Delhi District Court
Raj Kumar Kohli vs Smt. Gurbir Kaur Choudhary & Ors. on 3 October, 2015
Criminal Rev. No.03/15
Raj Kumar Kohli Vs Smt. Gurbir Kaur Choudhary & Ors.
03.10.2015
Pre: Ld. counsel for the revisionist.
None for the respondent.
File perused, vide separate detailed order placed along side in the
file, I do not find any substance to set aside the impugned order dated
24.11.2014 at this stage. Hence, revision petition is dismissed.
Accordingly, revision petition stands disposed of. Trial Court record, if
any, be sent back with an attested copy of the order.
Revision petition/ proceedings be consigned to record room.
(RAJ KAPOOR)
ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE-03
PATIALA HOUSE COURTS NEW DELHI
1
IN THE COURT OF SH. RAJ KAPOOR, ADDITIONAL SESSIONS
JUDGE (03) , PATIALA HOUSE COURT, NEW DELHI
Criminal Rev. No.03/15
Raj Kumar Kohli
Advocate,
Ex. Vice President
Delhi Pradesh Congress
r/o H No. E-88, Naraina Vihar,
New Delhi.
........Revisionist
Versus
1.Smt. Gurbir Kaur Choudhary
widow of late Col. Jag Mohan Singh Choudhary,
(IC-30295)
Signal Regiment R/o L-1, 1st Floor,
Kirti Nagar, New Delhi.
2.The State ( GNCT of Delhi)
........Respondents
03.10.2015
ORDER:
1. By this order I shall dispose of the criminal revision petition filed by the revisionist against the impugned order dated 24.11.2014 passed by the ld.MM in complaint case no.173/1A/14 titled as Raj Kumar Kohli v. Gurveer Kaur Choudhary', whereby ld. Trial court has dismissed the application of the revisionist filed u/s 156 (3) Cr. PC and fixed the complaint case for pre-summoning evidence.
2. Briefly facts of the case are that the above said complaint case u/s 200 Cr. PC along with an application u/s 156 (3) Cr. PC. On the application of the complainant, Ld. Trial Court called the 'status report' 2 from the SHO concerned. Ld. Trial court after going through the status report / ATR and complaint of the complainant/ revisionist observed that complainant / revisionist has made allegations against the respondent no.1 for the offence punishable u/s 420/468/471 IPC on the grounds that respondent no.1 Smt. Gurveer Kaur Choudhary is getting special pension being widow of late Lt. Col. J. S. Choudhary, who died on 03.08.1997 due to brain tumor while the same does not entitle the respondent to get the special pension as the same is not permissible under the law. Ld. Trial Court after perusal of all records and submissions of ld. counsel for the revisionist found that as per 'status report' the military authorities have clarified that as per the service documents available in the concerned branch, the special family pension has been granted to Smt.Gurbir Kaur Choudhary / respondent no.1 and same is correct as per her entitlement. Thus, ld. trial court considering the status report , documents annexed with the status report and the fact that the complainant can lead th evidence in the Court on its own and the investigation by the police is not required, dismissed the application filed u/s 156 (3) Cr. PC of the revisionist and fixed the case for pre-summoning evidence, vide impugned order dated 24.11.2014. Feeling aggrieved with the impugned order dated 24.11.2014, ld. Counsel for the revisionist filed the present revision petition.
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3. Arguments were heard at legnth. During the course of arguments Sh. K.K. Menan, Ld. Sr. Counsel for the revisionist has highlighted on the point of locus standi and submitted that there exist an act of commission of an offence and the case can be got registered even at the instance of any remote person. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the citation "Lalita Kumari". He further submitted that by withdrawing an amount from the exchequer in the form of pension the public at large is being cheated and the revisionist has sufficient interest in this case to prevent the withdrawal of the amount from the exchequer. On these grounds he submitted that the revision petition be allowed and he relied upon the following judgments:-
In Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of UP & Ors., it has also been observed that:-
"..................... .................. ....................
39) Consequently, the condition that is sine qua non for recording an FIR under Section 154 of the Code is that there must be information and that information must disclose a cognizable offence. If any information disclosing a cognizable offence is led before an officer in charge of the police station satisfying the requirement of Section 154(1), the said police officer has no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say, to register a case on the basis of such information. The provision of Section 154 of the Code is mandatory and the concerned officer is duty bound to register the case on the basis of information disclosing a cognizable offence. Thus, the plain words of Section 154(1) of the Code have to be given their literal meaning.
'Shall' :
40) The use of the word "shall" in Section 154(1) of the Code clearly shows the legislative intent that it is mandatory to register an FIR if the information given to the police discloses the commission of a cognizable offence.
41) In Khub Chand (supra), this Court observed as under: "7...
The term "shall" in its ordinary significance is mandatory and the court shall ordinarily give that interpretation to that term unless such an interpretation leads to some absurd or 4 inconvenient consequence or be at variance with the intent of the legislature, to be collected from other parts of the Act. The construction of the said expression depends on the provisions of a particular Act, the setting in which the expression appears, the object for which the direction is given, the consequences that would flow from the infringement of the direction and such other considerations..."
42) It is relevant to mention that the object of using the word "shall" in the context of Section 154(1) of the Code is to ensure that all information relating to all cognizable offences is promptly registered by the police and investigated in accordance with the provisions of law.
43) Investigation of offences and prosecution of offenders are the duties of the State. For "cognizable offences", a duty has been cast upon the police to register FIR and to conduct investigation except as otherwise permitted specifically under Section 157 of the Code. If a discretion, option or latitude is allowed to the police in the matter of registration of FIRs, it can have serious consequences on the public order situation and can also adversely affect the rights of the victims including violating their fundamental right to equality.
44) Therefore, the context in which the word "shall" appears in Section 154(1) of the Code, the object for which it has been used and the consequences that will follow from the infringement of the direction to register FIRs, all these factors clearly show that the word "shall" used in Section 154(1) needs to be given its ordinary meaning of being of "mandatory" character. The provisions of Section 154(1) of the Code, read in the light of the statutory scheme, do not admit of conferring any discretion on the officer in-charge of the police station for embarking upon a preliminary inquiry prior to the registration of an FIR. It is settled position of law that if the provision is unambiguous and the legislative intent is clear, the court need not call into it any other rules of construction."
4. In another judgment 'Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Dr. Manmohan Singh And Anr.,' wherein it has been observed that:-
"Appellant Dr. Subramanian Swamy argued that the embargo contained in Section 19(1) of the 1988 Act operates only against the taking of cognizance by the Court in respect of offences punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 committed by a public servant, but there is no bar to the filing of a private complaint for prosecution of the concerned public servant and grant of sanction by the Competent Authority, and tha respondent No. 1 was duty bound to take appropriate decision on his representation within the time specified in clause I(15) of the directions contained in paragraph 58 of Vineet Narain's case, more so because he had placed sufficient evidence to show that respondent No. 2 had committed offences under the 1988 Act.
The next question which requires consideration is whether the appellant has the locus standi to file a complaint for prosecution 5 of respondent No. 2 for the offences allegedly committed by him under the 1988 Act. There is no provision either in the 1988 Act or the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr. P.C.) which bars a citizen from filing a complaint for prosecution of a public servant who is alleged to have committed an offence.
The High Court was of the opinion that a prior investigation under Section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (for short, 'the 1947 Act') by a police officer of the designated rank is not sine qua non for taking cognizance of an offence under Section 8(1) of the 1952 Act. Before the Supreme Court, the argument against the locus standi of the respondent was reiterated and it was submitted that Section 5A of the 1947 Act is mandatory and an investigation by the designated officer is a condition precedent to the taking of cognizance by the Special Judge of an offence or offences committed by a public servant. While dealing with the issue relating to maintainability of a private complaint, the Constitution Bench observed :
"It is a well recognised principle of criminal jurisprudence that anyone can set or put the criminal law into motion except where the statute enacting or creating an offence indicates to the contrary. The scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure envisages two parallel and independent agencies for taking criminal offences to court. Even for the most serious offence of murder, it was not disputed that a private complaint can, not only be filed but can be entertained and proceeded with according to law. Locus standi of the complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence save and except that where the statute creating an offence provides for the eligibility of the complainant, by necessary implication the general principle gets excluded by such statutory provision. Numerous statutory provisions, can be referred to in support of this legal position such as (i) Section 187-A of Sea Customs Act, 1878 (ii) Section 97 of Gold Control Act, 1968 (iii) Section 6 of Import and Export Control Act, 1947
(iv) Section 271 and Section 279 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (v) Section 61 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, (vi) Section 621 of the Companies Act, 1956 and (vii) Section 77 of the Electricity Supply Act. This list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. While Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits anyone to approach the Magistrate with a complaint, it does not prescribe any qualification the complainant is required to fulfil to be eligible to file a complaint. But where an eligibility criterion for a complainant is contemplated specific provisions have been made such as to be found in Sections 195 to 199 of the Cr. P.C. These specific provisions clearly indicate that in the absence of any such statutory provision, a locus standi of a complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence. In other words, the principle that anyone can set or put the criminal law in motion remains intact unless contra-indicated by a statutory provision. This general principle of nearly universal application is founded on a policy that an offence i.e. an act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force is not merely an offence committed relation to the person who suffers harm but is also an offence against society. The society for its orderly and peaceful development is interested in the punishment of the offender. Therefore, prosecution for serious offences is undertaken in the name of the State representing the people which would exclude any element of private vendetta or 6 vengeance. If such is the public policy underlying penal statutes, who brings an act or omission made punishable by law to the notice of the authority competent to deal with it, is immaterial and irrelevant unless the statute indicates to the contrary Punishment of the offender in the interest of the society being one of the objects behind penal statutes enacted for larger good of the society, right to initiate proceedings cannot be whittled down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it into a straitjacket formula of locus standi unknown to criminal jurisprudence, save and except specific statutory exception. To hold that such an exception exists that a private complaint for offences of corruption committed by public servant is not maintainable, the court would require an unambiguous statutory provision and a tangled web of argument for drawing a far fetched implication, cannot be a substitute for an express statutory provision."
In another case "Randhirsinh Dipisinh Parmar v. State of Gujarat and 7 Ors.", it has been observed that :-
"7. He has relied upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak ; in the case of Manohar Lal v. Vinesh Anand and Ors. and in the case of Vishwanath Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors. , in support of his submission that the petitioner has locus standi to file the present petition and to object to withdrawal of the complaint involving serious offence. It is further submitted that as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that it is well recognised principle of criminal jurisprudence that anyone can set or put the machinery of criminal law in motion. It is submitted that as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, locus-standi of the complaint is concept foreign to criminal jurisdiction save and except that where the statute creating an offence provides for eligibility of the complainant. It is submitted that the same principle would be applicable when a prosecution for serious offence is being wrongly withdrawn.
9. Relying upon the above decisions, it is submitted that irrespective of the question of petitioner having locus-standi, the question which they have raised in the petition are important enough as would have led this court even suo-motu to take cognizance.
28. On the other hand, it is the contention on behalf of the petitioner that the concept of locus standi is unknown to the criminal jurisprudence and anybody can put the criminal machinery in motion and even if there are allegations of mala- fides, petition at the instance of the petitioner would be maintainable. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sheonandan Pasvan (supra) and Vishwanath Chaturvedi (supra).
In the said decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has further 7 observed that the locus-standi of the complainant is a concept foreign to the criminal jurisprudence. It is further observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that if any citizen can lodge a First Information Report or file a complaint and set the machinery of the criminal law in motion and his locus-standi to do so cannot be questioned, we do not see why a citizen who finds that prosecution for an offence against the society is being wrongly withdrawn, cannot oppose such withdrawal."
On the strength of the above citations and submissions made above, ld. counsel for the revisionist submitted revision petition be allowed.
5. Controverting the contentions of Ld. Counsel for the revisionist, ld counsel for the respondent submitted that the revisionist has no locus standi with regard to the application filed under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C which has been dismissed vide impugned order dated 24.11.2014. He further submitted that after dismissal of the petition filed under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C the case has been filed for preliminary evidence on the complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C and the same is pending for recording of evidence by the revisionist. He further submitted that the revisionist has no locus standi to file the complaint. Ld. Counsel has also gone through Section 415 IPC which defines cheating. He further submitted that one of the essential ingredients for considering the offence of cheating, is that the persons cheated should have come before the court. On these grounds he submitted that the revision petition is liable to be dismissed. In support of his contentions, he has replied upon the following citations: 8
1.Dharamvir Singh Vs. Inion of India and Ors., (2013) 7 Supreme Court Cases 316, in this case it has been observed that:-
"The appellant was enrolled as Sepoy in the Corps of Signals of the Indian Army on 15th June, 1985. Having rendered about 9 years of service in Indian Army he was boarded out of the service with effect from Ist April, 1994 on the ground of 20% permanent disability as he was found suffering from "Genrealised seizure (Epilepsy)". The Medical Board of Army opined that the "disability is not related to military service". On the basis of disability report, no disability pension was granted to him and when the appellant preferred representation the respondents rejected such prayer by an order dated 12th December, 1995 on the ground that the disability suffered by the appellant was neither attributable to nor aggravated by the military service.
23. If the amended version of Rule 14 as cited by the respondents is accepted to be the Rule applicable in the present case, even then the onus of proof shall lie on the employerrespondents in terms of Rule 9 and not the claimant and in case of any reasonable doubt the benefit will go more liberally to the claimants.
24. The Rules to be followed by Medical Board in disposal of special cases have been shown under Chapter VIII of the"General Rules of Guide to Medical Officers (Military Pensions) 2002. Rule 423 deals with "Attributability to service"
relevant of which reads as follows:
"423(a)For the purpose of determining whether the cause of a disability or death resulting from disease is or is not attributable to service, it is immaterial whether the cause giving rise to the disability or death occurred in an area declared to be a FieldService/Active Service area or under normal peace conditions. It is however, essential to establish whether the disability or death bore a casual connection with the service conditions. All evidence both direct and circumstantial will be taken into account and benefit of reasonable doubt, if any, will be given to the individual. The evidence to be accepted as reasonable doubt for the purpose of these instructions should be of a degree of cogency, which though not reaching certainty, nevertheless carries a high degree of probability. In this connection, it will be remembered that proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond a shadow of doubt. If the evidence is so strong against an individual as to leave only a remote possibility in his/her favour, which can be dismissed with the sentence "of course it is possible but not in the least probable" the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt. If on the other hand, the evidence be so evenly balanced as to render impracticable a determinate conclusion one way or the other, then the case would be one in which the benefit of the doubt could be given more liberally to the individual, in cases occurring in Field Service/Active Service areas. (c).9
The cause of a disability or death resulting from a disease will be regarded as attributable to Service when it is established that the disease arose during Service and the conditions and circumstances of duty in the Armed Forces determined and contributed to the onset of the disease. Cases, in which it is established that Service conditions did not determine or contribute to the onset of the disease but influenced the subsequent course of the disease, will be regarded as aggravated by the service. A disease which has led to an individual's discharge or death will ordinarily be deemed to have arisen in Service if no note of it was made at the time of the individual's acceptance for Service in the Armed Forces. However, if medical opinion holds, for reasons to be stated that the disease could not have been detected on medical examination prior to acceptance for service, the disease will not be deemed to have arisen during service. (d).The question, whether a disability or death resulting from disease is attributable to or aggravated by service or not, will be decided as regards its medical aspects by a Medical Board or by the medical officer who signs the Death Certificate. The Medical Board/Medical Officer will specify reasons for their/his opinion. The opinion of the Medical Board/Medical Officers,in so far as it relates to the actual cause of the disability or death and the circumstances in which it originated will be regarded as final. The question whether the cause and the attendant circumstances can be accepted as attributable to/aggravated by service for the purpose of pensionary benefits will, however, be decided by the pension sanctioning authority."
2.Mrs. Priyanka Srivastava Vs. State of U.P. & Ors, 2015 SCC online SC 272, in this case it has also been observed that:-
" The present appeal projects and frescoes a scenario which is not only disturbing but also has the potentiality to create a stir compelling one to ponder in a perturbed state how some unscrupulous, unprincipled and deviant litigants can ingeniously and innovatively design in a nonchalant manner to knock at the doors of the Court, as if, it is a laboratory where multifarious experiments can take place and such skillful persons can adroitly abuse the process of the Court at their own will and desire by painting a canvas of agony by assiduous assertions made in the application though the real intention is to harass the statutory authorities, without any remote remorse, with the inventive design primarily to create a mental pressure on the said officials as individuals, for they would not like to be dragged to a court of law to face in criminal cases, and further pressurize in such a fashion so that financial institution which they represent would ultimately be constrained to accept the request for "one-time settlement" with the fond hope that the obstinate defaulters who had borrowed money from it would withdraw the cases instituted against them. The facts, as we proceed to adumbrate, would graphically reveal how such persons, 10 pretentiously aggrieved but potentially dangerous, adopt the self-convincing mastery methods to achieve so. That is the sad and unfortunate factual score forming the fulcrum of the case at hand, and, we painfully recount.
26. At this stage it is seemly to state that power under Section 156(3) warrants application of judicial mind. A court of law is involved. It is not the police taking steps at the stage of Section 154 of the code. A litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate. A principled and really grieved citizen with clean hands must have free access to invoke the said power. It protects the citizens but when pervert litigations takes this route to harass their fellows citizens, efforts are to be made to scuttle and curb the same.
27. In our considered opinion, a stage has come in this country where Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. applications are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. That apart, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also can verify the veracity of the allegations. This affidavit can make the applicant more responsible. We are compelled to say so as such kind of applications are being filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility whatsoever only to harass certain persons. That apart, it becomes more disturbing and alarming when one tries to pick up people who are passing orders under a statutory provision which can be challenged under the framework of said Act or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But it cannot be done to take undue advantage in a criminal court as if somebody is determined to settle the scores. We have already indicated that there has to be prior applications under Section 154(1) and 154(3) while filing a petition under Section 156(3). Both the aspects should be clearly spelt out in the application and necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. The warrant for giving a direction that an the application under Section 156(3) be supported by an affidavit so that the person making the application should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is made. It is because once an affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This will deter him to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate under Section 156(3). That apart, we have already stated that the veracity of the same can also be verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of allegations of the case. We are compelled to say so as a number of cases pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial dispute/family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita Kumari are being filed. That apart, the learned Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in lodging of the FIR. "
3.Ramdev Food Products Private Ltd. Vs. State of Gujarat, 2015 SCC online SC 219, in this case it has also been observed 11 that:-
"7. Contention on behalf of the appellant is that the Magistrate and the High Court erred in declining to order investigation under Section 156(3) which was necessary in view of the allegation of forgery of documents and stamp papers by the accused to create back dated partnership deeds by forging signatures of a dead person. Such documents being in custody of the accused could not be otherwise produced except on arrest in the course of investigation and in accordance with Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Option of proceeding under Section 202, as against Section 156(3), has to be exercised only when evidence has already been collected and what remained to be decided was whether there was sufficient ground to proceed. Mere fact that the appellant first approached the Police and the police did not register First Information Report could not be taken against it nor the dispute being of civil nature was a bar to criminal proceedings, if a case was made out.
22. Thus, we answer the first question by holding that the direction under Section 156(3) is to be issued, only after application of mind by the Magistrate. When the Magistrate does not take cognizance and does not find it necessary to postpone instance of process and finds a case made out to proceed forthwith, direction under the said provision is issued. In other words, where on account of credibility of information available, or weighing the interest of justice it is considered appropriate to straightaway direct investigation, such a direction is issued Cases where Magistrate takes cognizance and postpones issuance of process are cases where the Magistrate has yet to determine "existence of sufficient ground to proceed" Category of cases falling under Para 120.6 in Lalita Kumari (supra) may fall under Section 202. Subject to these broad guidelines available from the scheme of the Code, exercise of discretion by the Magistrate is guided by interest of justice from case to case. "
On the strength of the above mentioned citations, ld. counsel for the respondent again submitted that the revision petition is liable to be dismissed.
6. Ld. Additional PP for the state submitted that he does not find any illegality in the impugned order dt 24.11.2014, therefore, the revision petition is liable to be dismissed.
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7. I have given careful consideration to the submissions of ld. counsel for the revisionist and ld. counsel for the respondent and ld. APP as well. I have also perused the impugned order dated 24.11.2014 vide which it has been observed that:
" 3. I have heard the submissions made by the Ld. Counsel for the complainant and carefully perused the record. The Counsel has relied upon the judgment of Apex Court in the case titled as Lalita Kumari v. Government of U.P. & Ors. DoD 12.11.2013. I have gone through the judgment relied upon by the Ld. Counsel. It is settled proposition of law that the power of the Magistrate to give directions u/s 156 (3) Cr. P.C. is discretionary and the same has to be exercised only when there is requirement of investigation/ custodial interrogation by the police. If the evidence is within the reach of complainant, usually the directions u/s 156 (3) Cr. P.C. are not given.
The word used in the section 156 (3) Cr.P.C is "may", whereas the word used in section 154 Cr. P.C is "shall". The wording of these section clearly implies that the police is bound to register an FIR when an information regarding cognizable offence is given to the police, whereas the Magistrate is not bound to give directions u/s 156 (3) Cr.P.C, even though the complaint discloses the commission of a cognizable offence as the Magistrate has to see whether the investigation by the police is required or not in the given case. Even in the judgment relied upon by the Ld. Counsel for the complainant, there is no such observation of FIR, when an application u/s 156 (3) Cr. P.C is moved. In the judgment of Hon'ble Delhi High Court titled as Subharkarah Luharka v. State DoD 9-7-2010 delivered in Crl. 6122/23/05, it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court that if the evidence is within the reach of the complainant and no investigation by the police is required, the Magistrate should ask the complainant to lead the evidence rather than giving directions to the police for registration of FIR u/s 156 (3) Cr. P.C.
4.In the status report filed by the police, it has been mentioned that the military authorities have clarified that as per the service documents available in the concerned branch, the special family pension granted to Smt. Gurbir Kaur Chaudhary, W/o Late Lt. Col. Jagmohan Singh Chaudhary is correct as per the entitlement. Alongwith status report, copies of the documents received from the concerned military authority are annexed. Considering the status report filed by the police, the documents annexed with the status report and the fact that the complainant can lead the evidence in the Court on its own and the investigation by police is not required, the application filed u/s 156 (3) Cr.P.C is dismissed. Put up on 02.07.2015 at 10:00 AM for pre summoning evidence."
8. Having given careful consideration to the submissions of ld. Counsel for the revisionist and ld. counsel for the respondent as well. I have 13 perused the citations relied upon by both the sides. The citations relied upon by the ld. counsel for the revisionist are not applicable in the present case since facts of the present case are entirely distinct. In the case in hand ld. trial court has already taken sufficient action by calling status report and other steps as well. As per "status report"
dated 26.08.2014 filed by the police, it has been mentioned that the military authorities have clarified that as per the service documents available in the concerned branch, the special family pension granted to Smt. Gurbir Kaur Chaudhary, W/o Late Lt. Col. Jagmohan Singh Chaudhary is correct as per the entitlement. Alongwith 'status report' certified copies i.e. (copy of letter dated 24 July 2014 of IHQ of MoD [Army]; detailed report dated 04 Aug. 1997 - reg. death of Jagmohan Singh Chaudhary;
letter dated 07 Aug. 1997 reg. death of Jagmohan Singh Chaudhary - written by Lt. Col., AAG Org-3 for Adjutant General; Pension Payment Order no.
M/F/259/97 ; issued by the office of the Chief Controller of Defence Accounts (PEN) Allahabad ; and CORR./PPO No.M/F/Spl./18/2001) of the documents received from the concerned military authority have also been annexed.
Therefore, contentions of the ld. counsel for the revisionist are not sustainable at this stage. It is well settled principle of law that this court has limited jurisdiction to interfere in the discretionary power of the ld. MM to set over the wisdom of trial court at this stage with regard to determination of facts. The determination of the facts is an exclusive domain of the original court of jurisdiction yet this court has limited jurisdiction to enter into the area of discretion of Ld. M.M. on the ground 14 of propriety and correctness. Therefore, I am of the view that ld. trial court has rightly considered that the complainant can lead the evidence in the Court on its own and the investigation by police is not required at this stage. Ld. Trial court has already fixed the case for pre- summoning evidence. In view of these facts and circumstances of the case, I do not find any substance to set aside the impugned order dated 24.11.2014 at this stage. Hence, revision petition is dismissed. Accordingly, revision petition stands disposed of. Trial Court record, if any, be sent back with an attested copy of the order. Revision petition/ proceedings be consigned to record room. ANNOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON THIS 03.10.2015 (RAJ KAPOOR) ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE-03 PATIALA HOUSE COURTS NEW DELHI 15