Delhi District Court
Manjeet Singh vs State on 15 July, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SHRI NAVJEET BUDHIRAJA, ADDITIONAL
SESSIONS JUDGE-02, SOUTH DISTRICT, SAKET COURTS, NEW
DELHI
CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION No. 254/2025
CNR NO. DLST01-0075792025
IN THE MATTER OF:
Manjeet Singh
S/o Late Sh. A S Vatni
R/o D-300, Sarvodaya Enclave
New Delhi-110017
.......Revisionist
Versus
The State
Govt of NCT of Delhi
........Respondent
DATE OF INSTITUTION : 29.05.2025
DATE OF RESERVING ORDER : 11.07.2025
DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT : 15.07.2025
DECISION : Allowed
JUDGMENT
The present revision petition is filed on behalf of the revisionist under section 440 read with section 438 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) seeking to set aside the order on charge dated 15.04.2025 passed by Ld. Judicial Magistrate First Class-02, South District, Saket Courts, New Delhi (Ld. Trial Court) in Criminal case no. 6294/2022 titled as State Vs. Manjeet Singh, arising out of first information report (FIR) no.97/2018 registered on 06.04.2018 under section 323 and 341 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 Digitally signed by NAVJEET NAVJEET BUDHIRAJ BUDHIRAJ Date:
2025.07.15 16:32:29 +0530 Page No. 1 of 14 (IPC) at PS Malviya Nagar.
BACKGROUND
2. Revisionist is a member of the Managing Committee of the Sarvodaya Enclave Residents Welfare Association (RWA), the welfare association looking after Sarvodaya Enclave (the 'colony'). Complainant, his son and his sister in law reside at B-18, Sarvodaya Enclave, New Delhi. On 06.04.2018, revisionist along with Retired Captain Pritam Singh, Facility Manager of the RWA visited the construction site at B-50 of the colony following the receipt of several complaints by residents of the colony in relation to the construction workers and improper management of construction supplied at the construction site at B-50 of the colony which were blocking the back lane and leading to health hazards.
3. While the revisionist was visiting the construction site at B-50 of the colony which was also the back lane of B-18 of the colony i.e. the spot, complainant alleged that he told the revisionist to approach the builder who was undertaking the construction work but the revisionist started shouting, became abusive, picked up a wooden bar and threw it on the complainant due to which the complainant sustained a serious injury on his right hand. His sister in law Daya Sharma was also pushed and sustained injuries on her head and near her eye. Thereafter, PCR van immediately took the complainant and Daya Sharma to AIIMS Trauma Centre. Thereafter, police registered an FIR under section 323/341 IPC against the revisionist based on the Page No. 2 of 14 Digitally signed by NAVJEET NAVJEET BUDHIRAJ BUDHIRAJ Date:
2025.07.15 16:32:33 +0530 complaint. A charge sheet was subsequently filed.
4. On 05.12.2023, Ld. Trial Court deprecated the conduct of the investigating officer (IO) and directed further investigation after allowing the application of the revisionist seeking further investigation. Subsequently, a supplementary charge sheet was filed on 03.05.2024.
5. On 22.11.2024 and 21.12.2024, Ld. Trial Court heard arguments on charge. Thereafter, on 15.04.2025, the impugned order was passed in which it was held that prima facie there is sufficient material to frame charge against the revisionist under section 323/341 IPC. Therefore, the present revision petition has been filed wherein the revisionist has challenged the impugned order on various grounds, inter alia, that the Ld. Trial Court has committed an error as there is no prima facie sufficient material to frame charge against the revisionist under section 341 IPC, the Ld. Trial Court has failed to consider the ingredients of offence under section 339 IPC, complaint nowhere states that complainant or his family members were physically restrained and on the contrary the FIR itself states "... immediately PCR van took us to Trauma Centre", the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider that further investigation was directed and supplementary charge sheet ought to have been considered, that there is no grave suspicion of offence under section 323 IPC and that not considering the revisionist's contentions would render the decision arbitrary.
ARGUMENTS AND FINDING
Digitally
signed by
Page No. 3 of 14 NAVJEET
NAVJEET BUDHIRAJ
BUDHIRAJ Date:
2025.07.15
16:32:37
+0530
6. Before meditating the arguments advanced on behalf of revisionist, it would be essential to reproduce the observations of Ld. Trial Court in regard to the satisfaction recorded while directing the framing of charge against the revisionist under section 323/341 IPC.
"On perusal of the statements of the complainant and the prosecution witnesses and the MLC on record, this court is of the view that prima facie there is sufficient material to frame charge against the accused under section 323/341 of IPC. Further, this Court is of the view that the veracity and the reliability of the prosecution witnesses is to be seen at the stage of trial. Further, the argument of the accused that the accused has been falsely implicated and has not committed the offence in the present case is in the nature of defence and is a matter of trial, therefore, this court is of the view that there are no sufficient grounds to discharge the accused."
7. It is limpid from the above that the Ld. Trial Court made general observations pertaining to the statement of complainant, prosecution witnesses and medico legal case (MLC) on record to form a prima facie view. As such, in view of three judge bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Bhawna Bai Vs. Ghanshyam, AIR 2020 SC 554, it was held by Apex Court that there is no requirement in law to give reasons in an order framing charges, but it is one of the contentions of Ld. Counsel for revisionist that the impugned order does not mention anything about the supplementary charge sheet which was filed after the intervention of the court and which in fact exonerates the revisionist.
Digitally
signed by
Page No. 4 of 14 NAVJEET
NAVJEET
BUDHIRAJ
BUDHIRAJ Date:
2025.07.15
16:32:40
+0530
8. Ld. counsel for the revisionist attracted the attention of the court to the order dated 05.12.2023 of the then Ld. MM-02, South, whereby the concerned SHO was notified to depute another IO and to conduct further investigation on the aspects mentioned therein. The Ld. Trial Court record further reveals that the supplementary report came to be filed on 03.05.2024 containing the statement of additional witnesses namely Retired Captain Pritam Singh, Smt. Bhaswati Mukherjee and Smt. Shafali Mittal. Ld. Counsel for the revisionist emphasized that the statement of these witnesses have not been referred to by the Ld. Trial Court while passing the impugned order.
9. Be that as it may, Ld. Counsel for the revisionist, during arguments, was asked as to whether, once the accused has been summoned, there is any scope of discharge of the accused in summons triable case at the stage of stating the accusation under section 251 Cr.P.C, pursuant whereof, Ld. Counsel for the revisionist placed reliance upon the judgments in (i) Dr. Kamala Rajaram Vs. D.Y.S.P Office of the S.P. (Rural) & Another, 2005 SCC OnLine Ker 302; (ii) R. Narayanana Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2019 SCC OnLine Del 6392; (iii) Bhushan Kumar and Another Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another, (2012) 5 SCC 424; and (iv) Amit Sibal Vs. Arvind Kejriwal and Another, (2018) 12 SCC 165 to assert that the Magistrate can very well discharge the accused in summons triable case in exercise of power under section 251 Cr.P.C read with section 258 Cr.P.C in case of lack of sufficient material forming a prima facie opinion of the commission of the offence.
NAVJEET BUDHIRAJ Page No. 5 of 14 Digitally signed by NAVJEET BUDHIRAJ Date: 2025.07.15 16:32:44 +0530
10. The present revision petition involves some legal aspects pertaining to the scope and import of section 251 Cr.P.C and section 258 Cr.P.C. The legal position in regard to the discharge of accused under section 251 Cr.P.C is not crystallized as some judgments favor the view that in the absence of any prima facie material against the accused, he can be discharged in a summon case, while some judgments hold otherwise (Smt. Lata Yadav Vs. State of UP and Another, Allahabad High Court, date of decision 06.01.2025). A cue can be drawn from the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Amit Sibbal v. Kejriwal, (2018) 12 SCC 165, wherein the court gave its imprimatur to the proposition of no discharge in summons case by setting aside the order of the High Court of Delhi permitting the respondent to raise the contentions at this stage of framing of notice and pass appropriate order as contrary to law.
11. Having documented the legal position as enunciated under section 251 Cr.P.C, a question arises further whether in a case where prima facie material is found to be insufficient to serve notice of the accusation against the accused under section 251 Cr.P.C in the absence of any provision for the discharge, should the accused be subjected to rigors of trial. In regard to this, section 258 Cr.P.C is relevant to note which postulates stopping of proceeding in a State case. Before analyzing the case in hand in the light of the section 258 Cr.P.C, it is also relevant to note the legal position as spelt out by the High Court of Delhi in R.Narayanan v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 2019 SCC OnLIne Del 6392 and High Court of Kerala in Dr. Kamala Rajram v.
Digitally
signed by
Page No. 6 of 14 NAVJEET
NAVJEET BUDHIRAJ
BUDHIRAJ Date:
2025.07.15
16:32:48
+0530
D.Y.S.P. Office of S.P (Rural) & Anr, 2005 SCC OnLine Ker 302.
(I) R Narayanan Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi):
8. Indubitably the finding of the leaned Additional Sessions Judge that at the stage of framing of notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C., the Trial Court has no option to discharge the accused once summons are issued is contrary to all canons of law. It is a fundamental principle of criminal law that a person cannot be put to trial without any allegations of prima facie offence being made out against him.
9. It is trite law that at this stage if the learned Trial Court on the facts available is satisfied that prima facie there is material to show commission of an offence, the learned Trial Court would be entitled to frame a notice. In the decision reported as 2006 Crl.L.J. 1447 Dr.Kamala Rajaram Vs. D.Y.S.P. office of the S.P. (Rural) & Anr. it was held:-
"4. It is admitted that after the court took cognizance, petitioner had appeared before the learned Magistrate and has been enlarged on bail. Particulars of the offence have not been read over to the petitioner. I need only mention that before the learned Magistrate proceeds to read over the particulars to the petitioner accused, the learned Magistrate must consider whether such allegations have been raised against the petitioner and such materials placed before court as to expose the petitioner to a criminal prosecution under Section 304A IPC. It is not necessary or possible for this court Digitally signed by NAVJEET Page No. 7 of 14 NAVJEET BUDHIRAJ BUDHIRAJ Date:
2025.07.15 16:32:57 +0530 in every case to consider all the allegations raised against the inductees and the materials collected against them to decide whether they deserve to stand trial. That question must initially be considered by the trial Magistrate who has the requisite materials before him before a charge is framed/discharged under Section 239/240 Cr.P.C. or while considering whether there is any sufficient material to read over the particulars of the offence to the indictee at the stage of Section 251 Cr.P.C. If accusations and materials are not sufficient to attract culpability the indictee should not be compelled to unnecessarily stand the trauma of trial. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that this petition can be disposed of with specific directions to the learned Magistrate to consider the contention of the petitioner that there is no sufficient allegations or materials raised against her to justify her being compelled to face further proceedings.
5. How can this be done by the learned Magistrate? The offence alleged is one punishable under Sec. 304A IPC. It is a summons case. Procedure prescribed under Chapter XX has to be followed. There is no question of framing any charge at the stage of Sec. 251 Cr.P.C. There is only the requirement of reading over the particulars of offence to the indictee. A formal framing of charge is not required; but certainly the particulars of offence of which he is accused must be stated to the accused and his plea has to be recorded. Notwithstanding the fact that the formal requirement of framing of a charge is not there, the Page No. 8 of 14 section pre-supposes that the learned Magistrate must consider whether such allegations are raised which amount to an offence. If no offence is made out, then there is no particulars of offence which have to be read over to the accused and therefore proceeding cannot proceed beyond Sec. 251 Cr.P.C. This appears to be implied from a reading of S. 251 Cr.P.C. which I extract below:--
"Substance of accusation to be stated: When in a summons case the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate, the particulars of the offence of which he is accused shall be stated to him, and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty or has any defence to make, but it shall not be necessary to frame a formal charge."
6. At any rate, the present case is one covered under Sec. 258 Cr.P.C. and the learned Magistrate has power under Sec. 258 Cr.P.C. to stop further proceedings. The provisions of Sec. 251 read with Sec. 258 Cr.P.C. must necessarily be held to clothe the learned Magistrate in a case instituted on the basis of a police report with the power to discontinue proceedings at the stage of Sec. 251 Cr.P.C., if there be no sufficient allegations or materials to justify continuance of proceedings for an offence punishable under Sec.
304A IPC. In these circumstances, notwithstanding the dictum in Alalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal (2004 AIR SCW 5174), it has to be held that the learned Magistrate has, at least, in a prosecution in a summons case instituted otherwise than on a police report, the power to discontinue the Page No. 9 of 14 proceedings at the stage of Sec. 251 Cr.P.C. by invoking his powers under Sec. 251 along; with the powers under Sec. 258 Cr.P.C. That is explicit in the language or S. 258 Cr.P.C. which I extract below:--
"Power to stop proceedings in certain cases:-- In any summons- case instituted otherwise than upon complaint, a Magistrate of the first class or, with the previous sanction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or any other Judicial Magistrate, may. for reasons to be recorded by him, stop the proceedings at any stage without pronouncing any judgment and where such stoppage of proceedings is made after the evidence of the principal witnesses has been recorded, pronounce a judgment of acquittal, and in any other case, release the accused, and such release shall have the effect of discharge".
7. The larger question whether Sec.
251 would justify discontinuance of the proceedings in all summons cases, whether instituted on a police report or otherwise need not be considered in this case. Suffice it to say that in a summons case instituted otherwise than upon a complaint, Sec. 251 read with Sec. 258 Cr.P.C.
does clothe the learned Magistrate with the requisite power to discontinue further proceedings and release the accused at the stage of S. 251 Cr.P.C. or later if the learned Magistrate feels that the allegations and the materials placed before him do not justify continuance of the proceedings against the indictee.
Directing continuance of proceedings when allegations and materials collected do not justify Digitally Page No. 10 of 14 signed by NAVJEET NAVJEET BUDHIRAJ BUDHIRAJ Date:
2025.07.15 16:33:01 +0530 such continuance will be the worst form of injustice. This petition is, in these circumstances, dismissed but with the above specific observations."
(II) Dr. Kamala Rajram v. D.Y.S.P. Office of S.P (Rural) & Anr:
"7. At any rate, the present case is one covered under Section 258 Cr.P.C. and the learned Magistrate has power under Section 258 Cr.P.C. to stop further proceedings. The provisions of Section 251 read with Section 258 Cr.P.C. must necessarily be held to clothe the learned Magistrate in a case instituted on the basis of a police report with the power to discontinue proceedings at the stage of Section 251 Cr.P.C., if there be no sufficient allegations or materials to justify continuance of proceedings for an offence punishable under Section 304A IPC.
In these circumstances, notwithstanding the dictum in Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal (2004 (3) KLT 382 (SC) = 2004 AIR SCW 5174), it has to be held that the learned Magistrate has, at least, in a prosecution in a summons case instituted otherwise than on a police report, the power to discontinue the proceedings at the stage of Section 251 Cr.P.C. by invoking his powers under Section 251 along with the powers under Section 256 Cr.P.C.
That is explicit in the language of Section 258 Cr.P.C which I extract below:-
"Power to stop proceedings in certain cases:-- In any summons- case instituted otherwise than upon Page No. 11 of 14 complaint, a Magistrate of the first class or with the previous sanction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate or any other Judicial Magistrate, may, for reasons to be recorded by him, stop the proceedings at any stage without pronouncing any judgment and where such stoppage of proceedings is made after the evidence of the principal witnesses has been recorded, pronounce a judgment of acquittal, and in any other case, release the accused, and such release shall have the effect of discharge".
8. The larger question whether Section 251 would justify discontinuance of the proceedings in all summons cases whether instituted on a police report or otherwise need not be considered in this case.
Suffice it to say that in a summons case instituted otherwise than upon a complaint, Section 251 read with Section 258 Cr.P.C. docs clothe the learned Magistrate with the requisite power to discontinue further proceedings and release the accused at the stage of Section 251 Cr.P.C or later if the learned Magistrate feels that the allegations and the materials placed before him do not justify continuance of the proceedings against the indictee. Directing continuance of proceedings when allegations and materials collected do not justify such continuance will be the worst form of injustice."
12. The golden thread which can be drawn from the aforesaid judgments is that the Magistrate while ruminating over the issue of service of notice under section 251 Cr.P.C has to consider the accusation on the basis of prima facie material and in case, the case is found to be Page No. 12 of 14 lacking on the said parameters, the Magistrate is clothed with the power to drop the proceedings against the accused by virtue of section 258 Cr.P.C. At this juncture, a question also begs for consideration whether any separate application is required to be moved on behalf of the accused under section 258 Cr.P.C. The answer to this should be in negative as there is no such requirement cited in the said provision, but the accused can certainly invoke the said provision by way of an application or otherwise verbally while pitching for his discharge due to want of sufficient evidence.
13. Having noted the legal position governing the exercise of power by a Magistrate under section 251 Cr.P.C r/w section 258 Cr.P.C, let us now advert to the impugned order to ascertain whether the same suffers from any infirmity warranting the revision thereof. First and foremost, the impugned order suffers from a procedural irregularity as in summons case, there is no framing of charge, rather section 251 Cr.P.C speaks about the stating of the particulars of offence to the accused, which is done by way of service of notice. This irregularity in itself would not be sufficient to interfere with the impugned order, however, it is fairly conceded by Ld. Additional Prosecutor for the State that ex-facie offence under section 341 IPC is not at all attracted as there is no specific allegation of wrongful restraint being committed by the revisionist. If section 341 IPC is not prima facie made out, only section 323 IPC in itself would not stand in the form of FIR as the same is a non cognizable offence, the consequent effect of this would also have to be considered by the Ld. Trial Court. Further, it is also manifest that the Ld. Page No. 13 of 14 Trial Court has failed to address all the contentions put-forth by the revisionist in relation to the supplementary charge sheet.
14. Thus, without venturing into the merits of the case, I deem it judicious to set aside the impugned order and to remand back the matter to the Ld. Trial Court to hear the revisionist afresh on the point of notice under section 251 Cr.P.C and also to consider the case from the prism of section 258 Cr.P.C to ascertain whether the material on record is lacking to constitute a prima facie view which could convince the court in dropping the proceedings against the revisionist and to pass an order afresh.
15. Needless to say, the revisionist shall be at liberty to move an application under section 258 Cr.P.C or to invoke the jurisdiction of the Ld. Trial court under the said provision verbally by putting forth the necessary submissions and Ld. Trial Court is not to get swayed by any observations made herein on merits.
16. To the aforesaid extent, the present revision petition stands allowed and the impugned order dated 15.04.2025 is set aside. Copy of this judgment be forthwith sent to Ld. Trial Court for compliance. Revision file be consigned to Record Room after due compliance.
Digitally signed by NAVJEETNAVJEET BUDHIRAJ BUDHIRAJ Date:
2025.07.15 Announced in the open (NAVJEET BUDHIRAJA)16:33:08 +0530 Court on 15.07.2025 Additional Sessions Judge-02, South, Saket Courts, New Delhi 15.07.2025 Page No. 14 of 14