Madras High Court
M/S.World Wide Brands Inc vs Smt.Dayavanti Jhamnadas Hinduja on 10 December, 2008
Author: D.Murugesan
Bench: D.Murugesan, V.Periya Karuppiah
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 10.12.2008 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE D.MURUGESAN and THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE V.PERIYA KARUPPIAH Civil Revision Petition Nos.1047 to 1052 of 2006 and M.P.Nos.1 of 2006 (6 MPs) & M.P.Nos.2 and 3 of 2006 M/s.World Wide Brands Inc. 1209, Orange Street Wilmington, Delaware, USA C/o. Remfry and Sagar Remfry House at the Millennium Plaza, Sector 27, Gurgaon 122 002. ... Appellant in all Revisions vs. 1.Smt.Dayavanti Jhamnadas Hinduja Smt.Janaki Madanlal Hinduja Smt.Veena Rajendra Hinduja Smt.Nalini Dinesh Hinduja Trading as The Central Wearhouse, 11th Cross Malleswaram, Bangalore 560 022. 2.The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks, Trade Marks Registry, Rajaji Bhavan, D-Wing, 2nd Floor, Besant Nagar, Chennai 600 090. ... Respondents in all the Revisions Revision Petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, praying to set aside the common Order dated 15.03.2006 made in O.A.No.15-20/2005/TM/CH by the Intellectual Property Appellate Board, Chennai. For Revision Petitioner : Mr.Habibullah Basha, SC for M/s.Gladys Daniel For 1st Respondent : Mr.T.V.Ramanujam, SC for Mr.V.Veeraraghavan Assisted by Mrs.P.V.Rajeswari COMMON ORDER
D.MURUGESAN,J.
The Civil Revision Petitions are filed invoking Article 227 of the Constitution of India by M/s.World Wide Brand Inc, against the order dated 15.03.2006 passed by the Intellectual Property Appellate Board dismissing O.A.Nos.15-20/2005/TM/CH.
2. The facts that give rise to all the revision petitions are as follows:-
Smt.Dayavanti Jhamnadas Hinduja, Smt.Janaki Madanlal Hinduja, Smt.Veena Rajendra Hinduja and Smt.Nalini Dinesh Hinduja, partners of a registered partnership firm, trading as M/s.Central Wearhouse at Bangalore had filed the following applications under Class-25 Sl.No. Application No. Description of the Mark
1. 597843 Camel Collection with for registration
2. 597845 Camel Trophy Adventure Wear
3. 597842 Camel Collection with the device (square)
4. 597840 Camel Collection with the device strip
5. 597837 Camel Collection with device (neck label)
6. 597848 Camel for registration of Trade Mark "Camel Collection" in respect of "all types of readymade garments, including foot wear and head gear" before the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks, Chennai and the applications were ordered to be advertised in the Trade Mark Journal 1206 (s) dated 08.09.1999. The applicants for convenience sake will be hereinafter referred to as 'the respondents'. M/s.World Wide Brand Inc,(herein after referred to as "the Petitioner") a corporation and existing under the law of the State of Delaware, United States of America, filed a notice of opposition along with a request on TM-44. The objections were mainly (A) The petitioner carry on an established international business as merchants of, clothing, suits, coats, vests, trousers, shirts, sweaters, belts, neckties, scarves, hats, caps, foot wear and head gear.
(B) In connection with world wide business, the opponents own and use, the trade mark "Camel Collection" and device of camel which are registered and/or applied for registrations in other countries of the world.
(C) The petitioner had applied for registration in India of the following trade mark viz.,Camel Trophy and device under application No.692742 dated 29.12.1995 in Class-25 in respect of "clothing, footwear and headgear'.
(D) By virtue of registrations and long standing use of trade marks "Camel Collection" and device of camel, the petitioner company is entitled to exclusive proprietary rights therein and members of the trade and public recognise the said trade marks as distinctive of the products and business of their company alone.
(E) The respondents were well aware of the use and reputation of petitioner's trade mark "Camel Collection" and the adoption by the respondents of the trade mark "Camel Collection" is therefore, blatantly dishonest and only with a view to trading upon and benefiting from the reputation and goodwill enjoyed by the petitioner under the trade marks "Camel Collection". Use of the trade mark "Camel Collection" would cause confusion and lead to dilution of distinctiveness of the trade marks of the petitioner and therefore,it would be contrary to Section 11(a) of The Trade Marks and Merchandise Act, 1958.
(F) The respondents are not proprietors of the trade mark "Camel Collection" and knowing fully well that the said trade mark had acquired reputation and goodwill and were exclusively identifiable with the goods of the petitioner' company, had adopted the said trade mark. The respondents cannot, therefore claim to be the proprietors of the trade mark within the meaning of Section 18(1) of the Trade Marks and Merchandise Act, 1958.
(G). Hence, the Registration of the Trade Mark "Camel Collection" in favour of the respondents would be contrary to the Sections 9,11(a) and 11(e) and 18(1) of the Trade Marks and Merchandise Act, 1958.
4. The respondents filed their counter statements disputing the claim of the petitioner by contending that the respondents have adopted the trade mark "Camel Collection" along with device of camel and are using since the year 1992 with openly and continuously without any encounter several years. The claim of the petitioner that they had earned reputation and goodwill was denied. By virtue of long and continuous extensive use since the year 1992, the respondents' trade mark is being adopted to distinguish their goods and it is distinctive of their goods only and with none else. Hence, the respondents contended that the applications were well within the provisions of The Trade Marks and Merchandise Act, 1958.
5. The petitioner filed evidence in support of the opposition by way of an affidavit. The respondents also filed evidence in support of their applications by way of an affidavit. The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks on consideration of the rival claims including the evidence had disallowed the opposition and ordered to proceed for the registration of the applications filed by the respondents herein.
6. Questioning the said order, the petitioner preferred O.A.Nos.15-20/2005-TM/CH before the Intellectual Property appellate Tribunal ( in short, 'the appellate Board'). The appellate Board having considered the various documents filed by the petitioner, found that the petitioner had registered the camel brand in various forms either as a word mark or with a device mark with various countries and the advertisements produced were admittedly made in other countries and not in India. The appellate Board had also considered the calendar of the year 1954 filed by the petitioner to support their plea that the camel brand cigarettes were familiar in India and found that the calendar was in Spanish language. Insofar as the calendar of the year 1957 and 1959 are concerned, again those were printed in Spanish. In regard to advertisements that were made in the name of RJ Reynolds (RJR), the appellate Board found that they have no relevance as there is absolutely no evidence on record to show that those advertisements were made in India in any of the magazines or in any other form. The appellate Board also found that there is no evidence to show that the materials were also in circulation in India. The appellate Board had also found that those advertisements had in fact related to cigarettes. The appellate Board had also considered the objection of the petitioner that those cigarettes were available in duty free shops in Indian Air-ports, and did not accept the opposition as to the transborder reputation earned by the petitioner in respect of Camel brand Cigarettes. Having considered the documentary evidence, the appellate Board refused to accept the opposition of the petitioner.
7. As regards the claim of the petitioner that they are the prior user in India, the appellate Board found that the goods are totally different and there cannot be any confusion. Further, the appellate Board found that the claim on trade mark "Camel" in world wide is also not made out and further except the vague statement that the camel brand cigarettes are available in duty free shops, there is no evidence to establish that the said trade mark is so well known in India or the same attained the transborder reputation. The appellate Board had also found that the petitioner failed to produce any evidence in regard to the camel publicity either in magazines or otherwise of the trade mark in India. Finally, the appellate Board found that the petitioner have failed to discharge their initial burden of proving the reputation.
8. As far as the opposition as to the registration of the trade mark is contrary to Section 11(1) (a) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 which came into force when the applications for registration were taken up for consideration is concerned, after analysing the documents produced by the petitioner with regard to an agreement entered into by the petitioner with Dornbusch & Co, permitting the licensee to manufacture shirts, sweat/T-Shirts, knitwear, etc., the appellate Board found that in as much as the territory for the licensee is mentioned as Benelux, Switzerland, Denmark, and Israel and the licence agreement was in respect of use of trade mark set forth in Schedule-A of the licensed articles and in connection with the manufacture, advertisement, permission, sale and distribution thereof in the territory described therein. Hence, the said licence agreement said to have been entered into by the petitioner with Dornbusch & Co will not establish the manufacture of garment with trade mark 'camel' by the respondent through the licensee Dornbusch & co. Having considered the entire issue, the appellate Board had rejected all the objections and had ultimately dismissed the appeals. Challenging the said order the present civil revision petitions.
9. We have heard Mr.Habibullah Basha, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr.T.V.Ramanujam, learned senior counsel appearing for the first respondent.
10. Before we delve upon the rival contentions, we are at the outset inclined to refer the scope of interference of the orders in exercise of the power under Section 227 of the Constitution of India.
11. In Waryam Sing v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215, the Apex Court has held that the power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 of the Constitution is to be exercised more sparingly and only in appropriate case in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors.
12. The above said law is again reiterated by the Apex Court in Singaram Singh v. Election Tribunal, AIR 1955 SC 425 and Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division & Appeals, AIR 1958 SC 398.
13. In T.Prem Sagar v. M/s.Standard Vacuum Oil Company, AIR 1965 SC 111, it has been held that in writ proceedings if an error of law apparent on the fact of the records is disclosed and the writ is issue, the usual course to adopt is to correct the error and send the case back to the special Tribunal for its decision in accordance with law. It would be inappropriate for the High Court exercising its writ jurisdiction to consider the evidence for itself and reach its own conclusions in matters which have been left by the legislature to the decisions of specially constituted Tribunals.
14. In Joint Registrar of Co-Operative Societies, Madras & others v. P.S.Rajagopal Naidu, Govindarajulu and others, AIR 1970 SC 992, the Apex Court has held that the High Courts should not act as a Court of appeal and re-appraise and re-examine the relevant facts and circumstances which led to the making of order.
15. In Muni Lal and others v. Prescribed Authority and others, AIR 1978 SC 29, it has been held that the High Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion different from that of the prescribed Authority.
16. In Ganpat Ladha v. Sashikant Vishnu Shinde, AIR 1978 SC 955, the Apex Court has held that the High Courts cannot justify the exercise of its discretionary powers under Article 227 of the Constitution as to the finding of fact; unless such finding of fact is clearly perverse and patently unreasonable.
17. In Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S.Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447, the Apex Court at page 460, para (4) has held thus:-
" It is true that in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution the High Court could go into the question of facts or look into the evidence if justice so requires it, if there is any misdirection in law or a view of fact taken in the teeth of preponderance of evidence. But the High Court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 277 of the Constitution to look into the fact in the absence of clear and cut down reasons where the question depends upon the appreciation of evidence. The High Court also should not interfere with a finding within the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal except where the findings are perverse and not based on any material evidence or it resulted in manifest injustice. Except to the limited extent indicated above, the High Court has no jurisdiction. In our opinion therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this case on the question that the High Court has sought to interfere, it is manifest that the High Court has gone into questions which depended upon appreciation of evidence and indeed the very fact that the learned trial Judge came to one conclusion and the Appellate Bench came to another conclusion is indication of the position that two views were possible in this case. In preferring one view to another of factual appreciation of evidence, the High Court transgressed its limits of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. On the first point, therefore, the High Court was in error."
18. In Ouseph Mathai and others v. M.Abdul Khadir, (2002) 1 SCC 319, the Apex Court in para (4) has held thus:-
"It is not denied that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution are extraordinary and discretionary powers as distinguished from ordinary statutory powers. No doubt, Article 227 confers a right of superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises the jurisdiction but no corresponding right is conferred upon a litigant to invoke the jurisdiction under the said article as a matter of right. In fact power under this article casts a duty upon the High Court to keep the inferior Courts and Tribunals within the limits of their authority and that they do not cross the limits, ensuring the performance of duties by such Courts and Tribunals in accordance with law conferring powers within the ambit of the enactments creating such Courts and Tribunals. Only wrong decisions may not be a ground for the exercise of jurisdiction under this article unless the wrong is referable to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of power by the subordinate courts and tribunals resulting in grave injustice to any party"
19. In State v. Navjot Sandhu, (2003) 6 SCC 641, the Apex Court, at page 656, para (28) has held as under:-
"Thus the law is that Article 227 of the Constitution of India gives the High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. This jurisdiction cannot be limited or fettered by any Act of the State Legislature. The supervisory jurisdiction extends to keeping the subordinate tribunals within the limits of their authority and to seeking that they obey the law. The powers under Article 227 are wide and can be used, to meet the ends of justice. They can be used to interfere even with an interlocutory order. However, the power under Article 227 is a discretionary power and it is difficult to attribute to an order of the High Court, such a source of power, when the High Court itself does not terms purport to exercise any such discretionary power. It is settled law that this power of judicial superintendence , under Article 227, must be exercised sparingly and only to keep subordinate court and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not to correct mere errors. Further, where the statute bans the exercise of revisional powers it would require very exceptional circumstances to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India since the power of superintendence was not meant to circumvent statutory law. It is settled law that the jurisdiction under Article 227 could not be exercised "as the cloak of an appeal in disguise".
20. In Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675, the Apex Court has held that exercise of power under Article 226 is available only to correct the error committed by the Court or the authority and the error should be self-evidence. The Apex Court had also cautioned that such an error which needs to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments or by indulging in a long-drawn process of reasoning, cannot possibly be an error available for correction by writ of certiorari.
21. In Ranjeet Singh v. Ravi Prakash, (2004) 3 Supreme Court Cases 682 the Apex Court has held that unless, the High Court finds patent error in the order of the tribunal or appellate board, it would not be proper to interfere in such order in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution.
22. The Superintendence power of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, over all Courts and tribunals is basically to keep the subordinate courts/tribunals/appellate authorities constituted under statutes within their bounds and not for correcting mere errors. The exercise of power is limited to want of jurisdiction, errors of law, perverse findings, gross violation of principles of natural justice and like the one. It may be exercised, if it is shown that grave injustice has been done to the person, who has invoked the jurisdiction with such grievance, the Court does not act as an appellate authority to reappraise the evidence and come to a different conclusion. Even if two views are possible, in exercise of power, the Court would not be justified in substituting its own reason for the reasons of the subordinate courts/tribunals or appellate tribunals/boards. Of course, the power of this Court is not taken away, where the statutory appellate tribunal/board brushes aside the evidence on conjunctures and without giving cogent reasons, which would result in error apparent on the face of the records. Unless, the errors questioned are apparently error, perverse and the findings are not supported by any materials, the exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution to interfere with in such orders may not be available.
23. Keeping the above law in mind, the entire issue involved in the matter shall be considered. The petitioner is the company viz., M/s.World Wide Brand Inc. It claimed to have owned and used the trade mark "Camel Collection", "Camel Collection and device of camel", "Camel Trophy" etc., and the petitioner claim to have owned around 1395 trade marks registration world over and their use is prior in time to that of the respondent.
24. As far as the ownership of the trade mark is concerned, the appellate Board had found that there is no dispute that the revision petitioner had registered its trade mark "Camel" brand in various forms either as a word mark or with device mark in various countries. How far the said finding could be made use of by the petitioner to succeed in these revisions is a matter for further consideration.
25. Insofar as the claim on the ownership of the trade marks is concerned, the petitioner have filed Exs.A to J before the Registering Authority and the appellate Board. As we have held, that even when this Court does not act as an appellate authority, while exercising the power under Article 227of the Constitution of India and also taking note of the fact that the scope of such revisional power is very limited, in exercise of such power this Court would not be entitled to either re-appreciate or consider any material placed before this Court when those materials were not placed and were not subjected to scrutiny by way of appreciation either before the registering authority or before the appellate board as the case may be. Hence, reconsideration of the evidence would necessarily be restricted only to Exs.A to J. In exercise of power under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, the High Court would be justified in not looking into any documents which were not produced before the Registrar of Trade Marks or before the Appellate Board and are sought to be produced for the first time before this Court.
26. We have carefully considered the submissions made by the respective counsel and also perused the documents. Excepting the fact that those Exhibits bear the brand name "camel", there is no other indication that the petitioner World Wide Brand Inc had any connection with those documents. In this context, we may also usefully refer to the fact that whatever the documents filed either before the registering authority or appellate board, could utmost be considered in respect of the trade mark owned by RJ Reynold Tobacco Company (RJR). There is absolutely no evidence placed either before the registering authority or the appellate Board, as to how the petitioner became the owner of the trade mark, except producing some list of registrations. It may also be pointed out that while the petitioner initially pleaded that RJR is the proprietor of the trade mark 'camel' in respect of cigarettes, thereafter they had come with the further plea viz., R.J.Reynolds International Inc (RJRI) was handling the non-US Tobacco business of RJR as well. It is not their case that RJR at any point of time has assigned the trade mark to RJRI, as the trade mark 'camel' still continues to vest with RJR. A different stand was taken before the appellate Board by stating that RJRI was acquired by Japan Tobacco Inc (JT). Though the petitioner claimed before the appellate Board that they are the affiliate of JT, who owns the rights, title and interest in various 'Camel" trade mark in relation to various products, strangely in the suit filed by the petitioner before the High Court at Delhi, they had taken the plea that they are the affiliate of J.T.America Inc (JTA) and they have also pleaded that the said JTA is the affiliate of JT and that JT owns the rights in the trade mark 'camel'. Though different pleas are taken as to the ownership of the trade mark 'camel', still the petitioner have not adduced any evidence to show as to how they derived the ownership of the trade mark "camel collection" etc., from RJR.
27. The appellate Board having found that the revision petitioner had registered the camel brand in various forms either as a word mark or as a device mark in various countries did not agree with the petitioner and consequently rejected all the objections. As it is much argued that the appellate Board had not considered the evidence placed on record in respect of (1) dishonest adoption of the trade mark "camel collection and camel device" by the respondent and (2) transborder reputation and consequently passing off, we are inclined to refer to the order of the appellate Board as to the discussions on the above aspects. We once again make it clear that unless the findings of the appellate Board are totally perverse and without any material evidence or certain findings which are given contrary to the admitted facts, the High Court cannot interfere with that order.
28. As far as the dishonest adoption is concerned, the respondents had conceived and adopted the trade mark "CAMEL COLLECTION" along with device of "CAMEL, and CAMEL TROPHY" during the year 1992 and has been doing extensive and continuous business using the above trade mark to the tune of several course, as has been found by the Registrar of the Trade Marks and the appellate Board. It is argued by Mr.Habibullah Basha, learned senior counsel that a licence agreement was entered into between the petitioner and the German licensee M/s.Dornbusch & Co and M/s.Seidensticker group of companies even during the year 1992. While considering the said argument advanced, the appellate Board had factually found that " Even assuming that the licensee of the appellate placed orders with the respondent in respect of readymade garments and obtained the same, there is nothing on record to show that the respondent was informed about the mark to be affixed on the garments. It is the normal practice in the trade that any foreign trader who gets the readymade garments from the manufacturer in India they get the garments alone and the label containing the trade mark will be affixed in their place. In the absence of any evidence to show that the licensee of the appellant requested the respondent herein to manufacture the garments with the trade mark "CAMEL" we find it very difficult to accept the plea put forth by the appellant."
29. The said finding was on consideration of the records and in our considered view that cannot be said to be perverse. As already observed, even if two views are possible while appreciating the documents, the view adopted by the appellate Board cannot be interfered with by this Court, even in the opinion of this Court a different view can be formed.
30. As far as the dishonest adoption is concerned, one more argument is advanced that the respondents had filed their written statements before the Delhi High Court in a suit filed by the petitioner and they have admitted the knowledge of the licence agreement. In our considered view as the said Written Statements had not been produced either before the Registrar of Trade Marks or before the appellate Board, this court cannot therefore, attach importance to the same. While opposing, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent would state that the said written statements were taken only to show the delay, lapses and acquiescence on the part of the petitioner, as such written statements were filed in the year 2003 when the petitioner had already opposed the registration of the trade mark. The circumstances under which such statements were made, is a matter to be adjudicated at the time of trial and cannot be acted upon even before such adjudication. We may in this context, usefully refer to the judgement of the Apex Court in M/s.Prem Ex-Serviceman Co-Op. Tenant Farming Society Ltd., v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1974 Supreme Court 1121 wherein the Apex Court while considering such an admission in the pleadings had observed thus:
" It may be that the members of the Co-operative Societies had made some admissions the nature and effect of which require examination. It is well settled that the effect of an alleged admission depends upon the circumstances in which it was made. We are unable to go into these questions until they have been fully and properly investigated by an authority empowered to consider them."
31. In the wake of the findings of the appellate Board and for our own reasons, we are not in agreement with the submission of the petitioner in regard to dishonest adoption.
32. As regards the submission relating to the transborder reputation is concerned, the petitioner had contended that the camel brand cigarettes were available in duty free shops and they have produced the catalogue of the year 1993-1994. While considering the above, the appellate Board had observed that "the plea of the appellant that the mark "CAMEL" is world wide is also not made out and further except the vague statement that the camel brand cigarettes are available in the duty free shops, there is absolutely no evidence to establish that the said mark is so well-known in India or the same attained the transborder reputation."
33. Law on transborder reputation may be stated as follows:-
Even when the goods are manufactured outside the Country, the foreign manufacturer or the importer can rely on the trade mark on the goods provided, they are in a position to establish the reputation in this Country in the trade mark and having a place of business in the country, is not at all essential for the manufacturer or importer of foreign goods. It is for the firm to establish an adequate good-will in the business which could be said to suffer damage by reason of the activity of the other firm. The firm must also establish that it has a business reputation in this Country which they are entitled to protect. It would not be sufficient even a mere knowledge of the make of the petitioner in the Country without any business activity. The petitioner cannot also take advantage of simple advertisement in India in order to prove that it is the user of a trade mark in this Country. As it has been factually found by the appellate Board that the transborder reputation can be established only by letting in evidence before the Registrar of Trade Marks that the mark is so well-known or familiar in India and most of the general public are fully aware of such mark connecting the petitioner, the contention could be accepted. For the same reason , the appellate Board has not applied the judgement of the Apex Court relied upon by the petitioner in N.R.Dongre v. Whirlpool, (1996) 5 SCC 714. When there is a specific finding that the petitioner had totally failed to produce any evidence with regard to the commercial publicity either in the magazines or otherwise the appellant mark in India, the contention relating to transborder reputation should be negatived. Even relating to the advertisement, it is seen that the petitioner had produced two calendars which are in Spanish Language and were not in circulation in India and the same cannot be relied upon for the purpose of advertisements of camel brand cigarettes in India. We find no infirmity in the finding of the appellate Board in rejecting the opposition relating to the transborder reputation, as those findings are only on consideration of the documents relied upon by the petitioner.
34. As the findings rendered by both the Registrar of Trade Marks as well the appellate Board are on appreciation of documents produced, in our considered view those findings require no interference in view of the limited scope to exercise the power under Article 227 of the Constitution.
35. In view of the above, the documents which were produced by the petitioner in this Court for the very first time cannot be looked into at all, as the consideration of fresh materials by this Court would not be appropriate while exercising the power under Article 227 of the Constitution. Further we do not find any reason for grant of injunction in favour of the petitioner on the ground of passing off also. In view of our above findings, which are basically on merits, the challenge to the registration of the trade marks "camel collection" in favour of the respondent to be contrary to Sections 9, 11(a), 11(e) and 18(1) of the Trade Marks and Merchandise Act, 1958 is also liable to be rejected.
36. For all the above reasons, we find no infirmity much less patent error in the order of the appellate Board and therefore, the Civil Revision Petitions Nos.1047 to 1052 of 2006 are dismissed. The common Order dated 15.03.2006 made in O.A.No.15-20/2005/TM/CH by the Intellectual Property Appellate Board, Chennai stand confirmed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.
Index : yes (D.M.J.) (V.P.K.J.) Internet : yes 10.12.2008 kmk ..... D.MURUGESAN, J. AND V.PERIYA KARUPPIAH, J. kmk Pre delivery Order in C.R.P.(NPD) Nos.1047 to 1052 of 2008 10.12.2008