supreme Court in Smt. Palchuri Henumayamma v. Tadikamalla Kotilingam, , dealt with almost an identical situation, obtaining in the instant case. In that case, Hindu male executed a will creating life interest in favour of his wife and vested remainder in favour of his two daughters. Dealing with the situation, the Supreme Court has held as under :
"The fact that Ramamma was made a guardian of the minors would not in any manner deviate from the fact that the property under the will was given to Ramamma for her enjoyment in lieu of her maintenance. The wording "My wife, Ramamma shall enjoy all my moveable and immoveable properties till her death" clearly shows that no arrangement was made by the testator for vesting of the properties in his daughters. It is only after the death of said Ramamma that he had desired that the property should be divided equally amongst his three daughters but then, as things would have it before the property could be said to have vested in the mother of the appellant, two circumstances intervened. Firstly, in the year 1944 itself, the appellants' mother died, and secondly by virtue of enactment of Section 14(1) of the Act in the year 1956, the estate of Ramamma got enlarged making her as the absolute owner of the property."
15. From the above discussion, it is clear that:
(a) the right of residence is a facet of maintenance;
(b) what was created in favour of Seshamma, under Ex.A-1, was not the right to maintenance alone, but the right to enjoy the property, during her life time, without the right to alienate it;
(c) by operation of Section 14(1) of the Act, the same has enlarged into an absolute right;
(d) the fact that certain other properties were also settled in favour of, or kept at the disposal of Seshamma, by her husband, makes hardly any difference, in the context of operation of Section 14(1) of the Act; and that
(e) the vested remainder, created in favour of the appellant under Ex.A-1, did not materialize, on account of enlargement of the limited right created in favour of Seshamma, into an absolute one.
Though the learned Counsel for the parties have referred to several other decisions, it is not felt necessary to refer to them.
16. The second appeal fails, and it is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.