Chattisgarh High Court
Indubala Tirki vs Harold Kirti Kumar Jacob on 23 November, 2009
HIGH COURT OF CHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
FIRST APPEAL No 111 OF 2003
Indubala Tirki
...Petitioners
Versus
Harold Kirti Kumar Jacob
...Respondents
! Shri Prashant Jaiswal Advocate with Shri Shailendra Sharma Advocate for applicant
^ Shri BP Sharma Advocate for respondent
CORAM: Honble Shri N K Agarwal J
Dated: 23/11/2009
: Judgement
JUDGMENT
23112009
1. This appeal arises out of the judgment and decree dated 9-4-2003 passed in Civil Suit No. 36-A/2002 by 9th Additional District Judge (FTC), Raipur whereby and whereunder the plaintiff's suit has been decreed.
2. Facts briefly stated are as under:-
3. The suit house situated on plot No. 20/1, Block No. 18, in Chotapara Ward of Bairan Bazar, Raipur, belongs to one Samual Clation Jacob. The said Samuel Clation Jacob was issueless. The plaintiff is his nephew. The defendant was staying with him since her childhood and was treated by said Samuel Clation Jacob as his adopted daughter. On 5-3-90, he executed a Will deed in favour of the defendant bequeathing the suit house in her favour. He cancelled the Will deed dated 5- 3-90 and executed another Will deed on 7-9-95 in favour of the plaintiff. Thereafter alleged Will deed dated 5- 10-95 is said to be executed in defendant's favour by him. Meanwhile, he left Raipur and went to Kolkata where he died on 18-12-95. His dead body was brought to Raipur and the same was buried at Raipur. On the application of the plaintiff, the said suit house stands mutated in his name in the Municipal records. In the said proceedings, the defendant did not disclose execution of Will deed dated 5-10-95 in her favour. The defendant applied for renewal of lease before Nazul authorities claiming herself to be legal representative of deceased Samuel Clation Jacob and got lease renewed in her favour. The plaintiff issued an eviction notice to the defendant who according to the plaintiff is in possession of the suit house as licensee. The defendant by sending her reply to the notice denied the right as claimed by the plaintiff and stated that the said Will has been cancelled subsequently by deceased Samuel Clation Jacob and executed the last Will dated 5-10-95 in her favour.
4. The plaintiff filed a suit against the defendant seeking relief of declaration of his title over the suit house, possession and damages claiming title based on Will deed based on 7-9-95. The defendant by filing her written statement, denied the right as claimed by the plaintiff and pleaded that the alleged Will dated 7-9-95 is vague; the said Will has already been cancelled by the deceased vide Will deed dated 5- 10-95; the suit house in fact was purchased by her and her husband Benami in the name of deceased and is residing in the property in her own right.
5. The trial Court on appreciation of pleadings of the parties, evidence led oral and documentary, recorded a finding that the plaintiff got ownership of the suit house in pursuance of Will deed dated 7-9-95; defendant failed to prove her title over the suit property; the Will dated 5-1-95 is highly suspicious and does not confer any title to defendant; and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. Hence this appeal.
6. Shri Prashant Jaiswal, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that the Will deed dated 7-9-95 is vague; the same was cancelled by Will deed dated 5-10-95 by the deceased, which is the last Will conferring title of the suit property upon the appellant/ defendant. Learned trial Court erred in holding the last Will dated 5-10-95 as suspicious. He would further submit that 8 suspicious circumstances as indicated by the Court below in its judgment cannot be said to be suspicious circumstances so as to disbelieve the Will. He would further submit that learned trial Court went wrong in disbelieving the last Will dated 5-10-95 and in believing the Will dated 7-9-95. For this, he placed his reliance upon the judgment of Supreme Court in the matters of H. VENKATACHALA IYENGAR Versus .N. THIMMAJAMMA AND OTHERS reported in AIR 1959 SC 443, Surendra Pal and others v. Dr. (Mrs.) Saraswati Arora and another, reported in 1974 SC 1999, Indu Bala Bose and others v. Manindra Chandra Bose and another, reported in AIR 1982 SC 133, Madhukar D. Shende v. Tarabai Aba Shedage, reported in (2002) 2 SCC 85. He would further submit that indisputably the defendant was the adopted daughter of Samuel Clation Jacob who also executed in the year 1990 a Will in her favour which was in suspicious circumstances cancelled and another Will was executed on 7-9-95 and finding fault in it, he again immediately executed the Will in defendant's favour. In this facts situation of the case, learned trial Court has grossly erred in disbelieving the last Will i.e. dated 5-10-95 which has been executed in appellant's favour.
7. Per contra, Shri B.P. Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent would submit that the only issue involved in the present case is regarding genuineness of Will dated 5-10-95 (Ex. D-1) and submitted that the same has rightly been disbelieved by the trial Court basing its finding upon 8 suspicious circumstances as referred in para 9 of its judgment. He would further submit that the said Will is bad and ineffective also for the following reasons:-
i. The format of the Will where the spacing in between lines has been adjusted so as to include and place signature of the testator, such kind of formatting suggests that signatures were taken on a blank paper fraudulently and the contents were typed later on.
ii. It is most improbable that although the name of the witnesses are typed however, the testator's name is hand-written and also under the words Vasiyat- Karta, whereas it had to be signed above the said word. iii. It also appears that all the effort has been made so that the contents should fit in a single page on which signature of testator was obtained by fraudulent means.
iv. The contents of the Will is also full of embellishments which signifies not only the intentions of the testator but more the anxiety of the defendant wherein they have given the details of the previous registered Will without explaining as to how the Praroop-karta (person who drafted the Will) has got the details when she admits that she was not given any document other that the details of the property and the bank account.
v. The statement has also been made in the Will that the beneficiary shall have right to obtain patta on the strength of the Will which further signifies more the concern and purpose of the defendant than the testator since admittedly after the death of testator she has obtained patta on 27-10-2001.
vi. The Will also says that the property is in fact bought out of the funds of the defendant and his husband however in the same breath she claims that she has inherited the property on the strength of the Will itself. This also demonstrates the haste and anxiety of the defendant.
vii. The Will also states that earlier Will in favour of the plaintiff dated 7-9-1995 was obtained by coercion, however it is most absurd to believe that a person admittedly residing all the time in Calcutta and also when the Will dated 7-9-95 was executed concerned the testator. Possibility of coercing a person from such a distant place is unpalatable even with a pinch of salt.
8. Shri Sharma would further contend that "Will" on all occasion held to be a solemn document and the interpretation and execution of the Will is to be decided taking into consideration all the circumstances prevailing at the time of execution and also every endeavor be made to appreciate the intention and mental state of the testator so as to ascertain precisely the intention of the testator. For the above preposition, Shri Sharma places reliance upon the judgment of Supreme Court in case of Gnambal Ammal -v- Raju Ayyar reported in AIR 1951 SC 103, Kalyan Singh v. Smt. Chhoti and others, reported in AIR 1990 SC 396, Jaswant Kaur v. Amrit Kaur, reported in AIR 1977 SC 74 and Yumnam Ongbi Tampha Ibema Devi v. Yumnam Joykumar Sing reported in (2009) 4 SCC 780.
9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
10. Before adverting to the facts of the case, it would be appropriate to deal with legal position regarding due execution, attestation and proof of Will.
11. Section 59 of the Indian Succession Act, provides that every person of sound mind not being a minor may dispose of his property by will. As per section 61 of the Indian Succession Act, will or any part of a will, the making of which has been caused by fraud or coercion, or by such importunity as takes away the free agency of the testator, is void. Section 63 of the India Succession Act provides procedure for a due execution of will.
12. Section 67 of the Evidence Act speaks for proof of signature and hand-writing of person alleged to have signed or written document produced. As per Section 68 of Evidence Act, document like a will shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive and subject to process of the Court and capable of giving evidence.
13. Supreme Court in case of H. Venkatachala Iyangar (supra) after considering Section 67, 68, 45 and 47 of the Evidence Act, in case of proof of a will, observed in para 18 to 22 and 39 as under:-
"18. What is the true legal position in the matter of proof of wills? It is well- known that the proof of wills presents a recurring topic for decision in courts and there are a large number of judicial pronouncements on the subject. The party propounding a will or otherwise making a claim under a will is no doubt seeking to prove a document and, in deciding how it is to be proved, we must inevitably refer to the statutory provisions which govern the proof of documents. Sections 67 and 68 of the Evidence Act are relevant for this purpose. Under Section 67, if a document is alleged to be signed by any person, the signature of the said person must be proved to be in his handwriting, and for proving such a handwriting under Sections 45 and 47 of the Act the opinions of experts and of persons acquainted with the handwriting of the person concerned are made relevant. Section 68 deals with the proof of the execution of the document required by law to be attested; and it provides that such a document shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution. These provisions prescribe the requirements and the nature of proof which must be satisfied by the party who relies on a document in a court of law. Similarly, Sections 59 and 63 of the Indian Succession Act are also relevant. Section 59 provides that every person of sound mind, not being a minor, may dispose of his property by will and the three illustrations to this section indicate what is meant by the expression "a person of sound mind" in the context. Section 63 requires that the testator shall sign or affix his mark to the will or it shall be signed by some other person in his presence and by his direction and that the signature or mark shall be so made that it shall appear that it was intended thereby to give effect to the writing as a will. This section also requires that the will shall be attested by two or more witnesses as prescribed. Thus the question as to whether the will set up by the propounder is proved to be the last will of the testator has to be decided in the light of these provisions. Has the testator signed the will? Did he understand the nature and effect of the dispositions in the will? Did he put his signature to the will knowing what it contained? Stated broadly it is the decision of these questions which determines the nature of the finding on the question of the proof of wills. It would prima facie be true to say that the will has to be proved like any other document except as to the special requirements of attestation prescribed by Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act. As in the case of proof of other documents so in the case of proof of wills it would be idle to expect proof with mathematical certainty. The test to be applied would be the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind in such matters.
19. However, there is one important feature which distinguishes wills from other documents. Unlike other documents the will speaks from the death of the testator, and so, when it is propounded or produced before a court, the testator who has already departed the world cannot say whether it is his will or not; and this aspect naturally introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question as to whether the document propounded is proved to be the last will and testament of the departed testator. Even so, in dealing with the proof of wills the court will start on the same enquiry as in the case of the proof of documents. The propounder would be called upon to show by satisfactory evidence that the will was signed by the testator, that the testator at the relevant time was in a sound and disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and put his signature to the document of his own free will. Ordinarily when the evidence adduced in support of the will is disinterested, satisfactory and sufficient to prove the sound and disposing state of the testator's mind and his signature as required by law, courts would be justified in making a finding in favour of the propounder. In other words, the onus on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts just indicated.
20. There may, however, be cases in which the execution of the will may be surrounded by suspicious circumstances. The alleged signature of the testator may be very shaky and doubtful and evidence in support of the propounder's case that the signature, in question is the signature of the testator may not remove the doubt created by the appearance of the signature; the condition of the testator's mind may appear to be very feeble and debilitated; and evidence adduced may not succeed in removing the legitimate doubt as to the mental capacity of the testator; the dispositions made in the will may appear to be unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances; or, the will may otherwise indicate that the said dispositions may not be the result of the testator's free will and mind. In such cases the court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last will of the testator. The presence of such suspicious circumstances naturally tends to make the initial onus very heavy; and, unless it is satisfactorily discharged, courts would be reluctant to treat the document as the last will of the testator. It is true that, if a caveat is filed alleging the exercise of undue influence, fraud or coercion in respect of the execution of the will propounded, such pleas may have to be proved by the caveators; but, even without such pleas circumstances may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will in executing the will, and in such circumstances, it would be a part of the initial onus to remove any such legitimate doubts in the matter.
21. Apart from the suspicious circumstances to which we have just referred, in some cases the wills propounded disclose another infirmity. Propounders themselves take a prominent part in the execution of the wills which confer on them substantial benefits. If it is shown that the propounder has taken a prominent part in the execution of the will and has received substantial benefit under it, that itself is generally treated as a suspicious circumstance attending the execution of the will and the propounder is required to remove the said suspicion by clear and satisfactory evidence. It is in connection with wills that present such suspicious circumstances that decisions of English courts often mention the test of the satisfaction of judicial conscience. It may be that the reference to judicial conscience in this connection is a heritage from similar observations made by ecclesiastical courts in England when they exercised jurisdiction with reference to wills; but any objection to the use of the word "conscience" in this context would, in our opinion, be purely technical and academic, if not pedantic. The test merely emphasizes that, in determining the question as to whether an instrument produced before the court is the last will of the testator, the court is deciding a solemn question and it must be fully satisfied that it had been validly executed by the testator who is no longer alive.
22. It is obvious that for deciding material questions of fact which arise in applications for probate or in actions on wills, no hard and fast or inflexible rules can be laid down for the appreciation of the evidence. It may, however, be stated generally that a propounder of the will has to prove the due and valid execution of the will and that if there are any suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will the propounder must remove the said suspicions from the mind of the court by cogent and satisfactory evidence. It is hardly necessary to add that the result of the application of these two general and broad principles would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and on the nature and quality of the evidence adduced by the parties. It is quite true that, as observed by Lord Du Parcq in Harmes v. Hinkson 50 Cal W N. 895: AIR 1946 PC 156 "where a will is charged with suspicion, the rules enjoin a reasonable scepticism, not an obdurate persistence in disbelief. They do not demand from the Judge, even in circumstances of grave suspicion, a resolute and impenetrable incredulity. He is never required to close his mind to the truth". It would sound platitudinous to say so, but it is nevertheless true that in discovering truth even in such cases the judicial mind must always be open though vigilant, cautious and circumspect.
39. In this connection we would like to add that the learned trial Judge appears to have misdirected himself in law inasmuch as he thought that the proof of the signature of the testatrix on the will raised a presumption that the will had been executed by her. In support of this view the learned Judge has referred to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Surendra Nath Chatterji v. Jahnavi Charn Mukerji (AIR 1929 Cal 484). In this case no doubt the Calcutta High Court has held that on the proof of the signature of the deceased or his acknowledgment that he has signed the will he will be presumed to have known the provisions of the instrument he has signed; but Mr Justice B.B. Ghose, in his judgment, has also added that the said presumption is liable to be rebutted by proof of suspicious circumstances and that undoubtedly is the true legal position. What circumstances would be regarded as suspicious cannot be precisely defined or exhaustively enumerated. That inevitably would be a question of fact in each case. Unfortunately the learned trial Judge did not properly assess the effect of suspicious circumstances in the present case to which we have already referred and that has introduced a serious infirmity in his final conclusion. Incidentally we may also refer to the fact that the appellant obtained a power of attorney from the testatrix on the same day; and that has given rise to the argument that the appellant was keen on taking possession and management of the properties under his control even before the death of the testatrix. There is also another circumstance which may be mentioned and that is that the Sub-Registrar, in whose presence the document was registered on the same day, has not been examined though he was alive at the date of the trial. On these facts then we are inclined to hold that the High Court was justified in reversing the finding of the trial court on the question of the due and valid execution of the will.
14. The Supreme Court in Kalyan Singh (supra) while dealing with the question of genuineness of will and burden of removing the suspicious circumstances by placing satisfactory material on record observed in para 20 as under:-
"20. It has been said almost too frequently to require repetition that a will is one of the most solemn documents known to law. The executant of the will cannot be called to deny the execution or to explain the circumstances in which it was executed. It is, therefore, essential that trustworthy and unimpeachable evidence should be produced before the court to establish genuineness and authenticity of the will. It must be stated that the factum of execution and validity of the will cannot be determined merely by considering the evidence produced by the propounder. In order to judge the credibility of witnesses and disengage the truth from falsehood the court is not confined only to their testimony and demeanour. It would be open to the court to consider circumstances brought out in the evidence or which appear from the nature and contents of the documents itself. It would be also open to the court to look into surrounding circumstances as well as inherent improbabilities of the case to reach a proper conclusion on the nature of the evidence adduced by the party."
15. The supreme Court in Surendra Pal (supra) considering the Sections 59, 61 and 63 of the Indian Succession Act observed in para 7 as under :-
"7. The propounder has to show that the Will was signed by the testator; that he was at the relevant time in a sound disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions, that he put his signature to the testament of his own free will and that he has signed it in the presence of the two witnesses who attested it in his presence and in the presence of each other. Once these elements are established, the onus which rests on the propounder is discharged. But there may be cases in which the execution of the Will itself is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, such as, where the signature is doubtful, the testator is of feeble mind or is overawed by powerful minds interested in getting his property, or where in the light of the relevant circumstances the dispositions appear to be unnatural, improbable and unfair, or where there are other reasons for doubting that the dispositions of the Will are not the result of the testator's free will and mind. In all such cases where there may be legitimate suspicious circumstances those must be reviewed and satisfactorily explained before the Will is accepted. Again in cases where the propounder has himself taken a prominent part in the execution of the Will which confers on him substantial benefit that is itself one of the suspicious circumstances which he must remove by clear and satisfactory evidence. After all, ultimately it is the conscience of the court that has to be satisfied, as such the nature and quality of proof must be commensurate with the need to satisfy that conscience and remove any suspicion which a reasonable man may, in the relevant circumstances of the case, entertain. (See H. Venkatachala lyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma (AIR 59 SC 443) and Rani Purnima Devi v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb (AIR 1962 SC 567). In the latter case this Court, after referring to the principles stated in the former case emphasised that where there are suspicious circumstances the onus will be on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the court before the Will could be accepted as genuine; and where the caveator alleges undue influence, fraud and coercion the onus is on him to prove the same. It has been further pointed out that the suspicious circumstances may be as to the genuineness of the signature of the testator, the condition of the testator's mind, the dispositions made in the Will which may be unnatural or unfair or improbable when considered in the light of the relevant circumstances. If the caveator does not discharge the burden which rests upon him in establishing the circumstances which show that the Will had been obtained by fraud or undue influence, a probate of the Will must necessarily be granted if it is established that the testator had full testamentary capacity and had in fact executed it validly with a free will and mind. The observations of the Privy Council in Motibai Hormusjee Kanga v. Jamsetjee Hormusjee Kanga AIR 1924 PC 28 support the above proposition. Mr Ammer Ali observed at p. 33:
"It is quite clear that the onus of establishing capacity lay on the petitioner. It is also clear that if the caveator impugned the Will on the ground that it was obtained by the exercise of undue influence, excessive persuasion or moral coercion, it lay upon him to establish that case."
In the light of what has been stated if the various requirements of a valid Will are established, then as observed by the Privy Council in Motibai Hormusjee Kanga's case AIR 1924 PC 28 at p. 33:
"A man may act foolishly and even heartlessly; if he acts with full comprehension of what he is doing the Court will not interfere with the exercise of his volition."
16. The Supreme Court in case of Smt. Indubala Bose (supra) has held in para 8 of its judgment that any and every circumstance is not a "suspicious" circumstance. A circumstance would be "suspicious" when it is not normal or is not normally expected in a normal situation or is not expected of a normal person.
17. The Supreme Court in Madhukar D. Shande (supra) in para 8 of its judgment has held that "The conscience of the court has to be satisfied by the propounder of will adducing evidence so as to dispel any suspicions or unnatural circumstances attaching to a will provided that there is something unnatural or suspicious about the will. The law of evidence does not permit conjecture or suspicion having the place of legal proof nor permit them to demolish a fact otherwise proved by legal and convincing evidence. Well-founded suspicion may be a ground for closer scrutiny of evidence but suspicion alone cannot form the foundation of a judicial verdict - positive or negative.
18. On careful reading of the above quoted statutory provisions and dicta of the Supreme Court in the above referred cases, following position of law would emerge:-
i. The propounder has to show that the Will was signed by the testator; that he was at the relevant time in a sound disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions, that he put his signature to the testament of his own free will and that he has signed it in the presence of the two witnesses who attested it in his presence and in the presence of each other.
ii. Once these elements are established, the onus which rests on the propounder is discharged. iii. Where the caveator alleges undue influence, fraud and coercion the onus is on him to prove the same. iv. Whether there are suspicious circumstances, the onus will be on propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the Court before the will could be accepted as genuine, meaning thereby the conscience of the Court has to be satisfied by the propounder of the will adducing evidence so as to dispel any suspicious or unnatural circumstances attaching to a will. v. A well-founded suspicion may be a ground for closer scrutiny of evidence but suspicion alone cannot form the foundation of a judicial verdict - positive or negative.
19. Now let us deal with the facts of the case. A bare reading of the pleading of the parties and the evidence adduced by them would reveal that there is no serious dispute regarding due execution and genuineness of the will dated 5-3-90, which was in favour of the defendant and dated 7-9-95 which is in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant categorically admits in her statement para 9 that the deceased has executed a will deed on 5-3-90 which was cancelled by him vide will deed dated 7-9-95 (Ex. P-1). The whole controversy revolves around the question whether or not the will deed dated 5-10-95 (Ex. D-1) suffers from well-founded suspicion or unnatural circumstances attaching to a will leading to hold it as ungenuine.
20. The plaintiff in amended para 6-A has specifically pleaded that in reply to mutation application filed by the plaintiff before the Corporation authorities, the defendant did not assert her right over the suit property based on will dated 5-10-95 (Ex. D-1) and thus the said will is forged. The defendant did not controvert the above pleading by amending her written statement. The above said pleading stands unrebutted. A bare reading of defendant's application to Najul officer (Ex. P-8) for mutation of her name over the suit land in Nazul records would reveal that she did not assert her right based on said will (Ex. D-1). In statement on oath before the Nazul Officer (Ex. P-9), she asserted her right over the suit property based on inheritance and not on the basis of said will deed. A bare perusal of will deed Ex. D-1, would reveal that it is prepared on a plain paper, contains signature of the testator at the extreme right bottom of the paper in which the name of the deceased has been hand-written in the hand-writing whereas the name of witnesses were typed. As per para 2 of the statement of attesting witness examined by the defendant Shri Shiv Shankar Dubey, he suddenly reached to the place for TV repairing where defendant Indu Bala Tirki and Advocate Mukta Sharma were present. They said him (Shiv Shankar Dubey) to sign on the papers and he signed on it. This creates a reasonable suspicion how his name as a witness was already typed.
21. As per statement of P.W. 2 Mohd. Jalil who admittedly was a witness to will deed executed on 5-3- 90 and also to will deed dated 7-9-95, the relationship between the deceased and the defendant became bitter. The deceased himself told him regarding danger to his life from the defendant and her husband, therefore, he executed the subsequent will in favour of the plaintiff (Ex. P-1) revoking earlier will dated 5-3-90 executed in defendant's favour.
22. Recital of will deed (Ex. D-1) is very unnatural inasmuch as it is very unnatural that a testator will right in a will that legatee is in fact the owner of the property and he is merely a benami owner as has been written in the Ex. D-1.
23. After taking into consideration the aforesaid fact including the circumstances as referred in the trial Court judgment and by applying the legal proposition as referred hereinabove, it would be crystal clear that the said will is highly suspicious. Looking to the texture and contents of the will deed Ex. D-1 dated 5- 10-95, it is highly improbable that a person will say in the will deed that the said property does not belong to him, rather he holds the same as benami; despite claiming her right on the strength of will deed Ex. D- 1, non-disclosure before Nazul authorities and Corporation authorities creates a serious doubt regarding genuineness of the will; statement of Mohd. Jalil stands un-rebutted. If the attesting witness was a chance witness, suddenly came at the place for TV repairing, how his name has been typed on Ex. D-1, without there being his prior consent to be witness to the document.
24. Looking to the aforesaid circumstances in addition to the circumstances referred by the trial Court, it is crystal clear that the suspicious circumstances are not trivial in nature but creates a reasonable doubt in the mind of Court about its genuineness. As per settled legal principle, it is for the defendant to explain such suspicious circumstances by leading cogent evidence therefor, for which she failed.
25. In view of the above, in the considered opinion of this Court, learned Court below has rightly held that the will deed Ex. D-1 suffers from highly suspicious circumstances and rightly disbelieved the will (Ex.D-
1) and rightly decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff.
26. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any substance in the appeal preferred by the defendant/appellant and the appeal is liable to be and is hereby dismissed.
27. In the circumstances, no order as to costs.
Judge