Gauhati High Court
Manik Datta vs State Of Tripura on 5 September, 1998
Equivalent citations: II(1999)DMC627
Author: A.K. Patnaik
Bench: A.K. Patnaik
JUDGMENT A.K. Patnaik, J.
1. This is an appeal under Section 374 of the Cr. P.C. againstthe judgment dated 24.2.1998 of the learned Sessions Judge, West Tripura,Agartala in Sessions Trial No. (W.T./A) 38/97 convicting the appellant for theoffence under Section 498A of I.P.C. and sentencing him to R.I. for 3 years and afine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default R.I. for 15 days, and convicting him also for the offenceunder Section 304B, I.P.C. and sentencing him to suffer R.I. for 7 years.
The facts briefly are that on 11.10.1995 the appellant lodged an informationwith the Officer Incharge of Lembucheri Police Out Post, Airport, West Tripura thatin the morning at 5.30 a.m. when he got up from sleep he found that his wife, Swapnawas not present on the bed and was instead hanging on the ceiling fan with a Sari.The police came and brought down the dead body of Swapna and she was cremated.Thereafter, F.I.R. was lodged by Smt. Chayya Das, the mother of the deceased, on20.10.1995 before the Officer Incharge of the Airport Police Out Post, West Tripura,Narsingar. In the said F.I.R., she alleged that the appellant and her daughter Swapnahad a love affair and the appellant gave a proposal for marriage, but she did notinitially agree because there was no money for the marriage. Thereafter on 10 Vadra,Sunday, the appellant alongwith 4 to 5 persons came to her house situated at Isanpurwith a Commander Jeep and said that he would marry the same day at the LaxmiNarayan Bari and the marriage took place at the Laxmi Narayan Bari. She furtherstated in the said F.I.R. that although the appellant did not demand any dowry atthe time of marriage, soon after the marriage the appellant started demanding Rs.15,000/- and some gold articles and also informed her that his father would allowSwapna in his house only if the said demand was fulfilled. Then she informed theappellant through her second son Sri Pradip Das on 10.10.1995 that he would givethe appellant one finger ring and Rs. 2,000/- but the appellant did not agree andinstead started altercation with Pradip regarding the demand. The same night at 10p.m. Pradip came out from the appellant's house and slept in the house of her elderdaughter which was nearby. Early in the morning the following day on 11.10.1995the appellant came from his house and informed Pradip and her elder daughter thatSwapna was seriously ill and that they should go and see her and then her eldersister and her husband Pradip went and saw that Swapna's body was hanging inone of the ceiling fans. Pursuant to the aforesaid F.I.R., investigation was carried outby the police and a chargesheet was filed and the learned Sessions Judge, WestTripura, Agartala, framed charge against the appellant under Sections 498A, 304B and 306, I.P.C. The appellant did not plead guilty and the trial was conducted. In the trial, 19 witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution and by theimpugned judgment the learned Sessions Judge held that the appellant is guilty ofthe offences under Sections 498A and 304-B, I.P.C. and imposed the sentences.
2. At the hearing of this appeal, Mr. B.B. Deb, learned Counsel for the appellantsubmitted that the appellant does not dispute the fact that the deceased was his wife.But the evidence on record would show that it was a simple case of suicidecommitted by the deceased on 11.10.1995. He argued the prosecution case that thedeceased committed suicide because of demand of dowry and torture by theappellant should be disbelieved because no such complaint was made by P.W. 4,the brother of the deceased, who was present at the house of the appellant on11.10.1995 when the body of the deceased was brought down from the ceiling fanby the Police. Mr. Deb pointed out that P.W. 1, the mother of the deceased lodgedthe F.I.R. nine days thereafter on 20.10.1995 making allegations of demand of dowryand torture by the appellant and submitted that such delay in lodging the F.I.R.shows that the allegations of dowry and torture are totally false. He further arguedthat P.W. 1 has admitted in her cross-examination that she has never visited thehouse of the deceased nor did the deceased come to her house before her death andtherefore she had no direct knowledge of any cruelty committed by the appellanton deceased or on any demand of dowry by the appellant from the deceased.Similarly P.W. 2, the father of the deceased, had no direct knowledge of demand ofdowry and torture by the appellant and his knowledge was derived from his twosons keshab and Pradip, P.W. 3 and P.W. 4. Thus, the only evidence against theappellant are the evidence of P.W. 3 and P.W. 4, Mr. Deb vehemently contended thatP.W. 3 Keshab Das has stated that after about 10/12 days of the marriage of theappellant with the deceased he had gone to the house of the appellant to see thedeceased and the deceased told him that the appellant used to torture her fordemanding money and gold ornaments, but no statement had been made by theP.W. 3 under Section 161 of the Cr. P.C. that he had gone to the house of the deceasedafter a few days after marriage. Mr. Deb contended that P.W. 3 Pradip Das hasstated that after 15 /20 days of marriage he went to the house of his elder sister (P.W.6) and from there he alongwith the husband of his elder sister (P.W. 5) went to thehouse of the deceased in the afternoon and that the deceased told him that theappellant wanted Rs. 15,000/- and that he had assaulted her, but P.W. 5 has deniedthat the deceased told any such thing to P.W. 4 and instead has stated that therelationship between the deceased and the appellant was quite good. Mr. Deb alsopointed out that P.W. 6 has also deposed that the relationship between the deceasedand the appellant was good and that she did not hear about any quarrel betweenthem and further P.W. 4 after returning from the house of the deceased had notinformed about any dispute between them. Mr. Deb argued that the P.W. 5 and P.W.6 were not only the close relatives of the deceased but also her neighbours and theirtestimony to the effect that there was good relationship between the appellant andthe deceased casts serious doubt on the prosecution case that the appellant madedemands of dowry from the deceased and tortured her. Mr. Deb also relied on theevidence of the three other neighbours of the deceased examined as P.W. 7, P.W.8 and P.W. 12 to the effect that the relationship between the appellant and thedeceased was good. He cited the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Stateof Maharashtra v. Ashok Chotelal Shukla, (1997) 11 SCC 26=111 (1997) CCR 159 (SC)=II (1997) DMC 685 (SC), for the proposition that where the prosecution failsto establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had committed the acts ofharassment of cruelty as contemplated by Section 498A and Section 304B of theI.P.C., the accused was entitled to acquittal. Mr. Deb contended relying on thedecision of the Kerala High Court in Sivamani @ Sivan v. State of Kerala, 1993 Cri.LJ 23, and the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Kumar Naik v. State ofKamataka, 1976 Cri. LJ 1925, that where the Court finds that there is some evidenceconnecting the accused with the commission of offence and does not acquit theaccused under Section 232, Cr. P.C. the Court will have to pass an order under Sub-section (1) of Section 233, Cr. P.C. calling upon the accused to enter on his defenceand adduce any evidence he may have in support thereof, but no order was passedby the Trial Court in terms of the Sub-section (1) of Section 233, Cr. P.C. calling uponthe accused to enter on his defence and adduce evidence in support of his defence.As a result, the appellant did not think it necessary to adduce any evidence. Mr. Debsubmitted that in the event in this appeal it is held that the appellant was not entitledto the acquittal, the case should be remanded back and the Trial Court should passan order calling upon the appellant to enter on his defence and adduce evidence insupport of such defence.
3. In reply, Mr. A. Ghosh, learned Public Prosecutor, contended that therecords of the Trial Court would show whether any order was passed in terms ofthe Sub-section (1) of Section 232, Cr. P.C. by the Trial Court calling upon theappellant to enter on his defence and adduce evidence in support of such defence.Mr. Ghosh submitted that P. W. 3 and P.W. 4 had clearly stated in their evidence thatthe deceased had told them about the demand of dowry and the torture by theappellant and that the cross-examination of the aforesaid two witnesses has notshaken such evidence establishing the guilt of the appellant. He further pointed outthat the said evidence of P. W. 3 and P.W. 4 about the demand of dowry and tortureby the appellant had been corroborated by the P.W. 1. He referred to Section 113B of the Evidence Act, where under the Court has to draw a presumption that aperson has caused dowry death once it is shown that soon before her death suchwoman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for or inconnection with any demand for dowry. He cited the decision of the Supreme Courtin the case of State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal, AIR 1994 SC 1418=I (1994)DMC 138 (SC)=IV (1993) CCR 393 (SC) for the proposition that the testimony ofclose relatives of the deceased relating to physical and mental torture inflicted byan accused under Section 498A should not be discarded simply on the score of theabsence of corroboration by independent witnesses such as tenants or neighboursliving in adjoining portion of the house because ordinarily it is not expected thatphysical torture or the abuses on the wife would be made by the husband in sucha way as to be noticed by such tenants or neighbours. Mr. Ghosh argued that theevidence of P.W. 3 and P.W. 4 as corroborated by P.W. 1 was sufficient for convictionof the appellant under Sections 498A and 304B, I.P.C. He relied on the decision ofthe Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Shanti v. State of Haryana, AIR 1991 SC 1226,for his submission that once cruelty to the deceased by the accused is establishedthe question whether the death of the deceased was homicidal or suidical wasirrelevant and the accused was liable to be convicted under Section 304B, I.P.C. Healso relied on the decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Vadde Rama Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1990 Cri. LJ 1666, and of the Bombay High Court inSarojakshan Shankaran Nayar v. State of Maharashtra, 1995 Cri. LJ 340:1995 (2)All India Hindu Law Reporter 501 (Bom), in which the objects of Sections 304B and 498A, I.P.C. and Section 113B of the Evidence Act have been discussed.
4. Sections 304B and 498A of the Indian Penal Code and Section 113B of theEvidence Act are extracted herein below :
Section 304B, I.P.C.: Dowry Death-(1) Where the death of a woman is causedby any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normalcircumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soonbefore her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husbandor any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand ofdowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband orrelative shall be deemed to have caused her death.
Explanation.-For the purpose of this sub-section "dowry" shall have thesame meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment fora term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend toimprisonment for life.
Section 498A, I.P.C.: Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting herto cruelty-Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of awoman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonmentfor a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation-For the purpose of this section, "cruelty" means
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as likely to drive the womanto commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb orhealth (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is within a view tocoercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demandfor any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by heror any person related to her to meet such demand."
Section 113B, Evidence Act : Presumption as to dowry death-When thequestion is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman andit is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by suchperson to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand fordowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.
Explanation.-For the purpose of this section "dowry death" shall have thesame meaning as in Section 304B of the I.P.C. (45 of 1860).
The underlined portion of Section 304B, I.P.C. makes it clear that when the husbandis accused of the offence, it has to be shown that soon before the death of the woman,the woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband for or inconnection with any demand for dowry. Similarly, it will be clear from theunderlined portion of Section 498A, I.P.C. that the offence of cruelty as defined inthe said section is said to be committed by the husband only when such husbandsubjects the woman to cruelty. The word "cruelty" has been defined in the explanation to Section 498A (a) and (b), Clause (b) of the said explanation indicatesthat harassment of a woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing herto meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on accountof failure by her to meet such demand constitute cruelty. Thus to bring home thecharge against the husband under Sections 304B and 498A, the prosecution has toprove that the husband subjected his wife to cruelty or harassment for or inconnection with a demand of dowry. This is what has also been held by the SupremeCourt in the case of Smt. Shanti v. State of Haryana (supra) cited by Mr. Ghosh,learned P.P. In paragraph 6 of the judgment as reported, AIR 1991 SC 1226; theSupreme Court observed: "However, we want to point out that this view of the High Court is not correctand Sections 304B and 498A cannot be held to be mutually exclusive. Theseprovisions deal with the two distinct offences. It is true that "cruelty" is acommon essential to both the sections and that has to be proved."
Section 113B of the Evidence Act does not take away this burden of prosecution toprove cruelty on the part of the husband towards his wife. Rather it provides thatthe Court shall presume that a person has caused dowry death, if it is shown thatsoon before the death of the woman, the woman had been subjected to cruelty orharassment by the accused for or in connection with any demand for dowry. In otherwords, the presumption as contemplated by Section 113B of the Evidence Actarises only after it is established by the prosecution that soon before the death of thewoman, the woman has been subjected to cruelty or harassmentby the accused foror in connection with demand for dowry.
5. Moreover, such cruelty on the part of the husband towards his wife by theprosecution has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and Section 113B of theEvidence Act does not alter this requirement of strict proof in criminal cases. In thecase of State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal (supra) cited by Mr. Ghosh, the SupremeCourt held in paragraph 14 of the judgment as reported in AIR 1994 SC 1410 :
"We are not oblivious that in a criminal trial the degree of proof is stricter thanthat is required in a civil proceeding. In a criminal trial however intriguingmay be facts and circumstances of the case, the charges made against theaccused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubts and the requirementof proof cannot be in the realm of surmises and conjunctures. The requirementof proof beyond reasonable doubt does not stand altered even after introduc-tion of Section 498A, I.P.C. and Section 113A of Indian Evidence Act.Although the Court's conscience must be satisfied that the accused is not heldguilty when there are reasonable doubts about the complicity of the accusedin respect of the offences alleged, it should be borne in mind that there is noabsolute standard for proof in a criminal trial and the question whether thecharges made against the accused have been proved beyond all reasonabledoubts must depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case and thequality of the evidence adduced in the case and the materials placed on record.Lord Denning in Bater v. Bater, (1950) 2 All ER 458 at p. 459, has observed thatthe doubt must of a reasonable man and the standard adopted must be astandard adopted by a reasonable and just man for coming to a conclusionconsidering the particular subject-matter."
In the State of Maharashtra v. Ashok Chotelal Shukla (supra), the Supreme Court foundthat the High Court had acquitted the accused in that case under Sections 304B and 498A, I.P.C. after recording findings that the prosecution had failed to establishbeyond reasonable doubt that the accused has caused the death of the deceased orthat the deceased committed suicide because of ill treatment and cruelty by theaccused and the Supreme Court did not interfere with the judgment of the HighCourt even though it found that the conduct of the accused in that case soon afterthe incident was unusual and that the accused has failed to explain some incriminating circumstances creating a strong suspicion about his involvement, what is tobe examined, therefore, in this case is whether the prosecution has establishedbeyond reasonable doubt that the appellant has committed any act of cruelty orharassment on the deceased for or in connection with demand of dowry.
6. The Trial Court has held the appellant guilty of the offences under Sections 304B and 498A, I.P.C. on the basis of the evidence of P. Ws. 1,2,3 and P.W. 1 hasadmitted in cross-examination that before the death of the deceased, she did notcome to her house nor she visited the house of the deceased. P.W. 1, therefore, hadneither witnessed the demand for dowry or the torture or harassment on thedeceased by the appellant. In fact, in her evidence she has stated that her son P.W.3 returned from the house of the deceased and reported to her about the paymentof Rs. 15,000/- and some gold ornaments and the torture by the appellant. Similarly,P.W. 2 had no direct knowledge about the payment of dowry and physical tortureby the appellant and he has stated that he learnt from P. Ws. 3 and 4 that the appellantused physical torture on the deceased after the marriage in connection with demandfor money and gold ornaments. Section 60 of the Evidence Act states that oralevidence must, in all cases whatever, be direct and if it refers to a fact which couldbe seen, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he saw it and if it refers toa fact which could be heard, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he heardit. Thus the fact that the appellant made demand of dowry and harassed thedeceased for or in connection with such dowry cannot be established by theevidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 who had not seen such demand of dowry and harassmentof the deceased by the appellant. Similarly, the fact that the deceased had told P. Ws.3 and 4 that the appellant was demanding Rs. 15,000/- and gold ornaments fromthe deceased and was torturing her for such dowry also cannot be established bythe evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 who had not heard that the deceased made theaforesaid statement to P. Ws. 3 and 4.
7. Coming now to the evidence of P.W. 3, he has stated that after 10 to 12 daysof the marriage, he went to the house of the appellant to see the deceased and thedeceased told him that the appellant used to torture her often for money and goldornaments. He has not stated any details of what the deceased has told her relatingto the demand of money and ornaments and the torture by the appellant. But itappears that in his examination under Section 161, Cr. P.C. no statement that he hadgone to the house of the deceased after some days of the marriage had beenrecorded. P.W. 1, however, has stated in her evidence that she has sent P.W. 3 to thehouse of the appellant to see the deceased but in the F.I.R. lodged by P.W. 1 on20.10.1995, P.W. 1 had no where stated that P.W. 3 went to the house of the appellantand came back and reported about the demand of gold ornaments and money andthe torture on the deceased by the appellant in connection with the said demand.
Further, P. W. 3 has in his evidence stated that on the day he visited the house of thedeceased after the marriage he went to the nearby house of his elder sister andinformed his elder sister about the torture on the deceased by the appellant, but hiselder sister who has been examined as P.W. 6 has no where stated about the visitof P. W. 2 to the house of the deceased after few days of the marriage and has insteadstated that her brothers never informed her any time that the appellant wasdemanding any money or gold ornaments or putting pressure for realisation of thesame. Considering the material omissions in the F.I.R. lodged by P.W. 1 and thestatement of P.W. 3 recorded under Section 161, Cr. P.C. discussed above and thematerial discrepancies in the evidence of P.W. 3 and P.W. 6 it is difficult for the Courtto rely on the evidence of P.W. 3 that he visited the house of the deceased 10 to 12days after the marriage when the deceased told him that her husband used to tortureher often for money and gold ornaments.
The only other evidence against the appellant is that of P.W. 4. Since P.W. 4visited the house of the deceased on the day before the date of death of the deceasedand is the main witness of the prosecution. The relevant portion of his testimony isextracted herein below:
"After about 15/20 days of the marriage I went to the house of my elder sisterSova Das residing at Lembucherra. From there I alongwith Sailash Bhowmikhusband of my elder sister went to the house of my sister Swapna in theafternoon. Then my sister Swapna told us that the accused wanted from hera sum of Rs. 15,000/- and for that demand he assaulted her. Then we told himthat it was not possible for us to give such amount. We told him that at bestwe can give him Rs. 2,000/- in the month of Agrahayan. Then I and SaileshBhowmik returned to my elder sister's house and stayed the night there. Inthe morning accused Manik Dutta came to that house and informed me thatSwapna was lying ill. Then myself and Sova and her husband rushed to thehouse of Swapna Das. On going there we found the dead body of Swapna washanging from the ceiling fan and her toes were found only about 2 inchesabove the ground. The post-martem examination was held at B.M. Hospitaland after that the dead body was taken to Lembucherra and cremation wasdone."
It would be clear from the aforesaid testimony of P.W. 4 that he went alongwithSailesh Bhowmik, the husband of his elder sister, to the house of the deceased andthe deceased told them that the appellant wanted from her a sum of Rs. 15,000/- andfor that demand he has assaulted her and that they told the appellant that it was notpossible for them to pay such an amount and that at best they could pay him Rs.2,000/- in the month of Agrahayan and then P.W. 4 and Sailesh Bhowmick returnedto the house of the P.Ws. 6 and 4 stayed the night there. Sailesh Bhowmick whoaccompanied P.W. 4 has been examined as P.W. 5 and has stated that he wentalongwith P.W. 4 to the house of the deceased to see her but she did not tell themanything and that the relationship between the deceased and the appellant wasquite good. Thus the only witness to the alleged statement of the deceased to P.W.4 that the appellant wanted from her a sum of Rs. 15,000/- and for that demand theappellant had assaulted her and that the appellant was told that he could be givenonly Rs. 2,000/- in the month of Agrahayan does not support^he version of P.W. 4 and has instead denied that any such statement was made by the deceased aboutthe demand of dowry and torture by the appellant and has rather stated that therelation between the appellant and the deceased was good. Hence, the evidence ofP.W. 4 about the statement of the deceased that the appellant was demanding Rs.15,000/- and the assault by the appelant stand uncorroborated, rather contradictedby the only other witness who was said to be present alongwith P.W. 4 when the saidstatement was made by the deceased to P.W. 4 and when P.W. 4 told the appellantthat they were willing to pay Rs. 2,000/- only. Moreover, the very next day, earlyin the morning, P.W. 4 was present when the police brought down the dead bodyof the deceased from the ceiling fan but there is no evidence to show that anycomplaint was made by P.W. 4 to the police on that date about the demand of dowryand the assault or the harassment on the deceased by the appellant, and it was onlyafter 9 days that the F.I.R. was lodged on 20.10.1995 by P.W. 1 alleging demand ofdowry and torture on the deceased by the appellant.
8. The evidence of P.W. 6, the elder sister of P.W. 4 and the deceased, also raisesreasonable doubts about the evidence of P.W. 4, P.W. 6 has stated that the relationbetween the appellant and the deceased was quite good and he did not hear aboutany quarrel between them. She has also stated that on return from the house of thedeceased P.W. 4 or P.W. 5 did not tell her anything about the dispute between theappellant and the deceased. In her cross-examination by the defence, she has furthertestified that after the marriage, the deceased used to stay very close to her houseand her children used to visit the house of the deceased every now and then and herchildren used to tell her that the deceased was living happily with her husband. Shehas further stated that she was having good relation with her husband and that herparents or brothers never informed her any time that the appellant was demandingmoney or ornaments or creating pressure for realisation of such ornaments andmoney. She has also stated that the deceased never told her about any such demand.
9. Both P.W. 5 and P.W. 6 have been declared hostile and have been cross-examined by the prosecution and have been confronted with their contradictorystatements recorded under Section 161, Cr. P.C. but they have denied to have madethe contradictory statements before the police. It has been held by the SupremeCourt in the case of Karuppanna Thevar v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1976 SC 980,that a hostile witness may not be rejected outright but the Court has at least to beaware that prima facie, a witness who makes different statements at different timeshas no regard for truth and the Court should be slow to act on the testimony of sucha witness and normally it should look for corroboration to his evidence. Theversions of P. Ws. 5 and 6 who were hostile witnesses therefore cannot be acceptedby the Court as true and correct, but on a reading of the evidence of P. Ws. 5 and 6who were close relatives as well as the neighbours of the deceased, any reasonableand just man would have reasonable doubts about the evidence of P.W. 4 that theappellant demanded money and gold ornaments and harassed the deceased inconnection with the said demand soon before the death of the deceased.
10. There are other material facts which add to the aforesaid doubts of theCourts regarding the prosecution case. P.W. 1 has stated in her F.I.R. as well as inher evidence that the appellant made no demand of dowry whatsoever at the timeof his marriage with the deceased. According to the said F.I.R. and evidence of P.W. 1, the marriage of the appellant and the deceased was as a result of love affairbetween the two. It is also stated by P.W. 1 in the said F.I.R. and in her evidence thatthe parents of the deceased did not initially agree to the marriage as they had nomoney for the marriage. The appellant, therefore, had full knowledge that theparents of the deceased were very poor and did not have the resources to meet anydemand of dowry and yet the appellant married the deceased. Unfortunately, thedeceased died about 21 days after the marriage. During these few days of marriage,no one has seen the appellant torturing or harassing the deceased.
11. There is thus no direct evidence of cruelty or harassment by the appellanttowards the deceased. P.W. 6 who carried out the post-mortem on the body of thedeceased has stated that besides the ligature mark and bruises on her neck, otherorgans were found normal and there was no other injury on the body. It is thereforedifficult to hold that the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt thatthe appellant had committed any act of cruelty towards the deceased or subjectedher to any harassment for or in connection with demand of dowry and was guiltyof the offences under Sections 498A and 304B, I.P.C.
12. In the result, this appeal is allowed and the conviction of the appellant andthe sentences imposed by the impugned judgment are set aside and the appellantis acquitted of the charges and is set at liberty.