Francis Kujur vs The State Of Jharkhand Through The Chief ... on 17 December, 2025

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Jharkhand High Court

Francis Kujur vs The State Of Jharkhand Through The Chief ... on 17 December, 2025

2025:JHHC:37808 For the Petitioners : Ms. Aparajita Bhardwaj, Advocate Ms. Tanya Singh, Advocate Mr. Rahul Kumar, Advocate Ms. Richa Lal, Advocate For the Respondents : Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, Advocate General Ms. Pinky Tiwary, AC to AG Ms. Komal Tiwary, AC to AG

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C.A.V. On: 03.11.2025 Pronounced On: 17/12/2025 All these writ petitions were taken up together for hearing at the stage of admission and for decision. Though in all these writ petitions, nature of prayer is different, but the issues and the reliefs, which the petitioners are seeking are same. In some of the cases, petitioners have challenged the order by which they have been removed from the service and they also seek a direction from this Court to allow them to work till their age of superannuation. In some of the writ petitions, petitioners have prayed to allow them to work till they attain the age of superannuation. Further, the petitioners pray that no fresh advertisement should be published for further appointments and they be allowed to continue to work. They also challenged the restriction, which has been imposed for employment, which is 7 (seven) years. Lastly, they submit that since they were appointed against a scheme, their tenure should be co- terminous with the scheme.

2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners argue that the petitioners were ex-servicemen and were appointed in terms of a scheme. Scheme does not provide any age of superannuation, thus, it will be presumed that their age of superannuation will be the same as that of a government servant. Further, it has been argued that when the scheme is continuing and still in force, petitioners cannot be removed and those removed be immediately reinstated. Their appointment should be co-terminous with the scheme and/or their actual age of superannuation should be as per policy of the Government. It is their case that respondents cannot restrict their term of service to 7 years. The petitioners also submit that the respondents are guilty of discriminating. According to them, some of the ex-servicemen have been allowed to continue for 15 years and whereas some have been removed on completion of 7 years of engagement. As per them, the recommendation of the respondents should be considered and the petitioners should be allowed to superannuate on attaining the age of 62 years. As per them, when the age of superannuation has been later on fixed by the respondents, the maximum length of 7 years of service of the petitioners, as fixed by the respondents, gets obliterated. They -: 56 :- 2025:JHHC:37808 lastly submit that now since the State is not getting sufficient work force, the prayer of the petitioners should be allowed.

3. Learned counsel for the respondents submit that as per the scheme, period of 7 (seven) years is the maximum period, which the petitioners can work. Any recommendation or suggestion cannot override the scheme . It is their further case that if someone have been allowed to work for more than 7 (seven) years, petitioners cannot derive any right from such illegal action. As per them, the condition of the scheme is to be strictly followed, without any deviation. He also submits that any correspondences or suggestion will not override the scheme. Further, there cannot be any equality in illegality.

4. All the petitioners are ex-servicemen / ex-army personnel. To maintain law and order and for providing adequate force at Police Station and also to excavate ante-social elements and to handle security related responsibilities, in industrial establishments etc. the Government of Jharkhand formed two battalions on 7th June, 2008 for multi-purpose work. These battalions were called as "Special Auxillary Police Force" (SAP). The work was contractual in nature. The force was formed out of retired ex-army men, who were to be engaged on contractual basis. Clause 4 of the said letter/scheme provides for conditions, which have been formulated for the contract. Age limit for recruiting the personnel was fixed in the age band of 35-40 years for Constables, Sepoi and Hawildar and for Officers, it was 45-55 years, which is evident from Clause 4(v). Further, as per the said letter, preference was given to a person of lesser age and who has acquired special training and have special experience.

5. The most important clause of the said scheme, which is relevant for the purpose of deciding these writ petitions is Clause 3. Clause 3 provides recruitment for each battalion from the Indian Army, Retired Leutinent Colonel, Major, Captain, Subedar Major, Subedar, Nayab Subedar, Hawaldar, Sepoi, Driver Sepoi, Staff, Clerk, who will be engaged on contractual basis, for a period of 2 (two) years and the tenure of contract, considering the need, can be extended till 5 (five) years. [Emphasis Supplied] The said clause also provides that they will be having the power of Special Police Officer.

6. Thus, from the aforesaid scheme, it is clear that the initial period of contract would be 2 (two) years, extendable for a further period of 5 (five) years. Thus, the total tenure would be 7 (seven) years. The salary and all other benefits, which will be payable, also form the part of the scheme. This initial -: 57 :- 2025:JHHC:37808 scheme of 7th June 2008 was amended on 18th March, 2016. Clause 4(v) of the Scheme of 7th June, 2008 was amended and the age brackette was increased. As per the amendment, the age brackette of ex-Sepoi and Hawaldar, which was 35-45 years, was increased to 35-55 years and for the officers, which was 45-55 years, was increased to 58-62 years. The aforesaid was the only amendment, which was brought in the original scheme. Be it noted that the scheme and the amendment were by approval of the Government.

7. On 27.10.2016, the Commandant of Special Auxillary Police Force-I made a recommendation to the Inspector General of Police (Operations-cum-SAP), Jharkhand. Vide the said letter, the officer had put forth his views and recommended to fix the age of superannuation of the members of the Special Auxillary Police Force to 62, 60 years respectively. The recommendation made by this letter, is the basis on which the petitioners are making their claim, that they should superannuate at the age of 65, 62 or 60 and cannot be removed on completion of their tenure of 7 (seven) years. Further, vide another letter dated 28.10.2016, the Inspector General of Police (Operations) replied that for Subedar Major / Subedar / Nayab, Sepoi, the age of superannuation can be fixed at 62 years and for Hawaldar, Sepoi, Attendant, it can be 60 years. These are the two letters, which the petitioners are relying upon in support of their case. If the content of these two letters are read properly, it will give a clear indication that this was not the decision of the government or the appropriate authority. These are only individual recommendations / suggestions of these individual authorities. The letter dated 27.10.2016, clearly, used the word that he is recommending the age of superannuation. The word used in the said letter, which is mentioned in Devanagri script is "vuq'kalk dh tkrh gS", which, if translated in English, will read as "recommendation is being made". Similarly, in letter dated 28.10.2016 of Inspector General of Police (Operations) also, it has been opined that the tenure can be extended, which is mentnioned in Devanagri script as "foLrkj fd;k tk ldrk gS", which, translated in English, means that the term can be extended. Basically, these are not concrete decisions in favour of extending or fixing the age of superannuation. These are mere recommendation of some individual officers.

8. Be it noted that the formation of Special Auxillary Police Force was by virtue of a scheme framed by the Government, which is dated 7th June, 2008. The said scheme provides that the tenure of the personnel, who are -: 58 :- 2025:JHHC:37808 taken in contractual employment, would be of 2 (two) years, which can be extended by another 5 (five) years, thus, total of 7 (seven) years. The scheme, as stated earlier, was framed with the approval of the Government. The scheme does not provide for any age of superannuation. The tenure has only been fixed. The said scheme was amended on 18th March, 2016. The amendment was brought with the approval of the Government, which amended only Clause 4 (v) of the original scheme, to enhance the age brackette of the different contractual ex-service men, who wants to seek appointment. This amendment also did not introduce any age of superannuation of these contractual personnel. Any clause of the scheme, which does not provide for age of superannuation, rather provides for specific tenure, cannot be modified by any recommendation of an Inspector General of Police (Operations) or by the Commandant. These letters of Inspector General of Police (Operations) and Commandant are mere recommendations, which cannot override the scheme framed and formulated by the Government. If any age of superannuation was to be included or to be read into the scheme, the same can only be done by a proper amendment and not by any recommendatory letter. This scheme is nothing but a rule governing the Special Auxillary Police Force. Any rule governing the issue of appointment or service condition has to be strictly followed. Any deviation can only be made by a proper amendment only.

9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Amaragouda L. Patil (Dr.) v. Union of India, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 297 at paragraph 57 thereof has held as under: -

"57. We hasten to add that whenever appointment to a public office is sought to be made, irrespective of the nature of the office, the rules prescribing mandatory eligibility criteria must be applied in a strict manner; after all, every public appointment under Article 16 of the Constitution must be fair, non- arbitrary and reasonable. Tested on this touchstone, the appointment of the third respondent fails to pass muster."

In the case of Tej Prakash Pathak v. High Court of Rajasthan, reported in (2025) 2 SCC 1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the 'rules of the game' cannot be changed midway unless the extant rules or the advertisement so permit. Paragraph 65.2 of the said judgment reads as under: -

"65.2. Eligibility criteria for being placed in the select list, notified at the commencement of the recruitment -: 59 :- 2025:JHHC:37808 process, cannot be changed midway through the recruitment process unless the extant Rules so permit, or the advertisement, which is not contrary to the extant Rules, so permit. Even if such change is permissible under the extant Rules or the advertisement, the change would have to meet the requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution and satisfy the test of non-arbitrariness;

10. Further, no intra-departmental correspondence or an opinion can override or supersede any of the clauses of the scheme. The scheme is to be strictly followed and the clauses, if there is no ambiguity, have to be adhered to and must be interpreted as it is drafted. In this case, there is no ambiguity in the clauses, i.e., the tenure of service of contractual ex-servicemen, which is 2 (two) years, extendable by 5 (five) years. There is nothing in the scheme to extend the period of service beyond 7 (seven) years. When the scheme does not specifically provide for age of superannuation, any intra-departmental letter cannot amend or supersede the same.

11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahadeo versus Sovan Devi, reported in (2023) 10 SCC 807, at paragraph 15 thereof has observed that inter-departmental communications are in the process of consideration for appropriate decision and cannot be relied upon as a basis to claim any right. Paragraph 15 of the judgment reads as under: -

"15. It is well settled that inter-departmental communications are in the process of consideration for appropriate decision and cannot be relied upon as a basis to claim any right. This Court examined the said question in a judgment reported as Omkar Sinha v. Sahadat Khan [Omkar Sinha v. Sahadat Khan, (2022) 12 SCC 228 : (2023) 2 SCC (L&S) 391] . Reliance was placed on Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab [Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 11 : AIR 1963 SC 395] to hold that merely writing something on the file does not amount to an order. Before something amounts to an order of the State Government, two things are necessary. First, the order has to be expressed in the name of the Governor as required by clause (1) of Article 166 and second, it has to be communicated. As already indicated, no formal order modifying the decision of the Revenue Secretary was ever made. Until such an order is drawn up, the State Government cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as bound by what was stated in the file. The said judgment was followed in K.S.B. Ali v. State of A.P. [K.S.B. Ali v. State of A.P., (2018) 11 SCC 277] , and Dyna Technologies (P) Ltd.

v. Crompton Greaves Ltd. [Dyna Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd., (2019) 20 SCC 1]"

12. So far as the argument of the petitioners, that some of the ex-

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2025:JHHC:37808 service men were allowed to continue for 13-15 years, is concerned, if at all the same has been done, the same is against the scheme. Respondents could not have allowed anyone beyond the scheme to continue and by doing so, respondents committed illegality. Petitioners cannot derive benefit from such illegalities. There cannot be equality in illegality. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jyostnamayee Mishra versus State of Odisha, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 117, "31. Another argument was raised while referring to two communications dated 28.06.1999 appointing Ms. Jhina Rani Mansingh and Sri Lalatendu Rath as Tracer on promotion, claiming to be from the post of Peon, on the basis of which the petitioner is claiming violation of Article 14, namely the discrimination. Suffice to add, this Court cannot put a stamp on the illegalities committed by the department while perpetuating the same. A litigant coming to the Court cannot claim negative discrimination seeking direction from the Court to the department to act in violation of the law or statutory Rules. It is a settled proposition of law that Article 14 does not envisage negative equality. Reference for the purpose can be made to a judgment of this Court in R. Muthukumar v. The Chairman and Managing Director TANGEDCO10. Relevant para thereof is extracted below:

"28. A principle, axiomatic in this country's constitutional lore is that there is no negative equality. In other words, if there has been a benefit or advantage conferred on one or a set of people, without legal basis or justification, that benefit cannot multiply, or be relied upon as a principle of parity or equality. In Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer11, this court ruled that:

"8. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud, even by extending the wrong decisions made in other cases. The said provision does not envisage negative equality but has only a positive aspect. Thus, if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some relief/benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such an order does not confer any legal right on others to get the same relief as well. If a wrong is committed in an earlier case, it cannot be perpetuated.""

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in its recent judgment in Director of Town Panchayat v. M. Jayabal, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2794 has reiterated the principle of negative discrimination and has held as under:

"16. ...No one can approach the court and base his claim on negative discrimination merely because some relief has been granted to a person who may not be entitled to the same. This Court in Tinku's case (supra) opined that wrongful conferment of a right or claim on someone would -: 61 :- 2025:JHHC:37808 not entitle a similar claim to be put forth before a court and nor would the court be bound to accept such a plea. The relevant paragraph is extracted below:

"11. The very idea of equality enshrined in Article 14 is a concept clothed in positivity based on law. It can be invoked to enforce a claim having sanctity of law. No direction can, therefore, be issued mandating the State to perpetuate any illegality or irregularity committed in favour of a person, an individual, or even a group of individuals which is contrary to the policy or instructions applicable. Similarly, passing of an illegal order wrongfully conferring some right or claim on someone does not entitle a similar claim to be put forth before a court nor would court be bound to accept such plea. The court will not compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again. If such claims are entertained and directions issued, that would not only be against the tenets of the justice but would negate its ethos resulting in the law being a causality culminating in anarchy and lawlessness. The Court cannot ignore the law, nor can it overlook the same to confer a right or a claim that does not have legal sanction. Equity cannot be extended, and that too negative to confer a benefit or advantage without legal basis or justification."

13. So far as letters of recommendations are concerned, same have got no value in the eyes of law. Same are recommendatory in nature. The scheme has not yet been amended. If the Government had accepted the recommendations, they should have taken appropriate steps to amend the Scheme as it was done in 2016 by increasing the age brackette of appointment. This is not the case here. Admittedly, the scheme has not been amended by including the age of superannuation. When the age of superannuation has not been included in the scheme, the same cannot be read by virtue of some intra-departmental letters between the Inspector General of Police (Operations) and the Commandant. There is nothing on record to suggest that the Government or the Department or the Highest Authority has accepted these recommendations. These letters are nothing but an opinion of the individuals and I hold that they exceeded their jurisdiction in doing so. In my opinion, the same does not have any force of law and cannot be treated to be a mandate as they are not the authorities to mandate and fix the age of superannuation. These letters cannot also override the clauses of the scheme.

14. Further, it cannot be said that the tenure of the petitioner should be co-terminous with the scheme. Even if the scheme was extended, the petitioners cannot get any benefit out of the same. Since the scheme does not -: 62 :- 2025:JHHC:37808 whisper that the appointment of the petitioners so made will be co-terminos with the Scheme, the petitioner cannot get any benefit. The petitioners cannot claim their services to be co-terminous with the Scheme. Further the concept of adhoc recruitment and adhoc appointments, which is impermissible, will also not be applicable in this case, as the nature of appointment is for a temporary period to rehabilitate ex-servicemen, providing adequate force for institutions and also to get a comparatively young continuing work force from time to time. There is a rationale in keeping the tenure to 7 (seven) years maximum, rather than to fix an age of superannuation. The State needs to rotate the work force for which this scheme has been made.

15. So far as the argument of the petitioners, that since the age brackette for induction has been made 62 years, thus, it can be considered that the age of superannuation would be same, is concerned, I am not in agreement with the same. The said interpretation will nullify the clauses of the Scheme when the scheme is not ambiguous, rather is specific. Further, the argument of the petitioners that since there is no age of superannuation fixed, recommendatory letters will have a binding effect is also not accepted as the scheme provides for maximum tenure which a person can serve, which itself is clear and unambiguous. The same cannot be said to be illegal or arbitrary.

16. In view of what has been held above, I find no merit in these writ petitions and the petitioners cannot, by way of right, claim that their age of superannuation be fixed in terms of recommendatory letter, which has got no force of law. No relief can be granted to the petitioners in these writ petitions. These writ petitions are, accordingly, dismissed. Interim order in favour of the petitioners in respective cases stand vacated. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, stand disposed of.

(Ananda Sen, J.) Ranchi Dated 17 December, 2025 Kumar/Cp-02 AFR Uploaded on 17.12.2025 -: 63 :-

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Jharkhand High Court