Patna High Court
Dr. K.C. Saha vs Dr. R.K. Banerjee on 27 March, 1981
Equivalent citations: AIR1981PAT248, AIR 1981 PATNA 248, 1981 BBCJ 327
ORDER Satyeshwar Roy, J.
1. By this application the defendant has challenged the order dated 10th May, 1980 passed by the Munsif, Jamshedpur by which he has held that the valuation of the suit has been made correctly by the plaintiff and it is within its jurisdiction.
2. The opposite party (i.e. the plaintiff) filed a suit for eviction of the petitioner--the defendant, on the ground that the petitioner is a licensee under the opposite party. A prayer has also been made for a decree for compensation and for mesne profits.
The petitioner contested the suit by filing written statement. According to the petitioner, he is a tenant in respect of the suit property at a monthly rental of Rs. 175/-under the real owner. It may be stated here that there is no dispute that Dr. S.K. Sarkar is the owner of the property. The petitioner also stated that the value of the property in suit was more than Rs. 20,000/- and therefore, the suit is beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsif.
3. The question of valuation was heard by the court below as a preliminary issue and by the impugned order it has held that the valuation as put by the plaintiff (i.e. Rs. 960/-) with regard to the property in suit was correct.
4. Mr. Banerjee learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has contended that the court below has not taken into consideration the evidence brought on record by the parties and the impugned order is, therefore, perverse and must be set aside. Mr. S.B. Sinha appearing on behalf of the opposite party submitted that this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction should not interfere with the impugned order as there has not been any failure of justice and the petitioner will not suffer any irreparable injury if the order of the learned Munsif is allowed to stand. His further contention is that in view of the decision in the case of Ramchandra Sah v. Chotan Sah (1971 BLJR 186) even if it be found that the valuation of the subject matter of the suit is beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsif, the opposite party may pray for giving equitable relief on payment of the court-fee payable on the amount the property is ultimately valued.
5. So far the second point of Mr. Sinha is concerned, in my opinion, the above decision has got no application to the facts of the present case. In the present case, the opposite party has sued the petitioner as a licensee. Therefore, a decree can be passed in his favour only if he can prove that the petitioner is his licensee. The question of giving any equitable relief will, therefore, not arise in this case.
6. Mr. Sinha submitted that the opposite party is not the absolute owner of the property. The interest of the opposite party is a lease-hold interest. Therefore, the market value of the suit building cannot be taken to be the value of the suit. Mr. Sinha wants to make a distinction between a suit for eviction filed by an absolute owner and a person who has a limited right; for instance a lease-hold right. In support of his contention Mr. Sinha has referred to a decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Rani Devi v. Trilok Singh (AIR 1980 All 111). So far the Allahabad case is concerned, it was decided on the basis of the Court-fees Act (1870) as amended in U. P. There is no such amendment in Bihar in the Court-fees Act. In my opinion, that decision, therefore, cannot be made applicable to the proposition raised by Mr. Sinha.
In the absence of any amendment to the Court-fees Act, Section 7 (v) (e) of the said Act, as it stands, shall apply to the present case. It reads as follows :--
"(v) For possession of land, houses and gardens. In suits for the possession of land, houses and gardens -- according to the value of the subject-matter; and such value shall be deemed to be ..... ...... ...... ......
(e) For houses and gardens. --Where the subject-matter is a house or garden -- according to the market value of the house or garden."
The Legislature, therefore, has made no distinction for the purpose of valuation with regard to the suit filed by an absolute owner or a person having a limited interest. But Mr. Sinha argued that what is required to be taken into consideration for the purpose of ascertaining the market value, is the particular interest of the person seeking relief from the Court. In support of this proposition he has relied upon a decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Manik Chand Mondal v. Sudhir Kumar Mondal (AIR 1960 Cal 420). According to Mr. Sinha, since opposite party himself is a tenant in respect of the property, the market value of the property cannot be the value of the suit. It will be his interest which should be valued. It appears from the decision in Manik Chand Mondal's case (supra) that their Lordships were considering the case in which Section 7 (v) (b) of the Court-fees Act (1870) was applicable. In that Clause a mode has been laid down for valuing a property. In this case there is no dispute that it cannot be disputed in view of the decision in the case of Jagdish Chandra Ghose v. Basant Kumar Bose (AIR 1963 Pat 308 (FB)), that Section 7 (v) (e) of the Act will apply. It must, therefore, be held that in view of the language used in Section 7 (v) (e) of the Act, the value of the subject-matter in suit will be the market value of the building in question from which the opposite party prays for a relief for eviction of the petitioner.
7. It appears from the impugned order that the court below has accepted the valuation on the basis of the case of the Allahabad High Court, referred to above. It further appears that it has not discussed any evidence adduced by the parties. In view of the fact that the decision of the Allahabad High Court has no application to the present case and in view of the fact that the court below has failed to discuss any evidence led by the parties, the order impugned cannot be sustained in law. Mr. Sinha did not press the first point.
8. In the result, the application is allowed, the order dated 10th May, 1980 is set aside and the case is sent back to the court below to give a fresh decision in accordance with law on the materials already on record after hearing the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.