Delhi High Court
Narotam Prasad And Ors. vs Premalabai Chavan And Ors. on 9 September, 1996
Equivalent citations: 1996IVAD(DELHI)334, 64(1996)DLT120, (1997)115PLR19
Author: S.K. Mahajan
Bench: S.K. Mahajan
JUDGMENT S.K. Mahajan, J.
(1) In May, 1956 All India Deaf and Dumb Society was registered under the provisions of the Societies Registration Act. Plaintiffs 3 to 5 have alleged themselves to be the ordinary members of the Society whereas plaintiff No. 2 is alleged to be the treasurer. Plaintiff No.l claims himself to be the Vice President of the Society. On 24th January, 1993 a meeting of the General Body of the Society was held, when the office bearers of the Society were elected. It appears that besides the seven elected members of the Executive Committee five additional members were nominated to the Executive Committee by the President of the Society. This nomination was alleged to be ultra vires the powers of the President as well as memorandum of the Association of the Society and plaintiffs 1 & 2 in spite of their being the office bearers of the Society were not being allowed entry in the Society premises nor letters were being accepted from the members and consequently they had to mail the letters to the office of the Society under registered post. It is alleged that there had been irregularities in the functioning of the Society and the defendants in order to scuttle the voice of the deaf and dumb members had illegally deprived them of their membership by not allowing entry to them into the premises of the Society. These acts of the defendants were alleged to be illegal. The present suit, therefore, has been filed for a declaration that memorandum of the Association and bye-laws of the Society were those which were registered on 11th May, 1956 and that only the ordinary and life members of the Society had right to vote and elect the Executive Committee. It has also been prayed in the plaint that a declaration be given to the effect that the President has no power to nominate the members of the Executive Committee of the Society and to direct the defendants to hold the meeting of the Executive Committee to manage the affairs of the Society. Certain other reliefs have also been claimed in the plaint.
(2) Along with the plaint, an application under Order 39 Rule I and 2 Civil Procedure Code was filed for restraining the defendants I and 2 from operating the bank account of the Society. Another application being IA..No-328/95 was filed by the plaintiffs on 11th January, 1995 for appointment of a receiver to take charge and manage the affair of the Society on the ground that the defendants had been misutilising the funds of the Society. An ex-parte order was passed on January 13,1994 whereby defendant No. I was restrained from operating the Bank account without the signatures of plaintiff No. 2 i.e. the treasurer of the Society. This order was passed presuming the averments of the plaintiff No. 2 to be correct that he was treasurer of the Society and he was not allowed to operate the Bank account.
(3) The defendants I and 2 after service filed the written statement and denied the allegations of the plaintiffs made in the plaint. It has been stated in the written statement that plaintiffs 1 to 4 had been removed from the membership of the Society w.e.f. 28th September, 1993 and they had therefore no locus standi to file the suit. It was further stated that the plaintiffs having not challenged the termination of their memberships, were not entitled to any relief in the suit. As far as the memorandum of Association and bye-laws of the Society are concerned, the stand of the defendants is that certain amendments were proposed in the memorandum of Association of the Society which were duly approved by the General Body meeting in 1985 and the plaintiffs had availed benefits from the Society on the basis of the said amendments. Moreover, the plaintiffs are also stated to be signatories to the said amendments. These amendments were duly confirmed by the General Body in its meeting held on 6th April, 1986. It is further stated that as an objection had been raised by the plaintiffs and some other members of the Society about the nomination of certain members by the President in 1993, fresh elections were held on January 2, 1994 to elect all the office bearers. In the meeting held on January 2, 1994 Mr. Padam Kumar Nagar was stated to have been elected as Treasurer of the Society and the plaintiff No. 2, therefore, according to the defendants, had ceased January 2,1994. Plaintiff No. I was not even a member according to the defendants on 2nd January, 1994 when the election was held and it was Ms. Malti Saxena who was elected Vice-President in the elections held on 2nd January, 1994. The contention of the defendants therefore, is that as neither the election held on 2nd January, 1994 nor the expulsion/termination of the plaintiffs by the Society with effect from 28th September, 1993 has been challenged in the present suit, the suit is not maintainable.
(4) Though the case of the plaintiffs is that they had not been served with any notice of expulsion or about the alleged termination of their membership from the Society, nor they are allegedly aware of any meeting held on January 2,1994 to elect the office bearers of the Society, however, from the record, I find that on 6th December, 1993 the Society had submitted a list of its office bearers along with an up-to-date list of members of the Society. In the list of members which had been sent to the Registrar, the names of none of the plaintiffs appear. An intimation about the elections to the Executive Committee of the Society, held on January 2, 1994, was also sent to the Registrar of Societies. In the list of office bearers submitted to the Registrar on October 31,1994, defendants 1 & 2 have been shown as the President and Secretary respectively whereas Malti Saxena and P.K. Nagar have been shown as the Vice President and the Treasurer of the Society respectively. Names of other members of the Executive Committee elected on 2nd January, 1994 have also been mentioned in the said list. Plaintiffs had been given notices to show cause as to why their membership be not terminated and from the record I find that a proper enquiry was held before a decision to terminate their membership was taken. Prima-facie I am unable to agree with the plaintiffs that they were not aware about the termination of their membership. It was only after their membership was terminated that they were not allowed, to participate in the affairs of the Society about which a complaint has been made in the present suit. lam, therefore, of the prima facie view that plaintiffs have suppressed material factsoftheirmembershiphavingbeen terminated and fresh elections having been held on 2nd January, 1994 from this Court.
(5) In the face of the said documents and taking into consideration other documents on record, prima fade, I am of the view that not only that plaintiffs were aware about the elections held on January 2, 1994 but they were also aware about the termination of their membership from the Society. As on the date of filing of the suit not only that the plaintiffs had ceased to be members of the Society but plaintiff No. 2 was also not its treasurer. The plaintiffs have neither challenged the termination of the membership nor the elections held on January 2,1994 and, in my view, therefore, they not entitled to challenge operation of Bank account by the elected off ice bearers of the Society.
(6) Though almost at the fag end of the arguments on the application for injunction the plaintiffs have filed an application for amendment of the plaint so as to have a declaration about their expulsion being illegal and ultra vires and also for a declaration that the elections held on 2nd January, 1994 were illegal and ultra vires, however, I am not taking into consideration the said application for the purposes of deciding the present suit as I feel that the continuance of the order of injunction is causing undue hardship to the Society which has been set up for the benefit of deaf and dumb persons and I have proceeded to decide the application for injunction.
(7) In my view, the plaintiff had suppressed the material facts of the termination of their membership from the Society as also the holding of elections on 2nd January, 1994 from this Court and they have been able to obtain an ex-parte injunction by suppression of material facts from this Court. The ex-parte order of injunction is, therefore, liable to be vacated on this short ground. However, even on merits, I find that the defendants, being the elected office bearers of the Society, have every right to manage its affairs in accordance with the Memorandum of Association of the Society. The plaintiffs have no right to interfere in the functioning of the Society by the defendants. The elected office bearers cannot be prevented from exercising their rights to manage the affairs of the Society.
(8) Though the plaintiffs have made applications about the defendants frittering away the funds of the Society, however, on the basis of the material on record, I am unable to persuade myself to agree with the plaintiffs. Moreover, as I have already held that the plaintiffs have not come to the Court with clean hands and have suppressed material facts from this Court, they are not entitled to the discretionary relief of injunction or appointment of receiver. Plaintiffs, not being members of the Society, cannot seek appointment of a receiver. Defendants as elected office bearers of the Society have a right to manage its affairs and in case of any irregularity, general body of the Society can remove them. I do not agree with the plaintiffs that there is any danger of the property being dissipated by the defendants. In my view, it will not bejust and convenient to appoint a receiver.
(9) For all the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs, in my opinion, are not entitled to any relief in either of the two applications. The same are, accordingly, dismissed and the interim orders passed earlier are hereby vacated.