Jharkhand High Court
Central Coalfields Ltd. And Ors. vs Maheshwar Manjhi [Alongwith L.P.A. ... on 21 June, 2005
Equivalent citations: 2005(2)BLJR1623, [2005(3)JCR269(JHR)]
Bench: Altamas Kabir, R.K. Merathia
ORDER
1. Although, these appeals are barred by limitation, having regard to the points raised, we are of the view that the question involved should be heard and decided, and, accordingly, we allow the applications for condonation of delay and condone the delay in filing all these appeals.
2. All these five appeals involve the same and/or similar questions of law and fact and are, therefore, taken up together for hearing and disposal.
Out of these five appeals, the appeal filed by M/s. Central Coalfields Ltd. against Mino Devi is based on a Judgment dated 3rd March, 2004. The other appeals are all directed against a common Judgment dated 23rd April, 2004.
3. In all the writ petitions, the common question was with regard to compassionate appointment as per the provisions of the National Coal Wage Agreement-V. Admittedly, the said Agreement makes provision for such appointment within the parameters, as indicated in the Agreement. Although, in the Agreement itself, no time limit has been spelt out for making an application for such compassionate appointment in place of a worker, who dies in harness, by a subsequent Circular, the time limit was initially restricted to six months from the date of death of the employee concerned and thereafter one year and one and half years, respectively, by two subsequent Circulars. The first Circular became effective w.e.f. 12th December, 1995, the second Circular which extended the period from six months to one year, became effective from February, 2000 and the last Circular became effective w.e.f. 27th November, 2002, extending the time further from one year to one and half years on the basis of a judgment delivered by this Court on 27th November, 2002 in Writ Petition (S) No. 4694 of 2002 (Roopna Manjhi v. C.C.L. and Ors.), see 2003 (1) JCR 324 (Jhr).
4. In the instant case, it appears that the employees concerned died in harness prior to the publication of the second Circular and applications for compassionate appointments were made in some cases after the second Circular came into operation. The respondents in the writ petition rejected the claims of the various writ petitioners on the ground that they have applied for such compassionate appointment beyond the stipulated period of six months, as provided for in the first circular which became operative in December, 1995. Aggrieved thereby, the writ petitions were moved before the learned single Judge, which as indicated hereinabove, were heard together, except the writ petition of Mino Devi, and disposed of by a common judgment dated 23rd April, 2004.
5. While recognizing the fact that various Circulars have been issued at different point of time, the learned single Judge was of the view that the applications made by the writ petitioners should not be confined to the period as prescribed by the first Circular, in view of the fact that their cases for compassionate appointment were taken up for consideration long after when, in fact, the third Circular had come into operation. The learned single Judge was of the view that the cases of the writ petition should be dealt with on the basis of the Circulars as prevailing on the date when the decision was taken in their respective cases. On that basis, the learned single Judge allowed the writ applications and set aside the order which had been challenged in the writ petitions and all the matters were remitted back to the authority concerned for passing afresh orders, in accordance with law, within a period of two months from the date of production of a copy of the order.
6. The effect of the judgment was that the respondents were directed to reconsider the claim of each of the writ petition without going into the technicality of the applications having been made by them beyond the period which may have been prescribed when their predecessors-in-interest were said to have died in harness.
Appearing in support of the appeals, Mr. Mehta urged that the question which had been considered by the learned single Judge had also fallen for consideration subsequently on 13th August, 2004 before the Division Bench in the case of Sushil Kumar Vengra v. Union of India, Writ Petition (S) 6589 of 2002 : 2005 (1) JCR 282 (Jhr), which was also a writ petition and referred to the Division Bench by the learned single Judge. Mr. Mehta submitted that after considering the various Circulars, which have been published from time to time and the decision of Roopna Manjhi (supra) on the basis of which the time period for making applications had been extended from one year to one and half years, the Division Bench was of the view that the time period as stipulated in the various Circulars had to be strictly followed and any deviation therefrom would have to be disallowed.
7. During the course of hearing, it was sought to be submitted by Mr. Sahani, appearing for some of the writ petitioners that the decision in Roopna Manjhi, as passed by the learned single Judge, had subsequently been questioned before the Division Bench and the same was affirmed in L.P.A. No. 16 of 2003 on 30th April, 2003. Mr. Sahni contended that the said decision had passed sub silentio, as it has not been brought to the knowledge of the learned Division Bench that such a decision had, in fact, been taken in Roopna Manjhi's case.
Be that as it may, Mr. Mehta contended that having regard to the decision in the case of Sushil Kumar Vengra, the views expressed by the learned single Judge cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside.
8. On behalf of the respondents/writ petitioners, it has however been urged that although initially the time period for making an application was six months, the authorities concerned realized that such Circular requires extension. Accordingly, on two successive occasions, the time period was extended by a period of six months each. It has been urged that having regard to the above, it could not have been the intention of the authority to strictly apply the provisions of the different Circulars, particularly, when it was the appellant authorities concerned, who had taken such a long time to dispose of the various applications made by the writ petitioners.
9. There is some amount of logic in the submissions made on behalf of the writ petitioners-respondents on account of the fact that their case were dealt with individually at a point of time when the time period of making an application had been extended to one and half years. Applying such parameter, the learned single Judge thought it fit to direct the appellants to consider the case of the writ petitioners afresh after discarding the technicalities, involving the time period for making such application.
10. We see no reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned single Judge, but having regard to the questions raised, we are of the view that this order must be confined to these writ petitioners/ respondents only, since their cases were considered by the appellant-authority after a long time. We, therefore, dispose of the appeals by affirming the order of the learned single Judge. But, we make it clear that the judgment of the learned single Judge and the directions contained therein shall remain confined to the respondents/writ petitioners only and will not create any precedent for future cases.
Having regard to the decision aforesaid, the time for complying with the direction given by the learned single Judge is extended by a period of three months from date.