Calcutta High Court
Sri Ram Brich Muchi vs Coal India Ltd. And Ors. on 20 May, 2004
Equivalent citations: (2005)1CALLT388(HC)
JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Mitra, J.
1. In this writ petition the petitioner has challenged the disciplinary proceeding initiated against him including the final order of dismissal passed in the said departmental proceeding. According to the petitioner, he is a permanent employee and works at Lakshmi Mata Colliery as an underground loader. The petitioner has been working under the Central Government undertaking, Coal India Ltd. and within its Unit at Eastern Coal Fields Ltd. The petitioner has been appointed from the year 1996 as an underground loader and since then petitioner is working diligently. After appointment the petitioner was issued an Identity Card. The petitioner has made this Identity Card as annexure P-1 to the writ petition. In the month of May 1999, the petitioner went to his native village getting the news of ailment of his grandmother. The petitioner took leave only for three days and left the colliery. But unfortunately his grandmother died. The petitioner along with his other family members completed the ritual performs of his grandmother. According to the petitioner, because of serious work load, the petitioner became seriously ill and the local doctor advised him to take rest till recovery.
2. The petitioner has averred that being cured from serious ailment he came to the colliery and submitted his joining letter to the colliery from 14.7.1999. The Attendance Clerk of the colliery advised the petitioner to meet the General Manager and to bring a consent letter from the said General Manager. Accordingly the petitioner met the General Manager and requested him to allow the petitioner to join his duty. According to the petitioner the said General Manager heard the petitioner sympathetically and assured him that he would be allowed to join duty very soon. Since 16.7.1999 the petitioner started moving from door to door of the officers of the authority concerned and got assurance from every corner. But on 16.7.1999 the petitioner received a charge-sheet issued by the Manager of the colliery. The charge-sheet has been made annexure P-2. According to the petitioner, he came to know that as per the standing order the respondents will conduct an enquiry. Since the petitioner was suspended he could not come to the place of duty and the petitioner started living in the colliery quarter with a view to attend the enquiry if conducted by the respondents. It has been alleged by the petitioner that suddenly he came to know that certain orders have been passed in the name of the petitioner. To collect the said orders the petitioner went to the office of the Manager on 20.6.2001. The Manager then made over the order of dismissal to the petitioner. Copy of the order of dismissal dated 28.6.2001 has been made as annexure P-3.
The petitioner in paragraph 11 of the writ petition has alleged that the order of dismissal passed by the General Manager is bad, illegal and void inasmuch as the said order of dismissal was passed by the General Manager of the colliery who is neither the Disciplinary Authority nor the Appointing Authority of the petitioner and he is much below In rank than the Disciplinary Authority. The petitioner further alleged that before passing the order of dismissal the Disciplinary Authority should have applied his mind and it would appear from the order itself with the order of dismissal was prepared by another person and the authority only put his signature over there. The order of dismissal is a non-speaking order and the same suffers from non-application of mind of the Issuing Authority. The petitioner further alleged that before passing the order of dismissal the Enquiry Authority failed to consider two aspects, firstly, as per the Circular and the established principles of law the respondents are bound to supply the copy of the proceeding and to issue second show cause notice, but, in the instant case the respondents neither served the copy of the proceeding upon the petitioner nor the petitioner was given an opportunity to defend himself before the higher Authority by answering the second show cause notice. Practically the Manager who is incompetent to pass any order of dismissal in collusion with the Enquiry Officer held the ex parte enquiry and passed the order of dismissal.
3. The petitioner also alleged that it is also established procedure followed by Coal India Ltd. that in almost all the cases past record of the delinquent is considered before passing any major punishment. But in the instant case that was not done. According to the petitioner, the record of presence of the petitioner in duty will make it clear that in the year 1996 he performed the requisite duty. In 1997 and in 1998 he performed satisfactory duty as required. According to the petitioner, as per Rules of the employees attached with the underground shall have to perform only 180 days duty in a year. Such provision according to the petitioner has been incorporated in a compelling circumstances. The absence was made not willfully but because of the situation beyond his control. On such ground the petitioner challenged the entire proceeding starting from the charge-sheet and prayed for quashing of the same. On behalf of the respondents in affidavit-in-opposition has been affirmed and filed. The said affidavit has been affirmed by one Sri Bakul Das claiming to the authorised agent of the respondent No. 2. In the affidavit-in-opposition the respondents averred that the petitioner has no legal right to move the writ petition. According to the respondents, the petitioner being an underground loader is admittedly a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and as such the petitioner has an efficacious alternative remedy before a forum under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Consequently the petition is not maintainable and the same is liable to be dismissed on that score. It has also been stated in the said affidavit-in-opposition that on 8.5.2002 the Hon'ble Justice M.H.S. Ansari dismissed the instant writ petition on the ground that this High Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the said writ petition. It has also been stated that against the said order passed by the Hon'ble Justice Ansari the petitioner preferred an appeal being A.P.O.T. No. 343 of 2002 which was heard and allowed by the Division Bench presided over by Hon'ble Justice S. Banerjea. By Judgment and order dated November 22, 2002 directed trial Court to hear out the Instant petition on merit. According to the respondents, the Hon'ble Division Bench considered the point regarding alternative remedy and as such did not express any opinion regarding existence of alternative remedy. Consequently the said preliminary issue is still wide open before this High Court. It has further been stated in the affidavit-in-opposition that the respondent No. 2 after holding a proper domestic enquiry into the charges leveled against the petitioner in the charge-sheet dated 7.8.1999 for committing misconduct under Clause 17(1) (a) of the model standing order for Industrial Establishment of Coal Mines. In the affidavit-in-opposition it has been stated that the petitioner did not give any reply to the charge-sheet explaining his conduct nor did he participate in the enquiry despite the notices for enquiry being issued to him. Consequently the Enquiry Officer who conducted the enquiry had no alternative but to hold the enquiry ex parte. The Enquiry Officer in his report found the petitioner guilty of the charges leveled against him in the charge-sheets. The respondents have annexed the copies of the charge-sheets dated 16.7.1999 and 7.8.1999, the enquiry proceedings and the enquiry report being annexure R-1 to the reply. The respondents in the said affidavit-in-opposition has further submitted that had the petitioner approached the forum and the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the petitioner being dismissed from service might have got an opportunity of being awarded a lesser punishment in lieu of dismissal by an Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court as the case may be under Section 11(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
4. The respondents in paragraph 10 of the affidavit-in-opposition said that by appropriate notification issued in exercise of power under the said Act the right, title and interest of the colliery were transferred to and became vested in Coal Mines Authority Ltd., A Govt. Company which subsequently came to be known as Coal India Ltd., the respondent No. 1 herein. The respondent No. 2 is a subsidiary of the respondent No. 1 and manages various collieries in the Eastern Region including Lakshmi Mata Colliery which was nationalised by the said Act. In paragraph 11 of the affidavit-in-opposition the respondents stated that the provisions of Articles 310 and 311 of Constitution of India are not applicable to the employees of the respondents Nos. 1 and 2. The service conditions of the petitioner were Industrial Govt. and guided by model standard orders for Industrial Establishments in Coal Mines.
5. In paragraph 12 of the said opposition it has been stated that the petitioner never informed the management of the respondent No. 2 about the alleged shifting of the family from the District of Nalanda to the District of Ahumed. In paragraph 13 of the said opposition it has been stated that the petitioner never informed the management of the respondent No. 2 about his going to the native place on alleged receipt of the news of the ailment of his grandmother or about his alleged illness. According to the respondents had the petitioner participated in the enquiry he would have got ample opportunity to prove the alleged statements about the received of the alleged knews of the death of his grandmother or about his illness. It has further been stated in the said opposition that it is settled that mere bald statement about occurrence such instance is no ground for interference by the High Court with respect to the disciplinary action taken against the petitioner on the basis of the proving misconduct. In paragraph 14 the respondents denied the allegations of serous ailments suffered by the petitioner or submission of his joining letter on 14.1.1999 or the assurance of the General Manager that he would be allowed to join his duty. The respondents submitted that the allegations are incorrect and not supported by any documentary particulars and as such no reliance ought to be placed on the same. The respondents in paragraph 15 of the affidavit-in-opposition categorically stated that as indicated in the charge-sheet dated 16.7.1999 the petitioner was required to submit his reply on 22.7.1999. The petitioner chose not to reply to the same for which a separate charge-sheet dated 7.8.1999 was subsequently issued to the petitioner. The petitioner did not file any reply to the charge-sheet not did he appear before the Enquiry Officer. A final notice of enquiry dated 20.10.2000 was sent to the petitioner by registered post at the last known address. In the record of the respondent No. 2 calling upon the petitioner to attend the enquiry. The petitioner in spite of due service of such notice refused to participate the enquiry and consequently an ex parte enquiry was conducted against the petitioner. The respondents in paragraph 16 of the affidavit-in-opposition stated that the General Manager, Mugma Area is competent to act as the Disciplinary Authority and dismiss an employee in the category of the petitioner. It has also been alleged that necessary delegation of power has been made in favour of the General Manager, Magma Area. In paragraph 17 the respondents denied all the allegations made in the writ petition that to the extent that the enquiry was bad, the dismissal order was passed without jurisdiction or the authority was not competent or the enquiry held was ex parte and it was collusive etc.
6. In paragraph 19 of the opposition it has been stated that underground labour or similar placed employees has to put in minimum of 190 physical attendance days and in respect of surface employees minimum 240 days of physical attendance are required to qualify for any leave. The respondents denied all other allegations made in the writ petition.
7. The respondents denied all other allegations made in the writ petition through their affidavit-in-opposition. The summary of the proceeding is the petitioner allegedly remained absent from service unauthorising. He was charge-sheeted, ex parte enquiry was held and the petitioner was dismissed from service. The petitioner has challenged from the issuance of the charge-sheet to the stage of passing the final order.
8. At the outset the learned counsel for the respondent Coal India Ltd. raised a point of maintainability of the writ petition before this writ Court. According to the learned counsel the issue involved is an Industrial Dispute and the alternative forum is already there and when a statutory forum is there, the writ petition is not maintainable. Before coming to the merit of the case let me now decide the said question regarding, the maintainability of the writ petition. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the writ petition is very much maintainable and in support of his contention he has cited so many decisions.
9. Let me now consider as to whether the writ petition is maintainable assumingly and/or admittedly industrial forum is the statutory alternative forum and that stands as a bar in moving a writ petition. Before dealing with this proposition it is to be noted that the term "statutory bar" and the term "without jurisdiction" are two different connotations, As such Industrial Disputes Act nowhere says that no writ petition will be maintainable in such a circumstances, therefore, let me see whether the entertainment of the writ petition is within the jurisdiction of this Court or not. Let me start with a decision state Ex Rel Hamilton v. Guninothe 156 MO 513, 57 SW 281 observes "to be a bar, other remedy must be adequate. Adequate remedy is one which is equally beneficial speedy and sufficient not merely one which at sometimes in the future will bring about relief."
10. Reference may be made to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court (Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad, Muzafarnagar). The observations of the Hon'ble Court Apex Court made in paragraph 3 of this judgment is important and relevant which is quoted hereinbelow :-
"3. It is a well-established proposition of law that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to litigant he should be required to pursue that remedy and not to invoke the special jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ. It is true that the existence of a statutory remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ. But, as observed by this Court in Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana, , "the existence of an adequate legal remedy is a thing to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs" and where such a remedy exists it will be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a writ thereof. But it should be remembered that the rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies before a writ is granted is a rule of self-imposed limitation, a rule of policy, and discretion rather than a rule of law and the Court may therefore in exceptional cases issue a writ such as a writ of certiorari notwithstanding the fact that the statutory remedies have not been exhausted. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh, 1958 SCR 595, 605 (AIR 1958 SC 86, 93), S.R. Das, C.J., for the Court observed:
"In the next place it must be borne in mind that there is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will He only where there is no other equally effective remedy. It is well established that, provided the requisite grounds exist, certiorari will be lie although a right of appeal has been conferred by statute. (Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Ed. Vol. II, p. 130 and the cases cited there). The fact that the aggrieved party has another and adequate remedy may be taken into consideration by the superior Court in arriving at a conclusion as to whether or not it should, in exercise of its discretion, issue a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings and decisions of inferior Courts subordinate to it and ordinarily the superior Court will decline to interfere until the aggrieved party has exhausted his other statutory remedies, if any. But this rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other legal remedies. In the King v. Postmaster-General ex parte Carmichael, (1928 (1) KB 291) a certiorari was issue although the aggrieved party had an alternative remedy by way of appeal. It has been held that the Superior Court will readily issue a certiorari in a case where there has been a denial of natural justice before a Court of summary jurisdiction. The case of Rex v. Wandsworth Justices ex parte read, 1942(1) KB 281 is an authority in point. In that case a man had been convicted in a Court of summary jurisdiction without giving him an opportunity of being heard. It was held that his remedy was not by a case stated or by an appeal before the quarter sessions but by application to the High Court for an order of certiorari to remove and quash the conviction."
11. There are at least two well-recognised exceptions to the doctrine with regard to the exhaustion of statutory remedies. In the first place, it is well-settled that where proceedings are taken before a Tribunal under a provision of law, which is ultra vires it is open to a party aggrieved thereby to move the High Court under Article 226 for issuing appropriate writs of quashing them on the ground that they are incompetent, without his being obliged to wait until those proceedings run their full course (see the decisions of this Court in Carl Still G. m.b.H. v. State of Bihar, and Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, . In the second place, the doctrine has no application in a case where the impugned order has been made in violation of the principles of natural justice. {See 1958 SCR 595, 605 (AIR 1958 SC 86, 93)],"
12. Then again another decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court (Dr. Smt Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindukanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur and Ors.). In this judgment the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 12 has observed in the manner as follows:
"12. The next question that falls for our consideration is whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the writ petition of the appellant on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy. It is true that there was an alternative remedy for challenging the impugned order by referring the question to the Collector under Section 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act. It is well established that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition. When an authority has acted wholly without jurisdiction, the High Court should not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy. In the instant case, the Vice-Chancellor had no power of review and the exercise of such a power by her was absolutely without jurisdiction. Indeed, the order passed by the Vice-Chancellor on review was a nullity; such an order could surely be challenged before the High Court by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and, in our opinion, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petition on the ground that an alternative remedy was available to the appellant under Section 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act."
13. Then again reliance may be placed on the decision (The Asstt. Collector of Central Excise v. Jainson Hosiery Industries). In this judgment the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that unless High Court is satisfied that the normal statutory remedy is likely too dilatory or difficult to give reasonably quick relief which should be loach to act under Article 226.
14. In another decision reported in 1985 (50) FLR 227 (Bhanwar v. R.T.C.). The Hon'ble Apex Court observed that it is well settled that as per Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 through a reference the employee never gets really adequate and efficacious remedy, in other words if reference is made under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the employee/workman will not really get adequate and efficacious remedy. The same decision reported in AIR 1999 page 22 (Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai) The Hon'ble Apex Court has observed in the manner as follows:
"20. Much water has since flown beneath the bridge, but there has been no corrosive effect on these decisions which, though old, continue to hold the filed with the result that law as to the jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, in spite of the alternative statutory remedies, is not affected, specially in a case where the authority against whom the writ is filed is shown to have had no jurisdiction or had purported to usurp jurisdiction without any legal foundation.
21. That being so, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petition at the initial stage without examining the contention that the show cause notice issued to the appellant was wholly without jurisdiction and that the Registrar, in the circumstances of the case, was not justified in acting as the "Tribunal".
15. In view of the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in different cases referred to above it can be safely said that statutory alternative remedy specially in the instant case does not stand as a bar in moving this writ petition. It is commonly known that in an Industrial Disputes initially attempt for conciliation is to be made by the Labour Commissioner which takes sometime. Then again the reference to Industrial Tribunal which is administrative action also consumes sometime (of course the reference part has been amended and the employee in his individual capacity can pray for reference directly). Thereafter the settlement before the Industrial Tribunal takes sometime appellate forum is also there which is again the writ jurisdiction and in this manner a big and valuable time from a workman's life is curtailed In that view it must be said that writ Court can offer an efficacious and speedy remedy. Considering of such aspects in my view this writ petition is very much maintainable before this Court and the objections raised by the learned counsel for the respondents in this regard is respectfully overruled.
16. Now let me see whether an employee can throw a challenge from the initiation of the charge-sheet or not. The answer is in the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2001 SC page 343 (State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna and Ors.). In this case the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that if the charge-sheet suffers from bias then the same can be a subject matter of challenge. In this judgment the Hon'ble Apex Court has also discussed. The consequence of bias in issuing a charge-sheet or in continuation with a departmental proceeding in a mala fide manner. In this decision the Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed as to what is apprehension of bias and what is real danger of bias for the sake of discussional convenience paragraphs 8, 21, 25, 33 and 34 are quoted hereinbelow:
"8. The test, therefore, is as to whether there is a mere apprehension of bias or there is a real danger of bias and it is on this score that the surrounding circumstances must and ought to be collated and necessary conclusion drawn therefrom. In the event, however, the conclusion is otherwise that there is existing a real danger of bias administration action cannot be sustained. If on the other hand allegations pertain to rather fanciful apprehension in administrative action, question of declaring them to be unsustainable on the basis therefor would not arise.
21. Soon after the issuance of the charge-sheet however, the Press reported a statement of the Chief Minister on 27th April, 1997 that a Judge of the High Court would look into the charges against Shri V.K. Khanna - this statement has been ascribed to be mala fide by Mr. Subramanian by reason of the fact that even prior to the expiry of the period pertaining to the submission of rely to the charge-sheet, this announcement was effected that a Judge of the High Court would look into the charges against the respondent No. 1 - Mr. Subramanian contended that the statement depicts malice and vendetta and the frame of mind so as to humiliate the former Chief Secretary. The time has not expired for assessment of the situation as to whether there is any misconduct involved - if any credence is to be attached to the Press report, we are afraid Mr. Subramaniam's comment might find some justification.
25. Bias admittedly negates fairness and reasonableness by reason of which arbitrariness and mala fide move creep in - issuance of the two notification assuming in hot haste but no particulars of any mala fides move or action has been brought out on record on the part of Shri V.K. Khanna - while it is true that the notings prepared for advocate General's opinion contain a definite remark about the mala fide move on the part of Shri V.K. Khanna yet there is singular absence of any particulars without which the case of mala fides cannot be sustained. The expression 'mala fide' has a definite significance in the legal phraseology and the same cannot possibly emanate out of fanciful imagination or even apprehensions but there must be existing definite evidence of bias and actions which cannot be attributed to be otherwise bona fide - action not otherwise bona fide, however, by themselves would amount to be mala fide unless the same is in accompaniment with some other factors which would depict a bad motive or intent on the part of the doer of the act.
33. While it is true that justifiability of the charges at this stage of initiating a disciplinary proceeding cannot possibly be delved into by any Court pending enquiry but it is equally well settled that in the even there is an element of malice or mala fide, motive involved in the matter of issue of a charge-sheet or the concerned authority is so biased that the enquiry would be a mere farcical show and the conclusions are well known then and in that event law Courts are otherwise justified in interfering at the earliest stage so as to avoid the harassment and humiliation of a public official. It is not a question of shielding any misdeed that the Court would be anxious, it is the due process of law which should permeate in the society and in the event of there being any affectation of such process of law that Courts ought to rise upto the occasion and the High Court in the contextual facts has dealt into the issue on that score. On the basis of the findings no exception can be taken and that has been the precise reason as to why this Court dealt with the issue in so great a detail so as to examine the Judicial propriety at this stage of the proceedings.
34. The High Court while delving into the issue went into the factum of announcement of the Chief Minister in regard to appointment of an enquiry officer substantiate the frame of mind of the authorities and thus depicting bias - What bias means has already been dealt with by us earlier in this Judgment, as such it does not require any further dilation but the factum of announcement has been taken note of as an illustration to a mindse viz. the enquiry shall proceed irrespective of the reply - Is it an indication of a free and fair attitude towards the concerned officer? The answer cannot possibly be in the affirmative. It is well settled in service jurisprudence that the concerned authority has to apply its mind upon received of reply to the charge-sheet or show cause as the case may be as to whether a further inquiry is called for. In the event upon deliberations and due considerations it is in the affirmative - the inquiry follows but not otherwise and it is this part of service jurisprudence and which reliance was placed by Mr. Subramaniam and on that score, strongly criticized the conduct of the respondents here and accused them of being biased. We do find some justification in such a criticism upon consideration of the materials on record."
17. The charge-sheet can be challenged if it is a biased one, vague and contains stale charges and if the charges becomes a result of mala fide. The charge-sheet can also be challenged if it is a biased charge-sheet. There are different kinds of bias - personal bias, official bias etc. In the instant case there is no question of personal bias but the official bias ex facie appears from the mala fide action on the part of the respondent authority. The respondent authority in its affidavit-in-opposition in paragraph 8 admitted that two charge-sheet dated 16.7.1999 and 7.8.1999 were served on the petitioner.
18. When the petitioner allegedly has been served with a charge-sheet, either it is served or it remains unserved. If it is served then service report must be there. If it is not served then also there must be service report. In that event service of two charge-sheets successively appears to be mala fide and/or non application of mind.
19. The principle of basic service jurisprudence is that the person would be served with a show cause notice if such a notice is served the incumbent employee will give its reply if the authority is not satisfied with the reply then the authority to issue charge-sheet and decide for departmental enquiry. For this purpose the authority can make a preliminary enquiry. In the instant case as it appears everything has done ex parte. The petitioner went on leave thereafter because of certain compelling circumstances. The petitioner remained absent and because of this unauthorized absence the service of the petitioner has been terminated. Enquiry has made ex parte and the petitioner would not get anychance to defend his case. The authorities alleged misconduct on the part of the petitioner and terminated his service. There is nothing to discuss about the enquiry report or the dismissal order inasmuch as the enquiry was done and dismissal order was passed as it appears with a pre-determined notion. In so far as the compliance of the provisions of natural justice less said is better. The order of punishment isn't only disproportionate but also it can be said shockingly disproportionate in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. State of Rajasthan 1996 (72) FLR page 316. The Hon'ble Apex Court observed that when the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, the Court can interfere.
20. In this case punishment for an unauthorized absence for a period of about two months. The service of the petitioner was terminated that is capital punishment was inflicted upon him. Nothing more is there which can be termed as shockingly disproportionate. In this case reference may be drawn to the decision reported in AIR 2001 SC page 3036 (Regional Manager, SBI, Hyderabad v. S. Mohammad Gaffar). In the judgment the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that normally Court should not sit over on appeal against the decision of the Departmental Authority, but if the Court finds that the punishment is disproportionate or rather shockingly disproportionate then the writ Court should not shut its eyes and should interfere in the matter.
21. In view of the discussions made above, in my opinion, the charge-sheet is biased, enquiry report has been vitiated because of proceeding in ex parte and the final order is shockingly disproportionate. Accordingly, the entire disciplinary proceeding starting from the charge-sheet to the issuance of final order is set aside. The respondent authorities are directed to reinstate the petitioner by giving him all his emoluments and the other, benefits of the service which he could have got had he not been placed in such a predicament. The emoluments and/or the salaries of the petitioner will be given from the date of filing of the writ petition and the petitioner will also be paid his current salaries month by month. The petitioner will be allowed to join his service within a period of fortnight from the date of communication of this order. The arrears, salaries and other allowances will be paid to the petitioner within three months from the date of communication of the order. The writ petition is thus allowed. But, since unauthorized absence part is admitted the authority, on following procedure may award the petitioner a lesser punishment other than dismissal.
There will be no order as to costs.
Urgent xerox certified copy, if applied for, will be supplied to the parties expeditiously.