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[Cites 4, Cited by 4]

Orissa High Court

Managing Director, Orissa State ... vs Smt. Gitarani Seal And Anr. on 26 March, 1991

Equivalent citations: II(1991)ACC649, 1992ACJ247, (1992)ILLJ619ORI

Author: A. Pasayat

Bench: A. Pasayat

JUDGMENT
 

 A. Pasayat, J. 
 

1. The judgment of the Commissioner for the Workmen's Compensation and Assistant Labour Commissioner, Jeypore, in W,C. Case No. 7 of 1985 is assailed by the Orissa State Warehousing Corporation (in short 'the Corporation') in this appeal.

2. An application under Section 10 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (in short 'the Act') was filed by the present respondent No. 1 claiming compensation for the death of her husband Mahendranath Seal. The claimant's case was that Mahendranath was employed by the present respondent No. 2 as a carpenter for execution of certain construction works of the Corporation and during the course of his employment on April 9, 1984 he fell down from the roof and died. He was claimed to be 40 years of age.

4. So far as the quantum aspect is concerned, it was asserted that the deceased was getting Rs. 25/- per day. Five issues were framed by the Commissioner who, on evaluation of the evidence, came to hold that the deceased was a workman; was engaged with activity connected with trade and business of the Corporation; and was entitled to a sum of Rs. 23,100/-. It was held that though respondent No. 2 was the contractor, so far as the deceased was concerned, the present appellant was the principal employer and was liable to pay the awarded sum to the claimant and was to be indemnified by the contractor on payment.

5. Mr. Basu, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that the nature of work clearly shows that the deceased was not a 'workman' within the meaning of the term as defined in Section 2(1)(n) of the Act. It has to be indicated here that the contractor respondent No. 2 did not i participate in the proceeding before the Commissioner.

6. The main plank of the argument of the appellant is that in order to be entitled to compensation the employment should not be of a casual nature, and the definition does not cover any person who is employed otherwise than for the purpose of employer's trade or business. Though the contention appears to be very attractive, yet it overlooks two aspects, viz. the absence of any statutory indication as to what is ; meant by 'for purposes of the employer's trade or business'. The undisputed business activities of the appellant are to store commodities. For such storage a storing place is absolutely necessary and the construction or repair of such storage place cannot be said to be link-less so far as the business or trade activities of the appellant are concerned. Therefore, the contention that the nature of employment, if any, had no link with the trade or business of the appellant cannot be accepted.

7. The other aspect is the employment with a contractor in terms of Section 12. Any person, which obviously includes a Corporation, who engages contractor in the course or for the purposes of his trade or business, contracts with any other person for the execution by or under the contractor of the whole or any part of such work, incurs the liability in respect of the workman vis-a-vis the contractor. The liability in such an event passes on to the principal employer. But law gives protection to the principal employer in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 12. Where the principal employer is liable to pay compensation, he is entitled to be indemnified by the contractor. In view of the conclusion by the Commissioner that the deceased was a workman under the present respondent No. 2 and the appellant was the principal employer, I do not find any scope for taking a different view in the matter.

8. The appeal, therefore, deserves dismissal which I direct. It is, however, made clear that the appellant is entitled to be indemnified by respondent No. 2 in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act. No costs.