Madras High Court
Palaniyandi vs Palanisamy on 27 April, 2018
Author: M.Sundar
Bench: M.Sundar
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
DATED: 27.04.2018
Reserved on : 17.04.2018
Delivered on : 27.04.2018
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.SUNDAR
S.A.No.44 of 2002
and
M.P.(MD)No.2 of 2013
Palaniyandi
S/o.Aandi .. Appellants
Vs.
1.Palanisamy
2.Andiappan @ Raja
3.Rengaraj
4.Palanisamy
5.Rajendran
6.Palaniyandi (died)
S/o.Andiappan
(R-6 died, memo recorded vide
court order dated 11.12.2013) .. Respondents
Second Appeal under Section 100 of CPC against the judgment and decree of the
II Additional Subordinate Judge's Court, Trichy dated 29.6.2001 made in
A.S.No.585 of 1999 reversing the judgment and decree of District Munsif
Court, Manaparai dated 13.7.1998 made in O.S.No.458 of 1996.
!For Appellant : Mr.S.Vinayak
for Mr.A.Joel Paul Antony
^For Respondents : Mr.A.N.Ramanathan
for Mr.R.Maheswaran for R-1
and for Mr.A.Thiagarajan for RR2 to 5
R-6 died
:JUDGMENT
This litigation commenced more than two decades ago. To be precise, it commenced on 31.10.1996 when one Palaniyandi filed a suit in O.S.No.458 of 1996 on the file of the 'District Munsif Court, Manapparai', which shall hereinafter be referred to as 'trial court' for the sake of clarity and convenience.
2 Palaniyandi filed the aforesaid suit against 9 individuals with prayers for declaration of title and consequential permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession. Plaint prayer reads as follows :
?a)For declaration that the Plaintiff is exclusive and absolute owner of suit properties and consequential relief for Injunction restraining the defendants, their men, agents and all persons claiming through or under them from interfering with the Plaintiff's peaceful possession and enjoyment of suit properties under the guise of forcibly dispossessing the Plaintiff of suit properties or in any manner whatsoever.
b)for cost of suit.
c)and for such other reliefs as this Hon'ble court may deem fit and proper in the nature and circumstances of the case and thus render justice.?
Plaint schedule consisted of 13 items of immovable properties. I am informed that item Nos.1 to 12 are Punja agricultural lands and item No.13 is two tiled houses. The 13 items of plaint schedule properties are as follows :
?1)Situate in Tiruchi District, Manaparai taluk, Ayanporuvai villge S.F.No.85/4, a plot measuring 0-06-0 Hectre. Kist 0-09 paise.
2)In the said village S.F.No.85/5, a plot measuring 0-05-0 Hectre Kist 0-07 paise.
3)In the said village S.F.No.85/6, a plot measuring 0-11-5 Hectre. Kiust 0-17 paise.
4)In the said village S.F.No.85/7, a plot measuring 0-20-0 Hectre. Kist 0-31 paise.
5)In the said village S.F.No.86/8, a plot measuring 0-23-5 Hectre. Kist 0-50 paise.
6)In the said village S.F.No.86/10, a plot measuring 0-13-5 Hectre. Kist 0- 29 paise.
7)In the said village S.F.No.86/18, a plot measuring 0-28-5 Hectre. Kist 0- 60 paise.
8)In the said village S.F.No.87/1A, a plot measuring 0-28-0 Hectre. Kist 0- 60 paise.
9)In the said village S.F.No.87/6, a plot measuring 0-02-5 Hectre. Kist 0-06 paise.
10)In the said village S.F.No.87/9-A, a plot measuring 0-00-5 Hectre. Kist 0-06 paise.
11)In the said village S.F.No.87/10-A, a plot measuring 0-00-5 Hectre. Kist 0-06 paise.
12)In the said village S.F.No.87/12, a plot measuring 0-13-0 Hectre. Kist 0- 28 paise.
13.Situate in Tiruchirapalli District, Manapparai taluk, Ayanporuvai Village, Valayapatti Poosari Street, two tiled houses bearing door Nos.3/76 and 3/77, provided with an energy connection in S.C.No.16 attached to A.Poruvai S.S. Value Rs.4,000/- These houses are comprised in New S.F.No.88/19, 88/27 and 88/35 of Ayanporuvai village."
3 The aforesaid 13 items of immovable properties shall hereinafter be referred to as 'suit properties' for the sake of brevity, convenience and clarity. To be noted, aforesaid suit filed by Palaniyandi in the trial court was inter-alia for declaratory and consequential injunctive reliefs qua suit properties. As mentioned supra, at the time of inception, suit was filed against nine individuals, but subsequently, defendants 2, 3 and 4 were deleted / exonerated in the trial court and therefore, there were effectively six defendants in the trial court.
4 After full contest / trial, the trial court in and by judgment dated 13.7.1998 declined to grant declaratory relief, but decreed the suit with regard to the injunction prayer. 5 out of 6 defendants carried the matter in appeal by way of a regular first appeal under Section 96 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as 'CPC' for brevity). This regular first appeal is A.S.No.585 of 1999 on the file of 'II Additional Sub Court, Tiruchirappalli', which shall hereinafter be referred to as 'first appellate court' for the sake of convenience and clarity. In the first appeal in the first appellate court, sole plaintiff was arrayed as respondent No.1 and 8th defendant was arrayed as respondent No.2. After full contest, in and by judgment and decree dated 29.6.2001, the first appellate court allowed the appeal by setting aside the injunction decree granted by the trial court. In other words, the first appellate court reversed the judgment and decree of the trial court. Aggrieved, sole plaintiff in the trial court Palaniyandi filed the instant second appeal in this court on 7.1.2002.
5 This second appeal was admitted by this court on 9.1.2002 on three substantial questions of law which are as follows :
?a)When the defendants have no better title than the plaintiff and when plaintiff has established his long and continuous possession, is he not entitle to decree for injunction against the persons who have no better title even though the plaintiff failed to establish his title (Air 1972 S.C. 2299)?
b)Whether not the plaintiff entitled to decree for injunction against a stranger based on his possession as per Sec.110 of the Indian Evidence Act (1996 TLNJ 378)?
c)Whether the Lower Appellate Court is right in law in placing reliance on the decision reported in 1998 TLNJ 100 which are on different facts??
6 This second appeal is now before me for final disposal. As mentioned supra, sole plaintiff in the trial court Palaniyandi is sole appellant before me. There are six respondents in the second appeal. Six respondents in the second appeal are defendant Nos.1, 5 to 7, 9 and defendant No.8 respectively.
7 With regard to 6th respondent, it appears that a memo has been filed vide USR No.4057 dated 11.12.2013. That memo has been recorded by the Court and recording in the Court file as contained in the memorandum of grounds of appeal reads as follows :
?R6 died, Memo USR No.4057 dt.11/12/13 recorded vide Court's order dt 11/12/13 in SA.44/2002?
8 That leaves us with the sole appellant, who was lone plaintiff in the trial court and five respondents, who were defendants 1, 5 to 7 and 9 in the trial court. Parties in this second appeal shall hereinafter be referred to by their respective ranks in the trial court, wherever deemed necessary for the sake of convenience and clarity.
9 Mr.S.Vinayak, learned counsel representing Mr.A.Joel Paul Antony, counsel on record for sole appellant and Mr.A.N.Ramanathan, learned counsel representing Mr.R.Maheswaran (counsel on record for first respondent) as well as Mr.A.Thiagarajan (counsel on record for respondents 2 to 5) are before me.
10 From the arguments of the aforesaid two learned counsel before me making reference to records of courts below wherever necessary, it unfurls that there is no dispute between parties to the lis that suit properties originally belonged to two blood brothers, Palaniyandi and Malaiyandi. It is the case of plaintiff that after the demise of Palaniyandi, suit properties devolved on his son Aandi and thereafter, on Aandi's son Palaniyandi who is the plaintiff. Plaintiff Palaniyandi and his grand father shared a common name (Palaniyandi). As far as defendants are concerned, they are claiming through the other brother Malaiyandi.
11 It is the case of defendants that after the demise of Malaiyandi, suit properties devolved on his son Aandi (to be noted, sons of both Palaniyandi and Malaiyandi have a common name 'Aandi'). It is the further case of defendants that after the demise of Malaiyandi's son Aandi, suit properties devolved on Malaiyandi's son Aandi's son Chinnaiya. It is the specific case of the defendants that Chinnaiya went Malaysia in 1950s and settled down there. I am informed that Chinnaiya had two wives and five sons. It is also the case of defendants that one wife Nallammal and two sons Subramanian and Murugaiya executed a registered power of attorney document with regard to suit properties in favour of first defendant. This registered power of attorney document dated 17.6.1996 is registered as document No.21 of 1996 in Ponnamaravathi Sub Registrar's Office. It has been marked as Ex.B.1. Therefore, it unfurls that defendants are not claiming title to suit properties, but are only claiming possessory right. It is their case that defendants are in possession of suit properties in their capacity as power of attorney agents on the strength of aforesaid Ex.B.1.
12 In the course of hearing, in the light of aforesaid narrative, it was put to both learned counsel that both plaintiff and defendants could have got only half share and could not have got entire suit properties even according to the aforesaid versions qua devolution which are pleadings in the trial court. Both learned counsel fairly agreed that this position is correct. Further more, in the light of the trajectory of the litigation in the two courts below, learned counsel for the appellant will be able to argue only on possession aspect, i.e., injunctive relief qua possession as the plaintiff did not file an appeal against dismissal of declaratory relief.
13 In the trial court, plaintiff Palaniyandi was examined as P.W.1. Two people, who worked for Palaniyandi, viz., one Raju and Mrs.Bagyam were examined as P.W.2 and P.W.3 respectively. On the side of defendants, first defendant Palanisamy examined himself as D.W.1 and 5th defendant Aandiyappan examined himself as D.W.2. On the side of plaintiff, as many as 22 exhibits, i.e., Exs.A.1 to A.22 were marked and on the side of defendants, 20 exhibits, i.e., Exs.B.1 to B.20 were marked. A perusal of the trial court judgment reveals that trial court has declined the declaratory relief primarily on the ground that aforesaid genealogy has not been clearly established. In other words, trial court has come to the conclusion that it has not been established that plaintiff Palaniyandi is grand son of Palaniyandi. To be noted, trial court has also come to the conclusion that it has also not been established that Chinnaiya is the grandson of Malaiyandi. In fact, trial court has concluded that even the factum that Malaiyandi and Palaniyandi being blood brothers has not been established.
14 However, with regard to grant of injunctive relief qua possession, three factors appear to have weighed with the trial court in granting injunctive relief. First factor is all original title deeds of suit properties are with the plaintiff and the same have been marked as Exs.A.1 to A.4. Second factor is that plaintiff has been able to produce and mark original kist receipts for suit properties though kist receipts are in the name of Chinnaiya. Third aspect is patta for suit properties have been produced by plaintiff. This is articulated in paragraph 12 of the printed judgment of trial court and I deem it appropriate to extract the same, which reads as follows :
15 To be noted, five issues were framed by trial court and the same are as follows :
16 After the aforesaid articulation in paragraph 12, trial court has answered issue Nos.1 to 4 in paragraph 13 of the printed judgment and I deem it appropriate to extract the same. Paragraph 13 reads as follows :
17 To be noted, issue No.5 is only a residuary issue and that has been answered in paragraph 14 which reads as follows :
18 Moving on to the judgment of the first appellate court, first appellate court set aside the injunction decree granted by the trial court holding that injunctive relief is a consequential relief. Having declined declaratory relief, i.e., relief of declaration of title, injunctive relief qua possession alone ought not to have been granted is the view taken by the first appellate court. First appellate court did so by placing reliance on a judgment of this Court in The State of Tamilnadu, rep. by the District Collector, Tiruchirappalli Vs. K.Purushothaman reported in 1998 T.L.N.J 100 :
(1998) 2 LW 171, which shall hereinafter referred to as 'Purushothaman case'.
This aspect of the matter has been articulated by first appellate court in paragraph 10 of its judgment and I deem it appropriate to extract the same, which reads as follows :
19 With regard to submissions before me, Mr.S.Vinayak, learned counsel for appellant argued that first appellate court has interfered with the injunction decree granted by trial court solely on the ground that injunction can be granted only if declaratory relief also had been granted. In other words, it was pointed out that first appellate court has interfered and set aside the injunction decree of trial court on the ground that trial court ought not to have granted the injunctive relief after having negatived and declined the declaratory relief. This according to learned counsel for appellant is incorrect.
20 In examining the aforesaid submission, I noticed that there is absolutely no tenable much less acceptable explanation available for the question as to why plaintiff / appellant did not prefer a regular first appeal against declaratory relief being declined. In other words, the dismissal of declaration of title prayer by trial court has been given legal quietus. This entire lis has to necessarily be viewed from this aspect of the matter. Therefore, at the second appellate stage under Section 100 CPC where I am examining the lis only on substantial question/s of law, it has to necessarily be construed that plaintiff / appellant has failed to establish title to suit properties and more importantly has accepted this position qua dismissal suffered in the trial court by giving complete legal quietus to dismissal of declaration of title limb of prayer. For all practical purposes, as far as this lis is concerned, plaintiff does not have title for suit properties. This is the obtaining position as the plaintiff / appellant has not chosen to file a regular first appeal under Section 96 CPC against dismissal of declaratory relief by the trial court.
21 One other aspect of the matter, which according to me is very important is the prayer in the plaint. Prayer in the plaint has already been extracted supra. A mere perusal of the prayer in the plaint would reveal that plaintiff has prayed for declaration of title and 'consequential' permanent injunction. Therefore, even according to the language in which prayer in the plaint is couched, the injunctive relief is consequent upon the declaratory relief. In very simple terms, this means that even according to the prayer in the plaint, plaintiff would be entitled to injunctive relief only as a consequence of declaratory relief. In other words, only if the plaintiff succeeds in establishing title and gets declaration title decree qua suit properties, would plaintiff be entitled to injunctive relief qua possession. Having couched the prayer in such a language, plaintiff / appellant cannot now be heard to contend that injunctive relief qua suit properties can be granted even if declaratory relief is negatived.
22 With regard to substantial question of law No.(a), it will be seen from a perusal of the substantial question of law that ratio of Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down in M.Kallappa Setty Vs. M.V.Lakshminarayana Rao [AIR 1972 SC 2299], has been built into the substantial question of law itself. Learned counsel for appellant drew my attention to paragraph 5 of the said judgment. Paragraph 5 of Kallappa Setty case reads as follows :
"5.So far as the question of possession is concerned, as mentioned earlier, both the trial court and the first appellate court have accepted the plaintiff's case that he was in possession of the suit site ever since he purchased the same in 1947. This is essentially a finding of fact. That finding is based on evidence. The High Court, in our opinion, erred in coming to the conclusion that the possession of the plaintiff after the sale deed in his favour is not a relevant circumstance. We are of opinion that it is an extremely important circumstance. The plaintiff can on the strength of his possession resist interference from persons who have on better title than himself to the suit property. Once it is accepted, as the trial court and the first appellate court have done, that the plaintiff was in possession of the property ever since 1947 then his possession has to be protected as against interference by someone who is not proved to have a better title than himself to the suit property. On the findings arrived at by the fact finding courts as regards possession, the plaintiff was entitled to the second relief asked for by him even if he had failed to prove his title satisfactorily. Therefore, in our opinion, the High Court was not right in interfering with the judgment of the trial court as affirmed by the first appellate court regarding relief 2."
23 Learned counsel for respondents Mr.A.N.Ramanathan pointed out that Kallappa Setty case is not applicable to the facts of the instant case. It is further submitted by learned counsel that Kallappa Setty case is clearly distinguishable on facts. It is pointed out that in Kallappa Setty case, the prayer was not one for declaration and consequential injunction, but there were two separate limbs. One for declaration and the other for injunction. According to learned counsel, this is distinguishing point No.1. According to learned counsel, distinguishing point No.2 is, in Kallappa Setty case, both courts below decreed both limbs, i.e., declaration of title as well as injunction qua possession. High Court though exercising power under Section 100 CPC (limited to substantial question/s of law) reversed the decrees of both courts below primarily on the ground that plaintiff has failed to establish satisfactorily his title to the suit property. These set of facts are contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Kallappa Setty case and I deem it appropriate to extract the same. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Kallappa Setty case read as follows :
This is a plaintiff's appeal by special leave. In the suit from which this appeal arises, the plaintiff prayed for two reliefs viz.:
?(1) declaring that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the plaint schedule site being in possession and enjoyment of the same, and that the defendant has no right whatever in this site, nor is he in enjoyment of the same; and (2) granting permanent injunction restraining the defendant from unlawfully and forcibly entering upon the suit site, and disturbing the plaintiff's possession and also from constructing the house by unlawfully obtaining a licence from the Municipality.?
2. The trial court decreed the suit as prayed for. The first appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. In second appeal the High Court reversed the decree of the courts below and dismissed the plaintiff's suit with costs, primarily on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to establish satisfactorily his title to the suit property."
24 It is highlighted by learned counsel for respondents that in the instant case, trial court after full contest dismissed the prayer for declaration of title and more importantly that dismissal has not been assailed any further. The dismissal of the prayer for declaration of title by trial court has been given legal quietus in the instant case. This according to learned counsel is the third distinguishing feature. This third distinguishing factor appeals to my mind and I am of the view that plaintiff / appellant not having challenged the dismissal of the prayer for declaration of title and giving quietus to the same is clearly fatal to the plaintiff / appellant. In other words, in Kallappa Setty case, the plaintiff therein did not suffer dismissal of declaratory relief. On the contrary, declaration of title relief was granted concurrently by both courts below. The two courts below are court of facts. When courts which dealt with facts have given the relief of declaration of title and particularly when the second court below is the last court of facts exercising power under Section 96 of CPC, the High Court reversed it in Section 100 CPC. That is not the scenario here. Therefore, the principle in Kallappa Setty case definitely does not help the appellant / plaintiff in the instant case. In this view of the matter, I answer substantial question of law No.(a) in favour of respondents and against the appellant. I accept the submission of learned counsel for respondents that substantial question of law (a) does not arise in the instant case owing to the aforesaid reasons. To be noted, respondents in the second appeal under Section 100 CPC are entitled to do so under sub-section (5) of Section 100 CPC.
25 I now move on to substantial question of law (b). In this second substantial question of law K.M.A.Mohamed Ali Tharanganar Vs. Velu reported in 1996 T.L.N.J. 378 has been built into. This shall hereinafter be referred to as 'Mohamed Ali case'. This Mohamed Ali case does not help the appellant / plaintiff, because Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 has no application in the instant case. Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act will come into play only when a person who is in possession is disputed to be the owner. In the instant case, prayer in the trial court itself was for declaration of title and consequential injunction. Trial court dismissed the declaration of title prayer and that has been given complete legal quietus. To be noted, Mohamed Ali case does not explicitly refer to Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act, but a passage from Sarkar 'on Evidence' (14th Edition - 1993) page 1448 has been extracted. As the second substantial question of law makes a specific reference to Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act and builds into it Mohamed Ali case, in the hearing before me, it had to necessarily be construed that Mohamed Ali case has been pressed into service for the purpose of Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act. In the light of the discussion supra and for the reasons set out herein, Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act does not come into play in the instant case and therefore, I have no difficulty in answering the second substantial question of law, i.e., substantial question of law (b) in favour of respondents and against the appellant / plaintiff.
26 This takes us to third substantial question of law, i.e., substantial question of law (c). With regard to third substantial question of law, a judgment in Purushothaman case has been built into it. To be noted, Purushothaman case has also been reported in (1998) 2 LW 171. The question is whether first appellate court was correct in placing reliance on principle laid down in Purushothaman case. Answer to this question again turns on the plaintiff not having challenged the dismissal of declaration of title relief. As the plaintiff / appellant has given quietus to dismissal of declaration of title prayer, it follows inevitably and indisputably that person, who has failed qua declaratory relief, cannot sustain the injunction relief. In this context, at the peril of repetition, it has to be noted that prayer in the plaint itself is for declaration of title and 'consequential' injunction as alluded to supra. I have already extracted supra elsewhere in this judgment that portion of the first appellate court judgment, wherein Purushothaman case has been relied on to say that relief of injunction cannot be sustained after negativing declaration of title prayer. Though Purushothaman case, on facts turns on adverse possession qua government land, in the instant case, it becomes applicable solely because dismissal of declaration of title prayer has been given legal quietus. If the plaintiff / appellant had challenged the dismissal of declaratory relief by trial court, the position may have been different. I do not want to delve into that aspect of the matter as that may take us to the realm of surmises and conjectures. For answering third substantial question of law, i.e., substantial question of law (c), suffice to say that in the light of this discussion, first appellate court was, on the facts of this case, correct in relying on Purushothaman case principle. Therefore, third substantial question of law, i.e., substantial question of law (c) is also answered in favour of respondents and against the appellant.
27 Though I have answered substantial questions of law, I deemed it necessary to deal with a case law in one aspect of the matter which was projected before me.
28 Learned counsel for the appellant Mr.S.Vinayak pressed into service a judgment of Supreme Court in Rame Gowda Vs. M.Varadappa Naidu reported in (2004) 1 SCC 769. Learned counsel drew my attention to paragraph 11 of the aforesaid judgment, which reads as follows :
"11.In the present case the trial court has found the plaintiff as having failed in proving his title. Nevertheless, he has been found to be in settled possession of the property. Even the defendant failed in proving his title over the disputed land so as to substantiate his entitlement to evict the plaintiff. The trial court, therefore, left the question of title open and proceeded to determine the suit on the basis of possession, protecting the established possession and restraining the attempted interference therewith. The trial court and the High Court have rightly decided the suit. It is still open to the defendant-appellant to file a suit based on his title against the plaintiff-respondent and evict the latter on the former establishing his better right to possess the property. "
29 This Rame Gowda case also does not help appellant / plaintiff in the instant case and the reason is contained in paragraph 11 itself. A reading of paragraph 11 of Rame Gowda case would show that it is a case where the trial court left open the question of title and proceeded to determine the suit on the basis of possession. In the instant case, trial court has not left open the question of title. On the contrary, trial court has conclusively dismissed and negatived the prayer for title after full contest / trial.
30 I have also extracted paragraph 12 of the trial court judgment. There is only one sentence in paragraph 12 regarding possession. That sentence is ?,Ue;jhYk; thjpjhd; jhth brhj;Jf;fspd; RthjPd mDnghfj;jpy; ,Ue;J tUfpwhh; vd;gJ thjpj; jug;g[ Mtz';fs; kw;Wk; rhl;rpa';fs;K:yk; bjs;sj; bjspthfpwJ/? This sentence is preceded by ?thjp rpd;idahtpd; thhpR vd;gij epU:gpj;Jjhd; thjp chpik nfhu Koa[k;/ ,t;tHf;fpy; mt;thW VJk; thjp epU:gpf;ftpy;iy/?
31 The aforesaid findings in the form of two sentences occur one after the other and in my considered view, in the light of the prayer being consequential injunction, they are dovetailed. Therefore, first appellate court was correct in taking the view that trial court ought not to have granted injunction relief after declining the declaration of title relief.
32 One more aspect of emphasis is the entire finding qua possession in trial court is contained only in one aforesaid sentence.
33 Learned counsel for appellant drew my attention to the deposition of D.W.1. To be noted, first defendant examined himself as D.W.1. D.W.1 has denied the suggestion that Ex.B.1 (Power of Attorney) was executed by legal heirs of Chinnaiya. Likewise, on a perusal of Ex.B.1, I noticed that there is a recital in Ex.B.1 to the effect that the principals are close relatives of D.W.1, but there is no pleadings to this effect. In the light of the fact that plaintiff in the trial court has not proved title qua suit properties and in the light of the fact that plaintiff has given legal quietus to the dismissal plaintiff's prayer in this regard by trial court, it would be a futile exercise to delve into these aspects. Not only would it be futile, it is even impermissible to do so in a second appeal considering the narrow and limited scope of Section 100 CPC as dismissal of declaratory relief has been given quietus, I deem it appropriate to not to delve into these aspects any further.
34 Thus I have answered all three substantial questions of law against appellant / plaintiff and in favour of respondents. This second appeal fails and second appeal deserves to be dismissed.
35 Second Appeal No.44 of 2002 is dismissed, confirming the judgment and decree of the first appellate court, i.e., II Additional Subordinate Judges Court, Trichy, dated 29.06.2001 made in A.S.No.585 of 1999, which has set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court, i.e., District Munsif Court, Manapparai, dated 13.7.1998 made in O.S.No.458 of 1996. Considering the nature of the lis, I deem it appropriate to leave the parties to bear their respective costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.
To
1.II Additional Subordinate Court, Trichy.
2.District Munsif Court, Manaparai .