Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
K. Tata Babu vs The Board Of Management, District ... on 31 January, 1996
Equivalent citations: 1996(1)ALT704
ORDER A. Gopal Rao, J.
1. This Writ Petition is filed for issuance of a Writ of Certiorari to quash the Order dated 4-10-1992 in proceedings No. ADMN/EST/91-92/1051 of the 2nd respondent as confirmed by the order dated 21-12-1992 in proceedings No. E/92-93 of the Board of Management of the 1st respondent and for consequential direction to reinstate the petitioner in service with all back-wages.
2. Petitioner joined the Hyderabad District Co-operative Central bank as an Assistant in the year 1965 and secured promotion as Bank Inspector in the year 1980. In the month of June, in the year 1988, the Loan application of Andhra Pradesh Housing Board Technical Employees Co-operative Credit Society (hereinafter called "the Society") was referred to the petitioner for inspection and report. On 27-6-1988, petitioner visited the office of the society, inspected the books of accounts membership register and after obtaining an undertaking from the pay Drawing Officer for collecting the instalments from the respective employees, recommended to the 2nd respondent for grant of loan to the society. The society availed loan on an earlier occasion also for Rs. 11,11,700/- and was regularly paying the monthly installments. Petitioner submitted his report on 30-6-1988 and the loan application of 133 members of the society was then processed upto the level of General Manager of the 2nd respondent Bank. The General Manager raised certain queries on the file relating to the grant of loan to the society. On 8-7-1988, the Bank addressed a letter to the A.P. Housing Board seeking certain particulars and the said particulars were received from. the Housing Board on 18-7-1988. On 19-7-1988, the Deputy General Manager (B) of the Bank Sri M.V. Subba Reddy visited the Housing Board and discussed with the top officials of the Housing Board as per the instructions of the General Manager of the Bank and recommended for grant of loan to the society. The Deputy General Manager answered the queries raised by the General Manager. In the meanwhile as the General Manager was on leave the President of the respondent-bank sanctioned the loan to the society on 26-7-1988. According to the petitioner the normal procedure is to place the file before the Board of Directors but that was not done and even though the Board met on 27-7-1988 ratification of the action taken by the President in sanctioning the loan was not obtained. Petitioner was on training from 23-7-1988 to 6-8-1988 in the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Central Agricultural Bank Limited, Hyderabad. He claims that except the report submitted by him on 30-6-1988 on the application of the society, he had no other role to play in the matter of processing the file for grant of loan to the society. The loan was disbursed ultimately by the Deputy General Manager by way of a deposit in the Current Account of the Society which withdrew the amount by issuing individual Account Payee Cheques on the same day to the concerned employees. The society remitted the first instalment towards the loan repayment on behalf of the 133 loanees but thereafter committed default in payment of subsequent instalments. The respondent-bank addressed the Housing Board regarding the default in payment of monthly recovery instalments and demanded remittance of the instalments amounts. The employees of the respondent-bank complained to the Commissioner and Registrar of Co-operative Societies that the President of the Bank in collusion with the Office-bearers of the society and employees of the bank had sanctioned benami loans. Acting on the above representation/ complaint, the Commissioner directed an enquiry under Section 51 of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act (for short "the Act"). The Commissioner appointed one Sri Abdul Haq, Joint Registrar in the Office of Commissioner for Co-operation as the Enquiry Officer, who conducted enquiry and submitted his report. In that report, the Enquiry Officer had stated that all the 133 members to whom the loan was sanctioned are fictitious persons and the bank employees right from the Section Clerk to the President, the office-bearers of the society and the Assistant Secretary of the Housing Board were jointly and severally responsible for the loss occasioned to the respondent-bank. He also recommended initiation disciplinary action against all the 10 employees of the bank, the office- bearers of the society as also the Assistant Secretary of the Housing Board. This report of the Enquiry Officer was submitted on 19-4-1990.
3. Basing on the report submitted by the Enquiry Officer on 19-4-1990, ten employees of the respondent-Bank, including the petitioner, were placed under suspension on 11-8-1990. Thereafter, surcharge proceedings were initiated by the District Co-operative Officer, Ranga Reddy District under Section 60 of the Act. In the surcharge proceedings, dt 28-12-1991 the Enquiry Officer held that 14 employees of the respondent bank including 10 persons referred to above are jointly and severally responsible for the loan amount sanctioned to the society and the said amount should be recovered from, them. On 22-4-1991, the order of suspension imposed on all the other Officers of the bank, except the petitioner, was withdrawn and all of them were reinstated to duty without prejudice to the civil and criminal proceedings to be initiated against them, for the reason that there is lack of Officers to run the administration of the Bank. Notwithstanding the enquiry conducted under Section 51 of the Act and the surcharge proceedings taken under Section 60 of the Act, a charge-memo was served on-the petitioner on 31-8-1990 framing two charges against the petitioner. Similar action was, however, not initiated against any other employees against who surcharge proceedings were taken, according to the petitioner. The two charges framed against the petitioner are (1) that he recommended the loan application of A.P. Housing Board Technical Staff Cooperative Credit Society Limited, Hyderabad, under loan Account No. 1002 without actually visiting the society and verifying details of the loanees and their salary particulars with the Housing Board, which has resulted in the sanction of loans to the Benami members and finally could not recover the amounts and thus caused loss to the bank; (2) that he failed to ensure disbursement of loans to the proper persons.
4. Petitioner claims that in spite of his request for giving him copies of certain relevant documents, the same were not furnished to him by the authorities. In spite of the same, petitioner submits that he had submitted his explanation on 19-11-1990. The Enquiry Officer was appointed on 9-11-1990 by the President of the Bank and on 20-11-1990 the Enquiry Officer issued a notice to the petitioner calling upon him to appear before him on 26-11-1990. Accordingly petitioner appeared before the Enquiry Officer on 26-11-1990 and the enquiry was adjourned to 21-2-1991. On 21-2-1991, the Enquiry Officer did not examine any witnesses on behalf of the bank, but recorded the statement of the petitioner and closed the enquiry. The enquiry officer did not even mark the documents. The reports already submitted by the concerned officers after conducting enquiry under Section 51 and initiating surcharge proceedings under Section 60 of the Act though relevant were also not marked. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report in March 1991, holding that the Charge No-1 is not proved, but however held that charge No. 2 i s proved. As mentioned already, at the time of disbursement of loan to the society petitioner was undergoing training and was not holding any post in the respondent-bank. Petitioner also claims that it is not his function or duty to disburse the loans to the loanees. The disbursement by the society to the loanees was through Account Payee Cheques. Based on the enquiry report, a show-cause notice was issued by the President of the bank on 1-2-1992 to the petitioner calling upon him to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service on the basis of the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer on Charge No. 2. Petitioner sought copies of certain documents from the authorities but the same were not furnished to him. In the absence of documents the petitioner could not submit his explanation. By order dated 4-10-1992 petitioner was dismissed from service by the 2nd respondent holding that he (petitioner) did not submit explanation within the time prescribed and therefore it is deemed that he has no explanation to offer to the show-cause notice dated 1-2-1992. The appeal filed by the petitioner on 28-10-1992 to the Board of management of the respondent-bank was also dismissed on 21-12-1992 by a single line order to the effect that the Disciplinary Authority was justified in dismissing the petitioner from service and there is nothing to consider to reduce the same.
5. Aggrieved by the same, petitioner filed this Writ Petition contending that principles of natural justice have been violated by the Disciplinary Authority; there is no discussion of the evidence on record and the report of the Enquiry Officer; the order is passed dismissing the petitioner from service solely on the ground that he has not filed his explanation; it is obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to give an independent finding on both the charges and that has not been done; the manner and method in which the enquiry was conducted by the enquiry officer is bad and no witnesses were examined and no documents were marked on behalf of the bank; the earlier reports submitted by the concerned authorities under Section 51 and under Section 60 of the Act are not referred to; the respondent-bank had shown discrimination in holding an enquiry by framing charges against the petitioner alone without taking similar action against the other erring officers against whom surcharge proceedings are also initiated.
6. The Respondent-Bank is contesting this Writ Petition on the grounds that - the Writ Petition is not maintainable as the respondent-bank is not a "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India; the inspection conducted by the. petitioner of the society is defective which resulted in occurrence of loss to the bank as the basis for processing the file for sanctioning is totally based on the report submitted by the petitioner and therefore the petitioner is solely responsible for the loss occurred to the bank; petitioner had colluded with the staff of the society and sent a false report; the enquiry conducted by the disciplinary authority is perfectly in order and the petitioner was given due opportunity during the course of enquiry, the irregularity committed by the petitioner being grave, the punishment imposed on the petitioner is justified; the appropriate punishment has been imposed on all the other employees taking into consideration their role in defrauding the bank by with-holding all increments accruable to them through their service.
7. In view of the rival contentions, the point for determination in this Writ Petition is, whether the action of the respondents in dismissing the petitioner from service under the orders impugned in this writ petition is justified?
8. The preliminary objection, raised by the Counsel for the respondents that the respondent-bank viz., Hyderabad District Co-operative Central Bank Limited, Hyderabad cannot be regarded as "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and consequently the Writ Petition is not maintainable, has to be considered and decided in the first instance.
9. A similar objection was raised and considered in the judgment in Writ Petition No. 16214 of 1993 dated 21-7-1994 by this Court, relating to the respondent-bank viz., Hyderabad District Co-operative Central Bank Limited, Nampally Station Road, Hyderabad. The effect of the Full Bench decision of this Court in Konaseema Co-operative Central Bank Limited, Amalapuram v. N. Seetharama Raju, 1990 (2) ALT 1 = 1990 (1) An.W.R. 675 = AIR 1990 A.P. 171 (F.B.) was also considered and it was held that there was deep and pervasive State Control and many of the Officers are deputed by the Government and are subjected to Government control. It was further held that the respondent bank being a Central Co-operative Bank, the functions of the bank are of public importance and are closely related to the Government functions. In that view of the matter, it was held that the respondent-bank could be classified as an "instrumentality of the State" and must be considered as "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India.
10. The learned Counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the above judgment dated 21-7-1994 in Writ Petition No.16214 of 1993 has been confirmed in Writ Appeal (vide Order dt l4-9-1992 in Writ Appeal No. 988/1995) and the same has become final. In the circumstances, I hold that the present Writ petition is maintainable.
11. Petitioner, when he was working as Inspector, in the month of June 1988, was entrusted with the loan application of the Society for verification of service particulars of the employees with the records of the Housing Board such as Pay Bills etc. Petitioner was asked to verify the books of accounts of the society to find out as to whether they are up-to date or not, whether the loanees have any previous out standings to be cleared, pay particulars of loanees, membership registers so as to ascertain whether the applicants are members of the Society or not, to scrutinize the minutes book of the society, to obtain an undertaking from the pay drawing officer of the society that he would ensure recovery of the loan amounts by way of instalments from the salaries of the loanees, to secure a copy of the resolution of the managing committee of the society recommending release of the loan on behalf of the members and lastly to secure a copy of the performance balance-sheet of the society on the date of the application.
12. Petitioner visited the Housing Board on 27th, 28th and 29th June 1988, inspected the books of accounts and other registers furnished by the society, secured pay particulars of the applicants and an undertaking from the pay drawing officer that he will recover the monthly instalments from the loanees. Petitioner has also seen the books of accounts membership registers and the resolutions of the managing committee of the society sanctioning the loans to the members. He also noticed that the same society had earlier availed a loan of Rs.11,11,700/- from the respondent-bank and is paying the instalments regularly. Having done so, petitioner did not entertain any doubt about the applications being fictitious and acting bona fide recommended granting of the loan by his report dated 30th June 1988. The file containing the application of 133 members of the society has been processed upto the level of General Manager of the respondent bank through proper channels in the hierarchy of Officers of the respondent bank. On 30-6-1988, the General Manager raised certain queries on the file with respect to sanctioning of the loan. One of the queries raised by the General manager was that the Deputy General manager should visit the Housing Board and discuss with the top management of the Housing Board and the Society as to their working system in the State and the genuinety of the membership. The respondent-bank itself addressed a letter on 8-7-1988 to the President of the Society and the Pay Drawing Officer and sought certain clarifications regarding the Fixed Deposits at members level and the investment to be made in the bank as there was certain discrepancy. A clarification was also sought relating to the certificate furnished by the Assistant Secretary of the Housing Board, as it is different from the service particulars and with a request to furnish the total strength of the Technical Staff in the entire State in the Housing Board with their designations. On 18-7-1988, the respondent-bank received clarification and the particulars sought for from the Housing Board as well as the Society. On 19-7-1988, as per the directions of the General Manager of the respondent-bank, the Deputy General Manager of the respondent-bank visited the Housing Board and discussed with the management about the loan applications and other details regarding the sanction of the loan. Thereafter the Deputy General Manager recommended for release of the loan. According to the petitioner after he submitted his report on 30-6-1988 he was no way involved in the subsequent events culminating in the sanctioning and release of the loan. The General Manager of the respondent-bank again raised certain doubts on 20-7-1988 for which a reply has been sent by the Deputy General Manager stating that the Housing Board would recover the total instalments from the loanees and remit it in the bank. The General Manager was on leave and therefore the file was placed before the President of the respondent-bank, who sanctioned the loan by his order dt. 26-7-1988 without placing it before the Board of Management which was due to meet on 27-7-1988. After the loan amount was released by issuing a crossed cheque the amount was creditted in the current account of the society on 27-7-1988 and the society in turn released the amounts in favour of the loanees by individual account-payee cheques. The first instalment by way of repayment by the society was paid on 19-9-1988. The details given above will indicate that except verifying the records accounts and other particulars by the petitioner as indicated in his report the matter was thoroughly considered by the other officers upto the level of the General Manager of the respondent-bank before the decision was taken to sanction the loan in favour of the society. It is clear that the sanction of the loan is not solely based on the report submitted by the petitioner. Subsequent to the receipt of the report from the petitioner, General Manager of the bank, as mentioned already, raised several queries on more than one occassion and the Deputy General Manager of the respondent-bank was specifically deputed by the General Manager for clearing the doubts raised by the General Manager. In fact the loan amount was paid by way of crossed cheque to the society and the society in turn disbursed the amount to the loanees the respective loan amounts, by crossed cheques. The first instalment in repayment of the loan amount was also paid by the society. It is clear that the society and other officers of the Housing Board have stage-managed the records and shown them to the petitioner when he went for the inspection. There was absolutely no scope for the petitioner to doubt the veracity of the accounts and other records of the society produced by the officers of the society and the officers of the Housing Board. In fact the facts narrated above will indicate that along with the petitioner ten officers were placed under suspension, an enquiry under Section. 51 of the Act was conducted against all of them and surcharge proceedings under Section. 60 of the Act were also initiated against all of them. The recoveries as per the surcharge proceedings are still pending and it is brought to the notice of this Court that recovery is being effected form all of them. The respondents have curiously singled-out the petitioner for the purpose of conducting disciplinary enquiry and accordingly framed the two charges mentioned above.
13. The Enquiry Officer has categorically held in his report dated 4-3-1991 that Charge No. 1 is not tenable in the eye of law and hence not proved. Regarding Charge No. 2, the Enquiry Officer held that the petitioner was negligent in not properly scrutinizing the loan application in question and he did not verify the service particulars of 133 new members of the society with reference to pay bills etc., of the Housing Board. He also held that the petitioner had simply relied on the records produced by the Office-bearers of the Pradesh Housing Board Technical Staff Co-operative Credit Society Limited, Hyderabad, and recommended sanction of loan on loan application in loan account No. 1010. Finally, the Enquiry Officer held "Had the charged officer took care to verify the service particulars of the loanees with reference to the Housing Board records the sanction of loan of Rs. 12,26,400/-would have been averted. From the above, it is quite evident that office-bearers of the society have managed to get the loan of Rs. 12,26,400/- sanctioned to 133 new members who were all benami and bogus members for which the charged officer is also held partly responsible for having acted in good-faith.....................I therefore feel that the charged officer Sri K. Tata Babu, Bank Inspector has committed major misconduct in discharging his duties as Bank Inspector".
14. Accepting this report of the Enquiry Officer, the disciplinary authority, viz., the president of the respondent-bank, by order dated 4-10-1992 held that the charged officer is not a fit person to continue in the service of the bank and ordered dismissal of the petitioner (charged officer) from the service of the bank with immediate effect. Though the order of the disciplinary authority dated 4-10-1992 runs into 26 pages, the entire order deals with the details of the requests made by the petitioner for supply of documents etc., and the reasons given by the disciplinary authority for not supplying the same. The only consideration, if any, by the disciplinary authority and the ultimate conclusion is in the last paragraph of the order, which is in following terms:
"In the circumstances, indicated supra, I have come to the conclusion that the Charged Officer has no explanation to offer to the show cause notice dated 1-2-1992 and hold that the Charged Officer is not a fit person to continue in the service of the Hyderabad District Co-operative Central-Bank limited, Hyderabad, and in exercise of the powers vested in me under Special Bye-law No. 13 of the Special Bye-laws relating to the Service Conditions of the employees of the Hyderabad District Co-operative Central Bank Ltd., Hyderabad, order that Sri K. Tata Babu, Bank Inspector (Under suspension), be dismissed from service with immediate effect".
As could be seen from the above, the only reason given by the disciplinary authority is that the charged officer has not given his explanation to the show-cause notice dt. 1-2-1992 issued by the disciplinary authority. There is absolutely no discussion or consideration regarding the merits of the case and the reasons of the disciplinary authority for concluding that the petitioner is guilty of the charges levelled against him. In other words, the order of the disciplinary authority is not a speaking order. Non-submission of explanation by the charged officer in reply to the show-cause notice does not absolve the disciplinary authority from considering the case on merits, more so, when the disciplinary authority is different from the enquiring authority. This order of the disciplinary authority dated 4-10-1992 was confirmed by the appellate authority, viz., Board of Management of the respondent-bank by proceedings dated 21-12-1992, simply stating.
"With reference to the appeal made by you to the Board of Management of the Bank, we have to inform that the Board of Management of the Bank met on 21-12-1992, has discussed your appeal dated 28-10-1992 in detail and I am directed to convey that the orders of the President, No. Admn/ Est/91-92/1051, dated 4-10-1992 is justifiable and there is no need to reconsider and reduce the same".
The Order of the appellate authority is equally bald and no reasons whatsoever are given for confirming the order of the disciplinary authority.
15. The Gujarat High Court, in Chandrashanker Chunilal v. State of Gujarat, 1977 (2) SLR 270 (Volume 17) dealing with a case where the disciplinary authority has not given reasons for imposing punishment, held "If such serious contentions are put-forth and yet the Disciplinary Authority merely recites that having considered the reply it chooses to accept the finding of the Enquiry Officer without giving reasons it is alibi for not applying the mind and not giving reasons and it cannot be countenanced. And if a cryptic statement like this, that the Governmenthas come to the conclusion that the charge against the delinquent Officer is proved, amounts to giving reasons, the whole gamut of quasi-judicial inquiry and duty to give reasons would stand defeated".
In State of Punjab v. Bakhtawar Singh, where the order passed by the disciplinary authority did not disclose that the authority had applied its mind to the material on record and did not indicate what charges were established, the Court held "This order cannot be said to be a speaking order.
It is arbitrary to the core. Such an order cannot be upheld. Hence it is not necessary to go into the other contentions advanced on behalf of Shri Abrol".
The Suprme Court, in Nand Kishore v. State of Bihar, ruled "The desirability of writing a self-contained speaking order in disciplinary proceeding culminating in an order of removal of the delinquent from service, cannot be over-emphasised. It is true that the impugned orders do not fully measure upto this devoutly desired standard. Nevertheless, they do contain a bald and general allusion to the primary facts, and a cryptic inference therefrom. There is no specific reference to or discussion of the evidence. The High Court, therefore, examined the record of the disciplinary tribunal, not with a view to make out or reconstruct a new case, but only to see whether there was some evidence of the primary facts relied upon by the domestic tribunal in support of its conclusion. We do not see any impropriety in the course adopted by the High Court".
In Siemens Engg. & Mfg. Co. v. Union of India, the Supreme Court held "It is now settled law that where an authority makes an order in exercise of a quasi-judicial function, it must record its reasons in support of the order it makes. Every quasi-judicial order must be supported by reasons. That has been laid down by a long line of decisions of this Court ending with N.M. Desai v. Testeels Ltd., C.A.No. 245 of 1970 decided on 17-12-1975 (SC). But, unfortunately, the Assistant Collector did not choose to give any reasons in support of the order made by him confirming the demand for differential duty. This was in plain disregard of the requirement of law".
In Durga Prashad v. Debi Charan, the Supreme Court observed "What the department did in the present case, was to submit a charge-sheet against him, get his explanation and thereafter it straightaway passed an order of dismissal. This was clearly in violation of the notification referred to above and could not be considered to be a reasonable opportunity as contemplated by the rule contained in the notification".
In the present case also, as mentioned already, the only reason given by the disciplinary authority is that the charged officer has not given his explanation to the show-cause notice dated 1-2-1992, issued by the disciplinary authority. This is not proper, as held by the Supreme Court in the above decision (Durga Prashad's case (6 supra).
16. In view of the fact that the order of the disciplinary authority is not a speaking order, the same cannot be sustained, as held by the Supreme Court in the decisions referred to above (1 to 6 supra).
17.The appellate authority has also not given any reasons whatsoever in confirming the order of the disciplinary authority. In R.P. Bhatt v. Union of India, 1985 (3) SLR 745 (SC) (Vol.40) the Supreme Court, dealing with a similar situation, held:--
"We regret to find that the Director-General has also not given any finding on the crucial question as to whether the findings of the disciplinary authority were warranted by the evidence on record. It seems that he only applied his mind to the requirement of Clause (c) of Rule 27(2), viz., whether the penalty imposed was adequate or justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case. There being non-compliance with the requirements of Rule 27(2) of the Rules, the impugned order passed by the Director-General is liable to be set aside".
The learned Counsel for the respondent-bank has contended that in page-12 of the order of the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary authority has given reasons and exercised its discretion independently to conclude that the petitioner is guilty of the second charge levelled against him. The relevant portion in page-12 of the order of the disciplinary authority, relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent-bank, runs thus:--
"The charge framed against the charged officer, explanation offered by the charged officer and findings of the enquiry officer have been examined with reference to the supporting material available in the bank and it is observed that though charge No. 1 was not proved in the absence of relevant records either in the society or in the bank, the allegation under charge No. 2 that he has failed in discharging his duties properly in verification of service particulars and pay particulars with the Housing Board, is held proved and resultantly an amount of Rs. 12,26,400/- was sanctioned by the Bank as benami loan and the Bank put to heavy loss".
The contention of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-bank, that the disciplinary authority has given reasons and exercise its discretion independently and the same is contained in page 12 of the order of the disciplinary authority, is not correct. What is contained in page 12 of the order of the disciplinary authority, extracted above, is only a narration of facts and the manner in which the Enquiry Officer concluded and decided the matter. A reading of the entire order of the disciplinary authority will establish, beyond any doubt, that there is no independent consideration at all by the disciplinary authority in awarding punishment to the petitioner.
18. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondent bank relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in State Bank of India v. S.S. Koshal, 1994Supp.(2) SCC 469 and contended that the appellate authority need not give any reasons in its order while confirming the order of the disciplinary authority awarding punishment; and even if the appellate authority has not given reasons while confirming the order of the disciplinary authority awarding punishment it does not vitiate the order of the appellate authority.
19. It is no doubt true that in State Bank of India v. S. S. Koshal 1994Supp.(2) SCC 469 it was held by the Supreme Court, inter alia, "In view of the fact that it was an order of affirmance, we are of the opinion that it was not obligatory on the part of the appellate authority to say more than this as the order as it is, shows application of mind. The order cannot be characterised as a non-speaking order". This decision, State Bank of India v. S.S. Koshal, 1994Supp.(2) SCC 469 is not applicable to the facts of the present case on hand. In the present case on hand, as held by me already, the disciplinary authority has not given any reasons at all in awarding the punishment to the petitioner. The order of the appellate authority also does not contain any reasons. In the circumstances, it must be held that the order passed by the disciplinary authority and also the order of the appellate authority, are orders passed without any reasons. Further, in the decision State Bank of India v. S.S. Koshal, 1994Supp.(2) SCC 469 it was observed "The appellate authority then says that it considered the relevant grounds of appeal and after considering the facts of the case came to the conclusion that there was no substance in the appeal". In that view of the matter, the Supreme Court held that in a confirming order of the appellate authority, no reasons need be given. The facts in the case before the Supreme Court State Bank of India v. S.S. Koshal, 1994Supp.(2) SCC 469 are totally different from the facts of the case on hand and therefore the said decision is not helpful to the respondent-bank.
20. For all the reasons stated above, I hold that the order of the disciplinary authority as well as the order of the appellate authority dismissing the petitioner from the service of the respondent-bank are not sustainable. In view of the above finding, there is no need to go into other aspects of the case. The writ Petition is allowed accordingly, and the proceedings No. ADMN/EST/91-92/1051, dated 4-10-1992 of the second respondent, as also the proceedings No. E/92-93, dated 21-12-1992 of the 1st respondent, are hereby quashed. Consequently, the respondents shall reinstate the petitioner to duty with all consequential benefits before 31st March, 1996. It is, however, made dear that this order will not in any way affect the surcharge proceedings already initiated relating to the loan account in question, and also the inquiry/investigation, if any, being conducted by the concerned authorities.
There will be no order as to costs.