Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
I.T.C. Bhadrachalam Paper Boards Ltd. vs Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court ... on 23 June, 1993
Equivalent citations: 1993(2)ALT495, (1994)ILLJ297AP
ORDER Eswara Prasad, J.
1. The question arising for consideration in this writ petition is, whether the first respondent-Labour Court, could invoke its jurisdiction and power under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ('the Act' for short) and interfere with the punishment imposed by the petitioner without taking into consideration all the relevant facts and factors.
2. It is necessary to set out the facts leading to the filing of this writ petition: The 2nd respondent was working as electrician in the organisation of the petitioner-Bhadrachalam Paper-boards Limited. He was removed from service with effect from December 1, 1988 on the ground of misconduct, namely for assaulting and abusing the security manager of the petitioner organsiation, using obscene and filthy language. After due enquiry, the charges framed against him were held proved and it was held that the petitioner was guilty of misconduct alleged against him and was ultimately removed from service. It was found that on March 7, 1988 around midnight, the 2nd respondent entered the housing colony of the petitioner and was summoned to the Office of the security manager, whereupon the 2nd respondent abused the security manager in filthy language and assaulted him. A criminal case was registered against the 2nd respondent which ended in conviction under Section 294 (b) and, 323 IPC. On appeal, the conviction under Section 323 IPC was confirmed and he was released under Section 3 of the Probation of Offenders of Act on January 30, 1989. The 2nd respondent moved the Labour Court under Section 2-A(ii) of the Industrial Disputes Act in ID No. 139/89. The Labour Court agreed with the findings arrived at the domestic enquiry, and held that the 2nd respondent used abusive language and assaulted the security manager, and that the petitioner was correct in holding that the 2nd respondent is guilty of misconduct and confirmed the findings. On the question of punishment, the Labour Court set aside the punishment of removal and directed his reinstatement into service with continuity of service, without back wages.
3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner Sri. K. Srinivasa Murthy contended that the 2nd respondent abused the security manager in an extremely foul and filthy language which cannot be tolerated by any person and also assaulted him and in such circumstances, the Labour Court should not have interfered with the punishment, having found the 2nd respondent guilty of the charges. He further contended that the Labour Court did not consider all the relevant facts and factors by omitting to consider the fact that the 2nd respondent assaulted the security manager and hence, the exercise of power under Section 11-A of the Act, was not justified.
4. The learned Counsel for the 2nd respondent contended that the Labour Court has jurisdiction under Section 11-A to direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit, once it is found that the order of dismissal was not justified. He further contended that it is quite common and usual for persons belonging to the lower strata of society, such as the 2nd respondent, to use abusive language and under such circumstances, the Supreme Court held that imposition of lesser punishment under Section 11-A is justifiable.
5. The findings against the 2nd respondent as held at the domestic enquiry and confirmed by the Labour Court are that the 2nd respondent assaulted the security manager, resulting in minor injuries to him and abused him in filthy language, and he was convicted under Section 323 IPC. On the question of past record of the 2nd respondent it was found that the 2nd respondent was earlier charge-sheeted on June 13, 1986 for riotous and disorderly behaviour by way of picking up a quarrel and assaulting a contractor's supervisor, resulting in administration of a warning to him on January 11, 1988, for subversion and indiscipline.
6. Dealing with the power of the Labour Court to interfere with the punishment under Section 11-A, this Court in APSRTC v. Addl. Labour Court 1984 (1) LLJ 128, held as follows: at 132 "No doubt, under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, even in a case where a Tribunal upholds the findings of misconduct recorded by the management at the domestic enquiry, the Tribunal can interfere with the punishment awarded by the management and alter the same. But, in exercising the discretionary power conferred on the tribunal by Section 11-A to interfere with the punishment, the discretion should not be exercised in an arbitrary manner but it should be exercised in a judicial and judicious manner. Before interfering with the punishment imposed by the management, the Tribunal must take into consideration all the relevant facts and factors and can interfere with the punishment imposed by the management only when it comes to the conclusion that the punishment imposed is extremely harsh and unjust and wholly disproportionate to the misconduct proved."
Before interfering with the punishment imposed by the management, the Tribunal must take into consideration all the relevant facts and factors in which event alone it can interfere with the punishment. The discretion in interfering with the punishment should not be exercised in an arbitrary manner and it should be exercised judicially and in judicious manner.
7. It has to be examined whether all the facts and factors have been considered by the Labour Court while exercising power under Section 11-A of the Act and whether the discretion exercised by the Labour Court is judicial and in a judicious manner. The factors which weighed at the domestic enquiry while imposing the extreme penalty of removal from service are that the workman assaulted the security manager and abused him in a filthy language. The Tribunal totally left out of consideration the fact that the workman assaulted the security manager. Without taking into consideration that factor also, which is very important, the facts and factors considered by the Tribunal were not complete and the exercise of power under Section 11-A was not justified. Even while considering the other factors against the workman, namely, that he abused the security manager in a filthy language, the Tribunal did not consider the nature of the abusive language used against him. The observations of the Supreme Court in Ved Prakash Gupta v. Delton Cable India (P) Ltd. 1984-I-LLJ-546 relied on by the learned Counsel for the workman does not help him. The nature of the abusive language attributed to the workman in that case is not clear from the said decision and it cannot be inferred that the Supreme Court would have come to the same conclusion, had it considered the abusive language used by the 2nd respondent in this case. The ribaldry indulged in by the 2nd respondent against the security manager is extracted in the judgment of the Tribunal. I would loath to repeat the same to form part of this judgment. It is the most filthy and foul language which cannot be said to be the language used by even the poorest and the most deprived sections of the Indian society. It will not be fair to say that the Supreme Court would have given a judicial recognition that the lower Sections of the Indian society commonly indulge or take pleasure in using such language. It is necessary that each case should be considered on its own merits and that no general principle can be laid down that all types of abusive language can be condoned.
8. It was necessary for the Tribunal to consider the effect of assault on the security manager by the workman in considering the question whether the punishment imposed was proper or not. It is also necessary for the Tribunal to consider the gravity of the abusive language which is found to have been used by the workman against the security manager in exercising power under Section 11-A of the Act. One more factor relating to the past conduct of the workman leading to a warning being administered for riotous and disorderly behaviour of the workman, is also relevant. The Tribunal ought not to have automatically interfered with the punishment without going into these factors which are relevant. The impugned order cannot be sustained as there is no judicial exercise of power under Section 11-A and there was no consideration of all the facts and factors and it is accordingly quashed. The Tribunal is directed to consider all the relevant facts and factors, as indicated above and to deal with the matter afresh, under Section 11-A of the Act. The writ petition is accordingly allowed.
No order as to costs.