Karnataka High Court
Vidyacharan Shukla vs B.S. Adityan on 25 August, 1988
Equivalent citations: ILR1989KAR2784
JUDGMENT P.K. Shyamasundar, J.
1. These are 5 Original Suits transferred to this Court for disposal by an order of the Supreme Court of India made on the 9th February, 1988 on an application made by one Adityan against whom there were a spate of suits virtually all over the Country. In the context of application made by Adityan, the Order referred to above came to be passed by the Supreme Court transferring all the cases to this Court for disposal. Supreme Court while passing the aforesaid Order had also directed the suits to be disposed off within three months from the date of Order if that was possible but regrettably it has not been possible to comply with that direction since the order along with the records in several cases was received by this Court after more than two months had elapsed from the date of Supreme Court's Order made on 9th February, 1988 (Ex.D-41). Thereafter it was noticed that in most of the cases service of summons had not been completed and pleadings were also not complete. With all this preliminary work having taken some time it was only possible thereafter to proceed with the task of hearing them which task was to some extent facilitated by the stipulation made on behalf of the plaintiffs - M/s. V.C. Shukla, erstwhile President of Indian Olympic Association in O.S.2/88 and the other plaintiff, the Madhya Pradesh Olympic Associating agreeing to have these suits disposed off only on one issue which arises in common in all these Suits viz. whether the General Assembly of Indian Olympic Association (hereinafter referred to as 'the I.O.A.') had the power to remove the President in office by passing a vote of no confidence. The other questions raised including what transpired at the meeting of the I.O.A at which the disputed vote of no confidence is said to have been passed, were given up by a memo filed before this Court on 15-7-1988. The said memo reads:
"In order not to disturb the continuance in the management of the affairs of the IOA the plaintiff will not question the validity or propriety of any acts done by the IOA under the purported presidentship of Mr. Adityan".
The plaintiffs further submitted that they would not lead oral evidence and just confine themselves to making submissions on the basis of documents tendered in evidence which were got marked by consent after dispensing with proof. This procedure resulted in the marking of Exs.P-1 to P-5 and Exs. D-1 to D-50, by consent with the result the Court was enabled to try the crucial issue arising for consideration, as aforesaid, straightaway without being put to the necessity of recording evidence in that behalf. I must add, as the plaintiffs opted not to lead any oral evidence defendants likewise desisted from leading any oral evidence. The statements made to this effect at the Bar have been duly recorded and find reference in the minutes maintained of these proceedings.
2. Although this Court is rarely called upon to decide legal matters in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, a discipline to which it is almost a stranger, the proceedings in these cases being Original Suits have nonetheless become amenable for disposal as if they were either appeals or other miscellaneous proceedings arising under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The fact that both sides agreed to short-circuit what otherwise promised to be a marathon trial, regard being had to the keenness with which the cases had been contested in this Court, it has now been possible to compress the controversy and to confine it to a single point lying within a narrow compass. This, as I have said, has been possible by the very reasonable attitude adopted by Counsel appearing on either side with Mr. Nariman, Senior Advocate-Supreme Court, leading or the plaintiffs along with the then Advocate General of Karnataka - Sri. Santhosh Hegde and Sri. Udaya Holla and the defendants represented by Mr. Sundaraswamy, another Senior Advocate of this Court, assisted by Junior Counsel Sri. K.G. Raghavan and others. Although the disposal of these suits seemingly depended on the solitary point arising for consideration to which I have already adverted to the dimensions of the question raised did admit of a lot of debate spanning over nearly a week of hearing involving copious citation of authorities all of which tended to make the task of the Court somewhat difficult, despite employing the very laudable labour saving devise of excluding oral evidence totally and relying instead only on documents all of which have been marked by consent.
3. I must now advert to the factual backdrop viz., the pleadings in the suits. The controversy herein is between two sports administrators of this Country and arises with reference to the plum office of the President of Indian Olympic Association which is one of the party-defendants in the suit. The real legal battle herein is between Mr. V.C. Shukla, a Member of the Parliament, and Mr. Adityan, both of whom are plaintiff and defendant in all the suits with the exception of Original Suits 3 and 4/88. The I.O.A. is a sports organization, an apex body registered under the Indian Societies Act, 1860 with a written constitution of its own, enjoying membership of a number of federating units all over the Country representing various disciplines in sports. The main object of I.O.A. is to foster and cherish games and sports in the Country and relate ultimately with and to the International Olympic Association of which it is a member. The General Assembly consisting of federate units of the sports organisations in the Country which number more than 100, elect once in four years under the auspices of the Constitution of the I.O.A. several office bearers and members of the executive, numbering in all 37 persons. Amongst those elected are the President, Secretary General, Joint Secretary, Treasurer and Members of the Executive. They can be In office till the next general elections which are held at an interval of four years. Sri. Nariman, learned Counsel for Sri. V.C. Shukla, mentions that the election of office bearers was held once in four years because the I.O.A. a member organisation of the International Olympic Organisation which had the task of overseeing the representation of the Country in Olympic games had to synchronize its election so as to oversee the selection and sending of an Indian team to the Olympic games which are held once in four years. With the impugned action of the General Assembly having interfered with the term of the President bringing about a premature termination thereof, strong exception is taken to an allegedly deviant procedure which in fact is the core controversy in all these cases.
4. Be that as it may, in the year 1984 Mr. V.C. Shukla said to be representing the Wrestling Federation, a federate member of the I.O.A. was elected as President. Likewise Mr. Shivanthi Adityan, defendant in O.S.1, 2 and 5 of 1988, was elected as Senior Vice-President, of whom there are nearly three in number. Even as Shukla, Adityan and other office bearers were manning their positions and were looking forward to the completion of their term of office which is almost round the corner, due for expiry in the month of October, 88 it so happened that 20 members of the I.O.A. sent a notice to Mr. Shukla as per Ex.D-6 (P-3) calling upon him to convene a Special Meeting of the General Assembly to discuss a no confidence motion against him, taking exception to the style of functioning of the President, alleging it to be wholly arbitrary in character. Notice also mentioned that he was required to convene a Meeting of the General Assembly on or before the 28th of December, 1987 in New Delhi at the office of the I.O.A. within 20 days from the receipt of notice falling which they would proceed to convene a Meeting on their own at the same venue. On receipt of that notice Mr. Shukla, having decided to convene a Meeting did call such a Meeting by writing to ail the members as per Ex.D-6(P-1), calling upon the members to attend the Meeting proposed to be held at Hotel Muscat in Trivandrum on 20th December, 1987 for discussing the no confidence motion move against him by the requisitionists. In that letter he also solicited the support of each member pointing out inter alia the creditable work done by him, particularly with reference to the augmenting of the funds of I.O.A. Incidentally he complained of undue interference with the affairs of the I.O.A. by the Department of Youth Affairs, Government of India and warned its members that it was time they took action to see the Association did not become a side-kick of the Government. One such letter was also addressed to Mr. Adityan and is produced at Ex.D-2. In between i.e., after Mr. Shukla wrote to all the members regards the Meeting to be convened at Trivandrum and the date of the Meeting, several developments took place. Madhya Pradesh Association filed two suits, one in Delhi and the other in Jabalpur assailing the tenability of the notices sent by the I.O.A. to all the members inviting them to the meeting at Trivandrum. Injunctions and stay orders were sought, for restraining the I.O.A. either from going ahead with the Meeting or from implementing the resolutions, if any, passed at the meeting if it was held. Even in distant Cuttack a suit was filed by one Shilender Roy against the calling of the general body meeting at the instance of the dissidents. In the suit Mr. Roy had impleaded all the 20 requisitlonists who had called upon Mr. Shukla to convene the Special General Body meeting. The following details will furnish the highlights of the spate of suits filed and the orders obtained in them.
5. The first ever suit filed was by the Madhya Pradesh Olympic Association before the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur on the 21st of October, 1987. Defendants in the suit were the I.O.A. Randhlr Singh and M.L. Jadam who was later dropped from the array of the parties. Relief sought for in the suit was for declaring the Meeting convened on the 27th of October, 1987 illegal and to restrain the defendants from conveying such a Meeting for discussing the no confidence motion tended against the President. An ex-parte temporary injunction having been sought for, the Court appears to have refused the same. Thereupon the plaintiff filed an appeal to the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Jabalpur in M.A. 369/87 on the 26th September, 1987 and was successful in obtaining an ex-parte injunction against the holding of the Meeting. The appeal, however, came to be dismissed on 15-10-1987 as having become infructuous since the Meeting, however, came to be held.
6. Next suit was the one filed by Shilender Kumar Roy in O.S.359/87 before the Court of Munsiff, Cuttack on 24th October, 1987. The relief therein was for stopping the Meeting proposed to be held on 26th and an interim order was sought for and obtained directing the defendants not to give effect to the decisions taken at the said Meeting. This suit is said to have been withdrawn on 2-2-1988.
7. The third suit was the one filed again by the Madhya Pradesh Olympic Association purportedly against the I.O.A. represented by R.L. Anand as first defendant and R.L. Anand again as second defendant. This suit numbered as O.S.665/87 has since been transferred to this Court and is currently numbered as O.S.3/88. The prayer In the suit was for a perpetual Injunction enjoining the defendants not to hold the Special General Body Meeting on 26-10-77 and transacting the business noted in the notice dated 28-9-1977. In the suit a temporary injunction appears to have been granted by the consent of the defendants restraining them from discussing the subjects mentioned in the meeting notice. A question arises now as to whether this suit still survives for consideration and disposal on merits.
8. O.S.2 of 1988 is the one filed by M/s. Shukla, Anand and the I.O.A. by its President as O.S. 285/87 before the District Court at Jabalpur. Defendants to the suit ars Adityan, Randhir Singh and Madhya Pradesh Olympic Association. The main relief sought for in the suit is for issuance of a perpetual Injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the working of the plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 as President and Secretary of the third defendant I.O.A. There is no interim order in the suit but an application made on 19th November, 1987 for stopping the Executive Council Meeting scheduled to be held at Calcutta on the 19th December 1987 had been dismissed. The suit in fact is the chief Ms which is commended for acceptance by the Court. Yet another suit being the fifth In the series was an unnumbered suit filed before the Calcutta High Court on 19th November, 1987 by the Madhya Pradesh Olympic Association against Adityan, Randhir Singh and State of Bengal as defendants which was subsequently given up oy a motion made on 30th June, 1988. Defendant No. 1 in the suit was the I.O.A. The prayer in the suit was for a declaration that defendants 1 and 2 M/s. Adityan and Randhir Singh were not entitled to function as President and Secretary General and for an injunction restraining defendants 1 and 2 from representing themself as President and Secretary General of the I.O.A. There is no prayer for any interim order in the suit. This suit on transfer to this Court is numbered as O.S.5/88. Mention must now be made of one another suit in O.S.2793/87 by one Ramlal Thaukur and Gurmeet Singh Sodhi in the High Court of Delhi against the I.O.A. Anand, Adityan, Randhir Singh and the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Delhi. The prayer in the suit was for a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to convene a Special General Body meeting under the supervision of the Court to decide the persons entitled to hold the posts of President and Secretary General and to restrain defendants 2 and 3 i.e., M/s Shukla and Anand from creating any disturbance in the smooth functioning of M/s Adityan and Randhir Singh, defendants four and five as office bearers. In the suit a temporary injunction was obtained on 16th December, 1987 restraining M/s. Shukla and Anand from interfering with the functioning of defendants four and five and on 18-12-87, the High Court modified the above order with particular reference to the representation of the I.O.A. at the National Games in Trivandrum. The Court appears to have directed that instead of Shukla and Adityan some three other neutral persons may act as representatives of the I.O.A. at the games which it appears was inaugurated by the President of India and on the concluding day the Chief Guest was the Prime Minister, On transfer to this Court the suit has been numbered as O.S.1/83. Subsequently, in this Court a memo has been filed on behalf of the plaintiff giving up the prayer for mandatory injunction for convening the Special General Body Meeting referred to supra, as a General Body Meeting had been, since held and at that Meeting Shukla was replaced by Adityan along with Randhir Singh to officiate as Secretary General in place of Anand whose co-option as Secretary General during the Shukla regime was invalidated.
9. Based on these developments before various Courts in the Country, an argument is sought to be built by Counsel for defendants M/s. Adityan and Randhir Singh that all the suits with the exception of the one by Ramlal Thakur in the Delhi High Court in O.S.2793/87 had been in fact engineered by Shukla In an all out effort to block the move to express no confidence in him and in consequence to put him out of office. It is contended that the conduct of Shukla in going to various Courts in the Country through his henchmen or stooges in order to secure orders for entrenching himself in office instead of boldly facing the no confidence motion to be considered at the Meeting convened under the provisions of the Constitution of the I.O.A. was clearly indicating of his intention to stage a no-holds barred war against those who desired to remove him from office by democratic measures and the said conduct having sullied his hands, he was, therefore, rendered ineligible for the equitable relief of injunction sought for in the suits now under consideration. The argument fed was that the suits should, therefore, be dismissed in limine, based mainly on the conduct of Shukla who had resorted to abusing the process of the Court with impunity. This argument is no doubt countered by Shukla pointing out that there is nothing in the record to show that the suits excepting the one filed by him after the General Meeting held on 27th of December, 1987 had been engineered by him. It is pointed out that there is nothing on record to show that he was connected with the Madhya Pradesh Olympic Association which had filed some of the suits and in any view of the matter there is little reason to infer that it was his hand which was guiding those litigations merely because he happened to hail from Madhya Pradesh. It is pointed out that he was not even representing the Madhya Pradesh Association in the I.O.A. into which he was inducted as the President of the Wrestling Federation of India. It is argued that merely because some persons had chosen to litigate against Adityan and others, he could not be made responsible for their action so as to throw doubts on his bona fides. Even otherwise, it is urged that asserting one's right in a Court of Law and initiating action to resist illegal denial of rights by others would never amount to abuse of the process of the Court and would not render the litigant a person seeking relief with a pair of sullied hands. I shall deal with this aspect more fully while dealing with the issue regards the propriety of granting relief to Shukla on grounds of improper conduct.
10. In the suits as they are now before Court, pleas have been taken setting out divergent accounts of what happened at the Meeting and in regard to the resolutions said to have been passed. Whereas plaintiffs submit that the motion to remove Shukla was never taken up for consideration at all and the Meeting merely resulted in being adjourned upon being advised of the stay orders and injunctions granted by Courts at Jabalpur, Delhi etc., defendants contend that although immediately after the Meeting was convened Shukla took the Chair he had to make way for somebody else since the Meeting was convened to consider a no confidence motion against him and thereafter Umrao Singh a Member of the Punjab Olympic Association having moved a no confidence motion against Shukla, it was carried by 78 votes for and 23 against amidst a thunderous ovation by the gathering. Similarly the motion for invalidating the co-option of Anand as Secretary General was also passed by the majority of the Members voting therefor and thereafter the Assembly resolved that Adityan the Senior Vice-President should officiate as President and Randhir Singh should officiate as Secretary General in place of Anand. It was further resolved that this arrangement should continue till the next elections were held. The minutes also record that while all this hectic activity was going on at the meeting Shukla was all the time trying to get at a document from his pocket and finally succeded in feretting it out and producing it before the Assembly saying that it was a stay order issued by a Court stopping the holding of the meeting and then inviting people to speak in favour of the motion to abstain from transacting any business in view of the Court Order. The minutes further disclose that by then the business itself being over, the Meeting adjourned sine die. This in substance is the recital in Ex.D-2 produced on behalf of the defendants. The plaintiff's version of the incident of the 28th December at Trivandrum is different and according to the plaintiff-Shukla the meeting adjourned without transacting any business in the light of the stay orders of the various Courts. Amongst the documents produced on either side no minutes of the meeting to support Shukla's version, as aforesaid, has been placed on record.
11. On the basis of the pleadings the following issues are framed in all the suits:
O.S.2/881. Are the plaintiffs 1 and 2 entitled to hold the office of President and Secretary General respectively of the Indian Olympic Association till the expiry of 27-10-1988 and are irremovable even therefrom till then even by the General Assembly by passing a vote of no-confidence in them?
2. Are plaintiffs estopped from denying competence of the General Assembly to remove the President and Secretary of the I.O.A. from office by expressing want of confidence in them?
3. Whether the suit on behalf of plaintiff No. 3 - Indian Olympic Association is brought by a competent person and with due authority? If not, is plaintiff No. 3 liable to struck off or deleted?
4. is the suit bad for non-joinder of requisitionists who are signatories to the notice dated 28-9-1987?
5. Whether the suit for bare injunction as sought for by the plaintiff is maintainable having regard to the provisions of the Specific Relief Act?
6. Whether the discretion to grant injunction should be refused to be exercised in favour of plaintiffs having regard to the conduct of plaintiffs and all other circumstances of the case?
12. In O.S.1/88:
1. Whether any cause of action in favour of the plaintiffs as members of the Association has arisen for the relief claimed?
2. Whether the suit as framed is maintainable?
3. Whether or not having regard to the Constitution and the rules of I.O.A. the General Assembly is empowered to pass a no-confidence motion against the defendants Nos. 2 and 3?
4. What reliefs are the parties entitled to?
13. In O.S.3/88:-
1. is the General Assembly incompetent to pass a vote of no confidence against the President and Secretary General before the expiry of 27-10-1988 and elect some one else in their place?
2. is the suit bad non-joinder of necessary parties, viz., the requisitionists?
3. Whether the suit for bare injunction as sought by plaintiff is maintainable having regard to the provisions of the Specific Relief Act?
4. is the suit bad for non-joinder of requisitionists who are signatories to the notice dated 28-9-1987?
5. Has plaintiff any cause of action to file the suit?
In O.S.No. 4 of 1988:-
1. Are the President and Secretary General once elected irremovable during a period of four years?
2. is the suit bad for non-joinder of necessary parties viz., the requisitionists?
3. is the suit not maintainable and is plaintiff disentitled to the reliefs sought having regard to the provisions of the Specific Relief Act?
4. Does the cause of action set up in the plaint survive and if not is the suit liable to be dismissed?
5. Whether the suit brought by plaintiff in the Court of the District Judge at Jabalpur is liable to be dismissed for lack of territorial jurisdiction and in view of Rule 27(c) of the Rules and Regulations of the Indian Olympic Association?
6. Has plaintiff any cause of action to file the the suit and does it survive now?
In O.S.5 of 1988:
1. Are the President and Secretary General once elected irremovable during a period of four years?
2. is the suit bad for non-joinder of necessary parties viz., the requisitionists?
3. is the suit not maintainable and is plaintiff disentitled to the reliefs sought, having regard to the provisions of the Specific Relief Act?
4. Does the cause of action set up in plaint survive and if not, is the suit liable to be dismissed?
5. Whether the suit brought by plaintiff in the High Court at Calcutta is liable to be dismissed for lack of territorial jurisdiction and in view of Rule 27(c) of the Rules and Regulations of the Indian Olympic Association?
6. Has plaintiff any cause of action to file the suit?
14. These issues had to be framed albeit the clear admission by Shukla that he took his stand on the basis of the sole point urged touching the validity of the proceedings of the General Assembly held on 28th December, 1987 vis-a-vis the power of the General Assembly to pass a vote of no confidence against him but nonetheless the pleadings in all these cases having stood as they were at the origin and neither side having asked for striking them off what is more the defendants, apart from justifying their action as per Ex.D-2, raising alternate pleas touching the maintainability of the suit on the basis of the plaintiff's conduct and on other aspects with particular reference to the discretionary nature of the remedy and the fact that remedy of injunction is an equitable one which does not always obtain ex debito lustitiae, the issues covering all these controversies had to be and in fact have been raised.
15. As already mentioned both sides stipulated that there will be no oral evidence and they would take their stand only on the basis of the documents produced on either side and further agreeing to dispense with proof of those documents. I have already adverted to the galore of documents tendered in evidence by both sides. There will be no occasion for a detailed reference to those documents as during the course of the arguments only a handful of them having been referred to and actually relied on, I shall, therefore, refer to those documents as and when required and at the appropriate places. Suffice it to say that the real issues arising for consideration herein would be:
(1) Whether the General Assembly of the I.O.A. had the power to pass a vote of no confidence motion against the President?
(2) If it did have the power, whether there was any sufffcient cause for passing the no confidence motion against Shukla and whether Shukla had been given the opportunity to defend himself?
(3) Whether the conduct of Shukla was such as to deny him the relief of injunction sought for?
(4) Whether in any view of the matter the discretionary relief of injunction should be refused In the interest of justice?
16. Before I proceed to deal with and dispose off these issues, it is necessary to take note of the fact that atleast two of the suits before me no longer survive and are liable for an inlimine rejection. The suit O.S.4/88 which is by the Madhya Pradesh Olympic Association is directed against the I.O.A. and Randhir Singh to stop the convening of the Meeting scheduled on 28th December, 1987. There was a connected appeal before the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur in M.A. 369/87, which has since been dismissed as having become infructuous after the controversial Meeting had been held. Therefore, without more, the said suit must be dismissed in view of the subsequent event of the Meeting in question having taken place, and there is now no question of stopping the Meeting from being held or restraining the defendants from attending that Meeting. Under these circumstances, O.S.4/88 shall stand dismissed as having become infructuous. Parties are directed to bear and pay their own costs in this suit.
17. Likewise the suit in O.S.3/88 which is again by the Madhya Pradesh Olympic Association has also got to fail in limine because the suit only sought for an injunction against the holding of a Special General Meeting on 28th December, 1987 and transacting the business tabled in the notice dated 20th September, 1987. The Court of the Subordinate Judge in Delhi had granted an injunction in the said suit restraining the parties from discussing the items mentioned in the meeting notice dated 20th September, 1987. What the Court appears to have done is not to stop the Meeting but prevent the transacting of any business in the meeting. This Interim order is said to have been passed on the basis of a concession made on behalf of the I.O.A. represented by the then Secretary General Dr. Anand as defendant No. 2. It is suggested that the suit is wholly collusive in nature as could be seen from the consent so readily given by the defendant to enable the Court to enjoin the meeting on 28th instant not to transact any business as per, the agenda already fixed. This suit will have to go in view of its limited scope and the fact that the march of time has robbed it of all its potential. The suit O.S.3/88, therefore, stands dismissed without any order as to costs for the reasons aforesaid.
18. Therefore, what now remains in final contention are the suits by Shukla in O.S.2/88 which was formerly O.S.2/87 in the District Court, Delhi and C.S.5/88, formerly an unnumbered suit in the Calcutta High Court and O.S.1/88 by R.L. Thakur. Whereas O.S.5/88 filed by the Madhya Pradesh Olympic Association and the suit of Ram Lal Thakur in O.S.1/88, formerly, suit No. 2793/87 in the High Court of Delhi is limited only to the issue of granting an injunction to defendants 2 and 3 in the suit to wit. Shukla and Anand from creating any disturbance in the smooth functioning of the I.O.A. Defendants 4 and 5 therein are Adityan and Randhir Singh, President and Secretary General respectively.
Issue No. 1:-
19. Decks having thus been cleared for the investigation of the major points in controversy in the proceedings, I shall now begin addressing myself to Issue No. 1 in all the suits. Issue No. 1 is the crucial point for consideration and it touches the power of the General Assembly to vote out of office an elected office bearer prematurely and instal in his place somebody else of its choice, pending a general election. It would at this juncture be convenient to make a brief reference to the salient features of the I.O.A. The I.O.A. is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act XXI of 1860. It has a written Constitution. It is also known as 'Bharatiya Olympic Sangh'. Clause I of the Memorandum of Association refers to the name of the Association, Clause II refers to its registered office which is situate at Delhi and Clause III refers to the various objectives of the Society. Rule 1 deals with definitions and explanation and Rule 2 deals with official and financial year. Rules 3 and 4 relate to members and membership fees and Rules 5, 6 and 7 deal with general and special general meetings and notices and quorum for meetings. Rule 8 deals with Elections, Rule 9 refers to the tenure of posts and Rule 10 to holding of office. Rule 11 refers to voting and Rule 12 enumerates the duties of the office bearers. President is designated as the Head of the Association and is required to preside over meetings and guide the association in all its activities. The Rule in particular denotes the powers and responsibilities of the President as:
(i) To Implement the objectives of the Association.
(ii) To deal with disciplinary matters arising in the I.O.A. or in the National Sports Federations/Associations/State Olympic Associations, as per rules on the subject. This would be subject to ratification in the next Executive Council meeting of the Association,
(iii) To ensure that the financial position of the I.O.A. is sound and unauthorised expenditure is not incurred. The President, IOA, is authorised to sanction expenditure upto Rs. 10,000/- for any one item. Expenditure in excess of Rs. 10,000/- but upto Rs. 50,000/- will be sanctioned/regularised by the Executive Council. Beyond the limit of Rs. 50,000/- the expenditure is to be sanctioned/regularised by the IOA General Assembly.
(iv) The President, IOA is to ensure that the various business meetings, as required under the Constitution, have been duly held.
Rule 12(b) deals with the duties and responsibilities of the Vice President. It states that in the event of prolonged absence of the President, a Vice President nominated by the President will take over the duties and responsibilities of the President during the absence. Rule 12(c) deals with the powers and functions of the Secretary General, Rule 12(d) deals with the duties of the Joint Secretaries, and Rule 12(e) with those of the Treasurer. Rule 12(f) deals with the duties and powers of the Paid Assistant Secretary. Rule 13 refers to the Bank Account and Rule 14A to the powers, functions and duties of the General Assembly, 14B refers to the powers, functions and duties of the Executive Council and Rule 14C refers to the powers, functions and duties of the Finance Commission and Rule 14D relates to the powers, functions and duties of other Commissions. Rule 15 refers to the qualification of the representatives and Rule 16 refers to the eligibility code. Rule 17 relates to the amendment of Rules and regulations whereas Rule 18 relates to general disciplinary regulations. Rule 19 refers to settlement of disputes/conflicts in the National Sports Federation/State Olympic Associations. Rule 20 relates to disciplinary sanctions. Rule 20 refers to imposition of disciplinary sanctions on member units and enjoins that penalty shall not be imposed without giving a hearing to the erring member and suspension as a Rule is treated as a temporary measure except in special circumstances. It also lays down that disciplinary action should be sanctioned by 2/3 majority of the General Assembly-Rule 21 refers to Appeals, Rule 22 to imposition of sanctions on sportsmen for unsportsman-like behaviour and act of violence. Rule 23 refers to the residual powers of the executive committee regarding the Rules of discipline. Rule 24 refers to making of officiating arrangements by the President of Indian Olympic Association. Rule 25 refers to disaffiliation, de-recognition, suspension of Sports Federations, Associations and State Olympic Associations. Rule 26 relates to expulsion of an individual or group of individuals from the National Sports Federations, Associations and State Olympic Associations. Rule 27 relates to the miscellaneous matters. The Constitution has a list appended to it with the Indian Olympic Association indicating that 29 Sports Federations and 20 Olympic Associations are Members of the General Assembly of the Association, each of them represented by 2 or 3 persons as Members of the General Assembly, depending on the numerical strength and size of the unit of the Olympic Association. This in brief is the summation of the Constitution of the I.O.A. and hence forward, wherever necessary, reference will be made to the appropriate provision of the Constitution in a little detail If need be.
20. Suffice it to note that there is no specific provision as such in the Constitution of the association for passing a no confidence motion against an office bearer. This in fact is the chief grievance of plaintiff Shukla who, assails the action now resorted to by the General Assembly to unseat him from the office of the President as wholly ultra vires of its powers. It is also urged inter alia that the scheme of the Constitution is such that it does not even permit the inferring of any such power for removing an office bearer by expressing want of no confidence in him by the General Assembly. Yet another submission made is that removal of an office bearer from the office by expressing no confidence in him is akin to the power of amotion which is peculiar to a statutory corporation and is generally implied as power inherent in every Such corporation to conduce to good administration and management. The submission on behalf of Shukla is that the I.O.A. being an non-statutory body such power of amotion neither obtains explicitly or impliedly and that In any view of the matter there is absolutely no scope for inferring the existence of such a power since the scheme of the Constitution of the Association does not lend itself for spelling out any such power by implication as well. A few decisions have been cited in support of this proposition on behalf of the plaintiff. It is then urged that even granting that there is such a power of amotion in a body like the I.O.A. it has however got to be exercised for a cause and after due notice thereof, to the office bearer against whom amotion is being made. This requirement is enjoined to be an absolute one and" admittedly no cause having been shown for removing Shukla from office, it is urged on his behalf that divesting Shukla of the office of the President of the I.O.A. was, therefore, otiose in law. Joining in the defendants answer this move for derailing the resolution of the General Assembly ousting Shukla and Anand from office by pointing out that the procedure of ousting an office bearer from office by amotion is not the exclusive preserve of a statutory corporation alone but such power of amotion can also be exercised by a non-statutory body like the I.O.A. and that power of amotion is inherent even in a non-statutory body. On behalf of Shukla it is next pointed out that in the case of an office bearer holding an office which has a fixed tenure amotion can only be for a cause and after due notice being given of such a move and the amotee being heard before the passing of a resolution of amotion. It was argued that the term of office of Shukla on his election in the year 1984 as President being for a four years period under Rule 9 he could not, therefore, be removed without there beYng any cause and in other words he could not have been amoved from office without any cause being pleaded and putforward in support thereof. The notice served by the requisitionists on Shukla calling upon him to convene a Special General Body Meeting to discuss a no confidence motion alleging that members had lost confidence in him because of his arbitrary style of functioning and the minute Ex.D-2 by which the no confidence motion is said to have been carried through pointedly making no reference to the deficiencies found in Shukla requiring his removal from office, the argument put forward is Shukla who could, in any view of the matter, be removed only for a cause had been purportedly removed without any cause at all and in consequence the exercise of power by the General Assembly in those circumstances is clearly illegal and abominable in law. The defendants as I have stated earlier sought to meet this objection by pointing out that I.O.A. being a non-statutory entity, being a simple body registered under the Societies Registration Act without becoming a creature of the statute was not tied up by the hide-bound rules and technicalities affecting a statutory corporation and that it enjoyed more freedom in relation to its internal management. It is urged that while it can take the benefit of all the inputs going into the efficient management and organisation of a statutory corporation, it enjoyed greater freedom and latitude to weed out from its body elements whose continued presence was considered detrimental to the interest of the organisation. In other words, according to them, a non-statutory corporation or body enjoyed all the advantages bestowed on a statutory corporation without being subject to restraints that blinker exercise of power and authority by a statutory corporation and can do all that a statutory body can do but at the same time remain free to take whatever action a statutory corporation can take without its power being gagged by explicit or implied bars. In support of this contention, Sri. Sundaraswamy for the defendants relied on an array of authorities apart from the statement of the law made in Halsbury's and other texts.
21. Before I go into this controversy regarding the nature and scope of the power of amotion and to examine as to what extent the said power is available in the present context I shall first ascertain whether there is anything in the Constitution of the Indian Olympic Association itself that bars either specifically or by implication, exercise of authority by the General Assembly to remove some one from office before the scheduled annual elections for the purpose of electing office bearers, is held.
22. In the context, it is necessary to keep in mind, concerned as we are presently with the office of the President of the Olympic Association, that the President is elected during the Annual General Body Meeting which is held only once in four years. Rule 8 may be recalled in this behalf. It reads:
"Elections:
A. Elections shall be held once in four years at the Annual General Meeting (Annual Meeting of the General Assembly) to elect the Executive Council members as shown below, from amongst the representatives of the members present.
i) A President;
ii) Nine Vice-Presidents;
iii) A Secretary General;
iv) Six Joint Secretaries;
v) A Treasurer.
vi) Seven Members elected from among the Representatives of State Olympic Associations; and
vii) Twelve Members elected from among the representatives of National Sports Federations/Associations/S.S.C.B."
A reading of the foregoing rule in all its conspectus makes it clear that it is only at an Annual General Body Meeting that an election for electing certain office bearers could be held and that happens only once in every four years. The scheme makes it clear that a Special Annual General Meeting can be held at any time but it is only at the Annual General Body Meeting held at an interval of 4 years that election of the office bearers can be gone through. In contrast a Special General Body Meeting can be called by the President on his own or at the request of 15 members and in that Meeting only specified subjects can be discussed. It is important to notice that in a Special General Body Meeting no election can be held. From these provisions an argument is built that the President once elected into office has got to last till another election is held at the end of four years Implying that there cannot be a new President in office between such elections. Contention is that the President is given an irreducible tenure of four years and such a tenure having been given in virtue of the election held at the Annual General Body Meeting that tenure cannot be broken up by a General Body Meeting specially convened for passing a vote of no confidence in an office bearer. It is then pointed out the result of expressing no confidence in the President has the effect of expelling him from office and the power of expulsion is liable to be exercised only by the Executive Council and that too following the procedure of issuing notice, according the opportunity of hearing etc. Proceeding next it is argued the fixity of tenure is so well entrenched in the Constitution of the association, the position of an office-bearer remains unshaken even if the accreditation given to a member by a federate unit is subsequently withdrawn. Such withdrawal of accreditation would not result in the cessation of office held by such a member either in the executive Council or as President, Secretary, Secretary General etc. and so would not result in creating an hiatus in the office if any held by the member under the Association, indicating thus the absence of the power of recall. Therefore, it is urged removal of Shukla from the office of the President could not have been achieved at all by expressing want of confidence in him since the electorate did not have the power for recalling Shukla from the Presidentship. Lastly it is argued very strongly that the modalities of exercising the power of vote of no confidence should be available before any such power could be exercised and especially so where such modalities are totally absent and not provided for in the Constitution, can there be exercise of such power at all is the question asked. It is urged that a man elected by a 2/3 majority must be certainly unseated by a like majority voting against him but if, on the other hand, he is permitted to be removed by a simple majority it would be making a travesty of law and justice. In the reply for the plaintiff which featured more than one Counsel beginning with Mr. Holla starting the reply and continued by the learned Advocate General, both of them laid great stress on the rule of law being the axiomatic base of all democratic institutions and urging that the I.O.A. being one such institution conduct of whose affairs underscored application and adoption of democratic measures, it was urged, the deposing of the President by resorting to a non-confidence motion should not be countenanced as existence of such a power was significant by its omission, and should therefore never be implied nor treated as inherent in the body.
23. With equal fervour Mr. Sundaraswamy submits that if we are to administer the Rule of law, it would be paradoxical to suggest that a body or organisation structured on laudable principles of democracy should be told to suffer an autocratic regime without expressing its collective will in protest because its Constitution did not make a specific provision for demurring against authoritarian rule or autocratic behaviour. It was pointed out by Mr. Sundaraswamy that good administration and management of an organisation necessarily required the power or authority to weed out from office any appointee, even if by election, in whom those responsible for his election had lost confidence and removal of such a person from office by expressing want of confidence in him was in the best traditions of democracy and democratic institutions. Thus the argument put forward finds itself raised to the sublime claims of Rule of Law, democracy and resistance to authoritarian Rule as juxtaposed to plain Rules of construction and testing the impugned action on the basis of its vires.
24. It seems to me, notwithstanding these nuances of political philosophy from which very often law is not divorced, the solution to the problem lies in the first instance by looking into the Constitution of the Association itself to see whether the scheme vis-a-vis its aims and objectives is such as to be wholly insulated against granting of power to a body electing a person into office from taking it away from him or her, being dissatisfied with that person for whatever reason it may be. If democracy is to be given a free play and if it can be said that democracy is the base of these institutions and Sports Organisations, providing as it does for electing office bearers who are responsible for administering the sports activities, a question that may well be asked is as to why the power of expressing displeasure at the style of functioning of an office bearer elected to an office cannot be ceded to the body of persons who are responsible for putting him or her, into that office. It seems somewhat hard to deny to the source that created an authority in a person either to prevent that person from exercising that authority or to take away from him the source of the exercise of such authority. It is one thing to say that in any given case exercise of authority was not bonafide and such exercise of power is ultravires. But, whether such a power does or does not exist at all being the question for consideration, that issue has to be examined with reference to the scheme of the Constitution of that body. As I have pointed out earlier the argument putforward by the plaintiff in favour of not inferring such a power to remove an office bearer in between elections scheduled to be held only once in four years, is first of all traced to the fact that the elections held for electing an office bearer are scheduled to be held only once in every four years and not before. It is, therefore, urged that every office bearer is bound to remain in office for four years. Thus, it is contended the omission to provide for a contigency like this being somewhat telling, due credence should be given to the framers of the Constitution in that behalf. Reference in this connection is made to the following decisions in support.
(1) LAKSHMI NARAIN MISRA v. MUNICIPAL BOARD AND ORS1962 ALJ 113.
(2) VEERAMACHANENI VENKATA NARAYANA v. THE DEPUTY REGISTRAR OF CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES, ELURU, WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT AND ORS ILR 1975 AP 242.
(3) HAJI ANWAR AHMED KHAN v. PUNJAB WAKF BOARD .
25. Before I deal with these decisions, it becomes necessary in the first instance to deal with the argument addressed that a person elected as an office bearer to an office having a fixed term of four years, that four years remained an irreducible minimum because of elections being held only once in four years. It is desirable in this context once again to refer to Rule 9 which reads:
"(i) An office-bearer of the Association may hold office as such for one term of four years on obtaining simple majority votes in the election".
The plain construction of the above Rule merely indicates that a person elected to office may remain in office for one term of 4 years but it does not mean that he has got to remain in office for the entire term of four years nor is there an inseparable fusion between the holder of an office and that term of 4 years. Such construction becomes implausible as its acceptance would mean that an office bearer cannot get rid of the office at all until the expiry of four years time, implying thereby he could not even demit office by resigning. It is significant to notice that the Constitution of the I.O.A. does not make a provision for ceding of office by resignation. The question may then arise whether a person elected as office bearer for a four year term cannot at all resign but then the plaintiffs do not support such a stand. According to them, albeit the written tenure of four years, demission of office on ones own volition by resignation is not excluded, it being the natural right and power of the holder. Omission to provide for such a contingency does not render it impermissible for the holder to throw off the yoke of office at will. It is argued that the bar, if any, is only against the removal of an office bearer from office by others, prematurely and before the completion of 4 years term. Per contra the argument of the defendants is that the four year limit does not spell out any tenure in the holder but merely indicates the outer limit beyond which a person cannot hold office. It is pointed out that regard being had to the language of the Rule, the employing of the word 'may' clearly indicates a choice for the holder of office to either continue for the full term or for demitting it earlier. It is, therefore, urged that in such a case fixity of tenure cannot be treated as a bulwark or an obstacle against removal before the expiry of the four year period. Reliance in this connection is placed on the meaning of the word 'tenure', as stated in Blacks 'Legal Dictionary' and Ramanath Iyer's 'Law Lexicon'. In Black's 'Legal Dictionary' 5th Edition Page 1317 the definition of tenure is stated as follows:
"Tenure: Generally, tenure is a right, term, or mode of holding or occupying, and 'tenure of an office' means the manner in which it is held, especially with regard to time."
In Ramanath Iyer's 'Law Lexicon' 'tenure' is defined as:
"The word 'tenure' when used in connection with the expression 'tenure of office' means the term of office."
The above definitions in the legal dictionaries clearly denote fixity as a period denoting the time frame for holding office. The question herein is whether there is such a fixity of tenure in the case of a person appointed as President by election to that office for which election is held only once in four years. Reference in this connection may be made to the words 'filling up' of vacancies in the Executive Council or in the case of an office held by an office bearer in between two general elections. The void is filled up by co-option by the Executive Council from amongst the members of the Executive Council or from amongst the members of the General Assembly. This becomes apparent from the power of the Executive Council vide, Sub-rule (E) of Rule 8. This Rule read with Rule 9 spelling out the alleged tenure, makes it clear that a person need not be in office for the whole period of four years and in case for any reason a hiatus occurs the void is made good by co-option at the instance of the Executive Council from amongst the Members of the Executive and the General Council. Apparently the Constitution of the association is somewhat flexible and pliant probably being a sports organisation it is made deliberately pliable so that there may be room for innovation depending upon exigencies. It, therefore, seems to me that the reference to the four year term in Rule 9 is not a mandatory fixation of duration of office but it is merely the limit beyond which the holder of the office cannot remain which means in between he can quit and if he can quit it seems to me he can also be removed. There appears to be fundamentally no reason to assert a fixed and irreducible tenure in an office bearer elected at one Annual General Body Meeting and who is expected to continue till the next General Body Meeting is held for the purpose of electing office bearers, which is done once in four years.
26. The learned Advocate General in the course of his reply while on the question of fixity of tenure referred to the provisions of the Constitution of India providing for holding of office by President of India and the Vice President of India for fixed period. Article 56 reads:
"56. (1) The President shall hold office for a term of five years from the date on which he enters upon his office:
Provided that --
(a) The President may, by writing under his hand addressed to the Vice-President, resign his office;
(b) the President may, for violation of the Constitution, be removed from office by impeachment in the manner provided in Article 61;
(c) the President shall, notwithstanding the expiration of his term, continue to hold office until his successor enters upon his office.
(2) Any resignation addressed to the Vice-President under Clause (a) of the proviso to Clause (1) shall forthwith be communicated by him to the Speaker of the House of the People."
Similarly Article 67 stipulates that the Vice-President shall hold office for a term of 5 years from the date on which he enters the office and can demit his office by writing under his hand addressed to the President. He can also resign his office and he can also be removed from office by a resolution of the Council of States passed by a majority of alt the then members of the Council and agreed to by the House of the People; but no resolution for the purpose of this clause shall be moved unless atleast fourteen days' notice has been given of the intention to move the resolution. The Constitution of India further enjoins the Vice-President to continue in office until his successor enters upon his office, notwithstanding the expiration of his terms. It seems to me there is a world of difference between the provisions of Articles 57 and 67 of the Constitution of India which provide for the appointment of President and Vice-President making it very clear they will hold office for a fixed period of five years subject of course to voluntary demission by resignation or removal during that period by an appropriate measure enjoined by those very provisions. Contrasted with Rule 9 of the Constitution of the I.O.A. what is quite evident is the absence of any indication of the period span being limited to a numerical term specifically, as in the case of the President of India and the Vice-President of India. But then the fact that an office bearer can and may remain in office during the interval of four years between one election and another does not amount to fixing a tenure in the holder for a period of four years as enjoined in the case of the President and the Vice-President of India, who are specifically empowered to hold office for a period of five years from the date of entering office. In this manner - it cannot be said that an office bearer elected by the General Assembly once in four years holds office for a period of four years and is considered to be a holder of a specified tenure. This being the apriori enunciation, warranted by the language of the Rule itself, let me now go to the authorities cited by Mr. Nariman in support of his contention that in a case like this one who holds an office for an irreducible period of tenure cannot be removed prematurely. The first ruling relied on by him is Lakshmi Narain Misra v. Municipal Board. That was a case in which a Vice-President of a Municipal Board after his election in the month of May, 1960 was sought to be removed from office by a resolution of the Municipal Board recorded in the month of June, 1960 resolving to cancel the election of the Vice-President made on 7th May, 1960. The resolution of the Board removing him from office was successfully canvassed before the High Court which held:
"A Vice-President is elected by a special resolution under Section 54(1) and under Sub-section (2) thereof his term of office is one year from the date of his election or the residue of the term of his office as a member of the Board, whichever is less. The words of the sub-section are absolute and they provide for an irreducible tenure, except in case of death or resignation. There appears to be nothing in the object and context of Section 54 to show that the tenure is liable to be cut down in any other manner. The general power of cancelling a resolution is thus obviously inconsistent with the statutory grant of a fixed and irreducible term of office to the Vice-President."
The above decision was rendered in the context of the provisions of the Municipal Board Act under which the Vice-President voted into office, was entitled to remain in office for a period of one year. It is, therefore, clear that by a subsequent resolution the Municipal Council could not unseat the Vice-President by passing a resolution cancelling the election of the Vice-President earlier. Obviously the council did not have such powers under the Act. There is little gainsay In denying that the Municipality unlike the I.O.A. herein is a creature of the statute and its powers and authority are drawn from the statute. Clearly where it has none, it cannot exercise authority to undo or unmake whatever had been done under the statute. Therefore, if a Vice-President is elected under the statute for a period of one year, the Municipality could not undo that election by passing any other resolution resulting in rescinding or repealing the earlier resolution. Exercise of power against the express provision of the statute could not be inferred at all. Thus, the decision holding the later resolution of the Municipality as ultra vires was clearly well warranted. I do not see how this ruling can be of assistance to us in the investigation of the powers of the I.O.A. under its Constitution.
27. The next decision relied on is a Bench decision of the Andhra High Court in Venkata Narayana v. Dy. Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Eluru. That was an appeal from the Judgment of a single Judge in VENKATARATHNAM v. DISTRICT COLLECTOR, NELLORE , the question being whether the members of the Executive Committee of a Co-operative Society, in the absence of any provision in the Act for moving a motion expressing want of confidence in the President of the Managing Committee, could move such a resolution on the assumption that there was such an implied power. Earlier the learned Single Judge having upheld the existence of such a power in the Committee, on appeal the Bench, disagreeing with the learned Single Judge, held:
"There is no implied power in the committee members to express want of confidence in the President or any office bearer and replace him."
It was further held:
"Omissions in statutes are not to be lightly inferred. No doubt it is the duty of the Court to try and harmonise the various provisions of an Act passed by the Legislature. But it is certainly not the duty of the Court to stretch the words used by the Legislature to fill in gaps or omissions in the provisions of an Act."
Mr. Sundaraswamy in contending against this decision relied on the decision of the Single Judge in Venkataratnam v. District Collector Nellore, and commenced for my consideration the view point that appealed to the learned Single Judge who implied such a power under Section 31(2)(a) of the Act in question in that case. His views in that behalf are collected and reproduced at page 251 of the Report as follows:
"True there is no specific provision in the Act empowering the Committee of Directors of a Co-operative Society to pass a no confidence motion against the President or to replace him before the terra of the Committee. But considering the democratic and co-operative principles underlying the co-operative law, it could not be said that the absence of a specific provision debars the committee of management from changing its office bearers in whom they have no confidence."
The learned Judges of the Division Bench did not agree with the above proposition and went on to point out that omissions in a statute is not to be lightly inferred and supplied by Courts. Apart from the fact that the above case was one in which the question was whether any residual power can be implied in the statute to which any action to be taken is ultimately traceable to, it seems to me that the consideration that prevailed therein was treating the exercise of expression of want of confidence as a measure adopted to expel a member from office. It looks as if the Court in the said case viewed the matter as a punitive measure and, therefore, the question mooted was whether such a power could be implied when the statute itself was silent in that respect. Possibly if the Division Bench had also taken the view as the learned single Judge appears to have done, bearing in mind that the action taken for removing an office bearer for want of confidence was in keeping with democratic and co-operative principles, underlying the co-operative law and not being merely punitive in nature, very likely the Bench also might have thought fit to agree with the learned Single Judge. Any how it is not necessary to go into this controversy and suffice it to note in the facts of that case the question treated as having arisen for consideration being of specific power for authorising the action taken, limitations against exercise of power in that behalf by implication had to be read in and therefore cannot be said to be unwarranted. At any rate the decision in the said case does not assist the plaintiffs.
28. The last decision cited in this connection is Haji Anwar Ahmed Khan v. Punjab Wakf Board. In that case, the question for consideration was whether a Chairman of a Wakf Board can be removed by passing a vote of no confidence motion against him and a new Chairman elected in his place. Under the Rules, there was no provision for convening a meeting for passing a vote of no confidence against the Chairman but relying upon Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, it was held that a meeting for expressing want of confidence in the Chairman can be called and no confidence motion passed against him just as a meeting was convened for electing a new Board Member or Chairman into office. Their Lordships had occasion to consider the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Venkataratnam's case and appear to have dissented therefrom. Paras 5 to 7 deal with the question. They read:
"As regards the first argument that there is no power with the members of the Board to express lack of confidence in the Chairman once elected in the first meeting of the Board after its Constitution under Rule 6 of the Rules, we are inclined to hold that there is no merit in this contention. The arguments that since there is no specific power given to the members of the Board to express lack of confidence in the Chairman after he is elected in the first meeting of the Board and, therefore, such power should be taken to be non-existent loses sight of the fact that in view of the provisions of Article 372(1) of the Constitution of India, part of common law based on the Rules of "justice, equity and good conscience" as suited to the genius of this Country is applicable in India. This was so held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, State of West Bengal v. Corporation of Calcutta, . It is accepted principle of common law relating to the removal of the holder of an office that the body which was authority to elect its Chairman has the inherent and implied power to remove the Chairman. If the Chairman holds his office at pleasure, then he can be removed at will, but if he holds his office otherwise than at pleasure, he can be removed only for cause after notice and hearing. In view of the principles of common law stated above, until and unless there is a provision in the statute bearing the removal of the Chairman by a vote of no confidence, it has to be held that the members who had the power to elect the Chairman have the power to remove the Chairman by a majority of votes. This principle is also enshrined in the provisions of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. A body of persons which has the power to elect its Chairman, has the power to remove him until and unless there is any bar signified in the provisions of the statute itself. The view which we are taking finds ample support from a Judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Bar Council of Delhi v. Bar Council of India, New Delhi 1, . In that case Their Lordships of the Delhi High Court came to the conclusion that in view of the application of common law principles and that there being no provision in the statute, barring the passing of no confidence motion, the Bar Council had the jurisdiction to frame a Rule providing for the convening of a meeting for the purpose of passing no confidence motion against the Chairman of the Bar Council.
6. Mr. Sibal, learned Counsel for the petitioner, relies on a Division Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Venkata Narayana v. Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Eluru ILR (1975) Andhra Pradesh 242, to contend that in case there is no express provision in the statute providing for passing a no-confidence motion, the said powers cannot be inferred as the Court cannot add or subtract anything to or from the statute. The learned Counsel contends that since there is no provision in the Act for removal of the Chairman by the members of their expressing lack of confidence, therefore, the petitioner who was duly elected Chairman, could not be removed. We have very carefully gone through this Judgment and with all respects to the learned Judges, we are unable to agree with the view taken therein. The main stress in that Judgment is on the principle that it is not the duty of the Court to stretch the words used by the Legislature to fill in gaps or omission in the provisions of an Act. This principle is unexceptional, but their Lordships did not consider the effect of the application of principles of common law as applicable in India in view of the provisions of Article 372(1) of the Constitution of India. That being so, we are of the opinion that the view taken in this Judgment is not the correct view of the law of the land".
I am in respectful agreement with the foregoing enunciation. It may be noticed that their Lordships had followed the decision of Delhi High Court in A.I.R. 1975 Delhi, 2008, holding that the Bar Council could frame a Rule prescribing the procedure for calling a meeting for expressing no confidence against the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Bar Council. In another context I shall refer to this decision of the Delhi High Court again. It may thus be seen that the judicial precedents relied on to support a case of irreducible tenure and a case of irremovability before the expiry of the term of office do not assist that exercise.
29. The endeavour made for shearing up the stand in favour of a bar against implying the existence of power to remove an office bearer before his time is up, has a few more facets and I shall now deal with them. It is argued the power of expulsion of a member and the authority to direct the exit of a member was only with the Executive Council and, therefore, a submission is made the expressing no confidence in the President amounts to expulsion from office and that power is exercisable by the Executive Council only and could not have been accepted in the General Meeting. Suffice it to note the ouster of President from office as a result of the no confidence motion while it may result in loss of office does not result in his expulsion from Membership of the Association. There is in law a well defined distinction between the removal of an officer or an official representative from depriving that person of membership of the body corporate. This appears to be the essential difference between emotion which means to remove from a post or station and expulsion which accounts to deprivation of membership in a body corporate. See in this connection the connotation of the word 'Amotion' and its meaning in Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, Pages 76 and 77:
"Amotion: A putting or turning out, as the eviction of a tenant or a removal from office. Dispossession of lands. Ouster is an amotion of possession.. A moving or carrying away; the wrongful taking of personal chattels.
In Corporation Law, the act of removing an Officer, or official representative, of a Corpt ration from his office or official station before the end of the term for which he was elected or appointed, but without depriving him of membership in the body corporate. In this last respect the term differs from "disfrachisement" or "expulsion".
It, therefore, becomes clear in legal terminology there is certainly a difference between loss of office and loss of membership of a body corporate. In the instant case Shukla may have lost the office of the President of the Indian Olympic Association but has not been removed or expelled from the association itself. He continued to be a member of the I.O.A. and, therefore, it cannot be said that his ouster from office amounts to expulsion under the Constitution of the Association. It is then pointed out that in the case of an office bearer who is voted into office by the General Assembly from amongst its members, the withdrawal of accredition on the basis of which a person enters the General Assembly of the Association will, however, not result in the deprivation of the office held by that person in the executive body of that Association. On the basis of this development it is argued that even where the parent body desires not to support the person representing it in the General Assembly, that person will not however lose his credibility with the Association and continues to be a member of the Executive Council till the next election and will thus remain unaffected by the machinations of his parent body. On the basis of this Rule the argument putforward is that once a person gets into the Executive Council and otherwise becomes an office bearer, he remains there unmoved and continues even against the wishes of his own parent body being against the continuance of that person as a representative in the General Assembly, becoming imperilled because of withdrawal of accreditation. The precise argument led is under the Constitution of the I.O.A. there is no power of recall. The fact that such a power of recall does not exist means very little in the context of the question under consideration. It has got to be noticed that once a person is elected to the membership of the Executive Council by the General Assembly he or she becomes an office bearer of the I.O.A. and that status he or she will continue to enjoy till the post held by that person is filled afresh consequent on the occurring of a vacancy. Otherwise such continuance cannot suffer any aberration by the withdrawal of the accreditation by the parent association by the recall of that person from the I.O.A. A person, it must be remembered, first gets into the General Assembly as an authorised representative of a federate unit and is thereafter voted into some office by the General Assembly. His position as an office bearer cannot be attributed to the acts of the body which sponsored his entry into the General Assembly of the I.O.A. What has got to be noticed is that an office bearer elected into office is different from a Member of the General Assembly and a person who is elected from the General Assembly as an office bearer cannot, thereafter, be amenable to the pervading influence of the sponsoring unit although he might have gained access to the General Assembly with the support of one such sponsor. Therefore, it is, thus, clear that the argument of withdrawal of accreditation not affecting a holder of office in the Executive Council has little impact on the point under consideration.
30. In the same strain the further argument put forward more parenthetically is on the basis of the requirement of Rule 9(2) which permits an office bearer to seek office for a further term of four years subject to being returned by a 2/3 majority of the members present during voting. On the basis of this Rule it is contended that a person voted into office for a second time on the basis of 2/3rds majority cannot be removed by passing a vote of no confidence motion by a simple majority. It is pointed out from the totality of the constitutional framework of the Association no modality has been laid down to cover the case of voting a person elected for a second time, out of office by expressing want of confidence in him. In other words, the argument is there being nothing in the Constitution providing for an exigency like the one under advertence, we had reached a blind end in any view of the matter because for one thing the Regulations did not lay down any prescribed modality in that whether it could be done only by 2/3rd majority which was a minimum requirement or by a simple majority. The argument is that if a person had to be elected by 2/3rd majority he cannot be made to shed that office unless a 2/3 percentage of persons constituting the majority had again expressed their displeasure and voted against him. In those circumstances, it is said that groping as we are in the dark in the absence of precise modalities and yard-sticks, it would be much safer to infer that the Constitution did, not merely not specifically authorise voting a person out of office by expressing no confidence in him, even impliedly did not sanction adoption of such a technique. It seems to me the argument as, aforesaid, merely blows out of proportion a very small hump that can be tided over easily. It is trite law that if there is authority to exercise power that authority may be either explicit or implicit but if what is missing is the procedure regulating the mode of exercise of power or authority, it is for the source of that power or source of that authority to determine as to how best it should exercise such power or authority. The mere absence of specific modality laying down a discernable pattern for the exercise of that power cannot lead, as urged herein, to a total denudation of the power itself. There cannot be any argument suggesting that merely because the pattern of voting during a no confidence motion not being stipulated in the Constitution was an indication of the absence of the right to move a vote of no confidence, it seems to me that the leap forward to this conclusion tries to cover a great leeway in between and must, therefore, necessarily find itself grounded as an argument without substance.
31. If the General Assembly has the power to elect a person into office and chooses for its own reasons to remove him from office and for that purpose a Meeting is convened, then as to how the business of removing that person from office and what are the modalities to be adopted in that behalf are all matters essentially for that Meeting to decide. It certainly has the power to adopt any particular method and cannot be denied of that power to choose whatever mode it likes. In a different context the High Court of England in the case of BRADLAUGH v. GOSSETT 1983-84 QBD Vol 12 held that in matters relating to internal management touching the procedure of the House of Commons the Court had no power to interfere. That was a case in which one Bradlaugh had been returned to the Parliament from a constituency in Northampton. After his election Bradlaugh reported to the House and asked the Speaker to swear him in as he was entitled by law to take the oath of office. The Speaker did not administer oath to Bradlaugh although law enjoined on him that duty and instead by a Resolution of the House of Commons, the Sargent of the House was directed to exclude Bradlaugh from the House until he undertook not to disturb the proceedings of the House. After Bradlaugh ascertained from the Sargent himself as to whether he had been enjoined to prevent him entry into the House for the purpose of taking his seat, if necessary by force, the Sargent having affirmed his intention of doing so tilt he was otherwise instructed by the Speaker, Bradlaugh took the matter to Court seeking a declaration that the Resolution of the House preventing him from taking his seat was null and void and interalia seeking an injunction restraining the Sargent at Arms from preventing him by force from entering the House and taking the oath as a Member. The Court then held that whatever is done within the walls of the Parliament is not liable for examination elsewhere and the House had exclusive jurisdiction to decide or regulate the course of its own proceedings. It is in this context Lord Justice Stephen made the classical statement "where there is no legal remedy, there is no legal wrong". I have only referred to this decision to point out that in these internal matters, touching the regulation of business etc., the body conducting the business is supreme and there is no question of any ultravires action, because it was doing something not provided for by its own Constitution. It would certainly be a different thing if under its Constitution, the I.O.A. had been expressly debarred from passing a vote of no confidence or the Constitution had specifically provided for the manner and mode of moving a vote of no confidence and had provided for modalities for its exercise. The Constitution has not provided for any of these things and, therefore, there is no basis for inferring any excessive exercise of authority or power. Thus the question of vires of the action does not arise at all. It is clearly a matter of internal organisation and is out of bounds so far as this Court is concerned as pointed out a century ago by the Queen's Bench in Bradlaugh's case referred to supra. Having in this manner considered all the arguments against implying power to remove an office bearer from office in between general elections, it has not been possible for me to find either specifically or impliedly any bar for the exercise of such power by the General Assembly under the Constitution of the I.O.A.
32. I now go on to the question which indeed is the core of the controversy between the two sides in that whether the power of removal of an office bearer from office which is akin to the power of amotion of an Officer of a Corporation and is treated as generally existing in all statutory corporations as an incidental or an inherent power, the exercise of which in the case of Corporation is found necessary in the interest of good administration and governance is available herein. A further facet of this power of amotion is said to come into reckoning touching the mode of its exercise depending once again on the nature of the office held in that whether the office was held by the holder thereof at pleasure of the corporate body or it was held for a fixed number of years spelling out a tenure in that office. The contention is if the office was held, over a fixed period of tenure then amotion in that case could only be for a valid cause and power itself can be exercised only after giving due notice to the office holder and giving a further opportunity to the affected person of being heard before the axe fell on him. In support of this contention, the argument led is the I.O.A. not being a company incorporated under the Companies Act or a statutory Corporation regulated by any statute it did not, therefore, have the power of amotion which is peculiar only to a statutory entity. Even otherwise it is urged granting that the I.O.A. had the power of amotion then it could have been exercised only for a valid cause and not without cause as it has now happened. This argument is sought to be supported by pointing out that the erstwhile President Shukla had been elected into office for a period of four years and, therefore, had to his credit a fixed period of tenure and hence his amoval could have been brought about only for a valid cause. It is argued that the no confidence motion moved against Shukla, as recorded in Ex.D-2, did not suggest any cause at all and consequently the amotion from office of Shukla must be treated as invalid and non-est in law. This argument has little of merit now that I have held that Shukla did not have any such fixed tenure and merely because he was allowed to be in office in between the elections held once in four years the interregnum did not spell out a fixed tenure of four years to the holder. Therefore, the argument that the resolution for amoval of the President could in this case have been only for a cause and no cause having been shown, amotion is invalid must stand rejected without more.
33. But then the contention the I.O.A. did not have the power of amotion since it was not a statutory Corporation still survives and needs to be considered now. In order to decide this question, somewhat vexed in nature, it is desirable to note in the first instance what is 'amotion', what is its nature, content and how it is effected. In Halsbury's Law of England, 4th Edition, Volume 9 para 1266 at page 751 reference is made to the power of amotion under the heading 'Vacation of Office'. It reads:
"Amotion means depriving a corporate officer of his office. A power of amotion is incident to a Corporation, unless it has been taken away by statute. It is necessary to the good order and Government of corporate bodies that there should be such a power, and a Corporation may by its incidental power to make byelaws confer upon itself power to amove for just cause, although there is no express power by the charter or prescription to make such a Byelaw.
A power to amove is strictly interpreted. Thus the word 'majority' will, in connection with such a power, be construed to mean a majority of the whole Corporation, including the persons to be amoved".
Para 1267 deals with 'Effect of forfeiture'. It reads:
"Where a person has been duly admitted to a corporate office and by some act or circumstances has forfeited it, the mere act or circumstance does not operate as a vacation of the office, but the holder must be duly amoved therefrom by the Corporation or other competent Authority, although this cannot as a rule be done until the officer has been heard in his defence, or at least had noticed of the intention to remove him."
Para 1268 refers to removal of a life officer. It has no bearing on the question now under consideration having regard to my finding that the plaintiff-Shukla had no fixed term or tenure. But para 1269 refers to 'Removal of Officer at Will' and states:
"Where a person is appointed to and holds an office at the will of the Corporation, he may be removed from it at the will of the Corporation, which may be signified to him by mere declaration by the Competent Authority, though in some cases it may be that the declaration must be under the corporate seal.
The surrender of the charter will operate to determine an office held under it during pleasure; but a Judgment given against a Corporation 'that the liberties thereof be seized into the King's hands', does not operate as an amotion of its officers."
If it could be said that the I.O.A. had the power of amotion and removal of Shukla from office was an act of amotion then I would say that he could have been removed at will because he was not the holder of an office having a fixed tenure. Para 1271 refers to causes of amotion which is again not relevant for the purpose of these suits.
34. But as I have already pointed out the power of amotion is denied to this Association because it is not a statutory Corporation and it is said that the power of amotion is incidental and relatable to the powers of a statutory Corporation alone. But Mr. Sundaraswamy, points out that so far as powers and liabilities are concerned they are general and common both to statutory and non-statutory Corporations. He urges that in the case of non-statutory Corporation or body, which the I.O.A. is, such a non-statutory Corporation can do everything that an individual can do unless inhibited directly or indirectly by a statute. Mr. Sundaraswamy, relies in this connection on the exposition of the law made in Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 9, Fourth Edition at Para 1326 as:
"Corporations may be either statutory or non-statutory, and a fundamental distinction exists between the powers and liabilities of the two classes. Statutory Corporations have such rights and can do such acts as are authorised directly or indirectly by the statutes creating them; non-statutory Corporations, speaking generally, can do everything that an ordinary individual can do unless restricted directly or indirectly by statute".
The statement of law as above is criticised strongly by the learned Advocate General in the course of his reply pointing out that it was based on a decision of the House of Lords in INSTITUTION OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS v. CANE (VALUATION OFFICER) AND ORS.(1960) All.E.R.(Vol.3),715, which bore on an entirely different topic and had no bearing whatsoever on the question of amotion vis-a-vis the powers of non-statutory Corporation in regard to amotion. I shall refer to this point a little later but will now pursue the proposed investigation into the nature of the power of amotion. That takes me to the notation of the word 'amotion' in Black's Legal Dictionary, 5th Edition page 76, which had been extracted by me earlier in the course of this Judgment. The learned Advocate General sought to rely in this connection on a passage in American Jurisprudence, 2nd Edition, para 1108 at page 548. The precise statement in the said para is as follows:
"Removal without cause:-
There is authority that in the absence of statutory, charter or byelaw provisions to the contrary, a director cannot be removed from office without cause during the term for which he has been elected. However it has been held that corporate byelaws providing for the election of directors and their tenure may validly provide for their removal without cause by the stockholders. But even so, a byelaw providing for removal of a director without cause is of no effect as to a director in office at the time of the enactment of the byelaw".
The concept of removal without cause has no application herein as, according to me, the office was not held for a fixed period of tenure. I may also point out that para 1094 of this treatise deals with the general meaning of term or tenure. It states that, 'if a term of office is specified in the charter or byelaws of a Corporation or the statutes under which a Corporation is organised, the officers are, as a general Rule, invested with the office for that period'. Therefore, jurisprudentially tenure of office is referable to a specific grant under the charter of byelaws of the Constitution of this Corporation and not otherwise. Adverting to the power of removal of an officer of a Corporation, the following passage at para 1105 may be noticed:
"REMOVAL:
In most jurisdictions the removal of officers of a private Corporation is provided for and regulated by statute or by charter provisions. The power of removing the administrative officers usually is expressly vested in the board of directors by whom they were appointed, sometimes under statutory provisions. However, the right to remove such officers is inherent in the Corporation and exists even in the absence of statutory authorisation. The rule accepted by the authorities is that if the law governing a Corporation is silent as to the tenure of the officers thereof and also as to their removal, the power of amotion is incidental to that of appointment, and those who have the appointing power may remove an officer appointed by them whenever, in their Judgment, the best interests of the institution require it."
Para 1107 relates to 'Removal by directors'. It reads:
"As regards officers elected by the Corporation itself, there is no implied power of removal vested in the directors. Officers so elected derive their title to their respective offices from the same source as the directors, and they can be removed only by the power that appointed them."
A perusal of the foregoing statements leads to the conclusion that In private Corporations as well there is power of amotion and even where It is not specifically conferred that power can be exercised by those who are responsible for the appointment of the office holder in question. The right to remove an officer is a right inherent in the Corporation and existed even in the absence of statutory authorisation. The power of amotion is thus incidental to the power of appointment and those who have the power to appoint may remove the officer appointed by them whenever in their Judgment the interest of the institution required it. Similar is the situation in Municipal Corporations where power to remove an officer is treated as part of the inherent capabilities of a Corporation pertaining to an office without a fixed tenure and the right to remove a person in office being otherwise not restricted in any other manner. Reference can be made in this connection to para 309 of American Jurisprudence 2nd Edition, Volume 56 at page 348. The enunciation therein reads:
"Although statutory or charter provisions have generally been enacted for the removal of municipal or other public officers, it is generally considered that a Municipal Corporation has the inherent power to remove any of its officers for just and reasonable cause provided the term of office is not fixed by law and the right to remove is not restricted in any other manner."
There appears to be little reason, having regard to the statements in all these legal treatises, to deny to non-statutory bodies or Corporations the power of amotion for removing the holder from an office treating it as in incidental power to be implied even in the absence of specific power of amotion being conferred to being exercised by the body responsible for inducting or electing the person in question into a particular office. The concept that power to appoint carries with it the power to remove appears to have been recognised by all those who believe in the tenets on which good administration rests, be it of a statutory Corporation or a private organisation. There is little gainsay in denying that a non-statutory Corporation or body profits as well as statutory Corporation by good governance and administration. If, therefore, the power of amotion is treated as a necessary adjunct and an essential requisite of good administration, t see no good reason as to why such a power should not be implied or treated as incidental to or inherent in a body like the I.O.A. when such power or removal or amotion is repeatedly implied as existing in a statutory Corporation and treated as being an inherent cog built into the system itself by the very nature of its functions and duties. If so, why then should such a laudable measure be denied to a private body or non-statutory organisation? I see no valid reason at all to support such a distinction on any tenable basis. The Olympic Association is charged with the task of overseeing the sporting activities in the Country and to monitor their progress so as to bring them to a peak, synchronizing it with the International Olympic Games held every four years and to ensure effective participation thereat which is indeed a mammoth task but done sadly all these years, I must say so with little or no compunction at all. Surely this organisation needs at all times the best of governance, denial of the benefit of such a measure to ensure good governance to a body like I.O.A. appears to be totally unwarranted and at any rate not supported either by principle or precedent.
35. The learned Advocate General in his reply on behalf of the plaintiff was inclined to suggest that power of amotion was different and it was something apart and distinctive from the right to move a no confidence motion against the holder of an office. It does seem to me that probably there is some force in this submission but even if I accept the above contention it would hardly benefit the plaintiff.
36. I have been at some pains to ascertain the philosophy behind amotion of no confidence. Although it is a method resorted to in all institutions, political or otherwise, curiously there appears to be sparse material touching its origin and nature. However, there is some information in this behalf in the book 'Democratic Theory' by Giovanni Sartori of the University of Florence, 2nd Edition (1958), Chapter VI (Democracy, Leadership & Elites), Page 102, para 3. The learned Author while discussing Democratic Theory devotes some thought to the concept of election and selection. He prefaces the start of an interesting discussion on this topic in the following manner:
"Let us ask an embarassing question: Why does the greater number count for the most? The answer might be: because it constitutes the larger portion of what is considered a good, i.e., of the popular will. This may be so, but why should the larger portion make for a greater value? The retort will be that assuming that one will has the same value as another, the greater the number of the wills gathered together, the greater is their collective "weight of value". The trouble with this argument is that, no matter how much we elaborate upon it, the determining factor of its conclusion is always a quantity. And therefore the objection arises again; a value is not a weight, and cannot be identified with larger portions.
"Ten million ignorances do not make up one knowledge", wrote Taine in his famous preface to the Origines de la France Contemporaine in 1875. A French doctrinaire, Royer Collard, formualted, the objection with great precision: "The will of a single person, the will of many, the will of all, is only a force that can be more or less powerful. Neither obedience nor the slightest respect is due to these wills purely and simply because they are wills." And Jefferson saw what the crux of the problem was when, in 1801, in his first inaugural address, he warned, 'Although the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will to be rightful must be reasonable.' And here we have touched on the sore point. Assuming that the quantitative rule is to be respected at all costs, the rule expresses and stands for a value only in so far as It is 'rightful' and 'reasonable'.
Our first question seems then to run a ground. Except that a shrewder disputant would probably follow another path, and instead of seeking an answer to the question. Why does the greater number have a greater value? Would object that the question itself is captious. For the point at issue is not a value but a technique, i.e., the criterion adopted in a democratic system for arriving at decisions. The procedural rule best suited to the working of a democracy is that the alternatives which are most wanted, that is, wanted by most people, are those that should be followed. And that is all. So we are talking about an instrument, not about a value. I agree with this completely and wish to stress that it is precisely the point we must always keep in mind."
(Underlining supplied) Learned Author observed at page 119 as:
"The point is, therefore, to see clearly what kind of leadership we need, and hence to single out the features of democratic leadership. In respect to the relationship between the leader and the led, decisions are democratic when the leader is responsible to the led and is controllable and controlled by them in many ways, whereas a decision is hierarchical when the power holder exercises strong, untrammeled control over his subordinates. This means that, vertically, democracy can be defined as a process of decision-making in which the leaders are receptive to the preferences of those who are led. In terms of goals democratic leadership intends to stress the role of the whole group, to encourage shared decisions, to decentralize responsibility, to take advantage of the ability and talents of all - in short, to activate the entire social body.
Our problem is how we are to be ruled, not to avoid being ruled. If, as Filippo Burzio felicitously put it, the non-democratic elites impose themselves' our problem is to reject the former and to encourage the latter. In conclusion the formula for democracy is, or should be, the following; neither to eliminate nor submit passively to power, but to make it a function; to control the leaders in the exercise of this function; and to put in office responsible accountable and capable leaders."
If I have made bold to quote these observations from a Book authored by a Political Scientist it is because I have heard a lot of argument on Rule of Law, democracy and how Rules of democracy had been flouted in the I.O.A. Mr. Nariman for the plaintiff at one stage amusingly maintained that Shukla's down-fall was probably due to the aversion of the Prime Minister to shake hands with him an act which he would be forced to go through on the concluding day of the National Games at Trivandrum held on the 21st December, 1987 where he was due to officiate as the Chief Guest at the closing day function. It is because of this aversion of the Prime Minister, that Shukla, according to Mr. Nariman, was probably axed. We really do not know whether this was the reason or there was any other more loftier or laudable reason for removal of Shukla and it is not for me to dwell, into the behind the screen manoeuvres stated to have led to the downfall of Shukla. But suffice it to note that power or no power, if Shukla had been deposed it was not due to any autocratic or arbitrary exercise of authority or power but it is through means sanctioned and recognised by the ideals of democracy based essentially on the question of the choice of a leader and that choice was always within the ken of those who fell behind the person chosen to be the shepherd of the flock. Having regard to the nature of the power exercised in this case, it seems to me, it is slightly different from the power of amotion. In the first instance what is to be noticed is the loss of office is brought about by the mere expression of want of confidence in the holder of the office. The moment such want of confidence is expressed in an identifiable fashion, for a moment I am not on the question of modalities, the very expression of no confidence by a large number of people responsible for installing a person in office would result directly in the loss of such office. But in the case of amotion the loss arises only on the specific amoval ensconced in a specific resolution of amoval. What is more in some cases the power of amotion is restrictive In the sense it could only be exercised for a cause. Nextly, it appears an officer amoted once can also be put back into office. Reference in this connection may be made to para 1266 Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 9, 4th Edition which has been excerpted earlier. But then a person removed from office after the members had expressed want of confidence in him cannot be restored to that office in the very nature of things for as it would then reduce the action taken by the majority into an absolute futility. Probably the power of amotion is more consistent with the principle of master and servant but then it is not necessary to decide that aspect of the question. Suffice it to note there is essential difference between loss of office by amotion and loss of office brought about by a no confidence motion.
In the book on Municipal Corporations, Vth Edition Volume 2 at page 779 learned Author Dillong portrays the difference between amotion and disfranchisement as follows:
"The elementary works treat of Amotion and Disfranchisement together; indeed, formerly, the important distinction between the two was not observed. Amotion relates alone to officers; disfranchisement, to corporators or members of the Corporation. Amotion, therefore, is the removal of an officer in a Corporation from his office, but it leaves him still a member of the Corporation. Disfranchisement is to destroy or take away the franchise of right of being any longer a member of the Corporation".
Learned Author at para 462 refers to the decision in REX v. RICHARDSON1 Burr. 517, and states:
"It is there denied that there can be no power of amotion unless given by charter or prescription; and the contrary doctrine is asserted, that from the reason of the thing, from the nature of Corporations, and for the sake of order and Government, the power is incidental".
38. It should be noted that the power of moving a no confidence motion against an office bearer need not always be explicit but may be implicit in the very nature of the organization in question. If the axiomatic principle or basic tenets of democracy should be the guiding factor in ascertaining the limits of that power, then, call it amotion or call it the power of expressing no confidence, existence of such power must certainly be treated as quite essential for good governance and administration. Hence the I.O.A. although it is a non-statutory body, certainly needed it. There is little reason to deny in law the democratic principle of removing from office the holder thereof by expressing want of confidence in him when he has forfeited such confidence. In the larger sense it seems to me the power of amotion is more inferior both in nature and amplitude to the power of removal of the holder of an office by expression of a vote of no confidence in him. In any view of the matter if removal of a holder of an office either by means of amotion or by expressing want of confidence in him is considered as a bulwark of safety against authoritarian Rule and despotism then it seems to me that I should without more and any hesitation accept even may be the veiled existence of such power in any organization be it a statutory Corporation or non-statutory Corporation or a friendly association or body like the I.O.A. registered under the Societies Registration Act, to remove a person holding office. This power or method of frowning through ballot upon persons in office, who display a tendency towards dictatorial disposition, is an instrument that is beneficient in character and, therefore, cannot be denied to the I.O.A. either on the ground that it does not have the veneer of a Corporation or on the ground that specific absence of power means a total embargo on the exercise of that power. To me it means neither.
39. It is said that there being a provision under the Constitution of the I.O.A. for amending it, the same was an indication that wherever there was no power the body can take power by amending the Constitution and, therefore, it is urged from the availability of power to amend the Constitution one could find a bar against exercising authority for achieving any result for which there is no provision. I cannot agree with this contention. After all the Constitution of the I.O.A. follows a well known pattern of legislation and in the process makes provision for amending it from time to time. That technique cannot be treated as indicating a bar against exercise of implied powers and nor can it be said that one cannot imply the existence of powers which are not specifically conferred. The right to amend the Constitution and the right to take power for a specific purpose in that behalf does not mean that certain powers essential and necessary for good governance and administration but not specifically conferred cannot be implied at all. It is then pointed out that the Constitution enjoins the fostering of the Olympic spirit and in that sense enjoins resisting of all pulls and pressures. Therefore, Mr. Nariman argued, if power of removal is not specifically existent, its existence by implication will give room for fissiparous tendencies to gain ground, thereby destroying the structural fabric of the organisation. It seems to me that if this species of power is treated as an essential requirement for good administration and better control of the organization it would be wrong to deny such a power to this body on the ground that it is likely to be abused. Every power, if exercised without reference to the context, need and exigency, is always bound to be detrimental to interests of any kind. But the interest of society can also suffer for want of power or authority to identify and to rectify a wrong, an ideal process which is very essential to orderly society. In such a situation bemoaning of the lack of power will be absolutely of no use, likewise the failure to exercise, such power when it is available, for fear of likelihood of some abuse will indeed be tragic. Criticising such an useful technique on the ground of likelihood of some abuse is no criticism at all and if we saw to it that those who exercised such power were people who are not prone to abusing it, then there is little reason to fear the consequence of implying such power.
40, Having regard to my views as above it seems to me the distinction sought to be made by both sides based on the character and nature of the body under consideration has really lost all significance which it might have otherwise had. As pointed out above, there is little reason to deny this power of amotion to a non-statutory Corporation like the I.O.A. or not to find in it that power by implication or to afford it that right without any pre-conditions. The view I have taken as aforesaid is supported by the statement of the law in Halsbury's Laws of England on which Mr. Sundaraswamy for the defendant relied on, notwithstanding the criticism of that statement in the text on the ground that it has been culled out from a decision which does not lay down any such proposition. In the present context, I do not wish to go into that controversy since it is not necessary for the purpose of these suits. In the view I have taken of the distinction between statutory and non-statutory Corporations, for the purpose of availing of this jurisdiction and power to amove a person from office, being not existent, I do not find it necessary to refer to the chain of decisions relied on by Mr. Sundaraswamy to evaluate the kind of authority or body the I.O.A. was. I have, therefore, not referred to those cases or to the criticism by the plaintiffs that most of those cases were of statutory Corporations. It is them urged on behalf of the plaintiffs that all these bodies with a slight anointment of a statutory cover are now treated as instruments of the State and are, therefore, to be treated as States within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. If that is so, it is clear the distinction sought to be drawn between a statutory Corporation owing its existence to the statute and a body like the I.O.A. registered under the Societies Act would in law not make them different or distinct entities as contended by the plaintiffs. It may be that if they are right in their contention that these associations are also treated as State within the meaning of Article 12 and hence are on par with the statutory Corporations in whom the power of amotion is treated as inherent or implied, then, by parity of reasoning one will have to concede the existence of such power being either inherent in such bodies or atleast to exist in them by implication.
41. Mr. Sundaraswamy, furnishes another angle to this question by seeking to invoke this power as part of the common law right that was available to one and all and, therefore, capable of being exercised. Strong reliance in this connection is placed on the decision of the Delhi High Court in BAR COUNCIL OF DELHI v. BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA . The question that arose for consideration therein was whether the State Bar Council could frame a Rule for removing the Chairman from office by passing a no confidence motion acting under Section 15 of the Advocates Act, 1961. The Court held:
"The Chairman of Bar Council is holder of office which is distinct from employment and he is not employee of any one. The power to elect Chairman conferred on the Bar Council also carries with it power of removal of holder of an office. The silence of the Act on the point of his removal indicates that the common law on the removal remains unchanged. The power to elect Chairman given to the Bar Council is only codification of a part of the common law and that codification does not change the other part of the common law implying the removal of the elected Chairman. Just as Rules can be made under the section to carry out the powers of the Bar Council, Rules also may be made on such implied power. The two powers are inseparable except by statutory intervention without which they remain connected even if only one of those powers have been made statutory".
In this case their Lordships referred to an earlier decision of the Delhi High Court in Mohan Chandra v. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India wherein the Court had upheld the right of the Council to remove from office the President elected for a period of one year by moving a vote of no confidence against him and inferred existence of such a power in the Council on the basis of general principle that the power to appoint carried with it the power to suspend or dismiss the holder of an office in terms of Section 16 of the General Clauses Act Although their Lordships in the Delhi Bar Council case did appear to have not fully approved the earlier decision in Chartered Accountants' case and seem to think that the calling in-aid of the principle of Section 16 was unnecessary, nevertheless felt that the application of the common law doctrine to remove from office a holder thereof was justified on the basis of Rules of justice, equity and good conscience. Their Lordships drew support in turn from the decision in STATE OF WEST BENGAL v. CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA , wherein it was held that a part of the common law has been retained in India as Rules of justice, equity and good conscience suited to the genius Of this Country.
42. It is contended for the defendants herein that the Delhi High Court8 had wrongly applied the said common law principle to a statutory provision in the Bar Council case. It may well be that the decision itself suffers from the aforesaid criticism but the I.O.A. not being a statutory body does not suffer from any inhibition against importing a common law principle since it remains free and untramelled by any statute. Suffice it to point out there is little reason not to take into account and make use of the common law principle relied on by their Lordships of Delhi High Court in the case of Bar Council of Delhi v. Bar Council of India. This decision has since been followed by the Punjab High Court in Haji Anwar Ahmed Khan v. Punjab Wakf Board, to which I have already adverted to. The Punjab case is a direct authority for the proposition that where power is not specifically conferred exercise of such power is facilitated by the principle of common law applicable in India by virtue of the provisions of Article 372(1) of the Constitution. It, therefore, seems to me judicial authority in this Country is in favour of conceding to these bodies the right to remove an office bearer from office by a no confidence motion against him although such power may not have been expressly conferred because such a power is an incident of the common law principle and can, therefore, be relied upon inspite of the alleged vaccum regards specific source thereof. Mr. Sundaraswamy relied in this connection on the decision of the Supreme Court in L.I.C. OF INDIA v. ESCORTS LTD . to show that in many ways a Company was like the State functioning under its basic Constitution and that the members of the Company who in a general meeting can appoint by election Directors of its choice also had the power to regulate them. In particular he relied on the following passage at para 100, which reads:
"Every shareholder of a company has the right, subject to statutorily prescribed procedural and numerical requirements, to call an extraordinary general meeting in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act. He cannot be restrained from calling a meeting and he is not bound to disclose the reasons for the resolutions proposed to be moved at the meeting. Nor are the reasons for the resolutions subject to judicial review. It is true that under Section 173(2) there shall be annexed to the notice of the meeting a statement setting out all material facts concerning each item of business to be transacted at the meeting including, in particular, the nature of the concern or interest, if any, therein, of every director, the managing agent if any, the secretaries and treasurers, if any, and the manager, if any. This is a duty cast on the management to disclose, in an explanatory note, all material facts relating to the resolution coming up before the general meeting to enable the shareholders to form a Judgment on the business before them. It does not require the shareholders calling a meeting to disclose the reasons for the resolutions which they propose to move at the meeting. Accordingly, the L.I.C. an instrumentality of State, as a shareholder of a company, has the same right as every shareholder to call an extraordinary general meeting of the company for the purpose of moving a resolution to remove some Directors and appoint others in their place. The Corporation cannot be restrained from doing so nor is it bound to disclose its reasons from moving the resolutions".
This decision in general and the foregoing passage in particular are relied on by Shri Sundaraswamy, to meet the argument that a no confidence motion cannot be sponsored without disclosing the reasons therefor. The dictum of the Court as excerpted above does support the contention putforth by Mr. Sundaraswamy, that members who are dissatisfied for any reason with the functioning of an office bearer could initiate a move to remove him from office and were not bound to disclose or cite the reasons actuating the move initiated by them. In fact the same principle is adumbrated in the book Practice and Procedure of Parliament by Kaul and Shakdher. The authors, pointing out therein the difference between a no confidence motion in the Council of Ministers vis-a-vis a motion of censure against an individual minister, state:
"A no confidence motion in the Council of Ministers is distinct from a censure motion. Whereas, censure motion must set out the grounds or charge on which it is based and is moved for the specific purpose of censuring the Government for certain policies and actions, a motion of no confidence need not set out any grounds on which it is based. Even when grounds are mentioned in the notice and read out in the house, they do not form part of the no confidence motion".
Initiating a no confidence motion without citing reasons therefor appears, thus, to be a well accepted Legislative practice. If no reasons are countenanced within the Legislature, it seems to me there is little reason to expect citing of reasons and grounds in support of a no confidence motion elsewhere. At any rate on the ground that Members had moved a no confidence motion against Shukla in the instant case, without spelling out the reasons therefor, the end result, viz., being the amoval of Shukla from the office of the President, cannot be invaldiated. The next stage in the argument of the defendants in justifying the no confidence motion is structured on the utility of Section 16 of the General Clauses Act which cedes to the authority exercising power of appointment the power also of removal or dismissal of the appointee. Section 16 of the General Clauses Act reads:
"Where, by any Central Act or Regulation, a power to make any appointment is conferred, then, unless a different intention appears, the authority having for the time being the power to make the appointment shall also have power to suspend or dismiss any person appointed whether by itself or any other authority in exercise of that power".
Although not the provision as such but the principle behind this provision, to wit, the exercise of the larger power carrying with it by implication, call it the lesser power or may be equivalent power of undoing the result of the exercise of such power, has been upheld by Courts in this Country. Mr. Sundaraswamy relies on this principle for fortifying the authority of the General Council to remove some one whom it had elected or voted into office and states the General Assembly which had the power of electing office bearers once in four years had at all times the power of ratifying all action taken by the Executive Council during the interregnum. It is pointed out that the power of co-option exercised by the Council in substituting personnel, who had gone out of office, in a resultant vacancy had to be ratified at the very next meeting of the General Council. There are other provisions in the Constitution which clearly indicate the supremacy of the General Council making it clear that it is the collective will and wisdom of the Council that ultimately mattered in the internal administration of the Association. The applicability of the principle of Section 16 of the General Clauses Act has been recognised by the Federal Court in the case of RAYAPPA v. MADHAVI AMMA AIR 1950 FC 140. Adverting to the utility of the principle behind Section 16 the Court made the following enunciation:
"Section 16 has codified the well-understood Rule of general law that the power to terminate flows naturally and as a necessary sequence from the power to create. In other words, it is a necessary adjunct of the power of appointment and is exercised as an incident to, or consequence of, the power; the authority to call an officer into being necessarily implies the authority to terminate his functions when their exercise is no longer necessary, or to remove the incumbent for an abuse of those functions or for other causes shown".
Supreme Court in LEKHRAJ v. DY. CUSTODIAN, BOMBAY , upheld the principle of power of appointment carrying with it by implication the power to suspend or dismiss any person so appointed. Their Lordships identified the aforesaid principle as follows:
"The principle underlying Section 16 of the General Clauses Act is that the power to terminate is a necessary adjunct of the power of appointment and is exercised as an incident to or consequence of that power."
In the much later case of HECKETT ENGG. CO. v. THEIR WORKMEN , Supreme Court again reaffirmed this principle i.e., the power to terminate a person in service being the necessary adjunct to the power of appointment and is exercised as incidental to and as a consequent of that power. Their Lordships followed in the above case with approval the decisions in Lekraj's and Rayappa's cases. Elaborating the point their Lordships made the following observations:
"We may also in this connection recall the provisions of Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Whether or not the Section in terms applies to the aforesaid Standing Orders of the Company which are certified under Section 5(3) of the Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act, 1946 may be a moot point but the general doctrine underlying the Section can well be made applicable to a case of the present nature for it is now firmly established that the power to terminate service is a necessary adjunct of the power of appointment and is exercised as an incident to or consequence of that power".
The argument of the plaintiff herein that Section 16 of the General Clauses Act has no application in terms is amply met with by the dictum in the above case holding that the principle of Section 16, if not the Section, proprio vigore is attracted in all these cases. Thus, there being overwhelming support in decided cases for holding that the basis of the principle of Section 16 of the General Clauses Act the power of termination is incidental to the power of appointment merits ready application in the absence of a specific bar in the exercise of such authority, must necessarily commend itself for acceptance herein. I, therefore, have little hesitation in importing the aforesaid principle and to apply the same in these cases to validate, if need be, the action taken to remove plaintiff-Shukla from the office of the President of the I.O.A. by expressing want of confidence in him by the General Assembly to whom undoubtedly he was beholden to because it was they who voted him into office in the year 1984, Both sides tended to depend on the purported agreement or contract between the parties governing the exercise of power under the Constitution of the I.O.A., with Mr. Sundaraswamy suggesting that all said and done Shukla was an agent of the General Assembly and was, therefore, at all times amenable to the control and discipline of the General Assembly. Likewise, the learned Advocate General reminded me of the provisions In the Constitution of the I.O.A. being akin to a contract between the parties and submitted that permitting the parties to act outside the four corners of the written contract was not merely impermissible but would tantamount to a breach of the agreement. It seems, however, unnecessary for me to go into and decide these highly debatable issues, more so when it has been possible for me to find power in the General Assembly to remove Shukla by passing an vote of no confidence. That power I have held to be clearly resident in the body as being an essential requisite, necessary for good administration and governance. Hence, that power is something out of the sphere of any written memorandum to which all concerned had subscribed. The said power, according to me, transcended all forseeable exigencies for which the written Constitution had made provisions for.
43. It cannot, therefore, be said that merely because a solution to a given problem not being located in the written Constitution, it does not mean that the problem should remain for even an unsolved conundrum. For the reasons mentioned above, I cannot subscribe to that view and, therefore, reject the argument resting on contract and written Constitution etc. and must, therefore, hold on Issue No. 1 that the no confidence motion successfully moved against the plaintiff Shukla was not bereft of authority and was not devoid of power as the General Assembly which exercised that power was invested with the said power impliedly. Hence the finding against the plaintiff.
44. Now what remains for consideration is the compendious defence based on the propriety of granting the equitable relief of injunction sought for by plaintiff Shukla and others restraining the defendants from interfering with the management of the association by Shukla. Amplification of this sortee against Shukla is the multi-pronged objection that irrespective of the potency of Shukla's claim against the validity of the no confidence motion plaintiff Shukla was not entitled to any relief at the hands of this Court (1) because of his conduct (2) his failure to seek a declaration of the validity of the action taken to remove him from office, and (3) the decree, if any, granted in these suits will serve little purpose since the general election to reconstitute the I.O.A. being almost round the corner being scheduled to be held in October, 1988 and having regard to the fact that during this brief interval reinstalling Shukla as President would not serve any beneficial purpose either to him or to the Association except through settled on going programmes in total dissarray. Therefore, it is urged on behalf of the defendants, the relief of injunction sought for by Shukla being purely discretionary it is inexpedient in the facts and circumstances of the case to grant any relief and it will be more in consonance with equity and justice to refuse the relief sought for as in any view of the matter the term of all the office bearers would come to an end in less than 2 months time from now.
45. I have generally culled out as above the substance of the issues on these matters as framed in the suits, without reproducing them impressima verba and shall now proceed to address myself to a consideration of the fore-going aspects which alone remain now to be decided.
46. Plaintiff's conduct:- Conduct is certainly a commending hallmark for relief in a proceeding in equity. Courts always insist that the suitor must approach the Court with clean hands and not with sullied hands. Mr. Sundaraswamy who read to me copiously from text-books and a galaxy of decisions also relied in particular upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in KARNAL DISTILLERY CO. v. LADLI PRASHAD, :
"The question of Court's jurisdiction to entertain a suit, is distinct from the question, whether having jurisdiction, it should exercise it in view of the circumstances of the particular case. The granting or refusing of injunctive relief rests within the Court's judicial discretion, guided by law and in harmony with the well established principles of equity, after exercise of due care and caution.
The claimant for such a relief must show, that he has a superior equity in his favour, entitling him to the injunction asked as against defendants. He has also to show, that he has been acting towards the defendants in a fair and equitable manner, free from any taint of fraud, sharp practice, undue influence or illegality. It is a cardinal principle of broad applicability, and he who seeks equity must do equity.
The other maxim, that he who comes in equity must come with clean hands, also embodies a principle of wide amplitude and expresses the basic concept of equity jurisprudence. According to this Rule, equity declines to lend its aid to a person whose conduct has been inequitable in relation to the subject-matter of the suit. The principle is, that he who has done inequity shall not have equity."
To similar effect is the statement made in various texts to which my attention was drawn to. As they are all very-well known I do not think it is necessary to recall all of them in this context. Suffice it to note that the relief of injunction which is purely discretionary obtains in no case ex-debito justitiae and is granted only when it is well merited.
In judging whether relief is merited or not the conduct of the plaintiff would certainly be of materiality as that would ensure relief not being snatched by a strategist or a trickster.
47. The question now is whether Shukla's conduct in seeking the equitable relief of injunction was so abominable and so reprehensible as to deny it on grounds of his conduct being a sufficient taboo against awarding of the same.
48. The conduct held out as unbecoming of the plaintiff is the series of suits filed by the Madhya Pradesh Association in Jabalpur, Delhi and Calcutta. It is pointed out, soon after receiving the requisition for holding the General Body Meeting, Shukla went on to call the Meeting and in the notice he packed a solicitation for support. It is then submitted that after having canvassed support and being not sure of cornering a majority, Shukla had resorted to filing a spate of original suits in various parts of the Country through his lieutenants who had obtained several ex parte interim injunctions as a result of collusion between both sides in those suits.
49. I really do not know if this case had gone into actual trial and oral evidence had been lead, there possibly might have been some support for this allegation that it was actually Shukla who had begun all these litigations sponsored on behalf of Madhya Pradesh Olympic Association. But, then, in the absence of any evidence, it will be some-what difficult to say that all these suits were engineered by Shukla. The fact that Shukla is said to be from Madhya Pradesh and in real life he is a politician should not lead me to conclude that Shukla and M.P. Association were two siblings running in tandem seeking orders from various Courts In the Country to stifle the I.O.A. Although in one or two suits filed by M.P. Association the interim orders obtained have all the colour of back-stage manoeuvres and for the moment the benefit thereof had gone to Shukla, I, still think it difficult to hold that Shukla was at the bottom of the spate of injunctions and stay orders let loose on the I.O.A. being traced either directly or indirectly to Shukla even in an ostensible fashion. Regards his own suit filed in the Delhi High Court, I do not think anybody can take exception to it because it is only action by a person who was fighting to remain in office and was depending on some right to which he thought he was entitled. Hence, regards the suit filed by Shukla himself, it is not possible to say his conduct was reprobatory and censurable. I must therefore say that I cannot non-suit Shukla on grounds of his conduct. Having regard to the aforesaid view, I have not thought it necessary to probe into the several interim orders obtained in Courts elsewhere by the M.P. Association and the curious spectacle of that Association obtaining an interim order for not giving effect to the Resolutions, if any, passed by the General Assembly on 20-12-1987 with the consent of Anand, the then Secretary General of the I.O.A. who was the defendant. It indeed appeared to be a comical interlude and a charade to which a Court should not have been a party. But, nonetheless, it appears to have come to pass.
50. Moving next to the other aspect bearing on the point of relief in equity, denial of relief is again urged on the basis of the omission to seek a declaratory decree holding that the passing of no confidence motion by the Association against Shukla is invalid and, therefore, not binding on Shukla, no injunction can be granted. The question is whether the said omission in the context of these cases was so wholly venial as to result in denial of relief to Shukla of whatever nature or kind. Adverting to the above, I am to point out, while the relief or declaration was probably desirable and would certainly have put the matter beyond controversy, the absence of such a prayer for declaration, should not, in my view, result in total failure of the cause itself. In the suits what is assailed is the motion of no confidence passed by the General Assembly against Shukla and the attack is based on the want of power in the General Assembly to pass a vote of no confidence against him. It is precisely for that reason it is claimed the passing of no confidence motion against him has no effect in as much as the general body itself had not such power by the exercise of which he could be removed and that he therefore remains unmoved from office. In other words in asking for a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from troubling him, Shukla by implication seeks for a declaration that the action of the General Assembly in removing him from office is invalid. If the prayer for a declaration is treated as being implicit in the prayer for perpetual injunction, it would, therefore, be evident that the suit does not suffer any in limine defect by the omission to seek a specific declaration appropos the purported exercise of authority to remove Shukla from office by moving a no confidence motion against him. Support for this proposition can be had from the decisions relied upon by the learned Advocate General the first of them being a decision of the Bombay High Court in INDUMATIBEN v. UNION OF INDIA . In that case the Court after noticing the distinction between Section 34 on the one hand and Sections 35, 36 and 38 of the Specific Relief Act, on the other, pointed out that while the Court may not grant a declaration when the matter is capable of taking in a consequential relief, but is, however, not inhibited similarly while granting as substantive relief the prayer for an injunction. The statement of the law, as aforesaid, is found in the following passage in para 5 of the Judgment:
"Coming to the form of the suit, the suit is so framed as to be a suit for an injunction. Under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act of 1963, a person may file a suit for a declaration as to any legal character, or as to any right to any property. This is a discretionary relief. Section 34 provides that no Court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. Section 37 pertains to injunctions. Sub-section (2) provides that a perpetual injunction can only be granted by the decree made at the hearing and upon the merits of the suit; the defendant is thereby perpetually enjoined from the assertion of a right, from the commission of an act which would be contrary to the rights of the plaintiff. Section 38 prescribes when a perpetual injunction may be granted. The difference between Section 34 on the one hand and Sections 37 and 38 on the other hand is that the Court may not grant a declaration where the matter is capable of consequential relief. But there is no such restriction put on injunctions and the Court may grant an injunction as a substantive relief without any prayer for declaration, although in many cases a declaration may be implicit in the grant of a perpetual injunction."
To similar effect is the pronouncement of Calcutta High Court in GOWARDHANDAS v. CALCUTTA MUNICIPALITY . Adverting to the scope of Section 54 of the Specific Relief Act, presently Section 38, their Lordships said:
"Under Section 54 of the Specific Relief Act every suit for perpetual injunction must involve a declaration or determination as to the existence of a right in the plaintiff and its threatened violation or the threatened commission of an act to injure that right of the plaintiff, or in other words, such a declaration would necessarily be implied in such suit, Consequently, in law, such a declaration would not alter the character of the suit as a suit for permanent injunction".
It seems to me that both on principle and precedent I should not accede to the argument that the suit should fail in limine because declaratory relief has not been sought for while maintaining an action for a bare injunction as done herein. I then move on to the penultimate point for consideration in that, having regard to the discretionary nature of the relief sought for in these suits, I should totally decline it and refuse to exercise my discretion because the granting of the same would but give to the plaintiff a pyrrhic victory resulting in putting him back in office which he would have to eventually vacate in one or two months time when general elections would be held in the usual course to reconstitute the Executive Council of the I.O.A. in the month of October, 1988. It is pointed out that the life of the Executive Council and its office bearers would admittedly draw to a close in the month of October, 1988 when fresh elections have got to be held mandatorily as enjoined by the Constitution of the I.O.A. It will, therefore, be futile for Shukla to seek reinduction into office as President from where he has to necessarily move out in just two months time. It is then argued that all this venture would serve no useful end at all since Shukla would not be personally benefited by the same and nor would the Association be benefited because it has been functioning normally even in the absence of Shukla from the day he was deposed. On the other hand it is pointed out induction of Shukla into office would throw out of gear the functioning of the I.O.A. particularly on the eve of Seoul Olympics which is now in the offing. Documents are produced on behalf of the Association to show that the officiating President Adityan and Secretary General Randhir Singh had been colloborating with the International Olympics Association right through. It is urged that now to suddenly change the President and Secretary General would result in total choas. Hence the Court is asked not to opt for creating a doldrum situation. Reliance in this context is placed on the memo filed on behalf of Shukla wherein he had undertaken not to interfere with the arrangements already made in view of the Olympics in case he got back his office with the help of the Court's decree. But, later on learned Advocate General, while rendering the reply said he had instructions to confine the memo only to the date of its filing and not to treat it as an undertaking in perpetuity because his client was apprehensive of the flurried activities going on at the I.O.A. subsequently. Be that as it may, I shall refer to this a little later and proceed to notice the final argument for the defendants on this aspect by pointing out that a majority of the members of the I.O.A. had expressed want of confidence in Shukla making it clear that he was not wanted by the majority of the members. Was it proper, fair and just to impose Shukla on a large cross-section of the I.O.A. who are unwilling to countenance him and, therefore, a fervent appeal is made by the defendants not to exercise discretion in favour of plaintiff-Shukla since that would result in foisting his stewardship on an Association which through an accredited majority had expressed disapproval of his continuance in office. Per contra for Shukla it is contended that all said and done he was merely vindicating his right for continuing in office to which he was elected for a period of four years in terms of the Constitution of the Association which had assured him occupancy of the office for four years without a break, except for renunciation thereof on his own volition, and in turn blamed the defendants - Adityan and others of having organised an unjust movement which had resulted in disruption of office held by him, without any - just cause. Adityan and Randhir Singh are sought to be dubbed as usurpers of an office which rightfully belonged to Shukla. It is, therefore, argued that refusal to exercise discretion in favour of Shukla would result in a set of interlopers continuing in office and, therefore, it is urged with certain amount of vehemence that if Shukla had otherwise made a point regards the ultravires nature of the act resulting in his ejection from office, then nothing should stand in the way of not merely the validity of that action being adjudged in accordance with law and upon being upheld the consequence flowing from such decision should not be withheld on tenuous grounds, treating these cases as instances not justifying the exercise of jurisdiction in favour of a successful plaintiff.
51. At first blush this argument of unjustness of denial to the plaintiff the rightful result flowing from a successful espousal of his cause may appear to be somewhat invincible but then, as urged by the defendants and in fact it is very much so, the result of declaring Shukla's ejection from office to be invalid should result in putting Shukla back in office it would also result in nullifying the desire of the majority by the acceptance of what appears to be a dry stick right of the plaintiff. Now let me put in to the balance the advantages to the plaintiff personally and the resultant benefit, if any, to the larger cause of the Institution by putting Shukla back in the seat not forgetting for a moment that the elections to the Executive Council of the Association are due in the month of October 1988, now almost within hand-shaking distance. It cannot be gainsaid, considering the time available to Shukla, that there is very little he can do for the Association, in the event of being put back in office. Although he had undertaken in the course of the memo referred to earlier that he will not redraw the plans already drawn up and will not interfere in any way where commitments are already made by the office bearers now in charge, it is now sought to be made out, and I recall the statement made by the learned Advocate General on behalf of Shukla in his reply, that the undertaking would be limited to the state of affairs prevailing on the date of memo and not beyond since Shukla has since become apprehensive about the developments in the I.O.A. that had occurred subsequent to that memo regards which he probably now has some misgivings and reservations. This change in the attitude of Shukla is a clear indication as to the coming events in case he was put back into office. There could now be little doubt that after getting back the office, he would not steer clear of the course followed by the present office bearers and this would certainly result in destablising the planned activities of the association.
52. Granting that not much of harm would come out by the inter-meddling if any done by Shukla at this stage, the prospect of any committed course of action now operating being disturbed and the Association steered into different direction is a factor that certainly does not augur well for the Association and I should think that permitting such a change of horses in midstream when they are nearing the finish would clearly be unwise and is certainly not an act of judicial statemanship or sagacity. If not for anything else, atleast on this consideration I must deter myself from according approval to any contemplated change in office,
53. Besides there is no question herein of Shukla himself benefitting personally if he is permitted to reclaim the office of the President at this stage. The office is one which is purely honorary in character and ensures no return monetarily and, therefore, the loss of office cannot be treated as inflicting a hardship on the deposed holder economically. In this back-ground the argument led for the answering defendants is that except for inflating Shukla's ego, the grant of a decree in his favour would serve no useful purpose. Joining in the plaintiffs suggest it is for the precise reason the defendants are seeking to stick to that office after having voted themselves in at a meeting which was wholly lacking in competence.
54. These arguments apart, there is no gainsaying that in law the relief of an injunction is purely discretionary in character and a Court need not and would not think of granting such relief merely because it is lawful to do so and on the contrary if there are circumstances that warrant withholding exercise of such discretion then the Court would be well advised in declining it but such denial of jurisdiction should be apparent and sustainable ex-facie. On this aspect of the matter, a large volume of citations ranging from learned passages in text-books of eminence to decided cases, have been relied upon by both sides. Mr. Sundaraswamy for the defendants invited my attention to copious legal cornlcopia obtaining on this topic. I would, however, begin by referring to Sections 36 and 41(1)(j) of the Specific Relief Act. Section 36 reads:
"Preventive relief is granted at the discretion of the Court by injunction, temporary or perpetual"
Section 41(j) reads:
"An injunction cannot be granted when the plaintiff has no personal interest in the matter".
A reading of both these provisions would indicate whereas granting preventive relief whether it be temporary or permanent is purely at the discretion of the Court, such an injunction will not be granted when the plaintiff has no personal Interest in the matter. Clearly herein the plaintiff does not claim and indeed it is not his case that he has suffered a personal loss in the sense of his personal interest floundering by the action of the defendants and hence he has been put to the necessity of litigating for re-establishing the reverses suffered by his personal interest. In those circumstances it would, therefore, be more appropriate for the Court to decline to exercise its discretion and refuse the injunction sought than by granting it. This finding, ensconsed as it is within the frame-work of the Specific Relief Act, under which the plaintiff seeks relief, would suffice to mark the end of the contending view points projected hereinbefore. But Counsel on both sides have taken a lot of pains in placing before Court what now must appear to be well expounded theory both in favour of and against granting of discretionary relief in this matter, I will therefore make a brief reference to the series of opinions from the text books and judicial precedents relied on.
55. This point raised by Mr. Sundaraswamy is sought to be put forward with great conviction, exalting the argument almost to an objection of an II limine character. The point of Shri Sundaraswamy is that the present dispute between the parties to these suits cannot be treated as being merely a legal battle between the combatants but its nuances carried over and affected a large body of outsiders who are not before Court. It is pointed out that the Government of India which finances the various training schemes and meets sponsored by the I.O.A. is some one interested in the out-come of these proceedings. It is then pointed out that the federating units who are members of the I.O.A. are not parties to the suits but were certainly interested in the proceedings and the out-come herein would affect them one way or the other. Attention is called to the collaboration aspect with the International Olympic Association by the present set of office bearers and the proximity of this proceeding in point of time to the Seoul Olympics scheduled to be held in the month of September, 1988 and it is therefore contended that any result adverse to the defendants would set-in a chain of reactions outside the boundary limits of the suits. Therefore, it is submitted that non-exercise of discretion would be the more appropriate form of action to be adopted by the Court. Mr. Sundaraswamy in this connection relied on the following passage in the book 'The Principles of Equitable Remedies' by Spry, Second Edition, page 375"
"Hence the interests of the public and of third persona are relevant and have more or less weight according to the other material circumstances. Thus it has been stated that Courts of equity, 'upon principle, will not ordinarily and without special necessity interfere by injunction, where the injunction will have the effect of very materially injuring the rights of third persons not before the Courts'. Regard must be had 'not only to the dry strick rights of the plaintiff and defendant, but also to the surrounding circumstances, to the rights or interest of other persons which may be more or less involved".
Mr. Sundaraswamy also brought to my attention the decision in MILLER v. JACKSON1977 (3) All.E.R. 338. This decision has been referred to by Mr. Sundaraswamy, in order to, amplify the application of the principle enumerated by Spry in the passage extracted herein before. In the case of Miller v. Jackson, the parties involved were a village cricket club and a neighbour who appeared to relish more or less the life of a recluse. The playground was being used from a long time for playing cricket, by the club members. The club found itself faced with hostile reaction from the neighbour, a lady who resented cricket balls occasionally smashing her window panes and falling into her lawn and rooms. It would appear the cricket club in an effort to ameliorate the hardship occasionally caused to the lady by the straying cricket balls at random, even offered to supply and fit a safety net over the plaintiff's garden when game was in progress, to remedy any damage as also to pay any expenses, and to fit unbreakable glass to the windows and provide shutters and safeguards for them. The lady and her husband, who were the plaintiffs in the suit, rejected all those offers and instead brought a suit against the cricket club claiming damages for negligence and nuisance and an injunction to restrain the club from playing cricket on the ground without first taking adequate steps to prevent balls being struck out of the ground and on to the plaintiff's property. At the trial the cricket club made no effort at concealing the prospect of the plaintiff's window panes suffering and the cricket balls landing in her garden but contended that such user of the cricket ground did not involve an unreasonable interference with the plaintiff's enjoyment of their own property and contended that it had taken, or offered to take, all reasonable steps to protect the plaintiffs and their property from harm. The trial Court found in favour of the plaintiffs and granted the injunction but in appeal by the club it was held that it was not an appropriate case for granting an injunction as the Court had to weigh the interests of the public at large against that of the individual and on the balance it found that the interest of the inhabitants of the village as a whole should prevail over the private interest of the plaintiff, who must have realised when they bought the house that cricket balls would sometimes be hit on to their property from the adjoining cricket ground. It is interesting to note that the aforesaid enunciation was made by the majority comprising of Lord Justice Denning and Lord Justice Geoffrey Lane. Attractive as the principle of the decision certainly is, particularly in the context of the facts of that case in the back-ground of village cricket which is very popular in England, it seems to me it has little of tilt so far as these cases are concerned. I cannot agree with Counsel that public at large or third parties who are outside the Court would in some way be affected by a decision either in favour of the plaintiff or in favour of defendant. At the highest the majority of the members of the I.O.A. may feel the bite but it is on their behalf that defendants 1 and 2, namely, Adityan and Randhir Singh, are contesting the case and consequently the cross-section of the members who supported the no confidence motion cannot legally feet aggrieved by an adverse decision rendered after contest between the plaintiff and their representatives. Thus there being any chance of the Government or any other person being aggrieved is difficult to fathom and it is also no concern of the Court which cannot be expected to ameliorate or assuage the feelings of an undetermined lot who may have a grouse against one side or the other in these matters. Therefore, I do not think it would be proper to decline, exercising of discretion to grant the injunction sought for on the ground that it would affect third parties or the public at large as had actually happened in the case of Miller v. Jackson, referred to supra.
56. Proceeding next Mr. Sundaraswamy, while dwelling further on the discretionary nature of the relief of injunction, relied on a few passages in some of the well-known books on injunctions to highlight the argument that the discretion granted to the Court under the Specific Relief Act to grant an injunction was not liable to be granted in these cases for the benefit of the plaintiff. The statement of the law in the book by Woodroff 'The Law Relating to Injunctions', 6th Edition, page 109 is relied upon. It reads:
"Moreover, in all cases it is to be remembered that in the exercise of the discretion given to it by the Specific Relief Act, the Court will consider not merely whether the plaintiff's right has been infringed, or even materially infringed, but also whether, under all the circumstances of the case, the ought to be granted an Injunction as the proper and appropriate remedy for such infringements".
The following passage in Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol.43 found in the Chapter 'Injunctions' at para 12 was next adverted to:
"The grant or refusal of an injunction is a matter of equitable jurisdiction. The power of a Court of equity to grant writs of injunction antedates specific legislative sanction, and ordinarily is not a statutory grant of power to a Court.
The propriety of granting an injunction depends on the facts of each particular case and the general principles of equity as related to injunctions and the right to exercise common sense in the granting or refusing of injunctions is one of the fundamental prerogatives of a Court of Chancery. Since an injunction should not be made an instrument of oppression and injury, it will not be granted when good conscience does not require it, where it will operate oppressively or contrary to justice, where it is not reasonable and equitable under the circumstances of the case, or where it will tend to promote, rather than to prevent, fraud and injustice. An injunction will be granted to protect clear legal rights, but not to accomplish a wrong, and the equities of the case must be, in favour of the parties seeking the injunctive relief. However, injunction will lie if the Court can by its decree assure the parties that its operative effect will be wholly without 'injustice or oppression to either party".
Reference was next made to the statement of the law contained in American Jurisprudence 2nd Edition, Vol.42 Article 23, which reads:
"Injunction is an equitable remedy and its grant or denial in a particular case is governed by those fundamental and established principles by which Courts of equity are guided and influenced in their judicial action and in the administration of relief. Some of the rules applicable to the exercise of the power are as binding on the Courts as are the rules of law in any case; but in a measure, the application for injunction is addressed to the conscience and sound discretion of the Court. While the Court must act within and according to definite and certain principles and is not justified in exercising its injunctive power contrary to established rules, it is not obliged to shut its eyes to the demands of justice because under the particular circumstances presented no general rules authorising the issuance of the writ may be found, where there are none forbidding it.
Equitable jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief will not necessarily be exercised in all cases where there has been a violation of legal right".
As could be noticed from the authoritative statements in the treatises referred to supra injunction is in the very nature of things a discretionary remedy which does not issue for the mere asking and, therefore, does not obtain ex-debito justitiae but is generally issued to suppress mischief or injury which in law is neither treated as intolerable irremediable and is granted to avoid multiplicity of suits, to suppress oppressive and interminable litigation end where injury cannot otherwise be adequately compensated by damages at law or is such that its continuance must occasion a constantly recurring grievance which cannot be removed or corrected otherwise than by setting in motion such preventive remedy. Learned Counsel then invited my attention to a series of decisions, mostly of the Supreme Court which bear on this point. In VAISH DEGREE COLLEGE v. LAKSHMI NARAIN AIR 1976 SC 888, the principal of a college challenged the termination of his service as contrary to his service conditions. It was held by the majority of the Bench that a contract of personal service cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced and the Court would not ordinarily grant a declaration that the contract subsists and the employee even after having been removed from service, can still be deemed to be in service against the will and consent of the employer. In P.V. JOSEPH'S SON MATHEW v. N. KURUVILA'S SON , the Court while dwelling on the scope of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act enjoined a duty on the Court to see that litigation does not give an unfair advantage to the plaintiff and observed that the Court should not grant specific performance merely because it is lawful or legal to do so. In NANI BALA v. CHARU BALA AIR 1979 Calcutta 309 a Bench of the Calcutta High Court made the following statement after a consideration of all the principles and most of the decisions bearing on the topic:
"It follows from the above principles laid down by different authorities that the grant of injunction is discretionary with Court, the discretion has, however, to be exercised after due consideration of all surrounding circumstances. It will not be correct to say that whenever there is an invasion of a right, the Court should grant injunction".
The last of the cases relied on is that of S.L. KAPOOR v. JAGMOHAN AIR 1981 SC 137. It was a case wherein a notification superceding the Delhi Municipality Corporation was challenged before the Supreme Court as violative of the principles of natural justice. The Court while making certain observations spelling out the criterion to be followed in deciding whether or not in a given case requirements of natural justice had been met did not, however, quash the notification after holding the notification to be violative of the principles of natural justice but contended itself in making a mere declaration that the notification was violative of the principles of natural justice without granting any relief because the term of the committee was due to expire just a few days after the decision of the Court in that whereas the Judgment was delivered on 18-9-1980 the term of the Committee was to expire on 3rd October, 1980.
57. This decision has been mainly relied upon by Mr. Sundaraswarny to emphasize the need herein to refrain from granting any effective relief to the plaintiff since the Association itself is due to go to the polls shortly. As could be seen from the decision cited supra the Court advisedly left the notification alone without quashing it as it would otherwise have done in usual course. A similar course is suggested in this behalf so that any turmoil or storm which is likely to blow up in the event of a decree being made in favour of the plaintiff, that would inturn result in reinstalling him in office against the wishes of the majority of the members of the I.O.A. was best avoided by not exercising the jurisdiction of this Court, a step which in the long run would serve the ends of justice rather than the unpalatable situation that would result by granting the injunction sought which would merely result in enforcing the drystick rights of the plaintiff without either benefiting him or the I.O.A. except of course boosting the plaintiff's ego in having had the satisfaction of chastising the defendants for rising against him.
58. As regards this submission of the defendants, Counsel for the plaintiff asserted that exercise of discretion in favour of the plaintiff will only result in righting a wrong perpetrated against the plaintiff at the instance of persons illdisposed towards him swayed by considerations alien to orderly and efficient management of the Association. It is, therefore, urged that Shukla's amotion from the office of the President of the Association should be declared invalid and he should be permitted to continue in office without let or hindrance by the defendants who are to be restrained by an effective injunction preventing them from baiting Shukla and disturbing him in the discharge of the duties and responsibilities as President during the reminder of the period of office which incidentally carried with it the prospect of a visit to Seoul as the Head of the I.O.A. of India to which privilege, it is said, he is justly entitled to and more deserving than the defendants.
59. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival stands as aforesaid and I have also taken note of the character and nature of the power exercised in these matters and also the conditions under which they are exercised, as can be gathered from the decisions cited and the statements of law as made in several of the Books to which my attention is called.
60. Apart from the fact that I have held the removal of Shukla from office by expressing want of confidence in him was an incident of plenary exercise of power that was legally tenable and valid, I cannot help take notice of the fact that in a month or two it may well be that neither Shukla nor Adityan will be holding office in the I.O.A. when the elections to reconstitute the Executive Body will take place in the month of October, 1988. Shukla has been out of office since December 1987 as a result thereof it is Adityan who is now functioning as President. It is common ground that Adityan has been responsible for conducting some sports meets recently in the Country and is presently responsible for the contingent of this Country taking part in the Seoul Olympic games. He and Secretary General Randhir Singh, have been accepted as substitutes for Shukla and Anand by the International Olympic Association with whom they have been collaborating eversince their co-option in the month of December 1987. Shukla undertook by a memo not to disturb the plans and commitments made by these office bearers but a few days later sought to limit his undertaking to the state of affairs which prevailed as on the date of the filing of the memo and not beyond which indicated clearly that If given the reins of power again he would not stop at trying his hand in overhauling the march of events that had taken place so far. If that would be the effect of putting Shukla back in the Presidential seat, it would result in introducing near chaos in the administration of this sports body a prospect which is certainly alarming and adequate enough to make me hesitate in making a decree in favour of Shukla. The statement of law made by the Supreme Court in Joseph's son Mathew v. Kuruvila's son, may be appropriately recalled in that relief should not be granted merely because it is lawful to do so, emphasising thereby the discretionary character and nature of the relief enjoining its grant or refusal after a due consideration of all the surrounding circumstances. True the case cited may admit the distinction pointed out on behalf of the plaintiff that the said case was regards granting of specific relief but when there is clearly no reason why the principle enjoined therein that Court should not be compelled to grant relief because it is lawful to do so should not be adopted in these cases for to exercise discretion in any and every given case may lead to certain consequences that are best avoided. The ends of justice may at times be best served with the Court staying its hands and declining to exercise discretion. It seems to me, for the reasons mentioned above, I should also do so and hold that even if Shukla was entitled to relief to which he is not found to be entitled to, I should still decline to exercise discretion in his favour and make the decree he seeks for. This should dispose of O.S.No. 2 of 1988 but still, leaves in the fray O.S.No. 5 of 1988 originally filed in the Calcutta High Court by Madhya Pradesh Olympic Association. That should also fail since the issues raised therein are the same as the issues raised in O.S.No. 1 of 1988 and I would, therefore, hold the suit O.S.No. 5 of 1988 to be covered by the decision herein.
61. However, it is sought to be made out on behalf of the defendants that the suit should be struck off in limine in that the I.O.A. could only be sued through its Secretary General. It is also said that the suits should have been, in any view of the matter filed in Delhi as enjoined by the Constitution of the I.O.A. Suffice it to note that the suit is only against Adityan and Randhir Singh, the State of Bengal being the third defendant. The I.O.A. is not a party for the said suit and, therefore, the act of substituting the Calcutta High Court to the Delhi High Court cannot be said to be a defect on the basis of which the suit was liable to be struck down in limine. The suit, however, having failed on merits shares the fate of the other suit in O.S.2 of 1988, which stands dismissed.
62. In the result, the following are my conclusions and findings pertaining to issues raised in these suits:
(i) The General Council of the I.O.A. had the necessary power to move a vote of no confidence motion against the then President Sri. V.C. Shukla and such power was implicit in the General Council of the I.O.A. referred to supra.
(ii) The motion for expressing no confidence even if not preceded by disclosure of reasons in support of such a motion, the same cannot be treated as invalid in law not merely for the reason that the motion of no confidence need not always be preceded by disclosure of reasons thereof but also for the reason that in this case the President in Office could have been removed by the General Council at its pleasure since the President is held not endowed with any fixed tenure,
(iii) The conduct of the plaintiff Shukla is not such as to disentitle him from seeking protection at the hands of this Court and in any event relief could not have been denied to Shukla on the ground that third parties would be affected by such a measure. But, in the facts and circumstances of these cases it was appropriate to deny relief to Shukla rather than granting the same as that would be the appropriate step to take in the exercise of the discretion of the Court for the reasons mentioned already.
(iv) The suit for bare injunction was tenable at the instance of Shukla since the very prayer for injunction implies the claim for declaration also in all these cases.
63. Pursuant to these findings all the suits, both contested and not contested, fail and are liable to be dismissed with the exception of the suit in O.S.1/88 by Ramlal Thakur and Gurmeet Singh Sodhi. In that suit there will be a decree granting an injunction against defendants 2 and 3 therein, who are none other than Shukla and Anand, restraining them from interfering with the governance and management of the I.O.A. by the office bearers now in office viz., M/s. Adityan and Randhir Singh, who are incidentally defendants 4 and 5 in that suit. The other portion of the relief sought for in that suit has already been given up by the plaintiffs by filing a memo into Court on 20-7-1988.
64. The only question that now remains is one of costs. It seems to me I should direct all the parties to bear and pay their own costs, since the suits raised questions of some importance and admitted a lot of debate. It, therefore, seems appropriate to hold that these are fit matters in which the parties should bear and pay their own costs in all the cases. It is ordered accordingly.
65. Before parting with these cases, I cannot but venture to express the hope now that the question of dry stick rights, touching the powers of the General Body of the I.O.A. having been settled, attention would now be bestowed by this sports body to pull itself up and help the Nation to reach a pride of place amongst the comity of Olympic Nations, instead of being counted as a tait-ender to which dismal position we have been shunted mostly due to the internecine quarrels among sports bodies and sports administrators to whom this Nation's destiny in the playing fields and the games stadia is entrusted.