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[Cites 15, Cited by 2]

Kerala High Court

E.I. Narayanan And Ors. vs The Regional Transport Authority, ... on 15 January, 1980

Equivalent citations: AIR1980KER115, AIR 1980 KERALA 115, (1980) ILR(KER) 1 KER 644, ILR (1980) 1 KER 644, (1980) KER LT 249

JUDGMENT
 

  Balakrishna Eradi, J.  
 

1. The common question of law arising in these cases for an authoritative pronouncement on which these writ petitions have been referred to a Full Bench is whether under the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules framed thereunder an applicant for the grant of a stage carriage permit, who had specified in his application itself the particulars of the vehicle which he proposes to put on the road in the event of the permit being granted in his favour, is entitled merely, on that account, to be preferred for the grant of the permit in relation to other applicants who, though shown to be possessed of equal or even better qualifications as on the date of consideration of the matter by the Regional or State Transport Authority, had not specifically furnished in their applications the particulars of the vehicles proposed to be used by them for operating the service in the event of the permit being granted to them. In Vypeen Transport Corporation (P.) Ltd. v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Trichur, 1960 Ker LT 1058: (AIR 1961 Ker 77), a Division Bench of this court observed:

"Section 2 (20) of the Act defines 'permit' as the document authorising the use of a transport vehicle or a carrier vehicle. Rule 175 of the Motor Vehicles Rules insists that the registration mark of the vehicle be copied in the permit from the certificate of registration itself. The Form prescribed for an application for 'permit' also shows that the details of the vehicle concerned should be furnished in the application. If one has not the vehicle at the tune of his making the application, it cannot be understood how he would be able to give the details of the vehicle in his application. The provisions of the Act and the Rules thus indicate clearly that the applicant is expected to own the vehicle for whose use as a stage carriage he wants the permit in question. It follows therefore that an applicant who owns a bus has a better claim for permit than one who intends to acquire a vehicle. Needless to say that applicants who intend to purchase a vehicle after getting the permit deserve little consideration."

2. When these writ petitions came up for hearing before a Division Bench the writ petitioners contended that the aforesaid view expressed in Vypeen Transport Corporation's case, 1960 Ker LT 1058: (AIR 1961 Ker 77), cannot be regarded as correct or sound in the light of the subsequent pronouncement by a Full Bench of this court in Cannanore Dist. Motor Transport Employees' Cooperative Society Ltd, v. Malabar public Conveyance, 1962 Ker LT 446: (AIR 1962 Ker 341) and by the Supreme Court in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Mangrulpir Joint Motor Service Co. (P.) Ltd., AIR 1971 SC 1804, that the relevant date, with reference to which the relative qualifications and merits of the rival applicants have to be evaluated is the date on which the Regional/State Transport Authority takes up the subject for consideration and not any anterior date and that hence the said ruling require reconsideration. The Division Bench considered that there was prima facie force in the said contention and hence referred these cases to a Full Bench so that there may be an authoritative pronouncement on the question.

3. The particulars to be contained in an application for a stage carriage permit have been specified in Section 46 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter called the Act). That section reads:

"An application for a permit in respect of a service of stage carriages or to use a particular motor vehicle as a stage carriage (in this Chapter referred to as a stage carriage permit) shall, as far as may be, contain the following particulars, namely:--
(a) the route or routes or the area or areas to which the application relates;
(b) the number of vehicles it is proposed to operate in relation to each route or area and the type and seating capacity of, each such vehicle;
(c) the minimum and maximum number of daily trips proposed to be provided in relation to each route or area and the time-table of the normal trips;

Explanation-- For the purposes of this section, Section 48 and Section 57, 'trip' means a single journey from one point to another, and every return journey shall be deemed to be a separate trip,

(d) the number of vehicles intended to be kept in reserve to maintain the service and to provide for special occasions;

(e) the arrangements intended to be made for the housing and repair of the vehicles, for the comfort and convenience of passengers and for the storage and safe custody of luggage;

(f) such other matters as may be prescribed."

4. It would be seen that there is nothing in clauses (a) to (e) which renders it obligatory for the applicant to furnish in the application particulars of the vehicle proposed to be used for the stage carriage service. But, the rule-making authority is empowered under clause (f) to prescribe additional matters in respect of which also particulars should be furnished in an application for stage carriage permit. Rule 175 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1961 reads:

"Every application for a permit shall be in one of the following Forms:--
(a) in respect of a particular stage carriage : in Form P.S.P.A.
(b) in respect of a service of stage carriages: in Form P.S.S.A.
(c) in respect of a particular contract carriage: in Form P.Co.A.
(d) in respect of a private carrier in Form P.C.A.
(e) in respect of a public carrier in Form P.U.A.
(f) in respect of a temporary permit: in Form P.T.A.
(g) in respect of any vehicle to be used for the transport of persons otherwise than for hire or reward : in Form P.T.V.A.
(h) in respect of a special permit under Section 63 (6): in Form S.P.A."

Admittedly, the cases before us are covered by clause (a) of these rules and, hence, the application for the stage carriage permit has to be made in Form P.S.P.A. The requirements as to particulars indicated in the form have to be read as having been prescribed by the rule itself within the meaning of Clause (f) of Section 46 of the Act-- see Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Babu Goverdhan Regular Motor Service Warora, AIR 1070 SC 1926.

5. It was strongly contended before us by counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents that a mere perusal of the Form P.S.P.A. and more particularly items 6 to 8 contained therein, is sufficient to show that an applicant for a stage carriage permit has to mention in the application itself the 'registration mark', 'type', 'seating capacity' and 'maximum laden weight' of the vehicle. On this basis it is argued that it is mandatory under Section 46 read along with Rule 175 (a) that the particulars of the vehicle proposed to be put on the road should be furnished by an applicant in his application for the grant of the permit. This argument, however, overlooks the significant fact that item 16 contained in the very same form (P.S.P.A.) contemplates that an applicant may not have obtained possession of the vehicle on the date of the application and hence may not be in a position to furnish the aforesaid particulars. Item 16 of the form reads:

"I/We have come in possession of the vehicle on............ I/We have not yet obtained possession of the vehicle and I/We understand that the permit will not be issued until I/we have done so and have produced the certificate of registration."

In this context reference may also be usefully made to Rule 186 which reads:

"186 (1). No permit shall be issued until the registration mark of the vehicle to which it relates has been entered therein.
(2) When the applicant is unable to produce the certificate of registration on the date of his application for the permit, owing to the fact that he is not on that date in possession of the vehicle duly registered, or for some other reason, the applicant shall within one month of the sanctioning of the application by the Regional or State Transport Authority, or such longer period or periods not exceeding four months in the aggregate as the authority may specify, produce the certificate of registration of the vehicle before that authority in order that the particulars of the registration mark may be entered in the permit. In the event of any applicant failing to produce the certificate of registration within the period specified by the Transport Authority, the authority may revoke its sanction of the application.
(3) The power vested in the Regional or State Transport Authority under Sub-rule (2) shall also be exercised by its delegate in respect of orders passed under the delegated powers," In our opinion, Sub-rule (2) extracted above makes it very clear that it is legally open to the Regional/State Transport Authority to sanction the grant of permit to an applicant even in a case where the applicant was not, on the date of his application for the permit, in possession of the vehicle duly registered and was, on that account or for some other reason, unable to produce the certificate of registration on the data of his application for the permit. In such cases, the applicant should produce the certificate of registration of the vehicle before the Regional/State Transport Authority within one month of the sanctioning of the application by such authority or such longer period or periods not exceeding four months in the aggregate as the authority may specify. We entertain no doubt that the provisions contained in Rule 175 (at (inclusive of the contents of the Form P.S.F.A.) and Rule 186 have to be read together. On such a combined reading it becomes clear that there is no mandatory obligation cast on an applicant for the grant of a stage carriage permit to furnish in his application the particulars of the stage carriage vehicle proposed to be used by him for operating the service in the event of the permit being granted in his favour. It will not, therefore, be legally right or proper to treat as invalid an application for a stage carriage permit which does not contain particulars of the vehicle proposed to be used or to disqualify or supersede an applicant, who is otherwise found suitable for the grant of a permit, merely on the ground that he had not furnished in the application the particulars of the vehicle owned or possessed by him.

6. It is now well settled that the relevant point of time, with reference to which the qualifications of rival applicants for a permit should be evaluated, is the date on which the Regional/State Transport Authority takes up the subject for final consideration and not any anterior or subsequent date. In Cannanore Dist. Motor Transport Employees' Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Malabar Public Conveyance, 1962 Ker LT 446: (AIR 1962 Ker 341) (FB), M. S. Menon, C. J. summed up the legal position as follows:--

"We have come to the conclusion that the date that is material is the date on which the Regional Transport Authority deals with the application. The earlier date--the date of the application-- may not be in the public interest which as is evident from Section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, is the important and paramount consideration in these matters."

The same view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Mangrulpir Joint Motor Service Co. (P.) Ltd, AIR 1971 SC 1804. Therein the Supreme Court observed thus:

"The High Court was in error on the second question in holding that the Regional Transport Authority would have Co consider the respective qualifications of the applicants as on the date of their applications and not as on the date of the actual consideration by the Regional Transport Authority of the applications for the grant of permit."

As repeatedly pointed out in the various decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Courts, the paramount consideration that should weigh with the Regional/ State Transport Authority in taking a decision regarding the grant of a stage carriage permit is the advancement of public interest Such decision will have; to be reached by the authority on a comparative evaluation of the qualifications possessed by the various applicants as! on the date of consideration of the subject by it. If, on the date of consideration of the applications, an applicant is found, to be possessed of a vehicle of the required specifications regarding its model, seating capacity etc, and if in respect of! other matters he is found to be possessed of better qualifications than a rival applicant who might have furnished the particulars of his vehicle in his application itself it will not be in the public interest and, hence, also legally not right to overlook the superior claims of the former and prefer the latter for the grant of the permit merely on the ground of his having furnished in his application particulars of his vehicle. As already observed by us, an application for the grant of a stage carriage permit cannot be treated as invalid merely on the ground that it does not contain particulars of the vehicle proposed to be used for the service nor can the applicant be disqualified or excluded from consideration on the said ground. If all other qualifications are equal as between the two applicants one of whom had furnished in his application the particulars of his vehicle and the other had furnished such particulars only at a later stage before the matter was taken up for consideration by the Regional/State Transport Authority and the vehicle offered by the latter is found to be of a later model and better quality (providing better comforts for the passengers) than the vehicle offered by the former, the Regional/State Transport Authority will be perfectly justified in taking the view that it will be in the public interest to grant the permit to the applicant who has offered the better vehicle (see Ikram Khan v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1976 SC 2333). However, if in such a case the vehicles offered by both the applicants are found to be substantially of the same type, quality, model etc. and if in respect of other matters both the applicants are equally qualified it will be open to the Regional/State Transport Authority in its discretion to prefer for the grant the applicant who had furnished the particulars of his vehicle in the application itself treating the said circumstance as a ground for tilting the balance as between the two persons whose qualifications are equal in all other respects.

7. With respect, we hold that the observations to the contrary contained in Vypeen Transport Corporation (P.) Ltd. v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Trichur, 1960 Ker LT 1058: (AIR 1961 Ker 77), cannot be regarded as correct law,

8. Having resolved the common question of law arising in these cases we shall now proceed to deal with the facts of each case separately and record our conclusions on the merits of the contentions put forward by the parties.

O. P. No. 234 of 1979:

9. The petitioner is a new entrant to the field of stage carriage operation. In response to a notification published by the Regional Transport Authority, Trichur inviting applications for the grant of two pucca permits on the route Ka-dangode-Chavakkad the petitioner and five other operators including respondents Nos. 3 and 4 filed their applications. The Regional Transport Authority, Trichur considered the subject on 24-7-1978 and passed the order Ext P1 granting one permit each to the writ petitioner and the 4th respondent. Among the six applicants the petitioner as well as respondents Nos. 3 and 4 were all new entrants. The ground stated by the Regional Transport Authority for preferring the 4th respondent is that he was an existing operator on the route and the petitioner was preferred for tha grant of the second permit on the ground that he had offered a later vehicle than respondent No. 3.

10. Another operator, who figured as the third applicant before the Regional Transport Authority, filed an appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal took note of the fact that while respondents Nos. 3 and 4 had furnished in their applications particulars of the vehicles which they proposed to put on the road, the writ petitioner had not specified any vehicle in his application and had produced the registration certificate of a 1978 model bus only at the time of consideration of the matter by the Regional Transport Authority, Relying on the ruling in Vypeen Transport Corporation's case, 1960 Ker LT 1058: (AIR 1961 Ker 77), the Appellate Tribunal confirmed the finding entered by the Regional Transport Authority that in view of the fact that the 4th respondent was an existing operator on the route on the strength of a temporary permit he was entitled to be preferred for the grant of one permit, especially since he had specified a 1977 model bus in his application Then it proceeded to consider the relative merits of the petitioner and the 3rd respondent. In regard to the said matter, the Regional Transport Authority held that as between the petitioner who had not specified any vehicle in his application, and the 3rd respondent who had specified a 1978 model bus in his application itself and had all along kept it available for use on the route, the 3rd respondent was entitled to preference since in respect of all other matters these, two applicants were equally qualified. The qualifications possessed by both the applicants as on the date of consideration of the subject by the Regional Transport Authority had been found to be equally balanced (both the petitioner as well as the 3rd respondent had offered 1978 model buses for use on the road). In these circumstances, on an application of the legal principles explained by us above, it cannot be said that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal acted illegally in preferring the 3rd respondent for the grant of the permit for the reason that he had mentioned the particulars of the vehicle in his application itself using the said circumstance as a factor for tilting the balance. There are, therefore, no grounds for interference with the judgment of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal evidenced by Ext. P3. The original petition accordingly fails and it is dismissed but, in the circumstances, without any order as to costs. O. P. No. 1548 of 1979:

11. In response to a notification under Section 57 (2) of the Act published by the Regional Transport Authority, Quilon Inviting applications for the grant of a pucca permit on the route Kottiyam-Mammoottilakadavu via Chinnakkada and Chamakkada the writ petitioner and seven others including the 1st respondent submitted their applications in August, 1977. Subsequently an erratum notification was published by the Regional Transport Authority on 1-11-1977 rectifying some error in the original notification. The Regional Transport Authority considered the applications on 27-12-1977 and passed the order Ext. P1 granting the permit to the petitioner herein on the ground that he had experience in operating temporary service on the route for a week and had offered a 1977 model bus with 55 seats. It was contended by the appellant (1st respondent herein) before the Appellate Tribunal that the appellant had specified in his application a 1977 model bus KLU 3195 while the petitioner herein had not furnished in his application the particulars of any vehicle and since in all other respects the appellant was equally qualified when compared to the petitioner herein the Regional Transport Authority had acted illegally in preferring the petitioner for the grant of the permit. It was further contended by the 1st respondent herein before the Appellate Tribunal that the experience gained on the route by the petitioner by the operation of a temporary service for a period of one week from 17-11-1977 after the publication of the erratum notification was in a vacancy created for that purpose by his brother the 2nd applicant who was operating a temporary service on the route and that this collusive arrangement should not have been countenanced by the Regional Transport Authority as furnishing a ground of preference. The Appellate Tribunal found that the petitioner herein had secured his vehicle only on 17-11-1977 subsequent to the publication of the erratum notification and the circumstances under which the said substitute temporary permit was granted lent some credibility to the allegation put forward by the appellant that there had been some collusive arrangement to enable the petitioner to acquire a nominal experience qualification before the date of consideration of the applications by the Regional Transport Authority. The Tribunal was, therefore, not inclined to take into account the one week's experience claimed on the route by the petitioner as affording a ground or justification for preferring him. It further held that since the vehicle offered by the 1st respondent was only a 1977 model bus he could not claim any preference over the 1st respondent who had also offered a 1977 model bus and had specified its particulars even in the application filed by him. In this view the Tribunal set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority and granted the permit in favour of the 1st respondent.

12. Having given the matter our anxious consideration we do not think any interference is called for with the finding recorded by the Tribunal that the short experience of one week claimed on the route by the petitioner by operating a substitute temporary permit in a vacancy created for that purpose by his brother deserved in the circumstances of the case, only to be ignored and that both the petitioner as well as the 1st respondent were equally qualified in all respects including the model of the vehicles offered by them and that the fact that vehicle offered by the petitioner had a slightly larger seating capacity was not of any material consequence. Since all the qualifications possessed by the petitioner and the 1st respondent were found to be substantially equal the Tribunal was justified in preferring the 1st respondent for the grant on the ground that he had mentioned the particulars of the vehicle in his application itself whereas the petitioner had acquired the vehicle only on 17-11-1977, shortly before the meeting of the Regional Transport Authority. There is, therefore, no ground for any interference with the impugned decision rendered by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. This writ petition will, accordingly, stand dismissed but, in the circumstances, without any order as to costs.

O. P, No. 1749 of 1979:

13. Pursuant to a notification issued by the Regional Transport Authority, Trichur under Section 57 (2) of the Act inviting applications for the grant of a stage carriage permit on the route Trichur-Mannamangalam the petitioner submitted his application on 27-9-1976. Ha had at that time in his possession a 1973 model bus KLH 109 and he gave the particulars of the said bus in his application. He stated also in the application that he was prepared to put on the route a later model bus, The 4th respondent, who was another applicant for the same permit, had furnished in her application the particulars of a 1976 model bus KRE 4462 owned by her. Besides the petitioner and the 4th respondent there were two other applicants also for the permit. The Regional Transport Authority considered the applications at its meeting held on 27-4-1978 and passed the order Ext. P6 granting the permit to the petitioner, the ground of preference mentioned as between the petitioner and the respondent being that the petitioner had offered the latest model vehicle. It may be stated at this juncture that the petitioner had mentioned in his application the particulars of a 1972 model bus and he had subsequently submitted a representation before the Regional Transport Authority in response to the notification published under Section 57 (3) of the Act stating that a latest model vehicle was available with him for being put on the route.

14. The 4th respondent took up the matter in appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal found that even though the petitioner and the 4th respondent were both new entrants the 4th respondent had full sector experience on the route since she was operating a service on the basis of a temporary permit from January, 1977 on the route Ayyanthole-Mannamangalam and had also previously operated another temporary service for a short period from October, 1976 on an identical route on the strength of another temporary permit while the petitioner had no experience at all on the route, It was further noticed by the Appellate Tribunal that in the applications for the grant of the permit filed by the parties the petitioner had specified only a 1972 model vehicle whereas the 4th respondent has furnished particulars of a 1976 model bus. In the opinion of the appellate authority, the fact that subsequently the petitioner acquired a later model vehicle three days prior to the consideration of the applications by the Regional Transport Authority and offered to use it on the route will not entitle the petitioner to preference In view of the superior qualification possessed by the 4th respondent on the basis of her full sec-for experience. On this ground the appellate authority set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority and granted the permit in favour of the 4th respondent. It cannot be said that in arriving at the aforesaid conclusion the State Transport Appellate Tribunal has committed any error of law, and hence there is no ground justifying interference by this court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The original petition accordingly fails and it is dismissed but, in the circumstances without any order as to costs. O. P. No. 3242 of 1979 :

15. The writ petitioner was one of the applicants for the grant of a permit on the route Calicut-Trichur via Parakadavu, Kottakkal, Valancherry etc. The General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum and one V. Madhavan Nair, Maya Transport, Trichur had also filed applications for the grant of the said permit. The Regional Transport Authority, Malappuram considered the matter at its meeting held on 12-12-1977 and passed the order Ext. P3 granting the permit to the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, The reasons stated by the Regional Transport Authority were that the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation got seven marks while the other two applicants got only five marks each and further that the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation has its offices at Kozhikode and Trichur and has also well-equipped workshops at Edappal and Trichur and they have also offered a 1977 model vehicle KRT 6232 having a larger seating capacity. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal challenging the legality and correctness of the aforesaid decision taken by the Regional Transport Authority. The other disappointed applicant Sri V. Madhavan Nair also filed a similar appeal. The appellate authority dismissed those appeals by its judgment dated 20th September, 1979 Ex. P15. It was contended by the petitioner before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal that the Regional Transport Authority ought to have awarded four marks to it on account of its sector qualification. That contention was, however, rejected by the Appellate Tribunal by pointing out that since the petitioner had been already awarded four marks for residence or place of business it could not be given under the rules any additional marks for sector qualification. Another contention urged by the writ petitioner before the Appellate Tribunal was that it was the only applicant who had specified in its application the vehicle which it proposed to put on the route and the said fact entitled it to preference over other applicants who had not furnished in their applications particulars of their vehicles. Dealing with this contention, the Appellate Tribunal pointed out that while tha petitioner had mentioned in its application only a 1975 model vehicle the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation had mentioned in the covering letter sent along with its application that the Corporation was ready to put on the route a latest model vehicle as and when the permit was, granted. It was further pointed out by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal that at the time of consideration of the subject by the Regional Transport Authority the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation had offered to put a 1977 model vehicle KRT 6232 for service on the route, In the view of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal the petitioner was not entitled, under these circumstances, to any preference merely on account of the fact that it had specified a vehicle in its application, A further contention advanced by the petitioner that it was entitled to preferential consideration by reason of the fact that it was the sole applicant for a temporary permit on the route in question and had been granted a temporary permit was rejected by the Appellate Tribunal by stating that the paramount consideration which should weigh with the authority granting the permit is the interest of the general public, and adjudged by the relative qualifications of the two applicants ft was clear that the interests of the public would foe better served by the grant of the permit in favour of the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, On these grounds the Appellate Tribunal upheld the decision of the Regional Transport Authority and dismissed the petitioner's appeal.

16. There is no scope for any interference with the aforesaid findings of fact entered by the Appellate Tribunal regarding the correctness of the award of marks made by the Regional Transport Authority and the evaluation of the relative qualifications possessed by the petitioner and the 4th respondent. The view expressed by the Appellate Tribunal that when the qualifications were not equal the petitioner was not entitled to any preference merely on account of the fact that he had mentioned the particulars of a vehicle in the covering letter sent along with the application is fully in accordance with the legal position as explained by us earlier in this judgment. The decision of the Appellate Tribunal does not, therefore, call for any interference by this court. The original petition is accordingly dismissed but, in the circumstances, without any order as to costs, O, p. No. 3642 of 1979)

17. The orders under challenge in this writ petition are the same as those which were impugned in O. P. No. 3242 of 1979. The writ petitioner herein is Sri V. Madhavan Nair to whom reference has been made by us while dealing with O. P. No. 3242 of 1979. He was applicant No. 2 for the grant of a permit on the route Calicut-Trichur via Parakkadavu, Kottakkal etc. Like the petitioner in O. P. No. 3242 the petitioner herein also had secured only five marks as against the seven marks awarded to the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation who was applicant No. 3. The Regional Transport Authority had further found that the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation was better qualified than this writ petitioner as well as the petitioner in O. P. No. 3242 of 1979, since the Corporation has offices at Kozhikode and Trichur, well-equipped workshops at Calicut, Edappal and Trichur, and had also offered a 1977 model vehicle for being put on the route. It was for these reasons that the Corporation was preferred for the grant of the permit. Just like the petitioner in O. P. No. 3242 this petitioner also preferred an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal and both those appeals were heard and disposed of together by the order Ext, P2 dated 20th September, 1979, the legality and validity of which we have already upheld while dealing with a P. No, 3242 of 1979. For the reasons already stated by us while dealing with O. P. No. 3242 of 1979 we reject the challenge raised by the petitioner against the orders evidenced by Exts. PI and P2, This writ petition is also dismissed. The parties will bear their respective costs.

G. Viswanatha Iyer, J.

18. While I agree that all the writ petitions should be dismissed I wish, with respect, to make more plain my view on the question of relevance of the mention of the vehicle in an application for a permit. No doubt the point of time for ascertaining the qualification for the grant of a permit is the time of the consideration of the competing claims by the R.T.A. Section 46 of the Motor Vehicles Act specifically provides for the mention of certain particulars and further provides for mentioning such other matters as may be prescribed, 'Prescribed' means prescribed by the Rules. The forms are part of the Rules, The Act, Rules and Forms should be read together to understand the scheme of control of motor vehicles; see M. S. R. T. Corpn. v. B. G. R. M. Service, Warora (AIR 1970 SC 1926) and M. S. R, T. Corpn. v. M. J. M. S. Co. (P.) Ltd. (AIR 1971 SC 1804), Rule 175 of the Motor Vehicles Rules provides for the forms to be used for applying for a permit. The form relevant for a permit to a particular stage carriage is Form P.S.P.A. If one looks at that form it can be seen that columns 6, 7 and 8 provide for furnishing particulars of Registration Mark, Type of Vehicle, seating capacity and maximum laden weight of the vehicle. No doubt Column 16 assumes that a person who has not yet obtained possession of the vehicles can also apply for a permit. If he comes into possession of a vehicle before the applications for a permit are taken up for consideration he may bring that fact to the notice of the transport authority. Rule 186 (2) suggests that vehicle can be got possession of even after the order for the issue of a permit. If other qualifications are equal, between competing applicants a question may arise as to the principle to be followed in choosing one from among them. At that stage it will be a matter to consider whether an applicant who has specified the vehicle in his application itself cannot be considered to have a better claim than an applicant who springs a surprise at the time Of consideration that he has now come into possession of the vehicle. First of all there is not enough time to other competing operators to find out whether the statement that one of the applicants has come into possession of the vehicle is true, whether that vehicle is withdrawn from any other route causing inconvenience to the passengers who are served by that vehicle in that route, etc. If this eleventh hour offer is accepted the object of publication of application for a permit will cease to have a meaning. This, publication is done to invite objections or representations, if any, against the claim put forward by an applicant for a stage carriage permit. If the vehicle offered is being used in a particular route it will be open to the public and the other competing applicants to state what they have to say against that vehicle being withdrawn and the R.T.A. will be in a position to find out whether it will be in the public interest to grant permit to that vehicle in the new route. That opportunity will be denied if the particulars of the vehicle intended to be used are not mentioned and a surprise is sprung on all other applicants and the R.T.A. by mentioning a vehicle at the time of consideration of the applications alone. Further after the last date for filing the applications is over as each applicant may know who all have applied and what type of vehicle is offered by the competing applicants in their applications, any shrewd applicant may try to withdraw one of his later model vehicles plying in any other route and offer the same at the time of the consideration of the competing applications. A person who is operating in one or more routes with a number of vehicles of which one may be a new one may be able to withdraw the latest model vehicle by replacing on some pretext that vehicle with an older one in that route and offer the same in the route for which applications are being considered. If the interval between the closing date for the application and the date of consideration by the R.T.A. is long, which is very often the case, a competing applicant can acquire a new vehicle and offer the same for consideration for the new route. These are some of the tricks that can be adopted and are often resorted to by the bus operators. A difference of an year or so in the make of a vehicle is not such an important factor sufficient to prefer a later make offered at the consideration of the applications. These being the various aspects of the case, though it may not be correct to say that an application in which the particulars of the vehicle proposed to be used are not mentioned, should not be considered, when other qualifications are equal, if a person who has mentioned the details of the vehicle in his application itself is preferred, the R.T.A. will not be said to be acting illegally or without jurisdiction or against public interest. In such circumstances such a preference if given cannot alone be a ground for interference by the S.T.A.T., more BO in an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. The decision in Vypeen Transport Corpn. v. S.T.A.T. I960 Ker LT 1058: (AIR 1961 Ker 77) only says that "An applicant who owns a bus has ft better claim for permit than one who Intends to acquire a vehicle. Needless to say that applicants who intend to purchase a vehicle after getting the permit deserve little consideration". In the light of the Rule read with the form referred to above, it may not be correct to say that the applicant who mentions the vehicle in the application has to be preferred ignoring every other consideration. That decision, if understood that way, may not be correct But in considering the claims of the competing applicants other qualifications being equal, the mention of the vehicle by an applicant in his application itself can tilt the case for a grant in his favour if that vehicle is good and road-worthy in all material respects and if that is done by the R.T.A, there is no illegality or want of jurisdiction for the appellate court to Interfere, much less for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.

19. Subject to the above observations I agree with the conclusions arrived at by Eradi J. in the above Original Petitions.

ORDER

20. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is orally asked for. We do not think that any substantial question of law of general importance arises, on which, in our opinion, a pronouncement by the Supreme Court is necessary. We decline to grant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.