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[Cites 12, Cited by 3]

Gujarat High Court

Indian Rayon Industries Ltd vs Bamaniya Lakhabhai Bhagvanjibhai on 10 March, 2015

Author: Akil Kureshi

Bench: Akil Kureshi

       C/SCA/6351/2006                                  JUDGMENT




         IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

            SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6351 of 2006



FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:



HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE AKIL KURESHI

================================================================

1   Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see
    the judgment ?

2   To be referred to the Reporter or not ?

3   Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the
    judgment ?

4   Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as
    to the interpretation of the Constitution of India or any order
    made thereunder ?

================================================================
           INDIAN RAYON INDUSTRIES LTD.....Petitioner(s)
                            Versus
        BAMANIYA LAKHABHAI BHAGVANJIBHAI....Respondent(s)
================================================================
Appearance:
MR NISARG M DESAI FOR NANAVATI ASSOCIATES, ADVOCATE for the
Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR TR MISHRA, ADVOCATE for the Respondent(s) No. 1
MR UT MISHRA, ADVOCATE for the Respondent(s) No. 1
RULE SERVED BY DS for the Respondent(s) No. 1
================================================================

        CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE AKIL KURESHI

                           Date : 10/03/2015




                               Page 1 of 12
      C/SCA/6351/2006                                        JUDGMENT



                           ORAL JUDGMENT

1. This   petition   is   filed   by   Indian   Rayon   Industries   Ltd.,   a  company registered under the Companies Act, challenging  the   judgement   of   the   Labour   Court,   Junagadh,   dated  10.1.2006 passed in Reference (LCJ) No.257/1999.

2. The   respondent   workman   was   engaged   as   temporary  Draftsman   initially   under   an   appointment   order   dated  19.1.1995   for   a   fixed   period   of   three   months.   Such  engagement  continued  from  time  to  time  for  nearly  three  and  half  years  under  separate  appointment  orders,  when  finally after completion of three months from the last order  of appointment dated 10.2.1999, such engagement was not  extended.   He   challenged   such   termination   before   the  Labour Court on the ground of violation of section 25F of  the Industrial Disputes Act.   Before the Labour Court the  employer raised the theory that workman was engaged for  fixed   period   for   the   work   of   drafting   which   was   specific  when there was no further work available, his engagement  would  not  be renewed.  Such  action  would  not  fall within  the definition of term 'retrenchment' in view of section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act.   The Labour Court by  the   impugned   award   held   to   the   contrary,   came   to   the  conclusion   that   section   2(oo)(bb)   would   not   apply   since  according to the employer the workman was appointed for  a specific power plant, however, he had worked in different  departments. According to the Labour Court, there was no  evidence that work of power plant was also over. Inter­alia  on such grounds, the Labour Court was persuaded to hold  that disengagement of the workman was retrenchment and  Page 2 of 12 C/SCA/6351/2006 JUDGMENT since  the  same  was  without  following  procedure  required  under section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, same was  also   illegal.   Resultantly,   the   Labour   Court   set   aside   the  termination, directed reinstatement with 80% back­wages. 

3. Counsel for the employer submitted that the appointment  of workman was on fixed term basis. Each extension was  covered   under   a   specific   written   order   of   appointment.  After   completion   of   period   envisaged   in   the   order   of  appointment, unless there was extension, the engagement  would   come   to   an   end.   He   relied   on   decision   of   the  Supreme   Court   in   case   of  Karnataka   Handloom  Development  Corporation Ltd. v. Sri Mahadeva Laxman  Raval  reported  in (2006)  13 Supreme  Court  Cases  15,  to  argue that the Labour Court committed a serious error in  setting aside the order of termination.

4. On   the   other   hand,   learned   counsel   Shri   Mishra   for   the  workman   opposed   the   petition   contending   that   the  workman   had   except   for   artificial   breaks,   worked  continuously    nearly for three and half years.  Fixed  term  appointment   was   a   camouflage.   Section   25F   of   the  Industrial   Disputes   Act   was   breached.   The   Labour   Court  therefore, correctly set aside the same. 

5. Few   facts   are   not   in   dispute.   The   engagement   of   the  workman for different spells of nearly three and half years  as   Draftsman   is   not   disputed.   Question   of   his   having  completed 240 days  during the relevant period prior to his  last engagement, is also not seriously in dispute. The fact  that   procedure   of   section   25F   of   the   Industrial   Disputes  Page 3 of 12 C/SCA/6351/2006 JUDGMENT Act   was   not   followed,   is   also   unquestionable.   Short  controversy   is   in   facts   of   the   case,   was   the   case   of   the  workman covered under section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial  disputes Act and, therefore,  excluded from the purview of  application  of  section  25F  of  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act.  Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act provides for  definition of term 'retrenchment' as to mean termination by  the  employer  of the  service  of a workman  for  any  reason  whatsoever   otherwise   than   as   a   punishment   inflicted   by  way   of   disciplinary   action.   Clauses   (a)   to   (c)     provide   for  exception to this definition. Relevant clause (oo) (bb) reads  as under :

"(oo) "retrenchment"   means   the   termination   by   the  employer   of   the   service   of   a   workman   for   any   reason  whatsoever,   otherwise   than   as   a  punishment   inflicted   by  way of disciplinary action, but does not include­ xxx xx (bb)  termination of the service of the workman as a result  of the non­renewal of the contract of employment between  the employer and the workman concerned  on its expiry or  of   such  contract   being   terminated  under   a stipulation   in  that behalf contained therein; or"

6. Thus any termination of service of a workman as a result of  non­renewal   of   the   contract   of   employment   on   its   expiry  would not amount to retrenchment. In the present case, we  are not concerned  with the later portion of this exclusion  clause  which  refers  to  termination  under  a stipulation  in  that   behalf   contained   in   the   order   of   appointment.   The  short   question   is   would   the   termination   of   service   as   a  result   of   non­renewal   of   contract   of   employment   on   the  Page 4 of 12 C/SCA/6351/2006 JUDGMENT expiry   of   the   period   of   employment   amount   to  retrenchment?

7. The   fact   that   the   initial   appointment   of   respondent  workman was on fixed term and upon completion of such  initial   period   of   three   months   was   renewed   from   time   to  time with breaks, under written orders of appointment also  on fixed  terms,  is not in doubt.  Ordinarily,  therefore,  the  case   of   the   workman   would   therefore,   fall   under   the  exclusion   clause     (bb)   of   section     2(oo)   of   the   Industrial  Disputes Act. However, the workman's contention that the  appointments  were  made  on  fixed  term  merely  by way of  camouflage,   the   need   for   employment   being   perennial,  needs closer scrutiny.

8. The workman in his deposition did contend that the nature  of work was permanent. In the cross examination, however,  he admitted that he was granted order of appointment on  temporary  basis.  When  he was working,  there were in all  five   such   persons   doing   similar   work   of   drawing   of  machinery   and   spare   parts     as   they   were   all   on   regular  basis.   He   admitted   that   whenever   the   company   installed  new plant or machinery, there would be need for preparing  drawing.  He admitted  that  when  he was disengaged  after  10.5.1999 by not extending his appointment, there was no  work of installment of new plant or machinery going on in  the company. In the year 1995, the company had set up a  new   power   plant   and   implemented   the   project   of   new  caustic soda plant for which purpose he was engaged. After  this project was over, he was given work in the office.

Page 5 of 12

C/SCA/6351/2006 JUDGMENT

9. Few things emerge from such evidence. Even according to  the workman, there were five permanent employees doing  the permanent nature of work of drawing. He was engaged  at the time when  new power  plant and new caustic  soda  project was being implemented. After such work was over,  he was retained in the office for sometime. 

10. Under   the   circumstances,   it   cannot   be   stated   that  engagement   of   workman   on   temporary   basis   with   fixed  tenure   was   merely   by   way   of   camouflage.   In   fact,   the  employer   company   had   permanent   establishment   of   five  different   Draftsmen   who   would   do   continuous   and  perennial   nature   of   work.   Only   when   new   plant   or  machinery   was   to   be   installed   as   in   the   present   case   of  requiring of setting up new power plant and caustic soda  project,  the company required additional help. Admittedly  such work had come to an end later on.

11. In background of such  circumstances, we may refer  to   the   decision   of   Supreme   Court   in   case   of  Karnataka  Handloom   Development     Corporation   Ltd.   v.   Sri  Mahadeva Laxman Raval (supra), in which it was held as  under :

18.  We   have   perused   all   the   appointment   letters   dated  14.01.1991,   24.02.1992,   10.02.1993,   03.03.1993   and  30.11.1993   produced   by   the   respondent   as   annexures  which   consistently   and   categorically   state   that   the  respondent's appointment with the Corporation was purely  contractual for a fixed period. The respondent was engaged  only under the Vishwa programme scheme which is not in  existence. Now the scheme came to an end during August,  1994 the respondent was also not governed by any service  rules of the Corporation. The Corporation put an end to the  Page 6 of 12 C/SCA/6351/2006 JUDGMENT contract w.e.f. 31.08.1993 which, in our opinion, cannot be  termed as dismissal from service. Even assuming that the  respondent had worked 240 days continuously he, in our  opinion,   cannot   claim   that   his   services   should   be  continued because the number of 240 days does not apply  to   the   respondent   inasmuch   as   his   services   were   purely  contractual.  The  termination  of his contract,  in our view,  does   not   amount   to   retrenchment   and,   therefore,   it   does  not attract compliance of Section 25F of the I.D. Act at all.
19.  The view taken  by the High Court,  in our opinion,  is  contrary to the judgment of this Court in Kishore Chandra  Samal  vs.   Orissa   State   Cashew   Development   Corporation  Limited   Dhenkanal  reported   in   2006   (1)   SCC   253   (Arijit  Pasayat and R.V. Raveendran, JJ). The above is also a case  of employment for specific period/fixed term and that the  workman   was   engaged   for   various   spells   of   fixed   periods  from   July,   1982   to   August,   1986.   The   workman   was  retrenched   at   the   end   of   each   period.   The   Labour   Court  held that the appellant served continuously for many years  covering   the   requisite   period   of   continuous   service   in   a  calendar year and that the provisions of Section 25F of the  I.D.   Act   had   not   been   complied   with,   termination   of   his  service is illegal and unjustified.  On the basis of the said  finding,   the   Labour   Court   directed   the   workman   to   be  reinstated to his former post. The High Court accepted the  stand of the respondent Corporation that the appointment  of   the   workman   was   on   NMR   basis   for   a   fixed   period   of  time on the basis of payment  at different  rates and since  the engagement was for a fixed period, the High Court held  that the award of the Labour Court was to be set aside. In  support   of   the   appeal,   learned   counsel   for   the   workman  submitted   that   the   High   Court   failed   to   notice   that   the  period   fixed   was   a   camouflage   to   avoid   regularization. 

Reliance   was   placed   on   a   decision   of   this   Court   in  S.M.  Nilajkar   &   Ors.   vs.   Telecom   District   Manager   Karnataka  [(2003)   4   SCC   27   ]where   it   was   held   that   mere   mention  about the engagement being temporary without indication  of any period attracts Section 25­F of the Act if it is proved  Page 7 of 12 C/SCA/6351/2006 JUDGMENT that the workman concerned had worked continuously for  more than 240 days. 

20. Arijit Pasayat, J speaking for the Bench, after referring  to   the   position   of  law  relating   to  fixed   appointments  and  the   scope   and   ambit   of   Section   2(oo)(bb)   of   Section   25­F  which  were  examined  by  this  Court  in  several  cases   and  also in  Morinda Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Ram Kishan &  Ors., (1995) 5 SCC 653 and which view was reiterated by a  three­ Judge Bench of this Court in  Anil Bapurao Kanase  vs.   Krishna   Sahakari   Sakhar   Karkhana   Ltd.   &   Anr.  reported   in   (1997)   10   SCC   599   noticed   and   reproduced  para 3 as under:­  "3. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that the  judgment   of   the   High   Court   of   Bombay   relied   on   in   the  impugned order dated 28­3­1995 in Writ Petition No. 488  of 1994 is perhaps not applicable. Since the appellant has  worked   for   more   than   180   days,   he   is   to   be   treated   as  retrenched   employee   and   if   the   procedure   contemplated  under Section 25­F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is  applied, his retrenchment is illegal. We find no force in this  contention.  In   Morinda   Coop.   Sugar   Mills   Ltd.   v.   Ram  Kishan in para 3, this Court has dealt with engagement of  the seasonal workman in sugarcane crushing; in para 4 it  is   stated   that   it   was   not   a   case   of   retrenchment   of   the  workman,  but of closure of the factory after the crushing  season was over. Accordingly, in para 5, it was held that it  is not 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of  the Act. As a consequence the appellant is not entitled to  retrenchment as per sub­clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the  Act.   Since   the   present   work   is   seasonal   business,   the  principles   of   the   Act   have   no   application.   However,   this  Court   has   directed   that   the   respondent   management  should maintain a register and engage the workmen when  the season  starts  in the  succeeding  years  in the order  of  seniority.  Until all the employees  whose  names  appear  in  the list are engaged in addition to the employees who are  already   working,   the   management   should   not   go   in   for  Page 8 of 12 C/SCA/6351/2006 JUDGMENT fresh engagement of new workmen. It would be incumbent  upon the respondent management to adopt such procedure  as is enumerated above." 

12. Likewise in case of  Batala Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd. v.  Sowaran Singh reported in (20050 8 Supreme Court Cases  481, the Supreme Court held as under :

"8.  We   find   that   the   High   Court's   judgment   is  unsustainable on more than one count.  In Morinda Coop.  Sugar   Mills   Ltd.   v.   Ram   Kishan   and   Ors.,  [1995]   5   SCC  653, it was observed as follows: 
"4.  It would  thus  be clear  that  the  respondents  were  not  working   throughout   the   season.   They   worked   during  crushing   seasons   only.   The   respondents   were   taken   into  work   for   the   season   and   consequent   to   closure   of   the  season, they ceased to work. 
5. The question is whether such a cessation would amount  to   retrenchment.   Since   it   is   only   a   seasonal   work,   the  respondents   cannot   be   said   to   have   been   retrenched   in  view of what is stated in clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the  Act. Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that  the view taken by the Labour Court and the High Court is  illegal.   However,   the   appellant   is   directed   to   maintain   a  register   for   all   workmen   engaged   during   the   seasons  enumerated hereinbefore and when the new season starts  the  appellant  should  make  a publication  in neighbouring  places in which the respondents normally live and if they  would report for duty, the appellant would engage them in  accordance with seniority and exigency of work.'' 
9.  The position was re­iterated by a three­Judge Bench  of this Court in  Anil Bapurao Kanase v. Krishna Sahakari  Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. and Anr., [1997] 10 SCC 599. It was  noted as follows: 
"The   learned   counsel   for   the   appellant  contends   that   the  judgment   of   the   High   Court   of   Bombay   relied   on   in   the  Page 9 of 12 C/SCA/6351/2006 JUDGMENT impugned order dated 28.3.1995 in Writ Petition No. 488 of  1994   is   perhaps   not   applicable.   Since   the   appellant   has  worked   for   more   than   180   days,   he   is   to   be   treated   as  retrenched   employee   and   if   the   procedure   contemplated  under Section 25­F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is  applied, his retrenchment is illegal. We find no force in this  contention.  In   Morinda   Coop.   Sugar   Mills   Ltd.   v.   Ram  Kishan, in para 3, this Court has dealt with engagement of  the seasonal workman in sugarcane crushing; in para 4 it  is   stated   that   it   was   not   a   case   of   retrenchment   of   the  workman,  but of closure of the factory after the crushing  season was over. Accordingly, in para 5, it was held that it  is not `retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of  the Act. As a consequence the appellant is not entitled to  retrenchment as per clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act.  Since the present work is seasonal business, the principles  of   the   Act   have   no   application.   However,   this   Court   has  directed that the respondent management should maintain  a register and engage the workmen when the season starts  in the succedding years in the order of seniority. Until all  the employees whose names appear in the list are engaged  in addition to the employees who are already working, the  management should not go in for fresh engagement of new  workmen.   It   would   be   incumbent   upon   the   respondent  management   to   adopt   such   procedure   as   is   enumerated  above.
11.  The   materials   on   record   clearly   establish   that   the  engagement   of   the   workman   was   for   specific   period   and  specific work. 
12.  In view of the position as highlighted in Morinda Coop.  Sugar   Mills   and   Anil   Bapurao's   cases   (supra),   the   relief  granted to the workman by the Labour Court and the High  Court cannot be maintained." 

13. Coming to the citation relied on by the counsel for the  respondent, one may find that on facts, Division Bench of  this   Court   in   case   of  Deputy   Executive   Engineer  Page 10 of 12 C/SCA/6351/2006 JUDGMENT Buildings   &  Ports   v.   J.R.   Vasiani  vide   judgement   dated  8.7.2010   passed   in   Letters   Patent   Appeal   No.850/2001  had   held   that   the   workman   was   appointed   on   17   times  under 17 different orders. It was held that it amounted to  colourful exercise of power.

14. In   case   of  Director,   Health   and   Family   Welfare,  Punjab,   Chandigarh   and   others   v.   Baljinder   Singh   and  another  reported   in   2006(3)   LLN   369,   the   Punjab   and  Haryana   High   Court   held   that   the   retrenchment   of   a  workman amounted to unfair labour practice.

15. In   case   of  Bhuvnesh   Kumar   Dwivedi   v.   M/s.  Hindalco Industries Ltd.  reported   in   AIR   2014   Supreme  Court 2258, also it was found that the  workman rendered  continuous service for six years except for artificial breaks  imposed   by   the   employer   with   oblique   motive.   It   was  therefore,   held   that   termination   of   service   amounted   to  retrenchment.

16. In the present case, the workman failed to establish  that   the   nature   of   work   was   perennial,   his   engagement  only being temporary. In fact the evidence suggested to the  contrary.   Additional   work  of  draftsman   being   sporadic  in  nature   depended   on   availability   of   work.   Looking   to   the  installment  of new plant and machinery,  he was engaged  purely   on   fixed   term   basis   under   specific   orders   of  engagement. It has come on record that he was engaged at  a time when the company had undertaken new project for  installing  of power  plant  and caustic  soda manufacturing  plant   and   such   work   was   later   on   over.     For   permanent  Page 11 of 12 C/SCA/6351/2006 JUDGMENT nature   of   work,   permanent   establishment   was   also  maintained.

17. In   the   result,   petition   is   allowed.   Judgement   of   the  Labour   Court   is   reversed.   Petition   is   disposed   of.   Rule  made absolute to above extent. 

(AKIL KURESHI, J.) raghu Page 12 of 12