Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
The Commissioner Of Police And Ors. vs N. Gopal And Anr. on 11 September, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2002(5)ALD599, 2002(5)ALT308
Author: B. Sudershan Reddy
Bench: B. Sudershan Reddy
JUDGMENT B. Sudershan Reddy, J.
1. Both these writ petitions may be disposed of by a common order since they are directed against the very same judgment of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal dated 1-8-2001 made in O.A.No.5448 of 2000 and the questions that arise for consideration are also one and the same.
2. Before adverting to the question as to whether the impugned order passed by the Tribunal suffers from any legal infirmity requiring any correction as such by this Court in exercise of its Certiorari jurisdiction, the relevant facts leading to filing of these writ petitions may have to be noticed:
3. The parties herein shall be referred to as writ petitioners and respondents as arrayed in W.P.No.1959 of 2002.
4. The writ petitioners in W.P.No.1959 of 2002 invoked the jurisdiction of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal challenging the orders of the Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad City dated 25th October, 1997 as confirmed in the proceedings dated 6-11-1998 on the file of the Additional Director General of Police (Administration), Andhra Pradesh where under the writ petitioners are made to compulsorily retire from service as a measure of punishment.
5. The first writ petitioner herein was appointed as Police Constable in the year 1989. Similarly, the second writ petitioner was also appointed as Police Constable in the year 1979 and subsequently promoted as Head Constable in the year 1984. Both of them have worked as Constable and Head Constable respectively at Saifabad Police Station during 1992 to 1994. Thereafter, both of them were transferred from Saifabad Police Station to Kamatipura Police Station in the year 1994.
6. It is alleged that on 21-12-1995 at about 2030 hours one Shamshuddin K. Ratani and his fiance Smt. Muneera alias Pinky were sitting on a bench near Budhapurnima and then the writ petitioners posing themselves as police officers of the Police Control Room threatened the said Shamshuddin K.Ratani and his fiance and extorted a gold chain and a Titan wrist watch, worth Rs.6,000/- from them by alleging that the said Ratani was creating nuisance with his fiance in the public place. On the complaint filed by the said Shamshuddin K.Ratani, a case in Crime No.748 of 1995 under Section 384 of the Indian Penal Code was registered on the file of Saifabad Police Station. Both of them were arrested on 26-12-1995.
7. It is also alleged that both the writ petitioners while working at Kamatipura Police Station exhibited dereliction of duty in absenting unauthorisedly without leave or permission with effect from 21-12-1995 to 9-1-1996.
8. The Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad by proceedings dated 2-6-1996 directed the writ petitioners herein to submit their explanation with regard to the following charges:
Article-I Sri M.Sadashiva Reddy, HC-5783 and N.Gopal, PC-7673 while working at Kamatipura Police Station exhibited dereliction of duty and irresponsible behaviour in absenting themselves unauthorisedly without leave or permission or intimation with effect from 21-12-1995 to 9-1-1996.
Sri M.Sasashiva Reddy, HC-5783 & N.Gopal, PC-7673 of Kamatipura Police station by their above acts exhibited lack of integrity and conduct, unbecoming of Government Servants.Thereby the HC-5783 and PC-7673 violated Rule 3 of APCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
Article-II That the said Sri M.Sadashiva Reddy, HC-5783 and N.Gopal, PC-7673 exhibited reprehensible conduct and misuse of official power in threatening the complainant Sri Shamshuddin and extorting a gold chain and Titan Watch, worth Rs.6,000/- and in involving themselves in Cr.No.748/95 under Section 384 IPC of Saifabad P.S.
9. Sri M.Sadashiva Reddy, HC-5783 and N.Gopal, PC-7673 by their above acts exhibited lack of integrity and conduct, unbecoming of a Government Servant, thereby the HC-5783 and PC-7673 violated Rule 3 of the APCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
10. Both the writ petitioners submitted their explanation on 18-7-1996 denying the allegations contained in the Charge Memo. It is their case that they were falsely implicated in the matter. It is also pleaded by them in their explanation that on similar allegations made against them in the Charge Memo, a complaint was lodged with the Saifabad Police Station and the same has been registered as a case in Crime No.748/95 under Section 384 of the Indian Penal Code. In the circumstances, the writ petitioners expressed their inability to file a detailed explanation as the same could possibly be used against them in the Criminal Court adversely and prejudicially affecting their interest in the criminal proceedings. The writ petitioners accordingly requested the authority to defer the enquiry in the disciplinary proceedings until the conclusion of the criminal proceedings.
11. However, the Commissioner of Police by the proceedings dated 22-8-1996 appointed the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Sultan Bazar Division as Enquiry Officer and the Inspector of Police, Saifabad Police Station as Presenting Officer.
12. It may have to be noticed that even while the disciplinary enquiry initiated against the writ petitioners herein was pending, the learned XV Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad by his Judgment dated 27-3-1997 in C.C.No.561 of 1996 acquitted both the writ petitioners. The learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the guilt of the writ petitioners for the offence punishable under Section 384 of the Indian Penal Code beyond all reasonable doubts.The learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that there is no independent evidence made available by the prosecution in support of the charge. The complainant - Shamshuddin K.Ratani who lodged the complaint on 21-12-1995 himself turned hostile and did not support the case of the prosecution.PW2 - N.G.Babji, panch witness, who is examined to speak about the confession of the writ petitioners and the seizure of MOs 1 and 2 from the possession of the writ petitioners was held to be a stock witness. The Court refused to place any reliance whatsoever upon his evidence. In the circumstances, the learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that there is no independent evidence as to the identification of the accused (writ petitioners herein). The Court came to the conclusion that the evidence of PWs 3 and 4 being the police officers is of no consequence. In the result, the learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that there is no evidence whatsoever against the writ petitioners to show that they have indulged in acts of extortion and of their forcibly taking away a gold chain and a wrist watch as alleged by the prosecution. The said Judgment has become final.
13. A perusal of the Judgment of the learned Magistrate would clearly establish that the acquittal was not on any technical grounds. The learned Magistrate in categorical terms held that the prosecution failed to establish the charge framed against the writ petitioners herein. The complainant himself did not support the case of the prosecution. The writ petitioners were not identified in the Court.
14. The writ petitioners thereafter submitted a detailed representation to the Enquiry Officer to drop further disciplinary proceedings in view of their clean acquittal by a Court of competent criminal jurisdiction. They have specifically requested the Enquiry Officer to take the contents of the Judgment of the criminal Court into consideration. They have also pleaded that the other charge relating to the unauthorised absence from 21-12-1995 to 9-1-1996 is inter-linked with the other charge of involving in a criminal case of extortion of a gold chain and a wristwatch from the complainant.
15. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 28-8-1997 to the Commissioner of Police (disciplinary authority). The Enquiry Officer held that the writ petitioners "have committed offence of extortion on 21-12-1995 and also absented for duty from 21-12-1995 to27-12-1995 (i.e. till after they released on bail). Though the delinquents arrested by police on 26-12-1995 it is not amounts to "ON DUTY", since they are not attend their duties under any reasons without permission or leave is amounts to "UNAUTHORISED ABSENCE". (The portion is extracted as it is and obviously the construction of the sentences is incorrect).
16. It may have to be noticed that the complainant Shamshuddin K.Ratani and his fiance Smt. Muneera alias Pinky appeared before the Enquiry Officer and gave their statements. Both of them in one voice stated that they cannot identify the persons who indulged in that act of extortion since the incident happened in darkness.
17. An important aspect that is required to be noticed is that in their statements they have stated that on the same day after lodging of the complaint before the Saifabad Police Station, two constables took them to a place nearby the tank bund where they caught hold of two persons and recovered the extorted wrist watch and gold chain from them. That means, the culprits were apprehended on 21-12-1995 itself and even the extorted articles were recovered from them. Whereas the Inspector of Police made a statement before the Enquiry Officer stating that the writ petitioners herein were arrested on 26-12-1995 at about 2200 hours during the course of investigation of the crime and the extorted property i.e. one gold chain weighing about 6 grams and a Titan wrist watch were recovered from the writ petitioners. The inconsistency between the versions given by the complainant and his fiance from whom the articles were alleged to have been extorted and the statement made by the Inspector of Police is glaring.
18. Be that as it may, the Commissioner of Police by the proceedings dated 29-8-1997 has communicated the enquiry report and called for further explanation from the writ petitioners. The writ petitioners have accordingly submitted their explanation.The Commissioner of Police having accepted the report of the Enquiry Officer and having found the charges held proved against both the writ petitioners imposed punishment of compulsory retirement by his proceedings dated 25-10-1997. The appellate authority confirmed the same.
19. The writ petitioners have challenged the same in O.A.No.5448 of 2000 in the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal having adverted to the material available on record came to the conclusion that the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer with regard to the second charge of extortion is based on no evidence. The finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer, according to the Tribunal, is totally unsustainable, as the same is not based upon any evidence. The Tribunal placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Ministry of Finance V. S.B. Ramesh1. The Tribunal, however, did not interfere with the finding of the Enquiry Officer with regard to the first charge relating to the unauthorised absence.
20. The Tribunal accordingly set aside the punishment of compulsory retirement from service imposed by the disciplinary authority against the writ petitioners and accordingly directed the disciplinary authority to impose minor punishment with regard to the charge of unauthorised absence. The writ petitioners were accordingly directed to be reinstated into the service.
21. The writ petitioners filed W.P.No.1959 of 2002 challenging the order of the Tribunal confirming the finding of the Enquiry Officer insofar as the first charge of unauthorised absence is concerned, which is held to have been proved. The Commissioner of Police preferred W.P.No.23699 of 2001 challenging the order of the Tribunal quashing the order passed by him as against the writ petitioners imposing punishment of compulsory retirement from the service.
22. The learned Government Pleader contends that the acquittal of the writ petitioners-delinquents by the competent Court of criminal jurisdiction itself would not be a bar to initiate departmental enquiry against the delinquents. The standard of proof in the departmental proceedings is one of the preponders of probabilities while in the Court the charges have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It is also contended that the Tribunal committed a serious error in interfering with the quantum of punishment.
23. It is true and very well settled that acquittal in a criminal case by the competent Court of criminal jurisdiction does not confer any automatic right upon the delinquent employee for his reinstatement into the service, even if the prosecution and the departmental enquiry is based on same set of facts. The nature of proof required in a criminal case for establishing the charges and the departmental proceedings for proving the misconduct is not one and the same. The charges in a criminal case and departmental proceedings cannot be the same, merely because the same set of facts are involved.The misconduct under the given service rules or regulations is entirely different from that of an offence under Indian Penal Code or any penal statutes, as the case may be. On the same set of facts, the disciplinary and the criminal Court can come to different conclusions with regard to the allegations made against the delinquent officer. The conclusions so reached operate in different fields.The consequences that flow from such conclusions are also different.
24. In M.Paul Anthony V. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd.,2, the Supreme Court having noticed that the criminal case and the departmental proceedings were based on identical set of facts observed:
"The findings recorded by the enquiry officer, a copy of which has been placed before us, indicate that the charges framed against the appellant were sought to be proved by police officers and panch witnesses, who had raided the house of the appellant and had effected recovery.They were the only witnesses examined by the enquiry officer and the enquiry officer, relying upon their statements, came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case but the Court, on a consideration of the entire evidence, came to the conclusion that no search was conducted nor was any recovery made from the residence of the appellant. The whole case of the prosecution was thrown out and the appellant was acquitted. In this situation, therefore, where the appellant is acquitted by a judicial pronouncement with the finding that the "raid and recovery" at the residence of the appellant were not proved, it would be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded at the ex parte departmental proceedings to stand."
25. The Supreme Court found that the departmental proceedings and the criminal case were the same without there being any iota of difference. Having found the same, the Supreme Court held that "the distinction, which is usually drawn as between the departmental proceedings and the criminal case on the basis of approach and burden of proof, would not be applicable." The Supreme Court interfered with the order passed by the disciplinary authority and quashed the punishment imposed upon the delinquent therein not on the ground that the case registered against the delinquent has ended in acquittal. The Supreme Court having adverted to the facts and evidence in both the proceedings, namely, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case held that "the same were without there being any iota of difference."Therefore, we have no difficulty whatsoever to agree with the submission made by the learned Government Pleader that the acquittal of the delinquent employee in a criminal case itself would not be a ground to order the reinstatement into the service even if the departmental proceedings and the criminal case have been initiated on same set of facts.
26. In V.Srinivas V. Superintendent of Police, Medak District3 a Division Bench of this court observed that "even in a case where the criminal trial ends in acquittal in favour of the delinquent employee, there does not exist any embargo on the part of the disciplinary authority in initiating disciplinary proceedings on the self same charges." It is further observed that "it is possible that a person can be found guilty of commission of misconduct despite his acquittal in the criminal trial."
27. Similar is the view taken by another Division Bench of this court, to which one of us is a member (Ghulam Mohammed, J), in Ch. S Lakshmi V. Executive Officer, Sri Durga Malleswara Swamy Varla Devasthanam4.
28. We have also taken similar view in W.P.No.13814 of 2002, dated 20-8-2002.
The principle is precisely stated by the Supreme Court in Corporation of Nagpur City, Civil Lines V. Ramchandra5 in which it is observed that "normally where the accused is acquitted honourably and completely exonerated of the charges it would not be expedient to continue a departmental inquiry on the very same charges or grounds or evidence, but the fact remains, however, that merely because the accused is acquitted, the power of the authority concerned to continue the departmental inquiry is not taken away nor is its direction in any way fettered." (Emphasis is of ours).
29. The learned counsel for the writ petitioners, however, relied upon a learned single Judge's judgment of this court in K.Raghuram Babu V. R.P.F., S.C.R.6 wherein this Court took the view that "when the petitioner-delinquent was acquitted by judicial pronouncement holding that he is not guilty of the charge, it would be unjust and unfair to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand." With respect to the learned Judge, the principle enunciated in the said judgment is not in tune with the binding precedents including the one in M.Paul Anthony (2 supra), upon which the learned Judge placed reliance in reaching to such conclusion. The said Judgment is contrary to the judgments of the Division Bench of this Court referred to hereinabove and the pronouncements of the Supreme Court and the same is accordingly overruled.
30. Be that as it may, the second charge framed against the writ petitioners is not the same as the one framed against them in the criminal case. The charge in the disciplinary proceedings is to the effect that the writ petitioners have exhibited reprehensible conduct and misuse of official power in threatening the complainant and extorting a gold chain and a Titan wrist watch and getting themselves involved in Crime No.748/95 under Section 384 of the Indian Penal Code of Saifabad Police Station. The charge essentially relates to the misuse of official power in threatening the complainant and extorting a gold chain and a Titan watch. It is true that the latter part of the accusation is same as the one made against the writ petitioners in the criminal case. But it is not exactly the same.
31. In the circumstances, mere acquittal of the writ petitioners in the criminal case registered against them itself is not a ground to exonerate them from the charges framed against them in the disciplinary enquiry.
32. It is required to notice that apart from the said charge there is yet another charge framed against the writ petitioners relating to unauthorised absence without leave or permission with effect from 21-12-1995 to 9-1-1996.That is not the subject matter of any accusation in any criminal case against the writ petitioners.
33. But the question that falls for consideration is as to whether the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are based upon any evidence as such?
34. The complainant and his fiance from whom the writ petitioners alleged to have extorted a gold chain and a wristwatch were examined as PLWs 4 and 5. Both of them in unequivocal terms deposed before the Enquiry Officer that they cannot identify the persons who indulged in that act of extortion.They have merely given the description of the said individuals who alleged to have forcibly taken away a gold chain and a wristwatch from them. They have stated in categorical terms that they cannot even recognise the writ petitioners who were present during the enquiry. They have denied that the writ petitioners were the persons who indulged in the act of snatching a gold chain and a wristwatch. That apart, they have also stated that the articles were recovered from two individuals within a short span of their lodging a complaint at 8-30 P.M. on 21-12-1995 itself. According to the evidence of PWs 1 to 3, the said articles were recovered from the writ petitioners on 26-12-1995 at 2200 hours. They were arrested on the same day. PWs 1 to 3 are the police officers. PW3 is also examined as one of the witnesses in the criminal case. His evidence has been disbelieved by the criminal Court.
35. It is under those circumstances, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer is not based upon any evidence whatsoever. The Tribunal accordingly interfered with the said finding and set aside the same.
36. The order passed by the disciplinary authority is somewhat peculiar. There is no clear finding as such recorded by the disciplinary authority accepting the report of the Enquiry Officer. The disciplinary authority observed as if the complainant and his fiance who were examined as PWs 4 and 5 have stated that those articles were extorted by the writ petitioners from them. The disciplinary authority also relied upon the description of complexion given by PWs 4 and 5 and came to the conclusion that the said description tallies with the complexion of the delinquents. It is stranger than fiction. That is how; the disciplinary authority upheld the charge No.2 framed against the writ petitioners.
37. In our considered opinion, the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and confirmed by the disciplinary authority are perverse. A finding, which is not based on the evidence and material available on record, is a perverse one. The finding, in our considered opinion, is totally unsustainable in law.
38. The learned Government Pleader, however, contends that it is not permissible for the Tribunal and even for this Court to interfere with the findings of fact. It is true that the Tribunal does not exercise any appellate jurisdiction over the orders passed by the disciplinary authority.Even this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot reappraise or re-appreciate the evidence available on record in order to substitute the findings for that of the Enquiry Officer or the disciplinary authority. But a finding based on no evidence can never be considered to be a finding of a fact. The decisions based upon such illusory findings are no decisions in the eye of law. Such decisions get vitiated by errors apparent on the face of the record. Such errors are liable to be corrected in exercise of Certiorari jurisdiction.
39. In Govt. of T.N. V. A.Rajapandian7, the Supreme Court held that "the Administrative Tribunal cannot sit as a Court of Appeal over a decision based on the findings of the inquiring authority in disciplinary proceedings. Where there is some relevant material which the disciplinary authority has accepted and which material reasonably support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority, it is not the function of the Administrative Tribunal to review the same and reach different finding than that of the disciplinary authority." The Supreme Court also took the view that "the question of adequacy or reliability of evidence cannot be canvassed before the High Court."
40. In S.B. Ramesh (1 supra), the Supreme Court upheld the interference by the Administrative Tribunal with the findings of the Enquiry Officer on the ground that "there was a total dearth of evidence to bring home the charge that the delinquent officer has been living in a manner unbecoming of a government servant.........." On that basis, the Tribunal in the said case set aside the order impugned before it, viz., the order of compulsory retirement of the delinquent officer.
41. In Sher Bahadur V. Union of India and others8 the Supreme Court noticed that the Tribunal as well as the High Court having referred to the enquiry report found that there was oral and documentary evidence to hold the delinquent guilty and that sufficiency of the evidence would not be a ground to challenge the order of the disciplinary authority by invoking the writ jurisdiction. It was contended in the Supreme Court that the High Court erred in not appreciating the contention that the enquiry report was based on no evidence and as such there was no valid basis for dismissal of the appellant. The Supreme Court while adverting to the said contention and while construing the expression 'sufficiency of evidence' observed that "the expression 'sufficiency of evidence' postulates existence of some evidence which links the charged officer with the misconduct alleged against him.Evidence, however, voluminous it may be, which is neither relevant in a broad sense nor establishes any nexus between the alleged misconduct and the charged officer, is no evidence in law. The mere fact that the enquiry officer has noted in his report, "in view of oral, documentary and circumstantial evidence as adduced in the enquiry", would not in principle satisfy the rule of sufficiency of evidence."
42. The Tribunal in the instant case came to the conclusion that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are based upon no evidence. The Tribunal was mainly impressed by the fact that the complainant and his fiance themselves did not identify the writ petitioners. They did not state before the Enquiry Officer that the writ petitioners indulged in acts of extortion. They have merely described the individuals who are alleged to have committed the acts of extortion. Obviously, the evidence, in no manner, connects the writ petitioners to the incident alleged to have taken place on 21-12-1995 and in the absence of the same, the question of the writ petitioners abusing their position does not arise. It is a clear case of no legal evidence.
43. The findings recorded by the Tribunal, in our considered opinion, are not vitiated. This Court in exercise of its judicial review jurisdiction normally does not interfere with such findings of fact by the Tribunal. The Tribunal on the other hand rightly interfered with the perversed finding of fact by the Enquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority. No case is made out requiring our interference.
44. The Tribunal rightly did not interfere with the finding of fact by the Enquiry Officer and as well as the disciplinary authority insofar as the charge No.1 is concerned relating to the unauthorised absence of the writ petitioners from 21-12-1995 to 27-12-1995. That finding is based upon the material available on record. The evidence of the responsible officers that the writ petitioners failed to report to duty for whatever reasons has been accepted by the Enquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority. Re-appreciation of evidence is impermissible and the Tribunal rightly refused to interfere with that finding.
45. It is, however, contended by the learned counsel for the writ petitioners that the writ petitioners could not report to duty on account of harassment meted out to them and on account of their illegal confinement by the superior police officers in connection with the investigation of the criminal case, which is the subject matter of charge No.2. It is stated in the affidavit and as well as pleaded by the learned counsel for the writ petitioners that the very same superior police officers are responsible for foisting a false criminal case against the writ petitioners. It is the case of the writ petitioners that the Inspector of Police, Saifabad Police Station was enimically disposed of towards them and they were subjected to harassment while they were working at Saifabad Police Station.
46. The Tribunal having gone into this aspect of the matter found that the report of the Enquiry Officer is not vitiated for any reason. However, the Enquiry Officer himself held that the writ petitioners were not unauthorisedly absent from 21-12-1995 to 9-1-1996 as alleged in the charge Memo. The Enquiry Officer found the writ petitioners to have been absent from 21-12-1995 to 27-12-1995.It may have to be appreciated that even according to the Enquiry Officer, the writ petitioners were arrested on 26-12-1995 in the process of the investigation of the case in Crime No.748/95 on the file of Saifabad Police Station. Obviously, the writ petitioners could not report to duty on 26th and 27th December, 1995 on account of their arrest.
47. Be that as it may, we are not inclined to make any detailed enquiry into the matter and disturb the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer as well as the Tribunal. Such a course is not permissible in law.
48. The next question that falls for consideration is as to whether the Tribunal is justified in interfering with the quantum of punishment? Whether the Tribunal is right in directing the reinstatement of the writ petitioners into the service giving liberty to the competent authority to impose a minor penalty?
49. We are required to appreciate that the disciplinary authority passed orders imposing punishment of compulsory retirement on the basis that both the charges were held to be proved against the writ petitioners. The punishment awarded to the writ petitioners is attributable to the cumulative effect of both the charges held proved against them. It cannot be said that the disciplinary authority would have imposed the same punishment of compulsory retirement as against the writ petitioners on the basis of the first charge alone being proved against them. The first charge relates to the unauthorised absence of the writ petitioners from 21-12-1995 to 27-12-1995. It is true that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and this Court to interfere with the quantum of punishment is limited. The Tribunal as well as this Court cannot interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed upon the delinquent officer unless it is held that the punishment imposed is so irrational as to shocks one's conscience and that no reasonable man while reasonably exercising his power would impose the same.
50. In the case on hand, the Tribunal having interfered with the view taken by the disciplinary authority on charge No.2 which is serious and grave in its nature set aside the punishment of compulsory retirement awarded, but left it open to the disciplinary authority to impose appropriate punishment, since charge No.1 is held to be proved as against the writ petitioners. The Tribunal itself did not award any punishment. The Tribunal remitted the matter for fresh consideration by the disciplinary authority for awarding appropriate punishment. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Tribunal itself had interfered with the quantum of punishment and substituted its own view for that of the disciplinary authority.
51. We do not find the Tribunal to have committed any error whatsoever requiring our interference in the matter.
52. The disciplinary authority shall take an appropriate decision in the matter in accordance with law in terms of the directions of the Tribunal as expeditiously as possible, preferably within six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
53. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit in both the writ petitions.
54. The writ petitions fail and shall accordingly stand dismissed.No order as to costs.