Tripura High Court
Sri Karna Das @ Mona vs The State Of Tripura on 10 August, 2018
Author: Arindam Lodh
Bench: Arindam Lodh
Page 1 of 21
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
CRL.A. NO.23 OF 2015
1. Sri Karna Das @ Mona
S/o Lt. Kajal Das
2. Raja Das @ Sani
S/o Lt. Nikhil Das
Both are the residents of Sripur,
P.O Halflong Chara
P.S. Dharmanagar,
Dist: North Tripura,
Pin 799254
.....Convict Appellants
Versus
1. The State of Tripura.
.... Respondent
For Appellant (s) : Mr. R. Sinha, Adv.
Mr. P. Saha, Adv.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. B. Chowdhury, P.P.
Date of delivery of Judgment &
Order : 10/08/2018.
Whether fit for reporting : YES.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARINDAM LODH
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER(ORAL)
This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 31.07.2015 in connection with Case No. Special (POCSO) 23/2015 passed by the learned Special Judge, North Tripura, Dharmanagar Crl. A. 23 of 2015 Page 2 of 21 sentencing the convict-appellants to suffer Simple Imprisonment for one month with a fine of Rs. 500/- each for committing offence punishable under Section 341 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for three years each and a fine of Rs.2000/- each, in default to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for three months each under Section 8, Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012 with further direction that the sentences shall run concurrently and both the convicts have been directed under Section 8 of Section 33 of Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012 to pay compensation of Rs. 3000/- each to the victim for the mental trauma caused to her by the convicts.
2. The prosecution case, in brief, is as under:
The victim girl has lodged an FIR on 15.04.2015 to the Dharmanagar Police Station stating inter alia that she is a student of Class-IX and while she was returning home after visiting ‗Charak Mela' at Shreepur, Dewaspassa along with one Sanchita Das (neighbourhood elder sister) and Tumpa Gour, her younger sister, and after going some distance away from the fair, Mona Das and Sani Das, the two accused- appellants of the locality detained them on the road and Mona Das caught hold of her hand and mouth from the backside and after taking her to the jungle by the side of Crl. A. 23 of 2015 Page 3 of 21 the road made an attempt to rape upon her. At that moment, when she and her sister shouted(raised alarm), said Mona Das and Sani Das fled away from the place of occurrence. She also came out from the jungle and started shouting. Later, on hearing her shouts the people from the adjacent locality gathered together and out of them a person(male) named Bappa Das took her to their house and brought her to Dharmanagar Hospital on considering her physical condition and appearance.
3. On the basis of this complaint Officer-in-Charge, Dharmanagar Police Station has registered a case bearing No. 2015 WDN 003 dated 16.04.2015 under section 341/376/511/34 of IPC and proceeded with the investigation. During the course of the investigation having satisfied with the prima facie evidence and materials, the investigating officer submitted charge-sheet and the learned Special Judge on the basis of the charge-sheet has framed the charge against both the accused-appellants which is reproduced below:-
Firstly, that on or about the 15th day of April, 2015 at about 6.30 p.m at Sripur, Dewanpassa both of you in furtherance of your common intention wrongfully restrained Laxmi Gour when she was returning home alongwith her younger sister Tumpa Gour from Charak Mela and both of you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 341 read with section 34 of Indian Penal Code and within the cognizance of this Court.
Crl. A. 23 of 2015 Page 4 of 21 Secondly, that on the same date and at the same time and place both of you in furtherance of your common intention attempted to commit Penetrative Sexual assault upon said Laxmi Gour, a girl aged 16(sixteen) years of age, and towards the commission of such offence caught hold of her and dragged her to the nearby jungle and both of your thereby committed an offence punishable under section 4 read with section 18 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offence Act, 2012.
Thirdly, that on the same date and at the same time and place both of your in furtherance of your common intention attempted to commit rape upon said Laxmi Gour and towards the commission of such offence caught hold of her and dragged her to nearby jungle and both of your thereby committed and offence punishable under Section 376(1) read with section 511 and section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and within the cognizance of this Court.
4. During the course of trial, on the basis of the above charges, as many as 11 witnesses have been examined including two investigating officers who investigated the case at different phases. The following documents have also been brought into evidence:-
1. Exbt- 2, 2/1, 2/2: Seizure-list
2. Exbt-3, 3/1- Statement of victim Miss Laxmi Gour recorded u/s 164(5) of Cr.P.C.
3. Exbt- 4: Excerpt from the statement of Smt. Pinki Bhattacharjee recorded u/s 161 Cr.P.C.
4. Exbt-6: Hand Sketch map of P.O.
5. Exbt-7: Index of Hand Sketch Map of P.O.
6. Exbt-8: Form of Bail and security.
7. Exbt-9: Birth Certificate of Smt. Laxmi Gour.
Crl. A. 23 of 2015 Page 5 of 21
8. Exbt- A: Excerpt from the statement of Shri. Suresh Gour recorded u/s 161 Cr.P.C.
9. Exbt-B: Excerpt from the statement of Miss Sanchita Das.
5. I have gone through the statements made by the complainant-victim and other witnesses. P.W.1, the victim girl has categorically stated that on their way both the accused started following them and all of a sudden the accused Mona Das hugged the victim-complainant from her behind when Sanchita Das ran away, and her sister Tumpa Gour started crying for help. Both the accused caught hold of the victim and took her to nearby jungle but the accused Raja Das @ Sani left the place, while accused Mona Das detained her in the jungle. The said Mona Das also laid the victim girl on the ground when she started scuffling to make herself free from the clutches of Mona and also had given a bite him on the upper portion of the elbow-joint of his right hand and somehow, she managed to get rid of the accused Mona Das. Thereafter, she came to the road and cried for help.
6. P.W-2 Tumpa Gour supporting the version of the prosecutrix, identified the accused-appellants in the dock. The said P.W.-2 is aged about 12 years so the learned Special Judge has tested the demeanor of the said witness which was found to be satisfactory. P.W-5 Sanchita Das Crl. A. 23 of 2015 Page 6 of 21 who is the neighborhood ‗didi' accompanying the victim girl also supported the version of the prosecutrix. She specifically has stated that Sani Das @ Raja Das detained the victim girl.
7. The cross-examinations made by the accused- appellants could not shake the above statements of fact of the prosecutrix which were further corroborated by P.W.-2 and P.W-5. The other witnesses gathered at the place of the occurrence after hearing the cry of the victim girl have stated that the victim girl explained the entire story to them immediately after being rescued.
8. In the examination under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. the accused-appellants have stated that the story was totally false and they were not connected to the incident. On the basis of the evidence and the materials, the learned Special Judge has convicted and sentenced both the accused-appellants, namely, Mona Das and Sani Das @ Raja Das as stated above.
9. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the conviction and sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge as aforestated, the appellants-accused have preferred this appeal.
Crl. A. 23 of 2015 Page 7 of 21
10. I have meticulously scrutinized the evidence and materials on record. I find the statements of the prosecutrix in her complaint, and her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. as well as her deposition before the trial Court have remained unshaken. The P.W.-2 and P.W- 5 who were the companions of the prosecutrix also corroborated the statements of the accused and there is no contradiction. But, according to me, the gravity of sexual assault has not been proved. It is true that the victim girl was hugged and she was taken to the jungle and also there was some scuffling and attempt to commit rape.
11. In the backdrop of the above facts and circumstances, this Court proceeds to dispose of the present case, on the following points:-
(i) Whether the prosecution has been able to prove the age of the prosecutrix;
(ii) Whether the evidence are sufficient to infer that the present case is a case of sexual assault under POCSO Act or it is a case of using criminal force intending to outrage her modesty.
12. Let me examine the point No. (i). In the instant case, the determination of the age of the victim prosecutrix is very important to find out whether the prosecution case attracts the provisions of POCSO Act. The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO Crl. A. 23 of 2015 Page 8 of 21 Act, 2012) has been drafted to strengthen the legal provisions for the protection of children from sexual abuse and exploitation. The ‗Act' defines a child as any person below the age of 18 years and provides protection to all children under age of 18 years from the offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment and pornography. So the age of the prosecutrix, in the case in hand, plays a very crucial role to impose any punishment to the accused-appellants under the POCSO Act. There was no attempt to determine the age of the prosecutrix by way of any medical or scientific examination. Prosecution has relied upon the birth certificate issued by the Dharmanagar Hospital, North Tripura (Exbt-9). The learned Trial Judge has marked this document as Exbt-9, on being compared the same with original and found it a true copy of the original.
13. I have perused this document and found that it is hand-written in a printed form consisting of different heads/captions in separate columns. P.W.-3 is the father and the P.W.-4 is the mother of the prosecutrix. But in their depositions they are silent about the age of their daughter. After perusal of the birth certificate (Exbt-9), it is clear that the very basis of issuing exbt-9 is the entry of the Birth and Death Register which is kept in the concerned Dharmanagar Hospital. To find out the legitimate relevancy of the said document, Section 35 of Crl. A. 23 of 2015 Page 9 of 21 the Evidence Act is required to be look into which is as under:-
" 35. Relevancy of entry in public [record or an electronic record] made in performance of duty.- An entry in any public or other official book, register or [record or any electronic record], stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which such book, registrar, or [record or any electronic record] is kept , is itself a relevant fact."
14. Section 35 of the Evidence Act requires the following conditions to be fulfilled before a document is held to be admissible there under:-
1) It should be in the nature of the entry in any public or official record;
2) It must state a fact in issue or relevant fact;
3) Entry must be made either by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country;
4) All persons concern indisputably must have a access thereto.
15. Situated thus, admitting the fact that there is a birth register on the basis of which the certificate was issued by the Dharmanagar Hospital, is very much relevant to prove the truthfulness of the date of birth recorded in the certificate dated 10.04.2009. Even then, there cannot be any dispute that the said admission Crl. A. 23 of 2015 Page 10 of 21 register has to be proved in accordance with law i.e., it has to be proved by the author who had written and filled up the prescribed form and also being compared with the original birth register kept in the hospital or it may be proved by any other person knowing the hand-writing of that person who made the entries in the original register as well as in the certificate in discharge of his official duty.
16. In Birad Mal Singhvi Vrs. Anand Purohit, reported in (1988) Supp. SCC 604, the Apex Court held:
(SCC p.619, para 15) "To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record; secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded."
17. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, the Apex Court in Birad Mal Singhvi (supra) observed as follows:(SCC pp.618- 19, para 14) ―14 .....The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined........ Merely Crl. A. 23 of 2015 Page 11 of 21 because the documents Exts. 8,9,10,11 and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exts. 8, 9, 10,11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi chand and Suraj prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted.‖ (emphasis supplied)
18. . The same proposition of law is reiterated by the Apex Court in Narbada Devi Gupta Vrs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, reported in (2003) 8 SCC 745 where the Apex Court observed as follows:(SCC P.751 Para 16) "16. ......The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the „evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue‟."
19. In my opinion, had the register and the scribe of this birth certificate (exbt-9) been produced, the Court could see the way the entries were made in the register in Crl. A. 23 of 2015 Page 12 of 21 proof of her date of birth and also on the basis of what the entry in regard to her age was entered upon. Further, to prove the contents of the documents the scribe who filled up the prescribed form was to adduce the evidence to prove the contents thereof in terms of Section 67 of the Evidence Act which speaks as under:-
―67. Proof of signature and handwriting of person alleged to have signed or to have been written document produced .- If a document is alleged to be signed or to have been written wholly or in part by any person , the signature or the handwriting of so much of the document as is alleged to be in that person's hand writing must be proved to be in his handwriting.‖
20. In the case of Ram Suresh Singh Vrs. Prabhat Singh alias Chhotu Singh & Anr., reported in (2009) 6 SCC 681, the Apex Court in Para 14 held that--
"14.There cannot furthermore be any doubt whatsoever that the same standard is required to be applied for the purpose of Section 35 of the Evidence Act both in civil as also criminal proceedings, as was held by this Court in Ravinder Singh Gorkhi v. State of U.P. (2006) 5 SCC 584, stating: "38. The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an Crl. A. 23 of 2015 Page 13 of 21 accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the P.W.3 although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted."
21. More so, I reiterate that the parents of the prosecutrix have not stated anything about the birth certificate.
22. Again, I reiterate that the most important and significant feature of the prosecution case is that neither ossification test nor any kinds of radiological test was conducted by the prosecution for determining the age of the girl, P.W.1. Needless to say, that ossification test and the radiological test could provide substantial evidence in respect of the age of the prosecutrix since these tests were very much relevant in determining the age. Further, the doctor who treated/examined the prosecutrix has not been examined by the prosecution. According to me, non- conducting of ossification and radiological test and non- examination of the Doctor who examined the prosecutrix immediately after the incident is a serious infirmity in the process of investigation leading to a reasonable doubt about the actual age of the prosecutrix.
Crl. A. 23 of 2015 Page 14 of 21
23. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that Section 8 of Section 33 of the POCSO Act will not be applicable to punish the accused-appellants.
24. The second plank of controversy is that whether there was an attempt to commit rape upon the prosecutirx. To go into the root of the controversy, let me have a look at the definition of ―rape‖ which is reproduced below:-
"375. Rape.- A man is said to commit "rape" if he-
(a) penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or
(b) inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of a women or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or
(c) manipulates any part of the body of a woman so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of such woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or
(d) applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person,...................................."
25. To understand the definition of rape with more intensity, I may gainfully refer a decision in Premiya alias Prem Prakash Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2008) 10 SCC 81 wherein the Apex Court at Para-9 describes rapes as follows: (SCC pp.83 , Para 9) " 9. 10. The offence of rape occurs in Chapter XVI IPC. It is an offence affecting the human body, in that Chapter, there is a separate Crl. A. 23 of 2015 Page 15 of 21 heading for „sexual offences‟. Which encompasses Sections 375, 376, 376-A, 376-B, 376-C and 376-D. „Rape‟ is defined in Section
375. Section 375 and 376 have been substantially changed by the Criminal Law(Amendment) Act, 1983, and several new sections were introduced by the new Act i.e., Section 376-A, 376-B, 376-C and 376-D. The fact that sweeping changes were introduced reflects the legislative intent to curb with an iron hand, the offence of rape which affects the dignity of a woman. The offence of rape in its simplest term is „the ravishment of a woman, without her consent, by force, fear or fraud‟ or as „the carnal knowledge of a woman by force against her will‟. „Rape‟ or „Raptus‟ is when a man hath carnal knowledge of a woman by force and against her will (Co. Litt. 123-B): or as expressed more fully, „rape is the carnal knowledge of any woman, above the age of particular years, against her will; or of a woman child, under that age, with or against her will‟ (Hale PC 628). The essential words in an indictment for rape and rapuit and carnaliter cognovits; but carnaliter cognovits, nor any other circumlocution without the word rapuit, are not sufficient in a legal sense to express rape; [1 Hon. 6, 1A, 9 Edw, 4, 26 a(Hale PC 628)]. In the crime of rape, „ carnal knowledge‟ means the penetration to any the slightest degree of organ alleged to have been carnally known by the male organ of generation (Stephen‟s Criminal Law, 9th Edn., p.262). In Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice (Vol. 4, p. 1356) it is stated „..... even slight penetration is sufficient and emission is unnecessary‟. In Halsbury‟s Statutes of England and Wales (4th Edn.) Vol. 12, it is stated that even the slightest degree of penetration is sufficient to prove sexual intercourse. It is violation with violence of the private person of a woman-an outrage by all means. By the very nature of the offence it is an obnoxious act of the highest order."*"
26. On the above perspective of law, if I read Section 7 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 which defines sexual assault, more or less a Crl. A. 23 of 2015 Page 16 of 21 similarity is found which is reproduced below for convenience :-
" 7. Sexual Assault.- Whoever, with sexual intent touches the vagina, penis, anus or breast of the child or makes the child touch the vagina, penis , anus or breast of such person or any other person, or does any other act with sexual intent which involves physical contact without penetration is said to commit sexual assault."
27. On a cumulative reading of the two definitions as aforestated, even a slightest degree of penetration of the male organ without any sign of emission constitutes rape while sexual assault means if a person with sexual intent touches the vagina, penis, anus or breast of the child will tantamount to sexual assault and is sufficient to commit an offence under Section 8 of the POCSO Act.
28. Hence, slightest degree of penetration is the essential requirement to attract the provisions of Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. Similarly, at least, touch to the vagina, penis, anus or breast of the child is the touchstone to attract the definition of Section 7 of the POCSO Act, least to say, the essential requirement vis a vis sine quanon to punish a person under Section 8 of the POCSO Act. So, in my considered opinion, in the absence of any evidence that the accused touched the vagina, penis, anus or breast of the child or makes the child touch the vagina, penis, anus or breast should not be held to be Crl. A. 23 of 2015 Page 17 of 21 guilty of committing offence punishable under Section 8 of the POCSO Act.
(emphasis supplied)
29. Keeping in view the above definition of rape, I have carefully scanned the statements of the prosecutrix recorded under Section 164(5) of the Cr.P.C. as well as her deposition which she made during the course of trial as P.W.-1. In her statement made under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. she has not stated anything that the accused- appellants have touched any of her private parts/organs as aforestated. She simply has stated that ‗Mona Das tried to commit rape upon me‟. In her deposition she has only stated that Mona Das detained her in the jungle. She has made a statement in her deposition that ‗he laid me on the ground', which statement is found absent in her 164(5) Cr.P.C. statement. So, in my view, it is an improved version of prosecutrix and this kind of evidence doubts the credibility and fairness of a witness.
30. After perusal of the medical report, I find no sign of any injury marks in any part of her body. Even there is no evidence that any of the wearing apparels of the victim- prosecutirx were found to be torn by the accused- appellants. In absence of any such evidence on record, in my considered opinion, it is very difficult to arrive at a finding that there was any attempt to commit rape or Crl. A. 23 of 2015 Page 18 of 21 there was any sexual assault committed by the accused- appellants upon the prosecutrix. There is only an evidence of wrongful restraint of the prosecutirx and scuffling between the prosecutrix and Mona Das i.e., accused- appellants No.1. The prosecutrix has not stated specifically about the act, but from her description of the incident it can be said that it is a case of ―fondling‖ for which, she undoubtedly can claim that her modesty has been outraged.
31. On a close reading of the evidence of the prosecution and materials on record, this Court is of the considered view that the prosecution has been able to prove that the accused-appellants wrongfully restrained the prosecutirx en route to their house from Charak Mela (a festival), as well as, they used criminal force with the intention to outrage her modesty, which, without hesitation attracts the ingredients of Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code.
32. It would be apposite to take note of para-10 of the case of Premiya(supra) which lays the following proposition:-
" 10. "9. In order to constitute the offence under Section 354 [IPC] mere knowledge that the modesty of a woman is likely to be outraged is sufficient without any deliberate intention of having such outrage alone for its object. There is no Crl. A. 23 of 2015 Page 19 of 21 abstract conception of modesty that can apply to all cases. (see State of Punjab v. Major Singh.) A careful approach has to be adopted by the court while dealing with a case alleging outrage of modesty. The essential ingredients of the offence under Section 354 IPC are as under:
(i) that the person assaulted must be a women
(ii) that the accused must have used criminal force on her; and
(iii) that the criminal force must have been used on the women intending thereby to outrage her modesty.
10. Intention is not the sole criterion of the offence punishable under Section 354 IPC, and it can be committed by a person assaulting or using criminal force to any women, if he knows that by such act the modesty of the woman is likely to be affected. Knowledge and intention are essentially things of the mind and cannot be demonstrated like physical objects. The existence of intention or knowledge has to be culled out from various circumstances in which and upon whom the alleged offence is alleged to have been committed. A victim of molestation and indignation is in the same position as an injured witness and her testimony should receive the same wright"*** In the instant case, after careful consideration of the evidence, the trial court and the High Court have found the accused guilty. But the offence is under Section 354 IPC."
33. According to this Court, the above principle is equally applicable to this case and this is a fit case to alter the sentence to Section 354 of Indian Penal Code from Section 8 of the POCSO Act, 2012.
34. For the reasons discussed above, the punishment under Section 341 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code as imposed by the learned Special Judge does not suffer from any illegality. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence to suffer simple imprisonment for one month Crl. A. 23 of 2015 Page 20 of 21 each with a fine of Rs. 500/- each, in default to suffer Simple Imprisonment for 7(seven) days each for committing offence punishable under Section 341 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code is affirmed. This Court alters the conviction and sentence of both the accused-appellants from Section 8 of the POCSO Act to Section 354 of Indian Penal Code and thereby both of them are convicted and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 1(one) year with a fine of Rs. 3000/- (Rupees three thousand) each, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for three months each. The fine money, if realized, shall be paid to the victim as compensation. Both the sentences shall run concurrently.
35. It is also made clear that the period of detention in custody of both accused-appellants during the course of investigation shall be set off against the term of their sentence imposed under this judgment and order of conviction and sentence.
36. Copy of this judgment and order is delivered to both of the convicts free of cost. A copy of this order shall also be sent to the District Magistrate of the North Tripura District.
Crl. A. 23 of 2015 Page 21 of 21
37. In the light of above discussions and directions, the instant appeal is partly allowed to the extent as indicated above.
JUDGE suhanjit Crl. A. 23 of 2015