Jharkhand High Court
Aamir Sohail vs (A) Sarwari Begum on 28 March, 2025
Author: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
Bench: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
1
2025:JHHC:10166
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND, RANCHI
C.M.P. 937 of 2023
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1. Aamir Sohail, aged about 52 years,
2. Md. Shadab Hussain, aged about 50 years,
3. Buland Akhtar, aged about 47 years,
4. Md. Fakhre Alam, aged about 45 years,
5. Shahrukh Quraishi, aged about 43 years, All sons of Late Salimuddin Quraishi, Resident of H. No. 239, Jama Masjid Chowk, Butcher Toli, P.O.-Hazaribag, P.S.-Sadar, Dist.-Hazaribag. (Amir Sohail is presently residing at Royal Regency, Flat No. 104, Samanpura, Raja Bazar, Indrapuri, P.O. & P.S.-Patna, Dist.-Patna, Bihar)
6. Shagufta Yasmin, aged about 55 years, Wife of Md. Rayuf Quraishi, Resident of H. No. 42, Behind LIC Office, Mahamaya Road, Mayapur. Abmikapur, P.O. P.S. and Dist.-Surguja. Chhattisgarh.
7. Zeba Tabassum, aged about 35 years, Wife of Md. Sarfaraz Quraishi, Resident of Madarsa, Gali, Samanpura, Raja Bazar, P.O., P.S. and Dist.-Patna, Bihar.
8. Nagma Anjum, aged about 29 years, Resident of H. No. 239, Jama Masjid Chowk, Butcher Toli, P.O.-Hazaribag, Hazaribag. P.S.-Sadar, Dist.-Hazaribag.
No. 1F. to 1H. all daughters of Late Salimuddin Quraishi
9. Sultana Khatoon, aged about 73 years, Wife of Salimuddin Quraishi, Resident of H.No.239, Jama Masjid Chowk, Butcher Toli, PO-Hazaribg, P.S. Sadar, Dist.
Hazaribag. .... .... Petitioners
-- Versus --
1(a) Sarwari Begum,W/o late Md.Syed, D/o Saibu Nisha R/o Z3/238 18/A Bagdi Para Road, Metiabruz, Kolkata, W.B. 1(c) Nagma Khatoon, w/o Md. Nasim, D/o Saibu Nisha,R/oG53, Bangla Basti Garden Rach Rolad, Kolkata,W.B. 1(d) Ahmad Raza 1(e) Md Shamim Raza 1(f) Nasim Raza 1(g) Naushad Raza All sons of late Saibu Nisha and Ali Raja., R/o 32 Bari Alam Mistry Lane,PO and PS Filkhana, Dist.Howrah,W.B. 2(a) Tamanna Almas, W/o Hanan Quraishi, r/O Mahamaya Road, Ambikapur, Chhattisgarh.
2(b) Md. Sajid Quraishi 2 2025:JHHC:10166 2© Md.Reyaz Quraishi Both sons of late Sajida Khatoon and late Illiyas Quraishi, R/o Sultanganj, Mewa Saw Lane, Sultanganj, Patna, Bihar. 2(d) Razia Khatoon, W/o Md. Laddan Quraishi, R/o Bela Toli, Dargah Road, Patna, Bihar.
2(e) Tabassum Perween, W/o Md. Aslam Quraishi, R/o Chandolia Madrasa Gali, Patna City, Patna, Bihar 2(f) Tanweer Almas, W/o Md. Rayes Ahmad, R/o Butcher Toli Chowk, Sadar, PO- Hazaribag, PS Sadar, Distt. Hazaribag.
. .... Opp. Parties
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI
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For the Petitioners :- Mr. Rajiv Nandan Prasad, Advocate For the Resp. Nos.2 & 3 :- Mr. Pratyush Shounikya, Advocate
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07/28.03.2025 The instant CMP has been filed for restoration of S.A. No. 183 of 2013 to its original file which has stood dismissed on 17.9.2019 on account of non-compliance of peremptory order dated 17.9.2019 passed by this Court.
2. Mr. Rajiv Nandan Prasad, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that this court granted two weeks time for removing the remaining defects in S.A. No. 183 of 2013, however, it was not removed within time and, therefore, S.A. No. 183 of 2013 has been dismissed. He further submits that earlier another counsel was appearing in this case who has not informed the petitioners as such the petitioners could not know about the defects and, subsequently, he has been engaged for filing the present CMP for restoration of SA No. 183 of 2013. Therefore, the present CMP may kindly be allowed and delay of 651 days may kindly be condoned.
3. The learned counsel further submits that IA No. 11689 of 2023 has been filed for condonation of delay of 651 days and same ground has been taken in the said interlocutory application for condoning the delay. He submits that SA No. 183 of 2013 may be restored to its original file. The learned counsel has relied upon a case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649 paragraph 21 which reads as under:
"21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice- oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not 3 2025:JHHC:10166 supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude."
Relying on above judgment he submits that liberal and pragmatic, 4 2025:JHHC:10166 justice-oriented approach is required to be taken by the court.
4. On the same line he further relied in the case of N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123 at paragraph no.9 which is an under:
"9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion e and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court."
Relying on the above judgment he submits that length of delay is not material and explanation is required to be considered.
5. He further relied in an order of a coordinate Bench in CMP No. 127 of 2017 dated 24.3.2022 and submits that considering the fault of the lawyer the delay was condoned and the matter has been restored and on the above grounds he submits that the present CMP may be allowed and Second Appeal may kindly be restored.
6. The learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently opposed the prayer and submits that the present matter is arising out of partition suit which was instituted in the year 1998 and the petitioners and the respondents are sisters and brothers respectively and the judgment of the learned trial court was also affirmed by the first appellate court and, thereafter, the second appeal was filed. He submits that since the Second Appeal was filed in the year 2013, however, the defects have not been removed and considering that aspect of the matter this court has passed the preemptory order on 17.9.2019 in-spite of that defects have not been 5 2025:JHHC:10166 removed. He submits that the Second Appeal was dismissed in the light of the peremptory order in the year 2019 itself the CMP for restoration was filed on 9.8.2023. He submits that the facts of the present case are otherwise in view of that the judgments relied by the learned counsel for the petitioners will not apply. He relied in the case of Union of India and another vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR reported in 2024 INSC 262 and he refers to paragraph nos. 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 33 and 35 which are reproduced hereinbelow:
"25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is hot merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public 6 2025:JHHC:10166 policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the 'Sword of Damocles hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.
29. In Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation, (2010) 5 SCC 459, this Court rejected the application for condonation of delay of 4 years in filing an application to set aside an exparte decree on the ground that the explanation offered for condonation of delay is found to be not satisfied.
30. In Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India Limited, (2012) 3 SCC 563, this Court, while dismissing the application for condonation of delay of 427 days in filing the Special Leave Petition, held that condonation of delay is not an exception and it should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. In that case, this Court held that unless the department has reasonable and acceptable reason for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process cannot be accepted. In Para Nos. 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29 respectively, this Court dealt with the scope of 'sufficient cause' and held as follows:
"25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the "better affidavit" sworn by Mr. Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. (2009) 8 AD 201 (Del)) as 11-9-2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-
1-2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on 8-1-2010 Le. after a period of nearly four months.
26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person-in-charge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the 7 2025:JHHC:10166 prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps.
27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department LUGS possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The 8 2025:JHHC:10166 government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few."
33. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Others, (2013) 12 SCC 649, this Court made the following observations:
21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:
21.1. (i) There should be liberal. pragmatic, Justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit.
philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.
21.3. (ш) Substantial Justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days. for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it 9 2025:JHHC:10166 may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is SO as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud. misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.
21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.
22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:
22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.
22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective.
22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a 10 2025:JHHC:10166 nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters."
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity.
Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case."
7. Relying on the above judgments learned counsel appearing for the respondents submits that in the facts and circumstances the present case is similar to that case in view of that the present CMP may be dismissed. He further relied in the judgment passed by a Division Bench of this Court in Commercial Appeal No. 08 of 2023 which was decided vide judgment dated 19.7.2024. He refers to paragraph nos. 48,49,50,51,55,62 and 64 which read as under:
"48. The provision of C.P.C. since contains a provision that the period of limitation is to be counted in case of liberty having been granted to approach the court and the period of limitation will be counted from the date of judgment/decree. Otherwise, keeping into consideration the very object and intent of Commercial Courts Act, 2015 in the present facts of the case, the object of the said Act will be redundant which is mainly for the expeditious disposal of the commercial disputes. If such thing will be allowed to be carried out, then the party concerned will be indulged in such practice which will ultimately lead to lingering of the commercial disputes and will ultimately frustrate the very object and intent of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.
49. Therefore, the aforesaid object has been taken into consideration by the Hon'ble Apex Court also in the case of Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) represented by Executive Engineer v. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited (Supra) as per the paragraphs which have been referred hereinabove wherein also the object of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 has been taken into consideration based upon that the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down the proposition that although the Section 5 of the Limitation Act has limited applicability under the statutory provision as contained in the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 but conferring discretionary power to the delay of a very shorter period depending upon the sufficient cause as also if there is no negligent approach of the party concerned.
50. The negligent approach has been taken into consideration and the due negligence said to be the sufficient cause for condoning the delay is the two parameters of the purpose of condoning the delay has per the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Government of Maharashtra (Water 11 2025:JHHC:10166 Resources Department) represented by Executive Engineer v. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited (Supra).
51. Sufficient cause has also been interpreted by Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment referred hereinabove and if the spirit of the judgments will be taken into consideration in the context of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, it would be evident that for the purpose of expeditious disposal, it is the bounden duty of the concerned court that in the rarest of rare case the principle is to be made applicable in view of the judgment rendered in the case of Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) represented by Executive Engineer v. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited (Supra), as such, the conduct of the party concerned is to be taken into consideration so as to reach to the conclusion as to whether the conduct of the parties is in negligent manner or any due diligence is there or not.
55. Further, the period of delay is also of 356 days, the Hon'ble Apex Court, in the Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) represented by Executive Engineer v. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited (Supra) has refused to condone the delay of 75 days, 131 days and 200 days.
62. The law is settled that the things are to be done strictly in accordance with the statutory provision and there cannot be interpretation beyond the statutory provision. Reference in this regard may be taken from the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Singhara Singh and Ors., AIR (1964) SC 358 (para-25), Babu Verghese and Ors. vs. Bar Council of Kerala and Ors., (1999) 3 SCC 422 (para-31,32), Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai vs. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala & Ors., (2002) 1 SCC 633 (para-27), State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ambay Cements & Anr., (2005) 1 SCC 368 (para-26) and Zuari Cement Ltd. vs. Regional Direction ESIC Hyderabad & Ors., (2015) 7 SCC 690 (para-14,26).
64. This Court, taking into consideration the aforesaid reasons, is of the view that the instant interlocutory application is not fit to be allowed due to the absence of the sufficient explanation as also in view of the discussion made by referring the provision of Rule XXIII Rule 2 C.P.C. and the principle laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) represented by Executive Engineer v. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited (Supra)."
8. Relying on the above judgments he submits that the law is well settled and required to be strictly followed in accordance with the statutory provision that has been held herein in view of that this CMP may be dismissed.
9. In view of the above submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, the court has gone through the materials available on records and 12 2025:JHHC:10166 finds that admittedly the second appeal was filed in the year 2013 and the same was allowed to be defective for years together and finally the matter was listed before the Bench on 17.9.2019 and on that day also nobody appeared on behalf of the appellant in view of that the peremptory order was passed. In-spite of that the defects have not been removed and, therefore, the second appeal was dismissed in the light of the peremptory order and further this CMP has been filed on 09.08.2023 after considerable delay of 651 days. Thus, it appears that purpose of filing the second appeal only to show that the case is pending for long. This Court is in agreement of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that liberal and pragmatic approach are required to be taken by the courts in deciding the limitation matter, however, at the same time the court is required to see the conduct and right accrue to the other parties. This court is in agreement of the judgments relied by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, however, it is well settled that the judgments are applicable in the facts and circumstance of each of the cases.
10. In light of the above discussions it requires to refer herein that the law of limitation is enshrined in legal maxim "interest reibublicae ut sit finis litium" (it is for the public good that there should be an ends of litigation). Therefore, it is well settled that Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time, as has been held in the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Brijesh Kumar & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors. reported in (2014) 11 SCC 351. The privy council in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corpn. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, (1939-40) 67 IA 416, relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lecturers, 1932, wherein, it has been said that ["A law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the judge cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognized by law]."
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11. While considering the similar issue the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649 on which much reliance have been made by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in paragraph nos. 21.5(v), 21.7(vii), 21.9 (ix) and 22.4(d) which are at cost of repetition again reproduced herein:
"21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.9. (ix) the conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go-by in the name of liberal approach.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a nonserious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters."
12. In view of the above it is settled proposition of law that a litigant does not act with bona fide motive and at the same time due to inaction on its part, the period of limitation for filing the appeal expires, such lack of bona fide and gross inaction and negligence of the vital factors it should be taken into consideration while considering the question of condonation of delay.
13. Admittedly in the case in hand in-spite of filing of the Second Appeal in the year 2013 it was allowed to be defective for years together and in view of that peremptory order was passed, in spite of that the defects have not been removed and further this CMP has been filed after delay of 651 days which suggests that only to delay the matter the petitioners who contested the suit and first appeal had adopted the such approach.
14. Sufficient cause was considered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. reported in (1962)2 SCR 762 wherein it has been held that merely because sufficient fault has been made out in the facts of the given case there is no right to the appellant to have delay condoned and paragraph no.12 of the said judgment stipulates as under:
142025:JHHC:10166 "12. It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration, but the scope of the enquiry when exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. In the present case there is no difficulty in holding that the discretion should be exercised in favour of the appellant because apart from the general criticism made against the appellant's lack of diligence during the period of limitation no other fact had been adduced against it. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant's application for condonation of delay only on the ground that it was appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground."
15. The meaning of "sufficient cause" has been considered in the case of "Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81 wherein paragraphs 9 to 15 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient is "adequate" or "enough inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices-12-to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable 15 2025:JHHC:10166 standard of a cautious man in this context, sufficient cause"
means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee (AIR 1964 SC 1336). Mata Din v A. Narayanan ((1969) 2 SCC 770: AIR 1970 SC 1953), Parimal v Veena ((2011) 3 SCC 545: (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1:
AIR 2011 SC 1150) and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbal ((2012) 5 SCC 157: (2012) 3SCC (CV) 24: AIR 2012 SC 1629))
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mahindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a "good cause" and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause".
11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal ((2002) 1 SCC 535: AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao ((2002) 3 SCC 195: AIR 2002 SC 1201])
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.
"A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and 16 2025:JHHC:10166 perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28,p. 266. " 605. Policy of the Limitation Acts-The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence. An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popet and Ratcha Property v SBI Staff Assn (2005)-14-SCC 510), Rajender Singh Santa Singh ((1973) 2 SCC 705: AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundik Jalam Patil Jaigaon Medium Project (2008) 17 SCC 448: (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907)
14. In P Ramachandra Rao State of Karnataka ((2002) 4 SCC 578: 2002 SCC (CH) 830: AIR 2002 SC 1856] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of Imitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of love laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay R.S. Navak (1992) SCC 225 1992 SCC (01) 93: AIR 1992 SC 1701.
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
16. In view of the above judgments the sufficient cause is required to be considered by the court considering the entire aspects of the matter. What has been discussed hereinabove the court finds that only to delay the matter such approach has been adopted by the petitioners herein that too in a case of partition wherein both the sides have been allowed certain shares in the property and they are sisters and brothers respectively.
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17. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale in this regard reference may be made to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
"605. Policy of the Limitation Acts-The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence."
18. In view of the above discussions, it is evident that sufficient cause means that the parties should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bonafide on his part in view of the facts and circumstances of the case or it cannot be alleged that the parties has not acted deliberately or remained inactive, however, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercise discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee &Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala Matadin V. A. Narayanan, (1969)2 SCC 770, Parimal V. Veena @Bharti, (2011)3 SCC 545 and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012)5 SCC 157.
19. In the aforesaid judgments the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts or a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible in deciding the condonation in any matter.
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20. In the case of "Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008)14 SCC 448 it was observed that the laws of limitation are founded on public policy. Statute of limitation are sometimes described as "statutes of peace". An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty some kind of limitation is essential for public order. The principle is based on the maxim "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium", that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of limitations are means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression. The object for fixing time limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.
21. In the light of the above facts, reasons and analysis this court has come to a conclusion that only to delay the matter such approach has been taken by the petitioners as such there is no merit in this CMP.
22. Accordingly, the present CMP stands dismissed.
23. Pending petition(s) is/are disposed of.
(Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.) Dated 28.03.2025 JHC/ KNR/ AFR