Bombay High Court
Lokmat Newspapers Limited vs Commissioner Of Labour, State Of ... on 11 July, 2002
Equivalent citations: [2003(97)FLR36], (2003)ILLJ767BOM, 2003(1)MHLJ103
Author: D.D. Sinha
Bench: D.D. Sinha
JUDGMENT D.D. Sinha, J.
1. Rule returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of Shri Manohar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, Shri Jichkar, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondent No. 1, and Shri Thakur, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2.
2. In the instant petition, the petitioner has assailed the impugned order dated 6-2-2001 passed by the respondent No. 1 whereby respondent No. 1 has reviewed its earlier order dated 27-5-1999 and exercised power under Section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act and made a reference of the issue of classification and re-classification of the petitioner to the Industrial Tribunal, Nagpur.
3. Shri Manohar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, states that MaratinEdition of Lokmat newspaper commenced its publication in the year 1971 from Nagpur. Thereafter Jalgaon Edition of Lokmat Maratindaily commenced its publication in the year 1977. The third edition of Lokmat Maratindaily commenced its publication from Nasik in the year 1996. Thus, upto the year 1990, the petitioner was publishing Lokmat Maratindaily only from Nagpur and Jalgaon. In addition to Maratindaily, which was published from Nagpur and Jalgaon, the Hindi daily under the name and style "Lokmat Samachar" was started from Nagpur in the year 1989.
4. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner further states that Government of India in its powers conferred on it under Section 8 of the Working Journalists and Other Newspapers Employees (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") has constituted Wage Boards from time to time for fixation or revision of rates of wages as provided under Section 8 of the Act. Section 9 regulates procedure for fixing and revising rates of wages. Section 7 deals with the recommendations of the Board. Section 11 deals with power and procedure of the Board and Section 12 deals with the power of the Central Government to enforce recommendations of the Wage Board.
5. It is contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that in exercise of powers conferred on the Government of India, the Government of India has constituted Wage Boards from time to time. One such Wage Board was constituted, which is referred to as "Palekar Award" and the recommendations of the Palekar Award were accepted by the Government of India and accordingly an order dated 26-12-1980 was published accepting the recommendations of Palekar Award. After the recommendations of Palekar Award were followed by the newspapers, the Government of India constituted another Wage Board, the recommendations of which were accepted by the Government of India vide order dated 21-1-1990 and the said recommendations of the Wage Board were popularly known as "Bacchawat Award". It is submitted that Section 11 of chapter IX, which deals with the recommendations of the Wage Board for Working Journalists and Non-Journalists Newspaper Employees, further contemplates classification of newspaper establishment.
6. It is submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that after coming into force the recommendations of the Palekar Award, the petitioner received a letter dated 10-5-1983 from the office of Government Labour Officer, Nagpur whereby information was sought regarding implementation of recommendations of Palekar Award. The petitioner vide letter dated 17-5-1983 gave necessary information to the Government Labour Officer, Nagpur regarding implementation of recommendation of such Award. The petitioner received another letter dated 9-8-1984 issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Nagpur on the subject of implementation of Palekar Award and its position as on 31-7-1984, The petitioner vide letter dated 16-8-1984 had supplied the requisite information to the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Nagpur. It is contended that petitioner has classified and re-classified itself as per Palekar and Bacchawat Awards.
7. It is contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the respondent No. 2 had submitted a demand on 13-6-1997 to the Conciliation Officer under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 at Nagpur. It is submitted that stand of the respondent No. 2 Union was as if Lokmat till date has not classified and-re-classified itself as per the Palekar and Bacchawat Awards and the said contention of the respondent No. 2 was absolutely false, incorrect and mischievous. It is further submitted that the respondent No. 2 Union only on the basis of assumptions and presumptions about classification and re-classification, without there being any basis or factual data in this regard, made the above referred incorrect statement knowing fully well that the petitioner has classified and re-classified itself as stated hereinabove. In accordance with the recommendations of Palekar and Bacchawat Awards and every individual employee in the Organization of the petitioner is benefitted so far as pay structure is concerned on the basis of classification and re-classification.
8. It is further argued by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner had filed its objections on 10-6-1998 before the Conciliation Officer wherein it was stated "that the Management is paying wages as per Bachhawat Award. Lokmat Newspapers having been duly classified as per the provisions of this Award, the said issue cannot be re-opened now." The petitioner had also objected to the locus of the respondent No. 2 Union to espouse the cause based on assumption and presumption and without any factual data about the classification and re-classification of the petitioner establishment based on the recommendations accepted by the Government of India of Palekar and Bachhawat Award. It is contended that respondent No. 1 after detailed enquiry and verification vide order dated 27-5-1999 declined to make reference of any industrial dispute as asked for by the respondent No. 2 in exercise of power conferred on him under Section 10(1) read with Section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
9. It is contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that order of respondent No. 1 rejecting to make reference of the industrial dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal was challenged by the respondent No.2 Union by filing Writ Petition No. 2418/1999 before this Court. It is submitted that petitioner was shocked and suppressed by the action of the respondent No. 1, without there being any additional development or facts or law and without even calling the parties concerned or without affording any opportunity to the petitioners had unilaterally in suppression of its earlier order dated 27-5-1999, has issued another order dated 6-2-2000 in exercise of power conferred on him under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act and made a reference of dispute to the Industrial Tribunal by reviewing his earlier order. Being aggrieved by the said order passed by the respondent No. 1, the petitioner has filed the present petition on the following grounds :
i) The order dated 27-5-1999 passed by the respondent No. 1 was in reference to the powers conferred on him under Section 10(1) and Section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act and respondent No. 1 declined to refer dispute for adjudication to the appropriate forum. It is contended that having declined to make a reference of industrial dispute, there is no occasion or propriety for respondent No. 1 to review his own order dated 27-5-1999 in absence of any changed circumstances and, therefore, the impugned order dated 6-2-2001 is illegal, improper and unsustainable in law.
ii) It is contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that without prejudice to the rights of the petitioner, even if it is presumed that under provisions of the Act, the respondent No. 1 is entitled to re-consider or review its earlier order, the same power should not be exercised by the respondent No. 1 without giving an opportunity to the petitioner to put forth its own submissions opposing the demand of the respondent No. 2 Union seeking reference of the industrial dispute and, therefore, the impugned order is violative of principles of natural justice.
iii) It is further contended by the learned senior Counsel for the petitioner that the respondent No. 1 in his earlier order dated 27-5-1999 has rightly observed that there is no case made out by the respondent No. 2 Union for making a reference of any industrial dispute since in the opinion of the respondent No. 1 there did not exist any industrial dispute. However, respondent No. 1 on its own unilaterally and without there being any new material, changed his decision by reviewing his own order dated 27-5-1999 and passed the impugned order dated 6-2-2002 whereby it is held that there exists a dispute and made a reference therefor to the Industrial Tribunal. The entire action of the respondent No. 1 in this regard is not only inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, but same is also violative of principles of natural justice and cannot be sustained.
iv) It is further contended by learned Senior Counsel Shri Manohar that the reasons for. passing the impugned order dated 6-2-2001 are mentioned for the first time in the affidavit filed by the respondent No. 1 in this Court and the impugned order is completely silent in this regard. It is submitted that all these reasons ought to have been recorded by the respondent No. 1 in the impugned order. In absence thereof, the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind. It is contended that if order is ab initio bad in law, the same cannot be validated by supplementing additional reasons at the later point of time and that too, in the affidavit filed by the respondent No. 1 in this Court and, therefore, the impugned order is not sustainable in law.
In order to substantiate the contentions, reliance is placed by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner on the judgments in Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji , Mohinder Singh Gill and Anr. v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delinand Ors., , A.K.K. Nambiar v. Union of India and Anr., and judgment of Karnataka High Court in Management of Theatre Sanjaya v. State and Ors..
10. On the other hand, Shri Jichkar, learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondent No. 1, states that demand dated 13-6-1997 was made by the respondent No. 2 Union and objections were filed by the petitioner on 10-6-1998. The Conciliation Officer submitted his failure report on 11-8-1998. After considering the failure report, the respondent No. 1 refused to make the reference under the Industrial Disputes Act particularly in view of the fact that remedy was available to the respondent No. 2 in the implementation of the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 and accordingly order was passed by the respondent No. 1 on 27-5-1999. It is contended that respondent No. 2 challenged the said order by filing Writ Petition No. 2418/1999 and during pendency of the petition, respondent No. 1 came to the conclusion that provisions of the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 do not provide remedy to the employees of the petitioner establishment as the provisions of the said Act come into play only when the rights have been duly adjudicated. It is submitted that in view of those facts, the dispute raised by the respondent No. 2 Union before Conciliation Officer can come to logical end only after adjudication and, therefore, respondent No. 1 after taking into consideration the above referred facts, referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal, Nagpur for adjudication vide order dated 6-2-2001.
11. It is further contended by the learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondent No. 1 that since making reference of dispute by the appropriate Government is an administrative function, the parties are not required to be heard before passing any such order. It is submitted that in the interest of industrial peace, respondent No. 1 has referred the dispute between petitioner and respondent No. 2 to the Industrial Tribunal vide order dated 6-2-2001. The issue of paying wages to the employees as per the Palekar and Bachhawat Awards is under question and issue needs adjudication by the competent Tribunal and, therefore, respondent No. 1 has re-examined the issue in this regard and has rightly referred the same for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. It is, therefore, contended that the impugned order dated 6-2-2001 is just and proper and does not suffer from lack of jurisdiction and same is sustainable in law. In order to substantiate the contentions, reliance is placed on the judgments of the Apex Court in Western India Watch Co. Ltd. v. The Western India, Watch Co. Workers Union and Ors., and M/s Avon Services Production Agencies (P) Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Haryana and Ors., .
12. Shri Thakur, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, supports the impugned order and states that the respondent No. 2 has denied the contentions canvassed by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner relating to factual as well as legal aspects of the matter. It is contended that crux of the matter is verification of the gross revenue of the petitioner newspaper establishment for the relevant periods and then fixation of newspaper establishment in the relevant class and thereafter applying the scales of pay fixed for the relevant class both by the Palekar Award and Bachhawat Award. It is further contended that it is an undisputed position that employees never had access to all the documents including the balance-sheets of the petitioner newspaper establishment to ascertain and agree to the gross revenue on the basis of factual position and it is only after the Union raised an industrial dispute, it will be possible for the employees to check the gross revenue and ask for appropriate classification and demand the wages as per these Awards. It is contended that this has not been done so far and, therefore, stand of the petitioner newspaper establishment of its having done classification of the newspaper without the knowledge and involvement of the employees and without giving them any opportunity to point out that the classification being done by the petitioner unilaterally and was not as per the definition of gross revenue, it cannot be said that the petitioner newspaper establishment stands duly classified as per the correct gross revenue as laid down in Palekar Award and Bachhawat Award.
13. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 that merely because respondent No. 1 on earlier occasion reftised to make a reference of the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal, it does not preclude the respondent No. 1 from making reference of dispute to the Industrial Tribunal if in his opinion there exists an industrial dispute and it needs adjudication. The respondent No. 2 challenged the earlier order dated 27-5-1999 by filing writ petition before this Court and in view of the contentions raised by the respondent No. 2 Union in the said petition, respondent No. 1 thought that basis of earlier order dated 27-5-1999 was factually incorrect and, therefore, earlier order was passed on misconception of facts and law and in such situation, it was open to the respondent No. 1 to re-consider the issue or review his own order and, therefore, respondent No. 1 was justified in passing the impugned order and making reference of dispute to the Industrial Tribunal.
14. It is vehemently argued by the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 that the impugned order being administrative in nature, it is not necessary to grant opportunity of hearing to the parties to the dispute before passing such order. It is contended that there is no requirement under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act in this regard. In absence thereof, it cannot be said that the impugned order would be bad in law on this count.
15. It is further contended by the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 that respondent No. 1 was required to take into consideration as to whether there exists an industrial dispute and if respondent No. 1 is satisfied that there exists one, then under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, he is empowered to refer the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal for proper adjudication. In the instant case, respondent No. 1 in view of the above referred facts, was satisfied that there exists a dispute between petitioner and respondent No. 2 Union and was justified in making reference to the Industrial Tribunal. In order to substantiate his contentions, reliance in placed by the learned Counsel on the same judgments, which were relied upon by the respondent No. 1.
16. I have considered the contentions advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the orders passed, inorder to appreciate the controversy in issue, certain undisputed facts need to be considered, which are as follows :
i) The Government of India had constituted Wage Board, known as Palekar Award and recommendations of Palekar Award were accepted by the Government of India and consequently, an order dated 26-12-1980 was published. The Government of India again constituted another Wage Board and recommendations of which were accepted by the Government of India vide order dated 21-1-1990 and the said recommendations of Wage Board were known as Bacchawat Award. In view of the above referred recommendations of Palekar as well as Bacchawat Awards, the newspaper establishment has to do classification and re-classification accordingly and thereafter is required to apply scales of pay fixed for the relevant class by both Palekar and Bacchawat Awards.
ii) The respondent No. 2 had submitted a demand on 13-6-1997 to the Conciliation Officer under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 at Nagpur wherein it was contended that the petitioner establishment till date has not classified or re-classified itself as per Palekar and Bacchawat Awards and pay fixation of the members of the Union has not been done accordingly. The petitioner filed its objections on 10-6-1998 before the conciliation officer and denied the contentions canvassed by the respondent No. 2 in its demand. The petitioner stated that the petitioner newspaper establishment has been duly classified and re-classified as per provisions of the Palekar and Bacchawat Awards and as per the said Awards, every individual employee in the organization of the petitioner is benefited so far as pay structure is concerned on the basis of classification and re-classification.
iii) The respondent No. 1 vide order dated 27-5-1999 declined to make reference of industrial dispute under Section 10(1) read with Section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act because at the relevant time it was thought by the appropriate Government that remedy to the employees was available under the provisions of the Journalist and Non-Journalist Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1955. The respondent No. 1 vide impugned order dated 6-2-2001 reviewed his earlier order and made a reference of industrial dispute to the Industrial Tribunal when he realised that grievance of the employees cannot be taken care of under the provisions of the Journalist and Non-Journalist Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1955.
17. In view of the above referred undisputed facts and on the backdrop of various contentions canvassed by the learned Counsel for the parties, the questions which arise for consideration in the present petition are as follows :
I) Once the appropriate Government applies its mind to the question of referring an industrial dispute to the Industrial Tribunal and declines to make such reference, whether it has a power at the subsequent stage to change its mind and make reference of dispute?
II) Whether appropriate Government is required to give reasons as to why it has decided to refer the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal having rejected the same once?
III) Whether the State Government is required to give hearing to the employer before making a reference on the second application since on an earlier occasion it was rejected?
18. In order to consider question No. 1, it would be proper at this stage to see scope and scheme of Sections 10(1) and 12(5) of Industrial Disputes Act. Section 10 contemplates that once appropriate Government is of the opinion that any Industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it can at any time by order in writing refer it to the Tribunal. The appropriate Government has to reach subjective satisfaction as to whether there exists a dispute - factual or apprehended and if such satisfaction is reached, then such dispute can be referred at any time by order in writing. The provisions of this section do not prescribe any time limit for such reference nor do they contemplate that such power can be exercised by the appropriate Government only once. There is in fact no embargo on the power of the appropriate Government to refer the dispute. The only requirement is that the appropriate Government on the basis of subjective satisfaction has to form its opinion that there exists an industrial dispute or same is apprehended. In such situation, the appropriate Government has absolute power to refer the dispute to the Tribunal.
19. The scheme of Section 10(1) of the Act would show that it confers a discretionary power on the appropriate Government and this discretionary power needs to be exercised on being satisfied that industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. The opinion which the appropriate Government has to form is undoubtedly on the basis of material, which is placed before it and if such opinion is reached, then appropriate Government has a power to refer such dispute to the Industrial Tribunal. The power conferred on the appropriate Government under this section is an administrative power and the order of reference, which the appropriate Government makes is an administrative act. It is the domain of the appropriate Government to hold in a given case, after being satisfied, that the industrial dispute exists, appropriate Government in such situation at any point of time is competent to pass an order in this regard. It will not be open to adjudicate upon adequacy or inadequacy of the material on which opinion is formed by the appropriate Government in view of the scheme of the Act. However, it is open for the parties to raise this issue before Industrial Tribunal to whom reference is made as to whether there exists in industrial dispute or not. The appropriate Government does not lack power to make a reference. There is no limitation under the scheme of the Act in respect of exercise of power by the appropriate Government. The appropriate Government is fully empowered to make a reference in respect of same industrial dispute, which was once declined by the appropriate Government to refer to Industrial Tribunal.
20. On the backdrop of the above referred facts, it is undoubtedly clear that appropriate Government can at the subsequent stage refer the same dispute to the Industrial Tribunal, if there are new facts brought to the notice of the appropriate Government or the earlier order of refusal to make a reference was passed on misconception of facts and law. Hence, the first question is answered in affirmative and contentions canvassed by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted.
21. In the instant case, the first order passed by the appropriate Government is dated 27-5-1999 whereby appropriate Government in exercise of power under Section 12(5) of the Act refused to refer the dispute because of following reasons :
"action pertaining to implementation under the Journalist and Non-Journalist Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1955 being likely to be taken, it is not necessary to take up dispute under Industrial Disputes Act, 1947."
The order of refusal to make reference was passed, thinking that remedy in respect of grievance made by the employees can be taken care of under the provisions of Journalist and Non-Journalist Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1955. However, in view of new developments particularly during pendency of the Writ Petition No. 2418/1999 in this Court, it came to the knowledge of the respondent No. 1 that the provisions of the Journalist and Non-Journalist Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1955 do not provide remedy to the employees of petitioner establishment as the provisions of the said Act are attracted only when rights have been duly adjudicated. The respondent No. 1, therefore, realised that earlier order dated 27-5-1999 whereby respondent No. 1 declined to refer the matter to the Industrial Tribunal was passed under misconception of facts and law that grievance of employees can be taken care of by the provisions of Journalist and Non-Journalist Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1955. As it has already been held by me that the respondent No. 1 is legally entitled to make an order of reference whenever he is of the opinion that there exists or apprehends an industrial dispute, in that case, the subsequent order of reference does not suffer from lack of jurisdiction. In the instant case, therefore, the impugned order dated 6-2-2001 is sustainable in law.
22. In order to answer second question, it would be relevant to consider the provisions of Sections 10 and 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 10(1) of the Act provides that where an appropriate Government is of the opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time by order in writing refer the dispute to the appropriate Authority. Similarly, Sub-section 12(5) of the Act contemplates that if on consideration of report referred to in subsection (4), the appropriate Government is satisfied that there is a case for reference to the Board, it may make such reference. It further provides that where appropriate Government does not make such reference, it shall record and communicate to the parties concerned, its reasons therefor. In view of the provisions of the Act, what emerges is that where appropriate Government does not make such reference, it is required to record reasons therefor and communicate to the parties. It is, therefore, apparent that only on rejection of the reference, appropriate Government needs to communicate the reasons therefor to the applicant as provided in Sub-section (5) of Section 12 of the Act and hence, in the instant case, the contention canvassed by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner in this regard cannot be accepted.
23. There is no quarrel with the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the judgments in Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji, and Mohindar Singh Gill and Anr. v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delinand Ors., . However, that does not help the petitioner in view of scheme of the provisions of Sections 10 and 12(5) of the Act. It is no doubt true that when statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by the fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. However, in the instant case, in view of scheme of Sub-section (5) of Section 12 of the Act, appropriate Government is expected to record reasons and communicate to the concerned parties only when it does not refer dispute to the Industrial Tribunal. In the instant case, we are faced with the situation where appropriate Government has made a reference to the Tribunal vide impugned order under Section 10(1) of the Act. On the backdrop of these facts as well as law, question does not arise whether the reasons disclosed in the affidavit filed by the State Government before this Court could be treated as reasons for passing the impugned order since there is no need to give reasons by the appropriate Government under the scheme of Sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Act. In that view of the matter, the second question is answered in negative and contention canvassed by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is rejected.
24. Lastly it is to be considered whether State Government is required to give hearing to the parties (particularly employer) before making reference on second application since on earlier occasion appropriate Government declined to refer the matter to the Tribunal. The order making reference under Section 10(1) is purely an administrative order and is hot a quasi judicial order. Since it is an administrative order, there is no need to issue any notice to the employer nor it is necessary or incumbent upon appropriate Government to hear the employer before making an order of reference or refusal to make reference. Under the scheme of provisions of the Act and by very nature of the order of reference (administrative), there is no need to hear the employer before passing of the order either under Section 10(1) or Section 12(5) of the Act. Same analogy would apply in respect of subsequent order, if any, is passed by the appropriate Government under Section 10(1) of the Act when it had declined to do so on earlier occasion. This issue also is no more res integra and is concluded by the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sultan Singh v. State of Haryana and Anr. decided on 12-12-1995 wherein Their Lordships have observed thus :
'The need for hearing is obviated, if it is considered on second occasion as even then if it makes reference, it does not cease to be an administrative order and so is not incumbent upon the State Government to record reasons therein. Therefore, it is not necessary to issue notice to the employer nor to consider his objections nor to hear him before making a reference. Accordingly, we are of the view that the High Court was wholly wrong in its conclusion that before making reference on second application, it was incumbent upon the State Government to give notice to the employer and to give an opportunity to the employer and record reasons, for making reference."
25. In view of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the above referred judgment, the ratio of the judgment rendered by the Full Bench of Karnataka High Court in the case of Management of Theatre Sanjaya and The State and others decided on 21-4-1983 cannot be treated as good law. Therefore, the contentions advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner in this regard must fail and the third question is answered in negative.
26. The sum and substance of the controversy in issue, therefore, is that the appropriate Government is entitled and has a jurisdiction to refer the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act even if on the earlier occasion, the appropriate Government declined to refer the dispute under Sub-section (5) of Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act, in case there are changed circumstances or earlier order was passed on misconception of facts and law. Similarly, the appropriate Government is neither required to issue notice to the parties concerned nor it is incumbent on the appropriate Government to hear the parties concerned before making order either under Section 10(1) or under Sub-section (5) of Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is immaterial whether such orders are passed at the first instance or at the later point of time since order making reference or declining to make reference is an administrative order and the appropriate Government in such situation is discharging its administrative functions. In view of this clear legal position, the impugned order is just and proper.
27. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the petition is misconceived and devoid of substance and hence, same is dismissed. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs.