Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
B. Maheswaramma vs Smt. M. Ramasubbamma And Ors. on 14 August, 1995
Equivalent citations: 1996(1)ALT274
Author: C.V.N. Sastri
Bench: C.V.N. Sastri
JUDGMENT P.S. Mishra, C.J.
1. Heard. On the facts of this case we are inclined to interfere with the direction of the learned Single Judge and order instead that the Revenue Divisional Officer must complete the enquiry within a reasonable time, preferably within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of the order and until the disposal of the enquiry the status quo as on the date of filing of the writ petition shall be maintained.
2. Learned Counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner has however contended before us that the appellant who has entered as a dealer on a licence temporarily granted to her in the vacancy on account of the cancellation/suspension of the licence of the writ petitioner-respondent has no locus standi in the matter as the challenge to the order of cancellation/suspension of the licence of the writ petitioner-respondent in no way involves the appellant. He has in short argued that for the proceeding which requires examination whether the cancellation/suspension of the licence of the petitioner-respondent is valid or not is a dispute between the petitioner-respondent on the one hand and the competent authority on the other. The appellant herein, thus, according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner-respondent, has no locus standi.
3. Who is a person aggrieved who can move the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and who in the event of any order made in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution can be a person who can seek the leave of the Court to appeal against the order, however, are questions which have received sufficient attention of the Courts in India. In Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francies Victor Coutinbo, AIR 1980 SC 1118, speaking on the meaning to be given to the expression 'person interested' in the Land Acquisition Act the Supreme Court has stated:
"Thus, the preponderance of judicial opinion seems to favour the view that the definition of 'person interested' must be liberally construed so as to include a body, local authority, or a company for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is bound under an agreement to pay the compensation. In our opinion, this view accords with the principles of equity, justice and good conscience. How can it be said that a person for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is to pay the compensation is not a person interested even though its stake may be extremely vital?"
The most candid, however, discussion on the subject of locus standi is found in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Jasbhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, AIR 1976 SC 578, in which it is pointed out that in a sense, the scope and nature of the power conferred by Article 226 is wider than that exercised by the writ Courts in England. The Supreme Court has however pointed out:
".....However, the adoption of the nomenclature of English writ, with the prefix 'nature of super added indicates that the general principles grown over the years in the English Courts, can, shorn of unnecessary technical procedural restrictions, and adopted to the special conditions of this vast country, in so far as they do not conflict with any provision of the Constitution, or the law declared by this Court, be usefully considered in directing the exercise of this discretionary jurisdiction in accordance with well recognised rules of practice."
Making a detailed study of this rule of practice the Supreme Court in the said judgment had pointed out:
"According to most English decisions, in order to have the locus standi to invoke certiorari jurisdiction, the petitioner should be an 'aggrieved person' and, in a case of defect of jurisdiction, such a petitioner will be entitled to a writ of certiorari as a matter of course, but if he does not fulfil that character, and is a 'stranger', the Court will, in its discretion, deny him this extraordinary remedy, save in very special circumstances."
After referring to the decisions of various Courts in India and England and the practice in United States about the locus standi, the Supreme Court in the said judgment had pointed out as follows:
"It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these categories: (i) 'person aggrieved'; (ii) 'stranger'; (iii) busybody of meddle some interloper. Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from those coming under the things which do not concern them. They masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in the name of Pro Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in the past-time of meddling with the judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often, they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity; while the ulterior intent of some applicants in this category, may be no more than spoking the wheels of administration. The High Court should do well to reject the applications of such busybodies at the threshold.
The distinction between the first and second categories of applicants, though real, is not always well-demarcated. The first category has, as it were, two concentric zones, a solid central zone of certainty, and a grey outer circle of lessening certainty in a sliding centrifugal scale, with an outermost nebulous fringe of uncertainty. Applicants falling within the central zone are those whose legal rights have been infringed. Such applicants undoubtedly stand in the category of 'person aggrieved'. In the grey outer-circle the bounds which separate the first category from the second, intermix, interfuse and overlap increasingly in a centrifugal direction. All persons in this outer-zone may not he 'persons aggrieved'.
To distinguish such applicants from strangers among them, some broad tests may be deduced from the conspectus made above. These tests are not absolute and ultimate. Their efficacy varies according to the circumstances of the case, including the statutory context in which the matter falls to be considered. These are: Whether the applicant is a person whose legal right has been infringed? Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sense, that his interest, recognised by law, has been prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of the authority, complained of? Is he a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person 'against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something, or wrongfully affected his title to something? Has he a special and substantial grievance or inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public? Was he entitled to object and be heard by the authority before it took the impugned action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the authority? Is the statute, in the context of which the scope of the words 'person aggrieved' is being considered, a social welfare measure designed to lay down ethical or professional standards of conduct for the community? Or is it a statute dealing with private rights or particular individuals?"
The principles enunciated in Jashbhai Desai's case (2 supra) have been reiterated so many times by now that no one entertained any doubt to the proposition that the meaning of the words 'person aggrieved' may vary according to the context of the statute and that even a stranger may be found to have locus standi although he may not have any personal interest of his own, provided he is not a busybody or meddlesome interloper, and although a stranger, he moves the Court for a right in common with the general public."
In the words of the Supreme Court in Jashbhai Desai's case (2supra), "Such harm of loss is not wrongful in the eye of law because it does not result in injury to a legal right or a legally protected interest, the business competition causing it being a lawful activity... the term injuria being here used in its true sense of an act contrary to law. The reason why the law suffers a person knowingly to inflict harm of this description on another, without holding him accountable for it, is that such harm done to an individual is a gain to society at large."
In a Full Bench judgment of the Madras High Court in Seethalakshmi Ammal v. State, , speaking for the Court one of us has noted that the Court has to see whether the petitioner has been subjected to a legal wrong and whether he had suffered a legal grievance. In other words, the Court has to see whether he has any legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on and reiterated the law in these words:
"The principles enunciated in Jashbhai Desai's case (2 supra) have been reiterated so many times by now that no one entertained any doubt to the proposition that the meaning of the words 'person aggrieved' may vary according to the context of the statute and that .even a stranger may be found to have locus standi although he may not have any personal interest of his own, provided he is not a busybody or meddlesome interloper, and although a stranger, he moves the Court for a right in common with the general public."
4. It is in the light of the above that when we see the claim of the appellant herein, we have no manner of doubt that she satisfies the test of a 'person aggrieved' in the, true sense. Though she is not a necessary party for the adjudication of the controversy between the petitioner-respondent on the one hand and the authority who has cancelled/suspended her licence on the other, since some interest of her has been created by grant of a licence to fill in the vacancy caused by the cancellation/ suspension of the licence of the petitioner-respondent, she has a locus standi to question any variation in the order of cancellation/suspension of the licence.
5. The extension of the said rule in appeals, to grant relief to a person who is otherwise not a necessary party and thus adjudication in his absence is not void altogether, in our view, will make the appellant herein a proper person who can move an appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge. We hold accordingly that the appeal is maintainable at the instance of the appellant herein.
6. We have decided however to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge for the obvious reason that no person who otherwise is not qualified or who has disqualified himself for a licence should be allowed to take advantage of any interim order of the Court. A person who has been subjected to a disciplinary action for a wrong doing, should not be allowed to function under an interim order of the Court. In all such cases it is not the interest of the party alone but the public interest which is of utmost importance. A person who is a Dealer of a fair price shop in essential commodities, is one whose conduct affects a large body of the consumers. The Court, before the final adjudication, shall refrain and not grant any interim order in his/her favour. When we make the above order, however, we are clear in our mind that the authority concerned should not unreasonably delay the disposal of the proceedings and any unreasonable delay in disposal of the enquiry by the Revenue Divisional Officer, may give rise to the suspicion that the petitioner-respondent has been wronged by some motivated order against her. It is necessary for the said reason to reiterate before we conclude that the Revenue Divisional Officer must abide by the time schedule and pass final orders strictly in accordance with law within the time indicated above.
7. In the result the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above.