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[Cites 10, Cited by 0]

Delhi District Court

Complainant vs . on 31 March, 2022

 IN THE COURT OF METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE (NI-05),
         WEST, TIS HAZARI COURTS, NEW DELHI
                      Presided over by- Devanshu Sajlan, DJS



 Case No.                -      Ct. Cases 894/2016

 Unique Case ID -               DLWT020007282016
 No.




                                  In the matter of :-

BIMLA KHATTAR
                                                                   ... COMPLAINANT
                                         VS.

AMITA
                                                                         ... ACCUSED


 1.     Name of Complainant                    : Ms. Bimla Khattar
 2.     Name of Accused                        : Ms. Amita
 3.                                                Section 138, Negotiable Instruments
        Offence complained of or proved        :
                                                   Act, 1881.
 4.     Plea of Accused                        : Not Guilty
 5.     Date of Filing                         : 10.02.2016
 6.     Date of Reserving Order                : 29.03.2022
 7.     Date of Pronouncement                  : 31.03.2022
 8.     Final Order                            : Acquitted




CC NO. 894/2016              BIMLA KHATTAR V. AMITA                     1 OF 12


                                                               DEVANSH       Digitally signed by
                                                                             DEVANSHU SAJLAN

                                                               U SAJLAN      Date: 2022.04.01
                                                                             10:03:55 +05'30'
               BRIEF STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR THE DECISION:-

A. FACTUAL MATRIX

1. The present complaint has been filed by Ms. Bimla Khattar (hereinafter
   "complainant") against Ms. Amita (hereinafter "accused") under section 138 of the
   Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter "NI Act").


2. The substance of allegations, as contained in the complaint, are as follows:


(a) The complainant and the accused had friendly relations. In August 2015, the accused
   requested the complainant for a friendly loan to the tune of Rs. 2,20,000/- and promised
   to repay the same within four months.


(b) It has been further alleged that the complainant advanced the said loan to the accused
   in cash.


(c) It has been further alleged that in discharge of the aforesaid legal debt, the accused
   issued and signed three cheques bearing no. 764799 dated 31.12.2015 for Rs. 20,000/-,
   another cheque bearing no. 764792 dated 31.12.2015 for Rs. 1,00,000/- and another
   cheque bearing no. 76479 dated 31.12.2015 for Rs. 1,00,000 drawn on Punjab National
   Bank, Kirti Nagar.


(d) It has been further alleged that upon the assurance of the accused, the complainant
   presented the aforesaid cheques for encashment. However, the cheque no. 764789 and
   764792 were returned unpaid by the bank for the reason "payment stopped by drawer".
   Further the cheque no. 764799 was returned unpaid by the bank for the reason
   "insufficient funds". Thereafter, the complainant sent a legal notice dated 12.01.2016
   to the accused. However, the accused allegedly failed to pay the cheque amount and




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    therefore, the complainant filed the present complaint.


3. Accused's stance, on the contrary, at the stage of framing of notice under section 251
   CrPC was that she has no legal liability towards the complainant since she had not
   taken any loan from the complainant. The accused further submitted that her cheques
   were misplaced and hence, on 09.03.2013, she had sent intimation to the bank regarding
   two cheques, i.e., cheque no. 764789 and 764792. The accused further submitted that
   she was unaware about the third cheque and that all the cheques have been misused by
   the complainant.

B. PRE-SUMMONING EVIDENCE & NOTICE

4. Pre-summoning evidence was led by the complainant and on finding a prima facie case,
   the accused was summoned to face trial vide order dated 01.04.2016. On appearance,
   the accused was served with the notice of accusation under Section 251, Code of
   Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter "CrPC") on 06.07.2018, to which the accused
   pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. The accused admitted her signature on the cheque
   no. 764799. However, she denied her signature on the other two cheques.


5. Thereafter, the accused moved an application u/s 145(2) NI Act which was allowed
   vide order dated 03.01.2019 and the complainant was allowed to be cross-examined by
   the accused.

C. COMPLAINANT'S EVIDENCE

6. During the trial, the complainant has led the following oral and documentary
   evidence against the accused to prove her case beyond reasonable doubt:-




   CC NO. 894/2016               BIMLA KHATTAR V. AMITA                  3 OF 12
                                            Oral Evidence

   CW1                           Bimla Khattar (Complainant) (tendered her evidence by
                                 way of affidavit and the same is exhibited as CW1/1)

                                     Documentary Evidence

   Ex.CW1/A, Ex. CW1/B           Cheques in question
   and Ex. CW1/C
   Ex. CW1/D (colly)             Returning Memos
   Ex.CW1/E                      Legal notice dated 12.01.2016
   Ex.CW1/F                      Postal receipt
   Ex.CW1/G                      Tracking report


D. STATEMENT OF ACCUSED

7. Thereafter, before the start of defence evidence, in order to allow the accused to
   personally explain the circumstances appearing in evidence against her, her statement
   under Section 313 CrPC was recorded without oath. In reply, the accused denied all
   the allegations against her. The accused submitted the following in her statement under
   section 313 CrPC:
          I have neither issued the afore-said cheques in favour of complainant nor taken any loan
          from the complainant. On 09.03.2013, it came to my knowledge that the two afore-said
          cheques of Rs. 1 lakhs each were missing from my house and accordingly I have
          informed the concerned bank about the same by moving an application to this effect.
          Accordingly, the bank stopped the payment of those cheques. Only after receiving the
          summons from this court, I came to know that the complainant has not only misused the
          afore-said two cheques of Rs. 1 lakhs each but she has also misused the third cheque of
          Rs.20,000/-. On 31.12.2015, the complainant has quarrelled with my mother (who has
          now expired) as well as my sisters. Thereafter, in order to take revenge from me and my
          family, complainant has lodged this false case against me. The complainant has
          mentioned my wrong address in the complaint i.e. T-106 rather my correct address is T-
          160. Due to the wrong address, the summons were not served upon me and warrants
          were issued against me. Complainant has intentionally and deliberately mentioned my
          wrong address in the complaint in order to harass me and my family.




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 E. DEFENCE EVIDENCE

8. The accused moved an application under section 315 CrPC which was allowed vide
   order dated 16.03.2022. The accused examined herself as a defense witness and
   thereafter, closed her evidence. The following evidence was led during this stage:


                                       Oral Evidence

    DW1                        Amita (Accused in person).

                                  Documentary Evidence

    Ex. DW1/1 (OSR)            Stop payment instructions dated 09.03.2013 issued to
    (colly)                    PNB, Patel Nagar.
    Ex. DW1/2 (colly)          Copy of the summons issued by the Court in the present
                               matter.


9. Thereafter, the matter was listed for final arguments. After listening to final arguments
   from both sides, the matter was reserved for pronouncement. I have heard the learned
   counsels on both the sides and have given my thoughtful consideration to the material
   appearing on record.

F. INGREDIENTS OF OFFENCE AND DISCUSSION


10. Before dwelling into the facts of the present case, it would be pertinent to discuss the
   legal standards required to be met by both sides. In order to establish the offence under
   Section 138 of NI Act, the prosecution must fulfil all the essential ingredients of the
   offence, as highlighted below:-


   First Ingredient: The cheque was drawn by a person on an account maintained by
   him/her for payment of money and the same is presented for payment within a period




   CC NO. 894/2016                BIMLA KHATTAR V. AMITA                    5 OF 12
    of 3 months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity;


   Second Ingredient: The cheque was drawn by the drawer for discharge of any legally
   enforceable debt or other liability;


   Third Ingredient: The cheque was returned unpaid by the bank due to either
   insufficiency of funds in the account to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount
   arranged to be paid from that account on an agreement made with that bank;


   Fourth Ingredient: A demand of the said amount has been made by the payee or
   holder in due course of the cheque by a notice in writing given to the drawer within
   thirty days of the receipt of information of the dishonour of cheque from the bank;


   Fifth Ingredient: The drawer fails to make payment of the said amount of money
   within fifteen days from the date of receipt of notice.


11. In addition to the above, the conditions stipulated under Section 142 NI Act must be
   fulfilled.


12. Therefore, in a cheque dishonour case under section 138 NI Act, the complainant is
   required to prove that the cheque in question was drawn by the drawer for discharging
   a legally enforceable debt. As per the scheme of the NI Act, once the accused admits
   signature on the cheque in question, certain presumptions are drawn, which result in
   shifting of onus on the accused.


13. The combined effect of section 118(a) NI Act and section 139 of the NI Act is that a
   presumption exists that the cheque was drawn for consideration and given by the




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     accused for the discharge of debt or other liability. Both the sections use the expression
    "shall", which makes it imperative for the court to raise the aforesaid presumptions
    once the foundational facts required for the same are proved (Hiten P. Dalal v.
    Bratindranath Banerjee, (2001) 6 SCC 16). Further, it has been held by the Hon'ble
    Apex Court in Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441 that the presumption
    contemplated under Section 139 of NI Act includes the presumption of existence of a
    legally enforceable debt. In order to rebut the statutory presumption u/s 139 NI Act, the
    standard of proof is that of preponderance of probabilities, by which the accused is
    required to raise a probable defence. To rebut the presumption, it is open to the accused
    to rely on evidence led by him/her or the accused can also rely on the materials
    submitted by the complainant or the circumstances upon which the parties rely in order
    to raise a probable defence (Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418).


14. Further, it is pertinent to note that it is a settled position of law that the accused, to rebut
    the statutory presumption, should bring on record such facts and circumstances, upon
    consideration of which, the court may either believe that the consideration and debt did
    not exist, or their non-existence was so probable that a prudent man would under the
    circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that they did not exist (Kumar
    Exports v. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513, ¶ 20).

15. The accused has contended that the aforesaid ingredients are not satisfied in the present
    case and that the statutory presumptions cannot be raised against the accused because
    the cheques in question were never drawn by the accused in favour of the complainant.
    The contentions of the accused are discussed herein below.




    CC NO. 894/2016                  BIMLA KHATTAR V. AMITA                       7 OF 12
                   Contention - Stop Payment Instructions Issued in 2013


16. Ld. Counsel for the accused has contended that in the present matter, out of the three
   cheques, the accused has denied her signature on two cheques Ex. CW1/A and Ex.
   CW1/B. In relation to the said cheques, the accused has also exhibited a letter dated
   09.03.2013 (Ex. DW1/1 (Colly) (OSR)) by which 'stop payment' instructions were
   issued by the accused to her bank in relation to the aforesaid cheques for the reason that
   the said cheques have been misplaced. Accordingly, it has been contended that when
   'stop payment' instructions were issued in 2013 itself due to missing of the said
   cheques, it becomes evident that these two cheques were never issued to the
   complainant in 2015. Before this contention is analysed, it is imperative to reproduce
   the relevant law in relation to liability in cases of 'stop payment instructions'.

17. Firstly, in Modi Cements Ltd. v. Kuchil Kumar Nandi (1998) 3 SCC 249, the Hon'ble
   Apex Court made it clear that even if a cheque is dishonoured because of "stop
   payment" instructions given to the bank, Section 138 of the NI Act would get attracted:

           16. ... once the cheque is issued by the drawer a presumption under Section 139 must
           follow and merely because the drawer issues a notice to the drawee or to the bank for
           stoppage of the payment it will not preclude an action under Section 138 of the NI Act
           by the drawee or the holder of the cheques in due course.

18. Further, in M.M.T.C. Ltd. v. Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd. [(2002) 1 SCC
   234], the Hon'ble Apex Court laid down that while complaints cannot be quashed in
   cases where the accused had issued 'stop payment instructions', the accused can show,
   during trial, that the stop-payment notice had been issued because of valid causes,
   including that there was no existing debt or liability at the time of presentation of
   cheque for encashment:




   CC NO. 894/2016                   BIMLA KHATTAR V. AMITA                          8 OF 12
            ... even when the cheque is dishonoured by reason of stop-payment instructions by virtue
           of Section 139 the court has to presume that the cheque was received by the holder for the
           discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or liability. Of course this is a rebuttable
           presumption. The accused can thus show that the 'stop-payment' instructions were not
           issued because of insufficiency or paucity of funds. If the accused shows that in his
           account there were sufficient funds to clear the amount of the cheque at the time of
           presentation of the cheque for encashment at the drawer bank and that the stop-payment
           notice had been issued because of other valid causes including that there was no
           existing debt or liability at the time of presentation of cheque for encashment, then
           offence under Section 138 would not be made out. The important thing is that the
           burden of so proving would be on the accused. Thus a court cannot quash a complaint on
           this ground. (Emphasis added)


19. The same position of law has been re-iterated in Laxmi Dyechem v. State of Gujarat
   (2012) 13 SCC 375 and Pulsive Technologies (P) Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, (2014) 13
   SCC 18.


20. Therefore, while it is indeed true that a complaint case under section 138 NI Act is
   maintainable in a case where the cheque has been dishonored for the reason "payment
   stopped by drawer", the accused can raise a probable defense by showing that the stop-
   payment notice had been issued because of valid causes, including that there was no
   existing debt or liability at the time of presentation of cheque for encashment.

21. In the present case, the date of the letter by which stop-payment instructions were
   issued to the bank is 09.03.2013. However, as per the complainant's version, the
   accused had approached the complainant for a loan in August 2015 and had promised
   to repay the loan within 4 months. Therefore, as per the complainant's own version,
   the accused had requested for the alleged loan in August 2015, i.e., after 2 years from
   the date of issuing stop-payment instructions.

22. I am of the humble view that the aforesaid set of facts raise a probable defense in favour
   of the accused. The 'stop-payment instructions' were issued in March 2013. The
   alleged loan was taken in August 2015. It is not possible that the accused would have




   CC NO. 894/2016                    BIMLA KHATTAR V. AMITA                           9 OF 12
    predicted the future that she would take a loan from the complainant in August 2015
   and give the cheques-in-question for repayment of the said loan, and therefore, she
   went ahead and issued 'stop-payment' instructions in 2013 itself, i.e., two years before
   she even requested for the said loan. The 'stop-payment instructions' makes it evident
   that the accused's version is truthful, i.e., that she had issued 'stop-payment
   instructions' in 2013 because she had misplaced the cheques in question. It is pertinent
   to mention here that the accused and the complainant are neighbours and used to visit
   each other frequently. Accordingly, it is not inconceivable that the misplaced cheques
   of the accused came into the possession of the complainant.

23. The alleged loan was taken in 2015 and hence, the accused could not have hatched a
   plan in 2013 itself to defraud the complainant by issuing 'stop-payment instructions'
   in 2013 qua the cheques in question. It would have been a different scenario if the stop-
   payment instructions were issued after grant of the alleged loan. However, issuance of
   stop-payment instructions way back in 2013 makes it evident that the accused had
   issued the said instructions due to bona-fide reasons, i.e., the accused had misplaced
   the cheques in question in 2013. Therefore, the accused has been able to raise a
   probable defense by showing that the stop-payment notice had been issued because of
   valid causes, and that the cheques in question were never issued by her in discharge of
   legal liability.


    Contention - Failure to show financial capacity/ source of funds to advance the
                                         alleged loan


24. Apart from the aforesaid probable defense raised by the accused, it is pertinent to note
   that there are other material discrepancies in the version of the complainant.


25. It is a settled position of law that showcasing that complainant did not have adequate




   CC NO. 894/2016                BIMLA KHATTAR V. AMITA                    10 OF 12
    financial capacity to lend money to the accused amounts to a probable defence and can
   help in rebutting the presumption that is accrued to the benefit of the complainant in
   NI Cases (Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418; K. Subramani v. K.
   Damodara Naidu, (2015) 1 SCC 99; Sheela Sharma v. Mahendra Pal, 2016 SCC
   Online Del 4696).

26. In the present case, the complainant has not been able to adequately show her financial
   capacity to lend a loan of Rs. 2,20,000. It is pertinent to note that in her evidence
   affidavit, the complainant has nowhere disclosed her source of funds for advancement
   of the alleged loan. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the complainant to prove her
   source of funds when she was questioned regarding the same. However, the
   complainant did not offer any sufficient explanation regarding her source of funds/
   financial capacity to advance the alleged loan.


27. In her cross-examination, the complainant has specifically deposed that she is a
   housewife and that her husband is the only earning member of the family. She has
   further deposed that she does not know her bank balance in August 2015 (the month in
   which the alleged loan was granted). The complainant could have produced her bank
   account statements to show her financial capacity. However, despite admitting that she
   maintains a bank account, the complainant has not furnished her bank account
   statements / passbook.

28. Further, if the complainant had arranged funds from her husband, who is the sole
   earning member of the family, she could have deposed her husband to corroborate her
   version. The complainant had deposed in her cross-examination that her husband takes
   care of all financial transactions and that he maintains a diary in respect of the loan
   advanced. Therefore, the husband of the complainant must have been summoned by
   the complainant to depose regarding the alleged loan and to further tender in evidence




   CC NO. 894/2016                BIMLA KHATTAR V. AMITA                   11 OF 12
    the diary in which the details of the alleged loan were maintained. However, the
   complainant did not take any steps to prove her financial capacity/ source of funds.
   Therefore, an adverse inference ought to be drawn against the complainant in this
   regard. Therefore, in my humble view, the accused has been able to raise a probable
   defense by casting a credible doubt over the source of funds / financial capacity of the
   complainant to advance the loan in question.

G. CONCLUSION

29. In the backdrop of the above discussion, I am of the considered opinion that the accused
   has successfully raised a probable defence in her favour and the complainant has failed
   to prove her case beyond reasonable doubt.


30. In the result of analysis of the present case, the accused Amita is hereby acquitted from
   the charge of offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
   The bail bond furnished earlier during trial is accepted for the purposes of section 437-
   A CrPC.



                                                   DEVANSH Digitally
   ORDER :

- ACQUITTED. signed by DEVANSHU SAJLAN U SAJLAN Date: 2022.04.01 10:03:25 +05'30' Announced in the Open (Devanshu Sajlan) Court on 31.03.2022 MM (NI Act-05), West, THC DELHI CC NO. 894/2016 BIMLA KHATTAR V. AMITA 12 OF 12