Karnataka High Court
Rana Enterprises, Bangalore And Others vs State Bank Of Mysore, Peenya Industrial ... on 11 January, 2001
Author: R. Gururajan
Bench: R. Gururajan
JUDGMENT R. Gururajan, J.
1. This appeal is preferred by the judgment-debtors challenging the order dated 28-7-2000 rejecting their application filed under Order 21, Rule 90 read with Section 151 of the CPC in Execution Case No. 1101 of 1997 by the XIX Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore, on the following facts.
2. The appellants are the judgment-debtors and the respondents are the decree-holder and the auction purchaser. They would be referred as per the rankings before the Trial Court.
3. The decree holder-State Bank of Mysore filed a suit in O.S. No. 2533 of 1986 against the judgment debtor-defendants seeking for a judgment and decree before the Trial Court. The matter was contested. The Trial Court decreed the suit against the defendants/judgment-debtors. An execution case was filed in Execution Case No. 1101 of 1997. There is another decree suffered by the judgment-debtors and another execution case in Execution Case No. 3 of 2000 is by the bank against the judgment-debtors. The said execution was opposed by the judgment-debtor. On the execution side sale was ordered. The judgment-debtor filed an application in I.A. No. I under Order 21, Rule 69 read with Section 151 of the CPC seeking for the postponement of the sale to be held on 1-4-1998 and 8-4-1998. I.A. No. II is also filed seeking for recalling the order dated 10-12-1998 ordering the sale of the property. These two applications were opposed by the decree-holder. The said two applications were dismissed on account of those applications becoming infructuous in view of the factum of want of bidders. An order to this effect was passed on 1-7-1999. Thereafter it was adjourned from time to time. Executing Judge ordered sale proclamation. The same was granted vide order dated 1-7-1999. On 23-9-1999 Court ordered issue of sale warrant. On 16-12-1999 Counsel for the decree-holder requested to receive a DD for a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- from judgment-debtor. Counsel for the judgment-debtor sought for time to pay the decretal amount. Subsequently an application was filed by the judgment-debtors under Order 21, Rule 90 seeking an order to set aside the sale of immovable property held on 9-12-1999 and 16-12-1999. From the records it is seen that a sale proclamation was duly published by beat of tom-tom. A spot sale was held. One Sri B.D. Satyanarayana had bid the property for a sum of Rs. 13,57,000/-. The sale was conducted in the presence of the Counsels in the Court hall. Out of the bidders present in the Court, one Mr. Vishwanath Kamath bid the property for a sum of Rs. 14,55,000/-. He stated that he is prepared to deposit 25% of the amount in the Court. He deposited Rs. 3,65,000/- being 25% of the bid amount. He agreed to deposit the balance amount within 15 days. The matter was adjourned to be heard on judgment-debtor application. On the same day Counsel for the judgment-debtor filed memo seeking permission to deposit Rs. 1,00,000/- in the Court. On 1-1-2000 the matter was adjourned to 17-1-2000. On the said date again matter was adjourned to 1-2-2000. It was adjourned from time to time. Finally the matter was heard. The application filed by the judgment-debtor was dismissed by an order dated 28-7-2000.
4. The auction purchaser has deposited the balance sum as well. In these state of affairs this appeal is filed by the judgment-debtors questioning the order of the Trial Court on various grounds.
5. Before the Trial Court the judgment-debtors questioned the sale on the following grounds:
1. The proclamation does not satisfy the requirement of Order 21, Rule 66 of the CPC; the value set forth in the proclamation does not reflect the true value of the schedule property; the decree-
holder has failed to mention the fact of the mortgage to another Bank. Violation of Order 21, Rule 66, sub-rule (2) of clause (c).
2. The second contention is that the proclamation is not properly published in terms of Order 21 of Rule 67 of the CPC.
3. The procedure of sale conducted on 9-12-1999 is vitiated for the reasons (i) the proclamation was not fixed on the Court house; (ii) one Siddappa bide the schedule property for Rs. 13,60,000/- by auction, but the same was altered to make it appear that one B.D. Satyanarayana bid at Rs. 13,57,000, he did not deposit 25%.
4. The next contention is sale conducted on 16-12-1999 is illegal for the reasons:
(i) The proclamation was not affixed on the Court house.
(ii) No sale could have taken place until after the expiration of at least 15 days calculated from the date on which copy of proclamation was so affixed on the Court hall as per Rule 68 of Order 21 of the CPC.
4-A. The proceedings disclosed that the highest bidder was K. Vishwanath who participated in his personal capacity but it was confirmed in favour of M/s. Kamath Transformers Private Limited, no authorisation as such was produced to bid on behalf of M/s. Kamath Transformers Private Limited.
5. It is further contended that the property would fetch Rs. 20,10,000 on a conservative estimation, the sale of the same at Rs. 14,55,000/- resulted in enormous loss.
With these grounds the judgment-debtors contended that substantial injury is caused to him in terms of Order 21, Rule 89 and therefore judgment-debtor wanted the sale to be set aside.
6. The matter was contested. After contest the Trial Judge has framed the following points at page 22 (internal page 10) of the order:
1. Whether the application filed by the judgment-debtor under Order 21, Rule 90 read with Section 151 of the CPC dated 13-1-2000 praying to set aside the auction sale of the immoveable property dated 9-12-1999 and 6-12-1999 deserves any consideration?
2. To what order?
7. The Trial Judge negatived the application in a detailed order. The Trial Judge noticed there is no procedural irregularity or illegality. The Trial Judge also noticed no evidence was let in with regard to various objections. The Trial Judge further noticed that there cannot be any injustice caused to him. Judgment-debtor never brought any independent purchaser on his behalf to bid in the auction on his part or in the Court while the property was set in sale. The Trial Court noticed the conduct of the judgment-debtor and after noticing the Trial Court viewed that it is nothing but a protraction in the execution side. In that view of the matter it dismissed the application.
8. The said order as I mentioned earlier is challenged before this Court in this appeal.
9. Sri C.G. Gopalaswamy, learned Counsel for the appellant strenuously and vehemently questioned the order by raising the very same pleas before this Court as well. His contention is that the Trial Judge is wrong in rejecting his application and Trial Judge is also wrong in failing to notice the substantial injury caused to his client.
10. Per contra Counsel for the Bank argued that the decree obtained in 1986 remains unexecuted till date. He argued that the judgment-debtors have failed to comply with their promises to deposit Rs. 1,00,000/-. He mentioned that even now if the judgment-debtor gets a suitable purchaser to get the property purchased, he has no objection for the same. The Counsel for the auction purchaser contended that various arguments advanced before this Court by the appellant cannot be accepted. He states that his hard earned money is lying in the Court for more than a year and he wanted the appeal to be dismissed.
11. I have heard this case for several days. In fact I have adjourned this case on several occasions for getting the matter settled. I also adjourned the case for the purpose of the judgment-debtor getting a better purchaser. Nothing was done in the matter before this Court. In the circumstances the matter is taken up for hearing on merits and after hearing the Counsels at great length on various dates this order is passed.
12. Before considering the rival pleas I deem it proper to refer to Order 21 which provide for execution of decree and orders. A detailed procedure has been prescribed with regard to the method and manner of sale of immovable property. Rules 64 to 68 of Order 21 provide for a procedure in the matter of Court sale. It further provide for the deposit etc. Order 21, Rules 89 and 90 were introduced in the Amendment Act, 1976. Order 21, Rule 89 provide for an application being made to set aside the sale deposit. Order 21, Rule 90 provide for the sale being set aside on the ground of irregularity or fraud, which read as under:
"(1) Where any immovable property has been sold in execution of a decree, the decree-holder, or the purchaser, or any other person entitled to share in a rateable distribution of assets, or whose interests are affected by the sale, may apply to the Court to set aside the sale on the ground of a material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it.
(2) No sale shall be set aside on the ground of irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it unless, upon the facts provided, the Court is satisfied that the applicant has sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity or fraud.
(3) No application to set aside a sale under this rule shall be entertained upon any ground which the applicant could have taken on or before the date on which the proclamation of sale was drawn up".
13. A careful reading of this provision would show that an application may be made to the Court to set aside the sale on the ground of a material irregularity or fraud in publishing and conduct of sale. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 90 of Order 21, further provide that no sale shall be set aside on the ground of irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it unless, upon the facts proved, the Court is satisfied that the applicant has sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity or fraud. An embargo is placed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 90 of Order 21 to the effect that no application to set aside a sale under this rule shall be entertained upon any ground which the applicant could have taken on or before the date on which the proclamation of sale was drawn up. Therefore it is very clear to me that the material irregularity or fraud with regard to a sale has nexus to a substantial injury suffered by the judgment-debtor. Unless a judgment-debtor proves to the satisfaction of a Court that he has sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity or fraud he cannot seek an order setting aside a sale in execution proceedings. This amendment is introduced with the laudable object of avoiding unnecessary dragging of the proceedings by the judgment-debtor. It has put a ceiling on unnecessary delay in the matter of enjoying the fruits by a decree-holder. As is often repeated that a litigation in this country particularly on the civil side commences only after obtaining a decree while executing it. A person who approaches the Court must be able to enjoy the fruits of a decree and he cannot be made to suffer indefinitely even after a contest of a claim in a Court of law. It is with this laudable object that the legislature in its wisdom has provided a provision for setting aside the sale on the ground of material irregularity or fraud which results in substantial injury to the judgment-debtor. Material irregularity is a different one from normal irregularity. The said irregularity must have caused substantial injury and that injury has to be proved to the satisfaction of the Court. Let me see as to whether the said mandate of law is complied with by the judgment-debtor in the case on hand.
14. The first contention is that the proclamation was issued on 1-4-1989 and a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- was shown in the proclamation. This has caused prejudice to the judgment-debtor. The judgment-debtor has also questioned the true value being defective as the mortgage of the property has not been mentioned in the sale proclamation. From the proceedings I see that two execution cases against the same judgment-debtors has been clubbed and the same is not opposed by judgment-debtor. The claim in Execution Case No. 3 of 2000 is Rs. 14,60,974/- and the claim in Execution Case No. 1101 of 1997 is Rs. 3,39,664/-. Sale notice was factually issued to judgment-debtor and the sale proclamation in the sale warrant was issued fixing the date for sale on his part on 9-12-1999 and the sale of it before 16-12-1999. After the spot sale was conducted and when the sale was to be confirmed objections were raised with regard to certain alleged defects in the matter of proclamation and the true value. It is seen that the proclamation is issued in the prescribed form on an earlier occasion dated 23-8-1999, it was subsequently reissued as per the order of this Court dated 23-9-1999 and the necessary details were also mentioned in the said notice. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the said procedure has resulted in substantial injury in terms of Order 21, Rules 89 and 90 of the Code. As mentioned earlier the material irregularity should be such that it has caused substantial injury to the judgment-debtor. The judgment-debtor has questioned the proclamation being bad in law. He has also questioned the same as not properly published or that it is not fixed on conspicuous part of the subject of the property. There is no fraud as such alleged against anyone by the judgment-debtor. It may be of interest to note that no evidence was let in by the judgment-debtor. Matter was adjourned on several occasions as I mentioned earlier. But he has not raised his little finger to lead evidence with regard to fraud. Nothing prevented judgment-debtor in seeking an opportunity to lead evidence which has caused substantial injury to him. Section is very clear to show that the facts are to be proved to the satisfaction in the matter of substantial injury. Therefore contention of learned Counsel with regard to the procedural irregularity in the matter of proclamation of value published cannot be accepted in the absence of proof to the satisfaction of the Court.
15. The next contention is that no sale could have taken place until 15 days calculated from the date on which the copy of the proclamation was so affixed on the Court house as per requirement of Rule 68 and Order 21. Order 21, Rule 68 reads as under:
"Time of sale: Save in the case of property of the kind described in the proviso to Rule 43, no sale hereunder shall, without the consent in writing of the judgment-debtor, take place until after the expiration of at least fifteen days in the case of immovable property, and of at least seven days in the case of movable property, calculated from the date on which the copy of the proclamation has been affixed on the Court house of the Judge ordering the sale".
16. The contention of the Counsel is that 15 days time is allowed more in breach according to him. The order of the Court is on 26-11-1999 ordering spot sale on 9-12-1999 and the Court sate is on 16-12-1999. According to the Counsel 15 days is not over. From 9-12-1999 (spot sale) was conducted. This is countered by the other side saying that 15 days mentioned therein is referable to the Court sale and not spot sale. I find substance in this submission. Spot sale is only an invitation for sale. The 15 days time as referred to in this provision is referred only to actual sale. The contention of the judgment-debtor if accepted would result in reviewing the language of the provision. Hence, I reject the same. The actual sale took place legally on 16-12-1999 in the Court. Moreover as I have mentioned earlier the judgment-debtor has not shown as to how any substantial injury is caused on account of this lapse if at all. Assuming that there is some material irregularity even then the said material irregularity must have caused substantial injury to the judgment-debtor. The facts of this case do not satisfy me that this has caused any injury much less substantial injury.
17. The Counsel referred to certain affixture being on one side which according to him is in violation of Order 21, Rule 54. It is also his case that proper publicity was not given. His further case is that one Siddappa was the highest bidder and the same is altered to appear as one Satyanarayana. To consider this plea I verified the original proceedings. In it at page 106 I noticed various names who were present. It is no doubt true that there is a word mentioned as Siddappa and before it, it is mentioned as Rs. 13,66,000/-, with the name of Sri Satyanarayana it is mentioned as Rs. 13,57,000/- on behalf of M/s. India Electrical Accessories. The bailiff has made this report. The judgment-debtor's Counsel made much of it by contending that virtually a fraud has been played in the case as in the original it is mentioned as Rs. 13,56,000/- which is actually Rs. 13,66,000/-. As I have mentioned earlier a fraud is a ground available to judgment-debtor under Order 21, Rules 89 and 90 of the CPC. The said fraud is required to be proved and same is not done in the case by leading evidence by judgment-debtor. Nothing prevented judgment-debtors in putting witnesses in support of his case. The same has not been done, the Trial Court noticing this lapse rightly rejected the contention. I am also of the same view on the facts of the case. Further I may point out at this stage that the said fraud assuming it to be true must have caused substantial injury to judgment-debtors by proof. Actually property was sold for more than Rs. 13,57,000/-. Therefore this contention is not acceptable to me. Subsequently one Sri Vishwanath Kamath has sought for a bid for Rs. 14,55,000/-. Hence again the objection of the judgment-debtor is that Mr. Kamath failed to produce an authorisation evidencing his capacity to represent M/s. Kamath Transformers Private Limited. It is no doubt true that Mr. Kamath has not produced any authorisation at that time. The Court has mentioned in the order sheet that Mr. Kamath represents the Company. Even now before me it is not shown factually Mr. Kamath does not represent the M/s. Kamath Transformers Private Limited. In this state of affairs, I am not preferring to reject the sale on this hyper-technical point, when the Court is satisfied about the status of Mr. Kamath the same cannot be brushed aside at the instance of the judgment-debtor. Therefore the same does not said to have caused any substantial injury as understood in law.
18. The Counsel also contended that the property would have fetched much more than what is offered to the auction purchaser. At this stage I may notice that judgment-debtor before the Trial Court promised to pay a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- and he did not do so before the Trial Court. He did not bring any better purchaser before the Trial Court. Even before this Court even after several adjournments judgment-debtor could not get a better purchaser than the auction purchaser. In the circumstances mere inadequacy of price in the absence of a better purchaser cannot be accepted. Moreover it can be safely presumed that in the Court auction the value is always underestimated. In the circumstances it cannot be sard price offered has caused any substantial injury to the appellants. As a matter of fact a memo is filed before this Court by the Counsel for the Bank stating that they are entitled for Rs. 19,00,000/- and that they would be satisfied with Rs. 14,57,000/- in view of the pendency of the proceedings. The said memo is taken on record forming part of this proceedings. Therefore, the inadequacy of price if at all is substantially met with by this memo filed here by the Bank. Moreover the decree is of 1986, and two execution cases get closed by this present auction purchases in the execution cases. Amount has already been deposited before this Court by the auction purchaser. Taking into consideration the conduct of the judgment-debtor, memo dated 5-12-2000, and the deposit before the Court, I am of the view that substantial justice is done to the judgment-debtors in the case on hand. In the circumstances I find no infirmity with regard to inadequacy of price in the absence of any evidence and better offer even to this day by judgment-debtor.
19. Counsels on either side relied on number of judgments. The judgment-debtor's Counsel relied on a judgment of Nagpur High Court in Kisan Dinaji v Deorao Nathuji and Another, with regard to sale held before expiration of 30 days in terms of Order 21, Rule 68 and the judgment of the Supreme Court in M/s. Shalimar Cinema v Bhasin Film Corporation and Another and Manjamma v S.N. Suryanarayana Rao and Others, with regard to the contention of the violation of Order 21, Rule 67. As I mentioned earlier contention is different from proving to the satisfaction of the Court in terms of Order 21, Rules 89 and 90. The Trial Judge rightly rules "no proof to his satisfaction" with which I agree in the case on hand. It is seen that the judgment of Nagpur High Court is before amendment of 1976. In the judgment of Supreme Court it is seen that evidence was factually led by the judgment-debtor and proved to the Court by material evidence. It was in those circumstances the Court ruled that on evidence injury was accrued to the judgment-debtor. In fact in that case the Court refused to consider the case of the auction purchaser on account of the failure on the part of the auction purchaser to adduce best evidence. Same argument holds good in this case also. Best evidence is not led by judgment-debtor and he has to suffer for the same. Insofar as Manjamma's case, supra, is concerned all that I would say is that the non-publication must have caused substantial injury in terms of Rule 90. Material facts as I have mentioned earlier would reveal in this case that on earlier occasion the sale was postponed for want of bidders. Second time after following the procedure, a bid of Rs. 14,55,000/- is accepted. On the facts of this case it cannot be said that on account of non-publication injustice is caused to the judgment-debtor on the facts of this case. In fact even in the case relied on by the judgment-debtor it is seen that evidence was recorded to prove the injury caused to judgment-debtor.
20. Counsel also relies on a judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Smt. Harbans Kaur, Chandigarh v Smt. Balwant Kaur, Chandigarh, to contend that the sale proclamation is bad in law. I have gone through the said case. A reading of the facts would show that there was a gross undervaluation of property in, proclamation in that case. It was not so in the present case. The valuation was shown as 5 lakhs and the property is sold at Rs. 14,55,000/-, In fact the Trial Judge has noticed these facts while rejecting the contention of the judgment-debtor with which I agree. The next judgment relied upon by the Counsel in M/s. Hotel Nataraj and Others v Karnataka State Financial Corporation and Others. In the said judgment the Court noticed evidence of the judgment-debtor as I see from the facts. Therefore, mere argument without evidence to prove substantial injury is not acceptable in law. At the cost of repetition I would say that mandatory requirements of "proof to consider substantial injury" has to be placed on record. Since the same has not been done in this case this judgment is of no use to the judgment-debtor.
21. The next case relied on by the judgment-debtor is the case of M/s. Annapurna Industries, Rice and Poha Mills, Hebbandi, Bhadravathi and Another v Syndicate Bank, Bhadravathi Branch and Others. The said case is clearly distinguishable on facts. In that case the property on account of failure to have wide publication, it fetched 1/3rd of valuation, In the present case it is not proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the present value of the property is much less than the market value. I once again say that the judgment-debtor in spite of repeated adjournments did not get any better purchaser before the Court. Therefore, the said judgment is of no avail to the judgment-debtor.
22. At this stage I must consider a well-known case of Desh Bandhu Gupta v N.L. Anand and Rajinder Singh. The Supreme Court in the said case noticed its earlier judgment in para 15 at page 148 in the case of M/s. Kay Jay Industries (Private) Limited v M/s. Asnew Drums (Private) Limited, is to the effect that if there was any material irregularities in the conduct of sale and if it causes substantial injury to the judgment-debtor the same could be set aside where the Court mechanically conducts the sale not bothering to see that the offer is too low and better price could have been obtained. If in fact price is substantially inadequate there is both material irregularity and injury. At the same time Court should not go on adjourning the sale till the good price is got as otherwise the decree-holder would never get the property of the judgment-debtor sold. This Court further held that there is always a considerable difference between the Court sale price and the market price. The Court sale is a forced sale and notwithstanding the competitive element of a public auction, the best price is not always forthcoming. Mere inadequacy of price cannot demolish a Court sale. Further, if the Court sales are too frequently adjourned with a view to obtaining a still higher price, prospective bidders will lose faith in actual sale taking place and may not attend the auction. What is expected of the Court is to make a realistic appraisal of the factors in a pragmatic way and if satisfied that in the given circumstances the bid is acceptable it should conclude the sale.
The Court further ruled:
"If the Court has fairly applied its mind to the relevant considerations while accepting the final bid, it is not necessary to give a speaking order nor can its order be examined meticulously. In that case the judgment-debtor was himself adopting dilatory tactics and the property was sold after considerable delay and postponements. The sale was upheld".
23. In the case on hand after going through the material on record in the light of the submission of the learned Counsel, I am of the view that the Court has taken a realistic appraisal in a pragmatic way in the given circumstances of this case in terms of the decision of the Supreme Court. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Court sale has to be set aside as contended by the appellants.
24. In Desh Bandu Gupta's case, supra, the Supreme Court in para 17 ruled as under:
"Sub-rule (2) enjoins proof thereof and the Court should find that by reason thereof the applicant sustained substantial injury".
Again the Supreme Court at page 150 held as under:
"It is true that there is distinction between mere irregularity and material irregularities and the sale is not liable to be set aside on proof of mere irregularity. It must be material irregularity and the Court must be satisfied that on account thereof substantial injury was sustained by the appellant".
25. In the instant case there is no proper proof to show that substantial injury is caused. As mentioned by the Supreme Court the Court must be satisfied that the material irregularity might have resulted in substantial injury. In the case on hand on the fact and circumstances of the case it is clear that no substantial injury is caused to the plaintiff and therefore the Court rightly rejected the application.
26. The respondents' Counsel relied on a judgment of Supreme Court in Dhirendra Nath Gorai and Others v Sudhir Chandra Ghosh and Others. In the said case the Supreme Court noticed that when the judgment-debtor did not object for non-compliance with Section 35 it does not render the sale a nullity and also non-observance of the provision of that section no substantial injury was caused to the judgment-debtor, the sale is not liable to be set aside in an application under Order 21, Rule 90. The Supreme Court further noticed as under:
"It follows that an objection that the sale proclamation did not conform to Section 35 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act cannot avail a judgment-debtor in an application under Order 21, Rule 90 of the CPC if he was present at the drawing up of the sale proclamation and did not raise any such objection at the time nor can it avail a judgment-debtor who after receiving notice did not attend at the drawing up of the sale proclamation at all".
27. In the latest judgment of A. Parvatham v Bank of Baroda and Others, various judgments on the point was considered by the Madras High Court and the Madras High Court ruled in para 9 as under:
"It is clear from Order 21, Rule 90 that on the ground of material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting the sale the person affected can approach the Court to set aside the sale. However, as per clause (2) of Rule 90 he has to establish that he sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity or fraud. Likewise as per clause (3) if such person had occasion to raise objections before the date of proclamation and failed to raise the same, he cannot be allowed to raise such objection after proclamation of sale was drawn up".
28. The Court noticed the conduct of judgment-debtor in para 28 reading as under:
"It is also clear that though she filed an objection for reduction of the upset price, she did not raise any objection at the time of drawing up of sale proclamation pointing out the defect. In such a circumstance, though notice was given to her, she did not attend at the drawing up of the proclamation, accordingly the sale held is not liable to be set aside under Order 21, Rule 90 of the CPC".
29. The Court noticed the effect of substantial injury in terms of Order 21, Rule 90. It noticed various case-laws and finally ruled that the same may not be set aside. I respectfully follow the judgment of the Madras High Court in the given set of facts in this case.
30. Taking into consideration the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Desh Bandhu Gupta, supra and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure here it cannot be said that the present case is one for setting aside the confirmation of sale.
31. Before concluding I must say that a litigant decree-holder should not be unnecessarily harassed/prevented in the matter of reaping the fruits of a decree after contest for several years. Here is a Bank which has lent money to the judgment-debtor, files a suit in the year 1986 and even after 15 years it is unable to reap the fruits of a decree in getting its money. All the opportunities provided to the judgment-debtors did not yield any satisfactory result in the matter of settlement or reducing the liability caused to the judgment-debtor if at all. In these circumstances no case is made out warranting any interference by this Court. However the memo filed by the Bank is taken as part of this proceedings. Bank is bound by the memo and the execution is confined to only Rs. 14,55,000/-.
32. Before parting with this case I cannot but observe the rule of law rules democracy. The Courts are entrusted with substantial powers to deal the dispute between the parties. If even after resolution of that dispute if a litigant is unable to enjoy the fruits of such success, days are not too far off that a litigant would lose faith in the system and he may resort to other methods. I find now civil disputes take longer time, and the execution case of a successful litigant takes a further long time. The lengthy trend in a Court has to be arrested in the larger interest of this sacred institution/system for maintaining rule of law in the country. In these circumstances it is imperative for the executing Courts to complete the proceedings as early as possible in accordance with law in the larger interest of maintaining the faith in rule of law and law Courts.
33. In the result the impugned order is confirmed in terms of my observation made in para 32.
34. Appeal is dismissed. No costs.