Madras High Court
K.R. Mohammad Ali vs Minor Santhosh, Rep. By Guardian Mothu ... on 7 July, 2000
Equivalent citations: 2000(3)CTC468, 2000 A I H C 3903, (2000) 3 MAD LJ 256, (2001) 1 RENCJ 191, (2000) 2 RENCR 380
Author: V. Kanagaraj
Bench: V. Kanagaraj
ORDER
1. The respondent in the Rent Control Original Petition No.8 of 1990 is the petitioner herein and he has come forward to institute the above Civil Revision Petition against the fair and decretal Order dated 25.11.1999 made in I.A.No.85 of 1996 in R.C.O.P.No.8 of 1990 passed by the Rent Controller and the I Additional District Munsif, Salem.
2. The original petitioner in the R.C.O.P. is the landlady viz., R. Amsavani Ammal who is reportedly dead. The second and third respondents herein namely, Minor Santhosh and V.Shiyamala Rani have come to be impleaded as legal representatives of the deceased petitioner R.Amsavani Animal as per the order dated 25.11.1999 made in I.A.No.85 of 1996 by the court below which is under challenge before this Court.
3. The contentions of the petitioner herein is that Minor Santhosh and V. Shiyamala Rani should not have been impleaded as legal representatives of the deceased R. Amsavani Ammal at all, since according to the revision petitioner, the rights of the deceased as claimed by her in the RCOP claiming to vacate the tenant for her own occupation being a personal right of her's has become non est in law. The lower court, refusing to accept the claim of the tenant, has allowed the petition of the legal representatives as a result of which the said order is being testified by the revision petitioner/tenant in the above revision,
4. Today, when the above matter was taken up for consideration, the learned counsel for the petitioners is present and since neither the respondents nor their counsel are present, this Court is left with no option but to decide the above matter in consideration of the facts and circumstances as pleaded by parties and having regard to the materials placed on record and upon hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner alone.
5. On the part of the learned counsel for the petitioner, two Judgments are cited. The first one is reported in Salima Bl v. Malika Begum, 1972 (2) MLJ 21 (SN) and the second one in Dr. Muhammad Ibrahim v. Rahiman Khan and others, 1947 (2) MLJ 419.
6. Prior to considering the above judgments, the learned counsel for the petitioner referred to Section 27 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1960 and it is relevant to extract the same here since it is only under this provision of law the petition had been filed before the court below.
"(1) Any application made, appeal preferred, or proceeding taken, under this Act by or against any person, may in the event of his death, be continued by or against his legal representatives.
(2) Where any application, appeal or other proceeding could have been made, preferred or taken, under this Act or by against any person, such application, appeal or other proceeding may, in the event of his death, be made, preferred or taken by or against his legal representatives."
7. Section 27 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') would indicate that any application, appeal or proceeding in the event of the death of the party may be continued by his legal representatives. It is under this Section only the legal representatives of the deceased have filed the petition concerned seeking the impugned order to implead them as parties to continue the proceeding. While the Section is positive in its nature and approach providing for the legal representatives to be brought on record, normally. Courts decide to permit the legal representatives to continue the litigation on the death of the original landlord. In fact, the only point for determination, at this juncture, is whether in the case in hand, on the death of the original petitioner/land lady, the cause of action survives or not so as to allow the legal representatives of the deceased landlady to carry on with the proceedings. Section 27 provides for impleading the legal representatives in general.
8. So far as the above Judgments are concerned, in the first Judgment wherein only a short note has been given, the learned single Judge of this Court, way back in the year 1972 pertaining to the facts of the case that was dealt with by him had concluded that Section 27 would not apply to that case where the relief sought for in the eviction proceeding initiated by the landlord is personal to the deceased as far as the ground of "bona fide requirement" of the premises for "owner's occupation" is concerned.
9. The second Judgment reported as given above had been decided in the year 1947 wherein also it has been held by another learned single Judge of this Court to the effect that an order of the Rent Controller directing the tenant to put the land lord, in possession of his house on the ground that the landlord desired to occupy the house himself as one for the personal convenience of the landlord and is not available after the death of the landlord at the instance of the legal representatives.
10. A subtle difference has to be made, at the outset, when courts go into the question of deciding the "owner's occupation" such as the one in the instant case wherein, on the part of the landlord, he/she comes forward to file the petition seeking eviction of the tenant on account of owner's occupation, no blunt conclusion could be arrived at without proper application of mind either regarding the application of Section 27 of the Act as extracted supra or in interpreting the terms "owner's occupation" in a different manner than what is plainly meant by the section.
11. So far as Section 27 of the Act is concerned, though the language employed in the Section would reveal as not being one that is mandatory, still, it cannot be either concluded on the face of the petitions filed by the landlord seeking eviction of the tenant for owner's occupation stating that Section 27 of the Act would not apply where the relief sought for is on ground of bona fide requirement of the premises for owner's occupation as it has been concluded in the first above judgment reported in Salima Bl v. Malika Begum, 1972 (2) MLJ 21 (SN) nor could the court jump to the conclusion that the landlord desires to occupy the house for himself or herself and this occupation being for the personal convenience of the landlord, on his/her death, the legal representatives cannot set up the same plea since the personal right would extinguish on the death of the landlord which will not be available for the legal representatives, as concluded in the other judgment reported in Dr. Muhammad Ibrahim v. Rahiman Khan and others, 1947 (2) MLJ 419 referred to above.
12. At this juncture, it is relevant to extract the language employed in Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act wherein originally the petition for eviction of the tenant by the landlord for personal occupation could be filed.
Section 10(3)(a): A landlord may, subject to the provisions of clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building.
(i) in case it is residential building, if the landlord requires it for his own occupation or for the occupation of any member of his family and if he or any member of his family is not occupying a residential building of his own in the city, town or village concerned."
" A reading of the above Section would indicate that the landlord may require his/her residential building either for his own occupation or for the occupation of any member of the family.
13. The only positive condition that has been imposed on the landlord to seek the remedy under this Section is, that neither himself nor the member of the family should occupy a residential building of his/her own in the city or town or village concerned. Now, from the language employed in the above Section, it has become the paramount duty of the court to assign the true meaning of the terms "for his own occupation or for the occupation of any member of his family". The clarity that is warranted regarding the language employed as extracted above is whether the terms "his own occupation" means, the particular landlord himself in singular or does it mean his close relatives, such as, his mother, wife and children who are also his dependents. Likewise, by the terms "any member of his family", whether it means any single member of his family or would it connote such family members, close relations, viz., the mother, wife, children, etc. of the member of the family of the landlord/ landlady.
14. The subject matter herein is the residential building. The moment the landlord or the landlady comes forward to file a petition under the above Section requiring the said residential building for his/her own occupation in its natural and ordinary meaning of the term "landlord" in the context of the Section could not mean the petitioner alone as though he has come forward to occupy the premises for his individual use leaving the other members who are part of the family, such as his mother, wife and children which may not be the legislative intent. It is unimaginable for the landlord or landlady to occupy the premises in single as though he or she need not have a family at all nor his wife or her husband and children should be left out of the occupation of the residential building. It cannot also be said that if the landlord succeeds in the petition, he should alone go and occupy the residential premises leaving his other such family members which is beyond one's imagination. It could not also be said that any landlord or landlady should not have a family of his or her own. Therefore, the correct way of interpreting the term 'landlord" in seeking the residential building for his own occupation, cannot mean in the narrow sense the landlord himself, but the term has got wider connotation to include his legal heirs who may be his dependants as well.
15. Secondly, even in the event that the petitioner comes forward to put up the same argument to the effect that since the landlord seeks the eviction of the tenant for his own occupation, the right being a personal one, it cannot extend to his legal representatives so as to give effect to Section 27 of the Act to entertain a petition for impleading the legal representatives of the deceased landlord. This argument cannot also be accepted in the sense that the moment the landlord passes away, automatically, either by intestate succession of survivorship on account of the operation of the law or by testamentary succession, the legal representatives would become the owners of the premises which is the subject matter in a petition filed by the original owner under Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act and such legal representatives cannot be denied of their right to continue the litigation instituted by their predecessor in title provided they are qualified in all respects to file a petition under Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act. Therefore, while the position of law is such, giving the interpretation for the terms "owner's occupation" in its narrow sense that it means only the petitioner and none-else so as to conclude that on the death of the petitioner/landlord, the right being his personal right, there is no question of impleading the legal representatives of the deceased owner under Section 27 of the Act, cannot sustain nor is it acceptable.
16. On the other hand, the terms "owner's occupation" should be given its wider meaning thereby making it clear that it is not the owner who is individually meant but the occupation is for himself and for his other dependants who might also be his legal representatives after his death. Therefore, the correct way of interpreting the term "landlord" in seeking the residential building for his own occupation, includes his legal representative also and hence, under pretext that it is his personal right that is involved, it is false to conclude that on his death, the same becomes either extinguished without being made available for his legal representatives or become nonest in law as it is argued on the part of the learned counsel for the petitioner.
17. For all the above discussions held, the only conclusion that could be arrived at is that the legal representatives of the deceased landlord in case of the landlord filing a petition under Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act seeking the premises for "owner's occupation" could well maintain the petition under Section 27 of the Act to continue the proceeding provided they have the same qualification of the deceased landlord so as to seek for the relief under Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act. Neither the cause of action would extinguish on the death of the original petitioner/landlord under pretext that it had been filed for his personal/individual occupation of the premises, nor could such rights of the original petitioner become non est in law so as to say that his legal representatives cannot continue the proceeding getting themselves impleaded by virtue of a petition filed under Section 27 of the Act. The petition filed under I.A.No.85 of 1996 by the respondents herein before the Rent Controller in RCOP No.8 of 1990 is perfectly within the bounds of law wherein the points that are to be decided are whether such petitioners are the real legal representatives of the deceased petitioner/landlord and whether they possess the qualifications to file a petition for eviction of the tenant on ground of "owner's occupation as contemplated under Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act. While so, the lower court deciding to implead the respondents herein as the legal representatives of the deceased original petitioner to continue the proceeding thus allowing the, petition filed under Section 27 of the Act is perfectly within the ambit of law.
18. After all, the tenant is always at liberty to question the rights or qualifications of the legal representatives sought to be impleaded, if they do not possess the same to get the relief under Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act which is left to the decision of the Rent Controller at the time of disposing of the main RCOP. Regarding maintaining a petition under Section 27 of the Act by the legal representatives, it is hereby declared that it could be well maintained.
19. In result, the above civil revision petition fails and the same is dismissed. No costs. The fair and decretal order dated 25.11.1999 made in I.A.No.85 of 1996 in RCOP No. 8 of 1990 by the Rent Controller and the I Additional District Munsif, Salem is hereby confirmed. Consequently, CMP No.22430 of 1999 is also dismissed.