Gujarat High Court
M/S. Coromandel International Limited vs Patel Pramod Indravadan on 11 February, 2026
Author: Bhargav D. Karia
Bench: Bhargav D. Karia
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/LPA/1407/2017 ORDER DATED: 11/02/2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 1407 of 2017
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION/2434/2006
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M/S. COROMANDEL INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
Versus
PATEL PRAMOD INDRAVADAN
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Appearance:
MS NANCY SONI for M/S TRIVEDI & GUPTA(949) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MR AKASH MODI for MR PRABHAKAR UPADYAY(1060) for the
Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BHARGAV D. KARIA
And
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE L. S. PIRZADA
Date : 11/02/2026
ORAL ORDER
(PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BHARGAV D. KARIA)
1. Heard learned advocate Ms.Nancy Soni appearing for M/s Trivedi & Gupta for the appellant and learned advocate Mr.Akash Modi appearing for learned advocate Mr.Prabhakar Upadyay for the respondent.
2. By this appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, 1865, the appellant - original petitioner has challenged the Order dated 13.04.2017 passed by learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No.2434 of 2006, whereby the Award dated 06.12.2005 passed by the learned Labour Court, Bharuch in Reference (L.C.B.) No.512 of 1999 has been upheld.
3. The brief facts of the case are as under:
Page 1 of 12 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Fri Feb 27 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 20:31:47 IST 2026NEUTRAL CITATION C/LPA/1407/2017 ORDER DATED: 11/02/2026 undefined 3.1 The respondent-workman was appointed as a trainee Boiler-cum-Incinerator Operator in the appellant Company on 15.04.1998. The training period was fixed for six months and thereafter it could be extended for a further period of three months at the discretion of the appellant Company. As per the terms of the appointment letter, the appellant Company could terminate the services of the respondent without any notice during the training period.
3.2 The initial training period was from 15.04.1998 to 15.10.1998 and thereafter it was extended for a further period of three months, i.e., up to 14.01.1999. The appellant Company, by letter dated 07.04.1999 sent through RPAD, intimated the respondent that as per Clause 3 of the appointment letter, his training was discontinued with effect from 13.04.1999. Thereafter, by communication made in the month of September 1999, a cheque of Rs. 1,426.25/- towards full and final settlement was sent to the respondent, which was not accepted by him.
3.3 The respondent thereafter raised an industrial dispute before the Labour Court, Bharuch, being Reference (L.C.B.) No. 512 of 1999.
3.4. The Labour Court, Bharuch, by Award dated 06.12.2005, directed reinstatement of the respondent with 50% back wages on the ground that the respondent Page 2 of 12 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Fri Feb 27 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 20:31:47 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/LPA/1407/2017 ORDER DATED: 11/02/2026 undefined was working as a skilled technical worker from day one and at the time of his termination also, he had been treated as being permanent and had completed 240 days of service.
3.5 Being aggrieved the appellant preferred a writ petition before this Court, which was disposed of by the impugned Judgment and Order dated 13.04.2017 on the ground that the respondent was discharging his duties as an apprentice who was engaged for one year and thereafter continued to be engaged by the appellant.
After 14.01.1999, there was no extension of the training period and, therefore, there existed an employer- employee relationship between the parties.
3.6 Learned Single Judge, after considering the provision of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, 'the ID Act'), concurred with the findings arrived at by the Labour Court that, if there existed an employer-employee relationship between the parties, then there is a breach of the provisions of section 25F of the ID Act. However, the learned Single Judge reduced the back wages from 50% to 20% from the date of termination till the date of Award of the Labour Court i.e. from 13.04.1999 to 06.12.2005 only, as the petitioner was given the benefit of Section 17B of the ID Act for period beyond the Award till his retirement.
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4. Learned advocate Ms.Nancy Soni for the appellant submitted that the respondent was appointed as a trainee and his initial period of six months was considered under training, which was extended for a further period of three months. Therefore, at best, the employer-employee relationship has come into effect only upon expiry of the training period on 14.01.1999.
4.1 Reliance was placed on Clauses 3 and 4 of the Appointment letter which permitted the appellant to terminate the services of the respondent during the training period without giving any notice. It was submitted that merely because the respondent worked for about one year with the appellant company, he cannot be considered as a regular employee during the training period in view of the terms of appointment stipulated in the Offer letter which was accepted by the respondent.
4.2 It was further submitted that the appellant has paid the benefit under Section 17B of the ID Act after the date of the Award passed by the Labour Court till today. In support of her submissions, reliance was placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan Development Corporation and Anr. Vs. Gitam Singh reported in (2013) 5 SCC 136, to submit that merely because there is a violation of Section 25F of the ID Act, it is not necessary to reinstate the workman. It was also submitted that that the Hon'ble Apex Court, in the said decision, has drawn a distinction Page 4 of 12 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Fri Feb 27 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 20:31:47 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/LPA/1407/2017 ORDER DATED: 11/02/2026 undefined between a daily wager and an employee holding a regular post for the purpose of granting consequential relief vis-a- vis the length of engagement of the employee.
4.3 It was therefore, submitted that at the best, a lump sum compensation may be awarded to the respondent- workman instead of reinstatement with 20% back wages as ordered by the learned Single Judge, considering the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid decision.
5. On the other hand, learned advocate Mr.Akash Modi appearing for the respondent submitted that the respondent was regularly appointed after due process on the post of Trainee Boiler-cum-Incinerator Operator and had discharged his duties diligently for one year before he was illegally terminated without any notice, notice pay or retrenchment compensation by the appellant company. It was further submitted that the Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have held that there exists an employer-employee relationship between the parties and in view of the Letter of Appointment which was issued at the beginning in favour of the respondent by the appellant, the respondent had discharged his duties for more than 240 days in the year 1998-1999. It was further submitted that the notice issued on 07.04.1999 by the appellant also did not refer to the 14 days' retrenchment compensation as per the Clause 4 of the appointment letter. It was, therefore, submitted that there is a clear violation of the provision of Section 25F of the ID Act and Page 5 of 12 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Fri Feb 27 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 20:31:47 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/LPA/1407/2017 ORDER DATED: 11/02/2026 undefined that the appellant could not have terminated the services of the respondent and thereafter made the payment of retrenchment compensation after a lapse of six months, which would not serve the purpose.
6. It was, therefore, submitted that no interference may be made in the impugned Judgment and Order passed by the learned Single Judge, in view of the limited scope of interference under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.
7. Having heard learned advocates for the respective parties and considering the facts of the case, it appears that the respondent-workman was appointed as Trainee Boiler-cum-Incinerator Operator with the appellant company by appointment letter dated 15.04.1998 and, as per the terms of the appointment, the first six months were considered as a period of training, which could be further extended and which was further extended upto three months. Therefore, the respondent was under
training up to 14.01.1999. As per Clause 3 of the appointment letter, during the training period, the services of the respondent can be terminated without any notice, and after confirmation of the appointment, termination of service would be subject to a notice of 14 days on either side. Merely because the period of training was over on 14.01.1999, in the absence of any confirmation by the appellant, it can be presumed that the appellant had confirmed the services of the respondent on expiry of nine months of training, and Page 6 of 12 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Fri Feb 27 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 20:31:47 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/LPA/1407/2017 ORDER DATED: 11/02/2026 undefined therefore it was incumbent upon the appellant to comply with the provisions of the ID Act before termination of service of respondent, by issuing notice, notice pay or retrenchment compensation. However, in the facts of the case, there is a clear violation of the provision of Section 25F of the ID Act and, therefore, the Labour Court and the learned Single Judge were justified in holding that there was an employer-employee relationship between the parties and that there was an illegal termination of the respondent from the service.
8. However, when there is a violation of section 25F of the ID Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in case of Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan Development Corporation and Anr. (supra) has held as follows:
"22. From the long line of cases indicated above, it can be said without any fear of contradiction that this Court has not held as an absolute proposition that in cases of wrongful dismissal, the dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement in all situations. It has always been the view of this Court that there could be circumstance(s) in a case which may make it inexpedient to order reinstatement. Therefore, the normal rule that the dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement in cases of wrongful dismissal Page 7 of 12 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Fri Feb 27 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 20:31:47 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/LPA/1407/2017 ORDER DATED: 11/02/2026 undefined has been held to be not without exception. Insofar as wrongful termination of daily-rated workers is concerned, this Court has laid down that consequential relief would depend on host of factors, namely, manner and method of appointment, nature of employment and length of service. Where the length of engagement as daily wager has not been long, award of reinstatement should not follow and rather compensation should be directed to be paid. A distinction has been drawn between a daily wager and an employee holding the regular post for the purposes of consequential relief.
27. In our view, Harjinder Singh 2 and Devinder Singh³ do not lay down the proposition that in all cases of wrongful termination, reinstatement must follow. This Court found in those cases that judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court was disturbed by the High Court on wrong assumption that the initial employment of the employee was illegal. As noted above, with regard to the wrongful termination of a daily wager, who had worked for a short period, this Court in long line of cases has held that the award of reinstatement cannot be said to be proper relief and rather award of Page 8 of 12 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Fri Feb 27 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 20:31:47 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/LPA/1407/2017 ORDER DATED: 11/02/2026 undefined compensation in such cases would be in consonance with the demand of justice. Before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors, including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which the termination has been set aside and the delay in raising the industrial dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute.
28. We may also refer to a recent decision of this Court in BSNL v. Man Singh24. That was a case where the workmen, who were daily wagers during the year 1984-1985, were terminated without following Section 25-F. The industrial dispute was raised after five years and although the Labour Court had awarded reinstatement of the workmen which was not interfered by the High Court, this Court set aside the award of reinstatement and ordered payment of compensation. In paras 4 and 5 of the Report this Court held as under: (SCC p. 559) "4. This Court in a catena of decisions has clearly laid down that although an order of Page 9 of 12 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Fri Feb 27 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 20:31:47 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/LPA/1407/2017 ORDER DATED: 11/02/2026 undefined retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act may be set aside but an award of reinstatement should not be passed. This Court has distinguished between a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee.
5. In view of the aforementioned legal position and the fact that the respondent workmen were engaged as 'daily wagers' and they had merely worked for more than 240 days, in our considered view, relief of reinstatement cannot be said to be justified and instead, monetary compensation would meet the ends of justice."
29. In light of the above legal position and having regard to the facts of the present case, namely, the workman was engaged as daily wager on 1-3-1991 and he worked hardly for eight months from 1-3-1991 to 31-10-1991, in our view, the Labour Court failed to exercise its judicial discretion appropriately. The judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court suffers from serious infirmity. The Page 10 of 12 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Fri Feb 27 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 20:31:47 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/LPA/1407/2017 ORDER DATED: 11/02/2026 undefined Single Judge 25 as well as the Division Bench26 of the High Court also erred in not considering the above aspect at all. The award dated 28-6-2001 directing reinstatement of the respondent with continuity of service and 25% back wages in the facts and circumstances of the case cannot be sustained and has to be set aside and is set aside. In our view, compensation of Rs 50,000 by the appellant to the respondent shall meet the ends of justice. We order accordingly. Such payment shall be made to the respondent within six weeks from today failing which the same will carry interest @ 9% per annum."
9. Considering the above dictim of law, we are of the opinion that, instead of reinstatement of the respondent workman with 20% back wages from the date of termination till the date of the Award, the same is required to be substituted in the facts of the case, as the respondent workman was in fact appointed and worked as a regular employee from 14.01.1999 till 13.04.1999. That is all about 3 months and considering the fact that he had undergone training for 9 months, at the best it can be said that he worked for about 12 months. In such circumstances, the Order of reinstatement with 20% back wages cannot be sustained and is required to be set aside. In our view, compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- to be Page 11 of 12 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Fri Feb 27 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 20:31:47 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/LPA/1407/2017 ORDER DATED: 11/02/2026 undefined paid by the appellant to the respondent shall meet the ends of justice, taking into consideration that the appellant has paid benefits under Section 17B of the I.D. Act since 2005 till date. Such payment shall be made to the respondent within a period of 4 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this Order, failing which the same will carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum.
10. The appeal is accordingly partly allowed to the aforesaid extent, with no order as to cost.
(BHARGAV D. KARIA, J) (L. S. PIRZADA, J) STANCY GOMES Page 12 of 12 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Fri Feb 27 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 20:31:47 IST 2026