Jharkhand High Court
Rana Umesh Singh vs State Of Jharkhand on 12 October, 2023
Bench: Shree Chandrashekhar, Anubha Rawat Choudhary
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
(Letters Patent Appellate Jurisdiction)
L.P.A. No. 658 of 2022
Rana Umesh Singh, son of Late Nathuni Singh, aged about 61 years, resident
of Village Alipur, P.S. Bakthirpur, P.O. Alipur, District Patna, Bihar
.......Petitioner/Appellant
Versus
1. State of Jharkhand
2. Secretary, Department of Home, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi, P.O &
P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi
3. Director General of Police, Jharkhand, Ranchi, P.O & P.S Dhurwa, District
Ranchi
4. Inspector General of Police, North Chotanagpur Zone, Bokaro, PO, PS &
District-Bokaro
5. Deputy Inspector General, North Chotanagpur Range, Hazaribagh, P.O, P.S.
& District-Hazaribagh
6. Superintendent of Police, Chatra, P.O. & P.S-Chatra, District Chatra
7. Deputy Superintendent of Police, Head Quarter, Chatra, PO, PS & District-
Chatra. ...... Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY
For the Appellant : Ms. Apurwa Pathak, Advocate
For the State of Jharkhand : Ms. Divya, AC to SC-III
ORDER
th 12 October 2023 Per, Shree Chandrashekhar, J.
The writ petitioner who was posted as Reserve Sub-Inspector at Chatra was dismissed from service. The appellate and the revisional authorities affirmed the order of dismissal of service passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, North Chotanagpur Range at Hazaribagh. Aggrieved thereof, the delinquent officer approached the writ Court in W.P(S) No.3225 of 2016 which has been dismissed vide order dated 22nd February 2022 holding that the acquittal in the criminal case shall not be a ground to interfere with the order passed in a departmental proceeding.
2. The writ Court has held as under:
"7. Be that as it may, having gone through rival submission of the parties, this Court is of the considered view that no interference is warranted in the instant case for the following facts and reasons:
(i) Though the petitioner has been acquitted by the criminal, Court, but it is well settled principle of law that acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from holding departmental proceedings and disciplinary authority would not be bound by the judgment of criminal court if evidence produced in departmental inquiry is 2 L.P.A No. 658 of 2022 different from that produced during the criminal trial. Object of a departmental inquiry is to find out if the delinquent is guilty of misconduct under the conduct of rules for the purpose of determining whether he should be continued in service. The standard of proof in a departmental inquiry is also different and is not strictly based on the rules of evidence. Hence, order of dismissal, based on evidence led in disciplinary proceedings, which is different from the evidence available in criminal court, is justified.
(ii) Moreso, in the present case, the petitioner is not acquitted honorably, rather, he is acquitted by the criminal court on the ground that prosecution did not produce any credible evidence to prove the charge and hence, benefit of doubt was given. The evidence available in the departmental enquiry is completely different from the facts led by the prosecution in criminal trial and as such, the fact of the instant case is entirely different from the cases relied upon the petitioner.
(iii) The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Krishnakali Tea Estate Vs. Akhil Bhartiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh, reported in JT 2004 (7) SC 333, it has been held that "This Court was concerned with the validity of the termination of the services of workmen after acquittal by the Criminal Court.
Dealing with a situation similar to the one in this case, where the acquittal was due to lack of evidence before criminal court and sufficient evidence was available before the Labour Court, this Court was of the opinion that the judgment in Captain M. Paul Anthony's case (supra) cannot come to the rescue of the workmen."
(iv) Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of State of Rajasthan Vs. B.K. Meena, reported in JT (1996) 8 SC 684, it has been held that "Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising the power to conduct departmental proceedings in accordance with the rules and regulations. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. In the disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether the Respondent is guilty of such conduct as would merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment, as the case may be, whereas in the criminal proceedings, the question is whether the offences registered against him under the PC Act are established, and if established, what sentence should be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of inquiry and the rules governing inquiry and trial in both the cases are significantly distinct and different."
(v) Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Deputy Inspector General of Police & Anr. Vs. S. Samuthiram, reported in (2013) 1 SCC 598, in para 24 it has been held thus :-
"24. The meaning of expression 'honourable acquittal' came up for consideration before this Court in RBI Vs. Bhopal Singh Panchal, reported in (1994) 1 SCC 541. In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46 (4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions 'honourable acquittal', 'acquitted of blame', 'fully exonerated' are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression 'honourably acquitted'. When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably 3 L.P.A No. 658 of 2022 acquitted."
(vi) Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited, represented by Managing Director (Admin. and HR) Vs. Sri C. Nagaraju & Anr. reported in JT 2019 (9) SC 338 same view has been reiterated and held that "any order of dismissal, which is based on evidence led in disciplinary proceedings, which is different from the evidence available in criminal court, is justified. High Court erred in interfering with the same."
(vii) The allegation against the petitioner in the departmental proceeding is of grave nature for committing forgery by getting job in police department. Such a grave misconduct in the police department cannot be accepted.
(viii)The allegation of helping the kith and kin in a government service, particularly in the disciplined police force is a misconduct of grave nature and as such the concerned person cannot be made scot free. The charges have been duly proved by the enquiry officer and the same has been affirmed up to appellate authority, as also revisional authority after considering each and every points and no providing adequate opportunity to the petitioner to place his case. No lacuna has been pointed out by the petitioner in the entire departmental proceeding. Therefore, it is a fit case, in which, no interference can be drawn into.
8. In view of aforesaid facts and circumstances brought on record as well as judicial pronouncement, I find no merit in this writ petition. Consequently, this writ petition stands dismissed."
3. Briefly stated, the appellant who was initially appointed as constable in the year 1982 received promotion to the post of Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police after about 28 years of meritorious service. During this period, he was posted at different places on different assignments and no complaint whatsoever was made against him. On 16th March 2012, a show-cause notice was issued to him on the allegation that he connived with his friends and forged documents by virtue of which his brother Dinesh Kumar Singh was shown posted at Chatra as Police/79 and thereafter at Jamshedpur. A charge-memo dated 28th June 2012 was served upon him for the aforementioned misconduct, in particular, for committing forgery and forging false documents. In the departmental proceeding, three witnesses were examined who supported the charge of conspiring with other five police personnel to prepare forged documents for projecting his brother Dinesh Kumar Singh as validly appointed. In the domestic inquiry, Ambar Lakda who was the Deputy Superintendent of Police at Chatra supported the allegations against Nawal Kishore Dubey, Bijul Kumar Singh, Rudal Singh and the appellant for preparing forged documents in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy. Pandey Ajay Kumar who was the Senior Attendant at Police Centre, Chatra stated that the appellant with the help of others prepared fake 4 L.P.A No. 658 of 2022 documents including Ranchi Area Order No.06/03 for demonstrating that his brother was appointed in Chatra district force. This witness made a categorical statement in the domestic inquiry that Dinesh Kumar Singh was not appointed in the service but on the basis of forged documents he was shown transferred from Jamshedpur district force to Chatra district force. He further deposed that the appellant had signed the Provident Fund Form of his brother while having full knowledge that his brother was never appointed in the police force. Similarly, Surya Sundi who was posted as Reserve Sub-Inspector at Police Centre, Chatra made statements supporting and corroborating the other two witnesses. The inquiring officer submitted a report dated 3rd December 2012 holding that charges against the delinquent police officer were proved. The disciplinary authority having considered the materials on record including the reply of the appellant to the second show-cause notice dated 9th May 2013 awarded the punishment of dismissal from service which, as noticed above, has been affirmed by the appellate as well as revisional authorities.
4. Ms. Apurwa Pathak, the learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the charge as framed in the departmental inquiry against the appellant was vague and the second show-cause notice dated 9th May 2013 did not disclose the proposed punishment and while so the punishment order cannot sustain the scrutiny in law. The learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that merely because the appellant happens to be the real brother of Dinesh Kumar Singh he has been punished on suspicion.
5. In the first place, there is no challenge to the findings recorded by the departmental authorities. This is also not a case set up by the appellant that the domestic inquiry was not conducted following the rules of natural justice or that the punishment order has been passed in breach of the extant rules. As regards vagueness in the charge, it would suffice to record that there are specific imputations of misconduct such as committing forgery, preparing forged documents and having entered into criminal conspiracy with others. This is a matter of record that a First Information Report vide Chatra PS Case No.91 of 2012 was lodged against four persons including the present appellant. The inquiring officer in a report running into 21 pages recorded a finding that the charges against the appellant has been proved. The witnesses produced by the department were not cross-examined by the appellant taking medical ground for his absence in the domestic inquiry. The disciplinary 5 L.P.A No. 658 of 2022 authority has recorded a finding that the medical ground taken by the delinquent police officer for not appearing in the domestic inquiry was a pretention and not supported by any document. The disciplinary authority has referred to each and every piece of evidence including the defence set up by the appellant vide his letter dated 12th December 2012. He had also taken note of Chatra PS Case No.91 of 2012 which was lodged on 16th May 2012 under sections 419, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 479 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. May be a criminal case against the appellant and others has failed but the fact remains that the witnesses either did not appear or support the prosecution during trial of the criminal case and as a result of which G.R No.424 of 2012 failed and ended in acquittal of the appellant and others.
6. The writ Court rightly observed that acquittal in the criminal case in such a circumstance cannot be a ground to interfere with the order of dismissal. This is well accepted a proposition that the tests in a departmental inquiry and in a criminal trial are different and a decision by a criminal Court is not binding in a civil proceeding. In a properly constituted departmental inquiry the order of punishment passed by the authorities cannot be interfered in exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in a case like the present one. The charge of forgery and conspiracy is very serious and, having regard to the appellant being a member of the disciplined force, the punishment of dismissal from service upon such a delinquent police officer is not disproportionate to the charge proved against him. Moreover, the issue of quantum of punishment falls exclusively within the domain of the departmental authorities and the writ Court shall not interfere in the matter unless it is demonstrable that the punishment awarded to the delinquent employee is so disproportionate to the charge proved that it shocks the conscience of the Court [refer, "Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India" (1987) 4 SCC 611].
7. In view of the above, we do not find any infirmity in the order of the writ Court dated 22nd February 2022 and, accordingly, L.P.A No.658 of 2022 is dismissed.
(Shree Chandrashekhar, J.) (Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.) Sudhir/NAFR