Calcutta High Court
Swapan Kumar Das vs Biswajit Cha on 12 October, 2018
Author: Shampa Sarkar
Bench: Debasish Kar Gupta, Shampa Sarkar
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
(Original Side)
Present:
The Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice Debasish Kar Gupta
And
The Hon'ble Justice Shampa Sarkar
A. P. O. NO. 475 Of 2017
Swapan Kumar Das
-Versus-
Biswajit Cha
Tarun Aich & Ors.
For the Appellant
: Mr. Swapan Kumar Das
For the Respondents
: Mr. Jaydip Kar, Sr. Advocate
Mr. R. Banerjee, Sr. Advocate
Mr. S. Mitra, Advocate
Mr. T. Aich
Heard on : 02/08/2018, 21/08/2018, 28/08/2018, 04/09/2018, 11/09/2018,
18/09/2018
Judgment on: 12 /10/2018
Shampa Sarkar, J. :
Aggrieved by a judgment and order dated August 2, 2017 passed by a learned Single Judge of this court in an application bearing No A.P.No 1305 of 2015, (hereinafter referred to as the said application) this appeal has been preferred.
2. The appellant filed the said application under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the learned Single Judge for setting aside an award dated May 14, 2015 made by an agreed arbitrator.
3. The dispute in the instant proceeding is one between a retired partner of M/S Mukharjee and Biswas advocates, (hereinafter referred to as the firm) and the remaining partners of the said firm.
4. The appellant carried the reference to an agreed arbitrator, primarily seeking his share out of the fixed deposits standing to the credit of the firm. The appellant's contention was that part of the profit that could have been taken home by the partners at the end of each financial year was voluntary permitted to be retained in the name of the firm by way of fixed deposits in banks with the understanding, that the retiring/outgoing partner would get his proportionate share out of the fixed deposits. In course of the reference, the appellant contended that he was entitled to his share in the fixed deposit amounts described as fixed deposit and clients' fixed deposits. The appellant also contended before the arbitrator that his share of 19.5% on those fixed deposits would be a part of the amount not drawn by him and was laying to his credit within the meaning of Clause 22
(a) of the partnership deed(hereinafter referred to as the said deed).
5. The claim of the appellant which was referred to the arbitrator was as follows:-
"19.5% Share in Fixed Deposits of:-
(i) Rs. 70,00,000/- (70 lacs) with Indian Bank, Vivekananda Branch with interest accrued thereon.
(ii) Rs. 25,00,000/- (25 lacs) with United Bank of India, High Court.
Branch with Interest accrued thereon.
(iii) Fixed Deposits with other banks for Rs. 20 lacs approximately with interest accrued thereon.
Rs.23,40,000/- (approx)"
6. The proceeding before the arbitrator only related to a claim on the fixed deposits lying with several nationalised banks in the name of the partnership firm.
7. In dealing with the claim of the appellant, the arbitrator held that the retiring partner was not entitled to any share on the fixed deposits but, only on the amounts mentioned in Clause 22 of the said deed. The arbitrator rejected the claim of the appellant on the Fixed Deposits and concluded as follows:-
"The said accounts show clearly profit earned by the firm each year, its distribution among the partners, Fixed deposits of the firm and clients' fixed deposits. In view of these accounts and there being no challenge thereto by the claimant, the claim of the claimant for any share of the fixed deposits cannot be allowed."
8. It appears from the award dated May 14, 2015 that the arbitrator found that the appellant was not entitled to any more than what was expressly provided for in Clause 22 of the said deed. The arbitrator came to a conclusion that the appellant not having challenged the accounts of the firm insofar as, the fixed deposits of the firm and clients' 'fixed deposit' as shown in the books of accounts of the firm were concerned, he could not claim any share in the fixed deposits. The arbitrator also rejected the contention of the appellant that the fixed deposits were created out of the funds of the partners.
9. Challenging the award, the appellant filed the said application. The learned Single Judge dismissed the application with the following observation:-
"Ordinarily, Courts do not sit in appeal over arbitral awards in course of proceeding under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Indeed, there is a distinction which is made between errors of jurisdiction and errors within jurisdiction. As a corollary, if there are two views possible and the arbitrator opts for one of them, the Court will not readily supplant its view for the arbitrator's and set aside the award on such ground. Courts also step in when there is manifest injustice occasioned to a party complaining against the award.
In this case, the arbitrator construed clause 19 of the partnership deed to be the provision which disentitled an outgoing partner to claim all the dues that he may ordinarily have in the absence of such a clause. On a meaningful reading of the award, it is evident that the arbitrator construed clauses 19 and 22 to imply that only such amount that would be mentioned as due to the outgoing partner in the audited accounts may be regarded as such partner's dues in respect of clause 22(a) of the deed, apart from the severance amount covered by clause 22(b) thereof.
Since it was possible for the arbitrator to take the view that is evident from the award impugned herein and there does not appear to be any miscarriage of justice thereby, the award does not call for any interference.
Accordingly, AP No.1305 of 2015 is dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs."
10. Before us, the appellant assailed the decision of the learned Single Judge as also the award on the following grounds:-
(i) The arbitrator did not consider the evidence of Tarun Aich and other bank employees on the point of fixed deposits.
(ii) The balance sheet of the firm were wrongly considered and the learned Single Judge as also the arbitrator arrived at an incorrect finding that the fixed deposits were clients' fixed deposits whereas, actually they were amounts fixed in the name of the firm credited out of the contribution of the partners, with an understanding that the outgoing/retiring partner would be entitled to payment of his proportionate share from the same.
(iii) There were no court orders directing the said firm to keep and invest money of the clients' by way of fixed deposits in the banks.
(iv)The award was against public policy as the same was made in violation of The Indian Contract Act, 1872 and The Indian Partnership Act, 1932.
(iv)The learned Judge erred in not interfering with the award and in holding that if there were two views possible in interpreting a clause in the partnership deed, the arbitrator was entitled to take one of the views, even if the same was an error within jurisdiction.
11. He referred to the decisions, namely, Associate Builders Vs. Delhi Development Authority reported in (2015) 3 SCC 49, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited Vs. Western GECO International Limited reported in (2014) 9 SCC 263, R. C. Lahoti and Arun Kumar, JJ. Vs. Bondar Singh and Others, Appellants v. Nihal Singh and Others reported in AIR 2003 SC 1905, C. E. S. C. Ltd. Vs. Rup Kumar Barik and Others reported in AIR 2003 CAL 195, ARM Group Enterprises Ltd. Vs. Waldorf Restaurant and Others reported in (2003) SCC 423, Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. Vs. United Bank of India and Others reported in (2000) 7 SCC 120,
12. Mr. Jaydip Kar, the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents drew our attention to Clauses 17, 19 and 22 of the partnership deed. He submitted that the partnership deed was a contract between the parties and the same was binding upon them. According to him the balance sheet of the said firm categorically showed that the fixed deposits were in the name of the firm and entered in the balance sheet under two distinct heads, that is, Clients' Fixed Deposit and 'Fixed Deposits'. The appellant was a signatory to those documents. He further argued, that according to Clause 19 of the partnership deed, in case of death or retirement of a partner the good will, tenancy, furniture, shelf, boxes and all other assets would automatically vest on the surviving and/or out going partners.
13. He contended that the appellant was only entitled to the amount as mentioned in Clause 22 of the said deed and the said clause did not include the fixed deposits lying in the name of the firm either as fixed deposit or as "clients' fixed deposit".
14. Mr. Jaydip Kar drew our attention to schedule A of the accounts which dealt with partners capital and according to him the said schedule A was the statement of the accounts dealing with the expression "amount lying to the credit of a partner in the current balance". Finally, Mr. Kar referred to section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and submitted, that the scope for interference of this court in case of arbitral awards was very limited and the same could be interfered with only when the award was opposed to public policy. He relied on the decisions in Associate Builders Vs. Delhi Development Authority reported in (2015) 3 SCC 49 and Harish Chandra and Company Vs. State Of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2016) 9 SCC 487.
15. Having heard the learned counsels for the parties we now, proceed to deal with their rival contentions. From Clause 13 of the said deed we find that the accounts of the partnership were under the control of the first three partners. The appellant was named as the first partner in the deed and the accounts of the partnership was under the control of the appellant along with Tapan Kumar Sen and Tarun Aich. It has been provided in the said Clause that the accounts of the firm, when certified by the auditor were binding on all partners. Clause 17 of the deed, provides for sharing of the net profits of the firm and the appellant as the first partner was entitled to 19.5% of the profit.
16. While examining the scope of the interference with an award one must consider Section 34 (2) of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which reads as follows:
"An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if-
(a) the party making the application furnishes proof that -
(i) a party was under some incapacity, or
(ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which
the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or
(iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration:
(v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or
(b) the Court finds that-
(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or
(ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India.
Explanation 1.- For the avoidance of any doubt, it is clarified that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only if,-
(iii) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of section 75 or section 81; or
(iv) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian Law; or
(v) it is in conflict with the most basic notions or morality or justice"
17. In the case in hand, the only ground available for the appellant to challenge the award was that the same was in conflict with the public policy of India. In our opinion, a conflict with the public policy of India has also been explained and we hold that neither was the award induced or affected by fraud or corruption nor was it in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian Law and also, there was no conflict with the most basic notions of morality and justice.
18. In Associate Builders (supra) fundamental policy of India has been explained to mean that the arbitrator must have a judicial approach and he must not act perversely. The relevant portion of the said judgment is quoted herein below:-
"34. It is with this very important caveat that the two fundamental principles which form part of the fundamental policy of India law (that the arbitrator must have a judicial approach and that he must not act perversely) are to be understood.
Interest of India
35. The next ground on which an award may be set aside is that it is contrary to the interest of India. Obviously, this concerns itself with India as a member of the world community in its relations with foreign powers. As at present advised, we need not dilate on this aspect as this aspect as this ground may need to evolve on a case-by- case basis.
Justice
36. The third ground of public policy is, if an award is against justice or morality. These are two different concepts in law. An award can be said to be against justice only when it shocks the conscience of the court. An illustration of this can be given. A claimant is content with restricting his claim, let us say to Rs 30 lakhs in a statement of claim before the arbitrator and at no point does he seek to claim anything more. The arbitral award ultimately awards him Rs 45 lakhs without any acceptable reason or justification. Obviously, this would shock the conscience of the court and the arbitral award would be liable to be set aside on the ground that it is contrary to "justice".
Morality
37. The other ground is of "morality". Just as the expression "public policy" also occurs in Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872 so does the expression "morality". Two illustrations to the said section are interesting for they explain to us the scope of the expression "morality":
'(j) A, who is B's Mukhtar, promises to exercise his influence, as such, with B in favour of C, and C promises to pay 1000 rupees to A. The agreement is viod, because it is immoral.
(k) A agrees to let her daughter to hire to B for concubinage. The agreement is void, because it is immoral, though the letting may not be punishable under the Indian Penal Code.'
38................
39. This Court has confined morality to sexual morality so far as Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872 is concerned, which in the context of an arbitral award would mean the enforcement of an award say for specific performance of a contract involving prostitution.
"Morality" would, if it is to go beyond sexual morality necessarily cover such agreements as are not illegal but would not be enforced given the prevailing mores of the day. However, interference on this ground would also be only if something shocks the court's conscience.
Patent Illegality
40.We now come to the fourth head of public policy, namely, patent illegality. It must be remembered that under the Explanation to Section 34(2) (b), an award is said to be in conflict with the public policy of India if the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption. This ground is perhaps the earliest ground on which courts in England set aside awards under English law. Added to this ground (in 1802) is the ground that an arbitral award would be set aside if there were an error of law by the arbitrator"
19. The above judgment also held that an award based on evidence which may not match up in quality would also not be violative of the fundamental principles of Indian Law as long as the arbitrator's approach was not arbitrary or mala fide.
20. We find that the learned Single Judge came to a finding after agreeing with the reasons given by the arbitrator that the view of the arbitrator was a possible view and the learned Single Judge had rightly held that while deciding an application under section 34 of the said Act, the court did not sit as a court of appeal. In Harish Chandra and Company (supra) the scope of interference with an arbitral award has been explained. The relevant paragraphs read as follows:-
"23. A three-Judge bench of this Court in State of U.P v. Allied Constructions, while examining the scope of Section 30 held as under:
'4........ The award is a speaking one. The arbitrator has assigned sufficient and cogent reasons in support thereof. Interpretation of a contract, it is trite, is a matter of the arbitrator to determine (see Sudarsan Trading Co. v. State of Kerala). Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 providing for setting aside an award is restrictive in its operation. Unless one or the other condition contained in Section 30 is satisfied, an award cannot be set aside. The arbitrator is a Judge chosen by the parties and his decision is final. The court is precluded from reappraising the evidence. Even in a case where the award contains reasons, the interference herewith would still be not available within the jurisdiction of the court unless, of course, the reasons are totally perverse or the judgment is based on a wrong proposition of law. An error apparent on the face of the records would not imply closer scrutiny of the merits of documents and materials on record. Once it is found that the view of the arbitrator is a plausible one, the court will refrain itself from interfering......'
24. S. Mukharji, J. As his Lordship then was, speaking for the Bench in Sudarsan Trading Co. v. State of Kerala, while examining the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 30 held as under"
'However, there is a distinction between disputes as to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and the disputes as to in what way that jurisdiction should be exercised. There may be a conflict as to the power of the arbitrator to grant a particular remedy. One has to determine the distinction between an error within the jurisdiction and an error in excess of the jurisdiction. The Court cannot substitute its own evaluation of the conclusion of law or fact to come to the conclusion that the arbitrator had acted contrary to the bargain between the parties. Whether a particular amount was liable to be paid or damages liable to be sustained, was a decision within the competency of the arbitrator in this case. By purporting to construe the contract, the court could not take upon itself the burder of saying that this was contrary to the contract and, as such, beyond jurisdiction. If on a view taken of a contract, the decision of the arbitrator on certain amounts awarded, is a possible view though perhaps not the only correct view, the award cannot be examined by the court.'
25............
26. The grounds such as inadequacy of reasons in support of an award, error committed by the arbitrator on facts, alternate and/or more plausible view could be taken then what is taken by the arbitrator, improper appreciation of evidence done by the arbitrator in recording any finding, etc. are not the grounds on which any award much less a reasoned award can be set aside the award because they do not fall within the four corners of any of the three sub-clauses of Section 30 of the 1940 Act."
21. We think it fit to refer to some relevant clauses in the partnership deed. Clause 19 of the said deed, deals with the effect of death, incapacitation and/or retirement of a partner, and reads as follows:-
" In the event of death or retirement of any of the partners the goodwill of the said partnership, the tenancy of the office premises and the office papers, furniture, safes, boxes and other fittings and law and other books and all other assets thereof shall vest automatically to the other surviving or continuing partners."
22. Clause 22 of the deed deals with the payment that shall be made in case a partner dies or becomes incapacitated or retires after the attainment of sixty eight year and reads as follows:-
"In case during the continuance of the partnership any of the partners dies or becomes incapacitated from further acting as a partner or retires after attainment of sixty eight years such partner or his heirs or legal representatives shall be paid by the other partners:
(a) all amounts undrawn and lying to his credit in the current balance:
(b) aggregate of the remuneration received for the five proceeding years and the gross profits for the five years arising to his share after adjustment of any amount if drawn out more than his share of profit shall be paid in full satisfaction of his share in the outstanding bills, goodwill, furniture, fittings, law books and other assets. Such payment shall be made no later than six months from the death retirement or the partner, as the case may be, from the till of the partnership and can be adjusted during next Six Years from the profit of the firm.''
23. According to the appellant, the amount as mentioned in Clause 22(b) had been paid to him and he did not have any grievance with regard to the same. His contention, that the amounts which were not drawn by him and were lying to his credit in the current balance were actually the fixed deposits and as per clause 22(a) of the partnership deed and he should be paid 19.5% of his share from those fixed deposits cannot be accepted.
19. The saving clause incorporated in clause 22 reads as follows:-
"22(a).................
22(b)..................
Save as aforesaid the retiring partner of the heirs or legal representatives of the deceased partner shall be have no right, title, goodwill or interest in the assets of the profession and shall not interfere with the running or administration"
24. In view of the above clause, a retiring partner did not have any right, title or interest in the assets of the profession and was barred from interfering with the administration of the firm. The partnership deed is a contract between the partners and its clauses are binding on each of the partners. Clause 22 is binding upon the appellant and according to the said clause he did not have any claim over the fixed deposits which were entered under the head "asset" in the balance sheet of the said firm. Section 28(3) of the said Act provides that while deciding and making an award, the arbitral tribunal shall, in all cases, take into account the terms of the contract and trade usages applicable to the transaction. Thus, the dispute in this proceeding mainly revolves around interpretation of clauses 13 and 22(a) of the partnership deed. Admittedly the appellant did not hold any fixed deposit receipts with regard to the fixed deposits mentioned against item no. 2 in the reference. In order to substantiate his claim that those fixed deposits were made out of the gross income of the partners, no material has been produced by the appellant. Whereas, Tarun Aich deposed that those fixed deposits were either clients fixed deposits or fixed deposits of the firm. In the statement of defence of the respondents also a similar stand has been taken and such plea of the Respondents is fortified by the accounts of the said firm. The accounts have been proved by the accountant.
25. We find from the balance sheet of the firm as on 31st March 2013 that the fixed deposit of the firm was Rs. 70 lakhs and 'clients' fixed deposits' was Rs. 38,74,270/- and both these entries have been classified as 'asset' of the firm. We are of the view that as per clause 19 of the partnership deed the partners did not have any right over the assets of the firm. The partners' capital account was shown as a separate entry in the profit and loss accounts of the firm.
26. A schedule had been appended to the accounts of the firm which reflects the partners' capital. The said schedule is quoted below:-
SCHEDULE "A"
PARTNERS CAPITAL
Name: Opening Share of Capital Intro/ Share of Transferred Closing
Capital Firms I. (Drawings Profit to Special Capital
Tax Adjust Fund
S.K.Das 75,069 11,700 - 94,231 - 157,600
T. K. Sen 68.645 10,500 (30,000) 84,567 112,712 -
T. Aich 39,690 10,200 - 82,150 - 111,640
Dilip.Kr. 62,778 9,600 - 77,318 - 130,496
Sinha
(34,883) 9,000 - 72,488 - 28,009
S.K.Partha
123,110 9,000 - 72,486 - 186,596
Debasish
Kr. Sinha
Total 3,34,409 60,000 (30,000) 483,238 112,712 641,935
27. It is admitted that as per clause 13 of the partnership deed the appellant being the first partner had complete control over the accounts and those audited accounts were binding on the partners, especially, because the same were signed by the partners. We agree with the arbitrator on the point that partners capital, that is, Schedule A has been referred to in clause 22(a) of the deed as "the amount lying undrawn to the credit of the partner in the current balance".
28. We find from the arbitral award that the arbitrator had considered the claim of the appellant and had come to a specific finding, that the plea of the appellant that the fixed deposits had been created from the gross income of the firm and not from the profit, was not acceptable as the accounts produced by the respondent at the instance of the appellant, did not support such contention. It appears from the record that the profit of the respective partners had been indicated in the profit and loss accounts each year. The appellant had never challenged the said accounts and moreover CW6 had proved the correctness of the accounts. The accounts clearly reflected the profit earned by the firm each year and the distribution among the partners. We find that the amount accounted for as 'clients' fixed deposit' and fixed deposits in the balance sheet tally with the quantum claimed by the appellant to have been invested in the banks as clients' fixed deposits and fixed deposits of the firm. Admittedly, there are no other fixed deposits. We find that the appellant was the first signatory to the accounts which were never challenged and we agree with the findings of the arbitrator in this regard. The amounts shown as fixed deposits in the books of accounts were the assets of the firm and were not amounts lying to the credit of the partners in the current balance. Percentage of profit of the each partner had been shown separately and schedule A of the accounts showed the amounts lying to the credit of each partner. The appellant in terms of clause 22(a) was entitled to his capital as reflected is Schedule A.
29. The arbitrator had considered both oral and documentary evidence which were on record and had rightly come to a finding that clause 22 (a) did not include the "clients' fixed deposits" and others "fixed deposits" of the firm which were thus shown in the books of accounts and it was not necessary for the arbitrator to call for court orders in order to verify whether clients' fixed deposits were actually so or not specially, because the said accounts were binding on the appellant.
30. It also appears from the accounts that the fixed deposit of Rs.
7,00,000/- in the name of the firm was also shown as an asset in the balance sheet which had been accepted by the partners of the firm all along. When clause 19 provided that the retiring partners did not have any right over the assets of the firm it could be logically concluded that the appellant also did not have any right over those fixed deposits which were accounted for as assets of the firms and the appellant had accepted such accounts.
31. Uttam Singh Duggal (supra) will not come to the aid of the appellant, in view of the fact that the books of accounts were on record as evidence to show that the fixed deposits were always entered as assets in the balance sheet and the respondents have proved their contention on the basis of such evidence. The law decided in ARM Group Enterprises Ltd. will not apply in the present case as the appellant had failed to prove that he had a share on the said fixed deposits as a partner who had contributed to the capital of the firm out of which the fixed deposits were created and in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, he was entitled to his share on the fixed deposits. The relevant portion of the judgement is quoted below:-
"Under Section 14 of the Partnership Act, 1932, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, property exclusively belonging to a person, on his entering into partnership with others, does not become a property of the partnership merely because it is used for the business of the partnership. Such property will become property of the partnership only if there is an agreement - express or implied - that the property was, under the agreement of the partnership, to be treated as the property of the partnership. See decision of this Court in the case of Arjun Kanoji Tankar v. Santaram Kanoji Tankar."
32. The decisions in Bondar Singh and Others (supra) and Rup Kumar Barik (supra) deal with the settled principle of law, that no evidence could be accepted if not pleaded but, these judgments do not have any impact in the facts of this case.
33. In ONGC Limited (supra) the fundamental policy of Indian Law had been elaborately discussed, and it had been laid down that the first and foremost principle for interference with an award would be to consider whether the arbitrator failed to have a 'judicial approach' in deciding the matter. The relevant portion whereof is quoted below:-
"35........ The duty to adopt a judicial approach arises from the very nature of the power exercised by the court or the authority does not have to be separately or additionally enjoined upon the fora concerned. What must be remembered is that the importance of a judicial approach in judicial and quasi-judicial determination lies in the fact that so long as the court, tribunal or the authority exercising powers that affect the rights or obligations of the parties before them shows fidelity to judicial approach, they cannot act in an arbitrary, capricious or whimsical manner. Judicial approach ensures that the authority acts bona fide and deals with the subject in a fair, reasonable and objective manner and that its decision is not actuated by any extraneous consideration. Judicial approach in that sense acts as a check against flaws and faults that can render the decision of a court, tribunal or authority vulnerable to challenge."
34. We have considered the impugned judgment and we are of the view that the learned Single Judge rightly held that the arbitrator's approach to the dispute under reference was correct. The arbitrator on the basis of the pleadings and the evidence held that an outgoing partner's entitlement as per clause 22(a) should be confined to the amount that was specifically mentioned against the partner's name in the books of accounts in each financial year which according to us is not an unreasonable finding.
35. We do not find any illegality in the judgment and order impugned. The appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
36. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for be given to the parties on priority basis.
I agree,
(Debasish Kar Gupta, ACJ.) (Shampa Sarkar, J.)