Punjab-Haryana High Court
Shyma vs Sh. Sanjay Chopra on 9 September, 1999
Equivalent citations: (1999)123PLR593
Author: Swatanter Kumar
Bench: Swatanter Kumar
ORDER Swatanter Kumar, J.
1. To an application under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred as the Act), filed by the wife, the husband not only raised vacuous contest but also made a counter, claim, claiming maintenance pendente lite from the wife. The husband owns property and a printing press in Delhi but still claims to be earning Rs. 1,500/- per month. In these circumstances, the husband presses for the claim of maintenance from his destitute wife, who is bringing up a minor child as well.
2. In order to discuss the issue with some elucidation, reference to basic facts, would be necessary.
3. Shyama was married to Sanjay Chopra on 20th April, 1992 at New Delhi. The parties lived together as husband and wife and a male child was born from this wedlock on 18th January, 1994. However, according to the wife, serious differences arose between the parties, primarily for the default of the husband and the cruelty inflicted upon her by her husband and his family members. The husband is alleged to be a drug addict and used to ill treat the wife as well as the child. Compelled with these circumstances and ill treatment that was meted out to her she was thrown out of the matrimonial home. She claims to be staying with her parents at Ludhiana. She was working as a teacher, but her services were terminated because of the notice issued by her husband to the Principal of the School, where she was working and, as such, she is without independent source of income sufficient to maintain herself and her minor child. Compelled by these circumstances, she filed a petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. 1955 praying for a decree of divorce of the marriage between the parties. This petition was filed on 6th August, 1995.
4. The petition was contested by the husband, who disputed the averments made in the petition and showed his intention to rehabilitate his matrimonial home.
5. During the pendency of the divorce petition before the learned Additional District Judge, Ludhaina, issues were framed on the pleading of the parties and issue No. 4 was treated as primary issue, as it related to territorial jurisdiction of the Court at Ludhiana. Learned Additional District Judge, vide his order dated 13th August, 1998 answered issue No. 4 in favour of the respondent and against the applicant-wife resulting in the filing of the First Appeal against the Order being F.A.O. No. 168-M of 1998.
6. The present application under Section 24 of the Act has been filed by the wife during the pendency of appeal on 9th March, 1999. According to the wife, the husband owns properties and is having a printing press and his monthly income is Rs. 15,000/- and she prayed for maintenance at the rate of Rs. 5,000/- per month for herself and Rs. 2,000/- per month for the minor child. She also prays for litigation expenses of Rs.20,000/-. Relevant para 4 of the application reads as under:-
"4. That admittedly the respondent-husband owns triple storey house in Pitampura, New Delhi and running a Printing Press and has a business of shares. His income in these days is not less than Rs. 15,000/- per month. Hence in the interest of justice an adequate maintenance pendente lite deserves to be allowed during the pendency of appeal to the wife and also the minor child. The appellant prays that an amount of Rs. 5,000/- per month towards maintenance pendente lite may be granted to her and Rs. 2,000/- per month to the minor child."
7. This application was contested by the respondent-husband, who, as already noticed, raised the counter claim by making following averments against his wife and claimed a sum of Rs. 10,000/- per month maintenance pendente lite and Rs. 25,000/- expenses from the wife. The relevant paragraph of the reply reads as under:-
".....The respondent understands that the appellant-wife is doing the job of a teacher at or about Ludhiana and earning more than Rs. 20,000/- per month from her job and tuition work being done by her. So by no stretch of imagination can it be said that the appellant-wife has no source of income. Further more, it is also submitted that the present respondent and his father had been depositing money in favour of the appellant-wife from time to time during her stay at Delhi. In addition to depositing the said money, the present respondent had made investments in the name of the appellant-wife from U.T.I, and also from other companies amounting to Rs. 15,000/- and in this way a sum of more than Rs. 30,000/- had been deposited in the individual and sole name of the appellant-wife in savings bank account which can be withdrawn at any time by the appellant-wife. Thus,-it is apparent that not only the appellant-wife is able to maintain herself but also the present respondent and his other family members had in fact been depositing money in her sole name.
xx xx xx It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that the present application under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 filed by the appellant-wife may please be dismissed alongwith costs and she may very kindly be directed to pay to the respondent-husband a sum of Rs. 10,000/- per month as maintenance pendente lite and a sum of Rs. 20,000/- as the litigation expenses in the interest of justice."
8. At the very outset, I must notice that re-conciliation efforts attempted by this Court on various occasions failed to yield any result to re-settle the, matrimonial home between the parties. It is for this reason that the application remained pending for some time. During the reconciliation proceedings, the parties were directed to be present in Court and on 25th February, 1999, when the parties were present, some questions were put to the parties in the open Court and on the basis of the submission made by time, the following order was recorded.
"Husband, who is present in person, submits that he has triple storeyed house in Pitampura, New Delhi. His sister is running a Beauty Parlour, where the wife was also working earlier, at the top floor of the said house. He further states that he is running a printing press at 3873, Mori Gate, New Delhi under the name and style of Sudesh Printers. He further says that he is not earning even Rs. 2,000/- per month and it is not possible for him to give any more amount than Rs. 300/- per month to the child.
The wife, who is also present in Court, submits that her husband is a drug addict and there is a threat to her life. The environment of the house of her husband is such which would be prejudicial to the welfare of the child, therefore, she does not wish to leave her child there. She further says that in the interest of child and to save her life, if the husband is ready to give divorce, she would not claim permanent alimony but the rights of the minor child should be protected.
Counsel for the parties pray for some time to consider other proposals in regard to the settlement of the matter. Counsel for the respondent submits that the child should be directed to produce in the Court as the respondent has not seen his child for more than four years. The child is directed to be produced in Court on 11th March, 1999 at 10.00 a.m. A sum of Rs. 500/- has been paid in advance to the wife in Court on account of expenses for travelling of the mother and the child.
List on 11.3.1999."
9. In view of the above narrated facts, the controversy between the parties falls in a very narrow compass. The wife has admitted that she had been working as a teacher. However, her services were terminated by the School authorities because her husband served a notice upon the Principal of the School making irresponsible allegations against the wife. This notice was served upon the school-authorities on 1.5.1995 and the School authorities, vide order dated 9th May, 1995, terminated of the services of the wife. The said letter reads as under:-
"KUNDAN VIDYA MANDIR CIVIL LINES, LUDHIANA Ref. No. KVM 14/95/138 Dated 09.5.1995 Mrs. Shyama Mehta, Kundan Vidya Mandir, Civil Lines, Ludhiana.
Dear Madam, With reference to our letter No. KVM/94/924 dated November 16, 1994.
Your services are no longer required in the School. You will, therefore, cease to be on the staff of the School w.e.f. May 10, 1995 (F.N).
The dues if any will be paid to you as per the School rules.
(Dr. D.B. Sharma) Principal.
Copy to:
Vice Principal - for necessary information.
Bursar and Acct. for necessary action."
10. The loss of job obviously would have created serious problem to the wife to make her both ends meet and to bring up the minor child in a proper and required/desired manner. Even if she is doing some tuition work and making efforts to make her both ends meet, in the present day of high costs of living, this cannot operate as a bar for her to claim maintenance from her husband. The wife is entitled to enjoy the same status, socially and financially, which she would have enjoyed if she would have continued to live with her husband. The husband has made vague and wild averments in the reply. He has given no particulars such as, against which account the money was deposited, when it was deposited and the number of U.T.I. Such vague pleadings having been specifically denied by the wife would not carry the case of the husband any further for the purpose of determination of this application and counter claim raised by him. The court may even assume that the wife being an educated person, would be earning something from tuition work, though the husband has placed no definite material on record or any concrete documentary evidence in support of the averments he has made in reply to the application, which would form basis for taking a prima facie view by the Court, admittedly, the minor child has no source of income and is totally depended upon his mother for his day to day needs.
11. Coming to the case of the respondent husband, in his submissions before the Court he had clearly admitted that his family owns three storeyed house in New Delhi. He is having a Printing Press. But he has stated that he is not earning even Rs. 2,000/- per month from his business and cannot give more than Rs. 300/- per month to the minor child.
12. In the reply to the application filed by the husband, there is no specific averments made by him. Rather he has opted to vaguely deny the averments, which, in fact, is contrary to his submissions made before the Court. Once the husband owns the property, where his sister is carrying business of Beauty Parlour at the top floor and he is having a Printing Press under the name and style of Sudesh Printers, it was for the husband to bring on record the relevant documentary evidence to show that his income was less than Rs. 2,000/- per month. Admittedly, the husband has placed no document on record such as income tax return or assessment order in relation to running of his business of printing press. In other words, the husband has intentionally withheld the best evidence, which was in his power and possession from the Court. The husband cannot take advantage of such a situation, which has been crated by him alone. On the one hand, he got the services of his wife terminated and on the other hand he claims to have hardly any income despite admittedly owning property and business. This version of the husband apparently has no credence or genuineness.
13. It is a settled principle of law that in such proceedings, which are summary proceedings and are primarily to be decided on the basis of documentary evidence/affidavit produced by the parties, by forming a prima facie view, the onus lies on the parties to bring the best evidence in their power and possession on record. The strict and stringent application of principle of onus based finding may result in frustrating the very object and purpose behind the enactment of the provisions of Section 24 of the Act. Such provisions must be construed liberally and in favour of the person intended to be benefited therefrom. Every party to a lis before the Court is under a legal and moral obligation to disclose the true and correct facts and place the best evidence. In its power and possession on record to enable the Court to do complete justice between the parties to the proceedings.
14. This Court in the case of Gurvinder Singh v. Harjit Kaur and Anr. (1998-2)119 P.L.R. 422 held as under:-
".....It is expected from every litigant irrespective of the fact whether he is seeking relief from the Court or not that he would state true and correct facts. There is not only implied but specific obligation upon every party who approaches the Court to verify the facts true to the knowledge and belief of the party specially in the cases of present kind where the Curt has to take prima facie view keeping in mind the urgency of the matter regarding grant or refusal of maintenance. Primarily the onus has to be discharged by respective parties in support of the averments made in the application or reply as the case may be. Concept of heavy burden of proof would be applicable during the trial where the parties have the liberty to lead oral and documentary evidence in support of their case. The Court would be well within its jurisdiction to draw adverse inference against a party who actually or attempt to withhold the best, evidence and true facts from the Court with intention to frustrate the claim of others at this preliminary stage of proceedings ...."
15. The principle in the case of Gurvinder Singh (supra) is fundamentally supported by the principle settled by the Hon'ble Court in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraua Naidu (dead) by LRs v. Jagannath (dead) by LRs and Ors., (1995-1)109 P.L.R. 293, where the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:-
The facts of the present case leave no manner of doubt that Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the Court. A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. Jagannath was working as a clerk with Chunilal Sowear. He purchased the property in the Court auction on behalf of Chunilal Sowear. He had, on his own volition, executed the registered release deed (Ex.B-15) in favour of Chunilal Sowear regarding the property in dispute. He knew that the appellants had paid the total decretal amount to his master Chunilal Sowear. Without disclosing all these facts, he filed the suit for the partition of the property on the ground that he had purchased the property on his own behalf and not on behalf of Chunilal Sowear. Non-production and even non-mentioning of the release deed at the trial is tantamount to playing fraud on the Court. We do not agree with the observations of the High Court that the appellant-defendants could have easily produced the certified registered copy of Ex.B-15 and non-suited the plaintiff. A litigant who approaches the Court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party....."
16. Both the husband and the wife owe an obligation to look after their minor child and to do all acts and deeds possible within their means for the welfare of their child. This Court in the case of Dr. R.K. Sood v. Usha Rani Sood, (1996-3)114 P.L.R. 186, held as under:-
"17. Under the Hindu Law father not only has a moral but even a statutory obligation to maintain his infant children. The scope of his duty is to be regulated directly in relation to the money, status, that the father enjoys. The right of maintenance of a child from his father cannot be restricted to two meals a day but must be determined on the basis of the benefit status and money that the child would have enjoyed as if he was living with the family including his mother and father. Irrespective of the differences and grievances which each spouse may have against the other, the endeavour of the Court has to be to provide the best to the child in the facts and circumstances of each case and more so keeping the welfare of the child in mind for all such determinations. Liability to maintain one's children is clear from the text of this statute as well as the various decided cases in this regard. The statutory obligation is paramount to the wish of the father and he cannot be permitted to limit this claim of the child on flimsy and baseless grounds."
17. The apathetic conduct of the husband toward his wife and minor child and the process of law certainly is not worthy of any commendation. In fact, it is a glaring example of serious attempts to frustrate the due process of law. Certain litigants by their clever acts are able to create an exception to the basic maxim Lexnil frustra jubet (law commands nothing vainly) and conveniently avoid execution of the orders of the Court. Reply to the application under Section 24 of the Act is vague, indefinite and so is the counter claim. Having admitted before the Court that he owns property and a printing press, the counter claim for maintenance pendente lite made by the husband is totally unfounded. Having lost even upto the Hon'ble Supreme court of India in proceedings initiated by the wife under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the counter claim is nothing but a counter-bias. The unhealthy attitude of the husband is further demonstrated by his unscrupulous participation in instrumenting the termination of services of his wife from the school. Thus, frustrating the orders of the Court passed under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, by not even making the payment of the amount legally payable to the wife.
18. The cumulative effect of this uncharitable conduct of the husband is nothing but a great negligent on his part. This is equivalent to fraud on process of law. In other words, it unequivocally demonstrate the Magis de bono quam de malo lex Intendit (law favours a good rather than a bad).
19. At this stage, it must be noticed that, vide order dated 11th June, 1998, the learned Magistrate, had directed the husband to pay maintenance at the rate of Rs. 400/- per month to the wife and Rs. 300/- per month to the minor child with effect from the date of the application. This order was challenged by the respondent-husband in Criminal Revision No. 676 of 1998 in this High Court, of course, unsuccessfully. The High Court in Criminal Revision No. 676 of 1998 decided on 8th January, 1999, inter se the parties, after taking into consideration the entire material and the submission made on behalf of the parties held as under:-
"......Husband, to my mind, has not called upon the wife to resume conjugal society with him after he had obtained the decree of restitution of conjugal rights and therefore, it cannot be said that the wife had withdrawn from his society without reasonable cause or excuse. In the execution proceedings also, the wife could urge that her withdrawal from the society of the husband was for sufficient cause or excuse, more particularly when it was on ex-parte decree.
XX XX XX On his own showing, he stated that he is earning Rs. 2,000/- per month. It is generally seen that where a person is called upon to discharge his liability, he under states his income. Sanjay Chopra is liable to maintain his wife whom he has married. Liability to maintain the wife arise from the very concept of marriage. Maintenance allowed to the wife and child is not on higher side. So, this revision fails and is dismissed."
20. Having failed to forward the case of the respondent on factual premises, learned counsel for the respondent-husband raised two fold contentions; (a) that the wife cannot claim maintenance for the minor child under Section 24 of the Act; and, as such, the relief is not permissible in law and (b) the respondent has got an exparte decree of conjugal rights against the applicant-wife, which per se disentitle the wife from claiming maintenance.
21. As far as the first contention is concerned, this is no more res-integra and settled by a Division Bench Judgement of this Court which was followed in the case of Dr. R.K. Sood (supra) and the Court held as under:-
"10. The scope of this section is not restricted. In fact it is in aid to the provisions of Section 24 of the Act. The right to claim maintenance is not only granted to either of spouse to the marriage but also to the children born from the marriage. The court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 26 of the Act can pass interim orders with respect not only to the custody, education etc. of the minor children but also with regard to their maintenance. The Legislature imposes an obligation upon the Court to pass such orders at the time of passing of a decree or even thereafter on the application of the children.....which will be consistent with the wishes of the children as far as possible. The intention of the Legislature to grant definite protection to the minor children is clearly indicated in the scheme of the Act and more particularly relating to grant of maintenance.
11. Hindu Marriage Act is primarily a social legislation intended to provide protection to the spouses to a marriage and their children. While looking into the provisions of a social legislation the object sought to be achieved by such legislation becomes a paramount consideration before the Courts. It is also an equally, settled principle of law that if there is a power provided under a statute for claiming a relief, then mere mentioning of a wrong provision or incorrect section would not disentitle the party to such a relief from the Court if otherwise permissible and can be granted within the four corners of the Statute. It will hardly be just fair for a father to avoid his liability to pay maintenance to his child and such a technical objection which in any case is not even sustainable. The present application is not stated to have been filed under Section 24 of the Act, as it does not say so. So the objection itself is ill founded. The application is and in any case can easily be treated as an application under Section 26 of the Act where filing of such an application is specifically permissible. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Usha v. Sudhir Kumar, (1974)76 P.L.R. 196 held as under:-
"There is no doubt that under Section 24 of the Act the child cannot claim maintenance and is only either of the two spouses, who can make a claim. At the same time, it is clear that a claim can be made for maintenance of a child during a proceeding under the Act and the Court can in exercise of powers vested in it by Section 26 of the Act pass such interim orders in any proceeding under the Act, from time to time, as it may deem just and proper with respect to the maintenance and education of minor children, consistently with their wishes, wherever possible. But even if no application under Section 26 is made and a wife makes an application under Section 24 and claim that the amount which she necessarily requires to maintain herself includes the provisions for necessities for her infant child, the same can no doubt be taken into account in fixing the quantum of allowance under the provisions."
13. As already discussed certain observations of the Division Bench in Ram Lal's case (supra) are on different facts and are of not much help to the husband. Secondly the judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Mrs. Usha (supra) was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench. The earlier co-ordinate Bench had laid down after detailed discussion certain principles of law and the observations of the subsequent Division Bench would no way alter such principles of law. The observations of the subsequent co-ordinate Bench in my humble view will have to be read as per incuriam on the basis of the settled principles of stare decisis. It appears that the earlier Division Bench's view of this Court was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench dealing with the case of Ram Lal (supra): In this regard it will be appropriate to make a reference to the judgment of the Supreme court in the case of Assistant Collector of Estate Duty, Madras v. Smt. V. Devaki Ammal, Madras, J.T. 1994(7) S.C. 513 and Bhagwan Dass Arora v. First Additional District Judge, Rampur and Ors., A.I.R. 1983 Supreme Court 954. In this regard reference can also be made to the cases of Fitrat Faza Khan v. State of Utter Pradesh and Ors., 1982(2) S.C.C. 449; Bachan Singh v. The State of Punjab etc. etc., 1982(3) S.C.C. 24 and A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and Anr., 1988(2) S.C.C. 602.
14. In view of the above discussion and the facts and circumstances of this case the objection raised by the counsel for the petitioner is not maintainable and merits rejection. A specific right has been granted to the children to claim maintenance in their own right under the provisions of Section 26 of the Act during pendency of any proceedings under the Act. Further more, even a mother can claim maintenance on behalf of the minor child along with her under the provisions of Section 24 of the Act, as such a right is fully recognised in law."
22. For the aforesaid reasons, I have no hesitation in rejecting the first contention raised on behalf of the husband.
23. Now coming to the second contention raised by the respondent husband, the same also deserves to be rejected.
24. Firstly the same contention was raised before the High Court in Criminal Revision No. 676 of 1998 which was rejected by the Court and Special Leave Petition against the said judgment of the High Court has admittedly been dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. Secondly, an ex-parte decree for restitution of conjugal right cannot be held to be a bar to the maintainability of a petition under Section 24 of the Act. The relief like maintenance, permanent alimony under Section 25 of the Act can be granted to the wife, even upon final culmination of the proceedings under various provisions of the Act. Thus, it does not stand to reasoning as to how the interim relief can be declined to the wife. The wife is intending to initiate proceedings against the ex-parte decree and such decree to say the least can not frustrate a legitimate, socially and legally protected, right of the wife and the minor child of maintenance under Section 24 of the Act. This view was taken by Orissa High Court, in the case of Ramesh Chandra Mishra v. Kanchan Bala Mishra, 1986(2) Hindu Law Reporter 296.
25. Even this Court as well as the Karnataka High Court have taken the view that existence of a decree under Section 9 of the Act is no ground for refusing of maintenance to the wife. In this regard, reference can be made to the cases K. Narayan Roa v. Bhagya Lakshmi, 1984 Criminal Law Journal 276, and Jai Kaur v. Ajaib Singh, 1988(1) Hindu Law Reporter 340.
26. The intention and conduct of the husband, who has obtained such decree would again be a relevant consideration for determining the maintenance within the purview and scope of Section 24 of the Act. Where the conduct clearly shows that the petition itself lacks bonafide intention to resume conjugal right, this could hardly be raised as a defence for refusing the maintenance to the wife. The conduct of the husband has been of such a nature that lacks bonafide on his part at every stage. His sole aim appears to be more to embarrass and expose his destitute wife and the minor child to the rigours of repeated litigations.
27. This Court in the case of Roop Narain v. Padma Wati,7 1977 (3) Hindu Law Reporter 245 held as under:-
" .... In the context of the trick, it became necessary for the lower court to refer to the earlier conduct of the husband. The husband has been clearly trying to take advantage of the trick, which he played upon his wife. The appeal filed by him is, therefore, dismissed with costs."
28. The Legislative intent behind the provisions of Sections 9 and 24 of the Act are totally independent to each other. The criteria for deciding petitions/applications under these respective provisions is guided by judicial discretion founded on well settled canons of law falling in different compartments. These provisions in no way are destructive of the remedy available under either of the provisions. They must be construed together harmoniously to achieve the basic object underlying this social welfare legislation.
29. For the aforesaid reasons, I have no apprehension in coming to the conclusion that the second contention raised on behalf of the respondent is also liable to be rejected.
30. Now the only factor that remains to be determined is the quantum of maintenance which should be paid by the husband to the wife and minor child. The Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of Smt. Jasbir Kaur Sehgal v. The District Judge Dehradun and Ors., (1998-2)119 P.L.R. 515 (S.C) held as under:-
"No set formula can be laid for fixing the amount of maintenance. It has, in very nature of things, to depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Some scope for leverage can, however, be always there. Court has to consider the status of the parties, their respective needs, capacity of the husband to pay having regard to his reasonable expenses for his own maintenance and those he is obliged under the law and statutory but involuntary payments or deductions,. Amount of maintenance fixed for the wife should be such as she can live in reasonable comfort considering her status and the mode of life she was used to when she lived with her husband and also that she does not feel handicapped in the prosecution of her case. Her right to claim maintenance fructifies on the date of the filing of the petition for divorce under the Act. Having thus fixed the date as the filing of the petition for divorce it is not always that the Court has to grant the maintenance from that date. The Court has discretion in the matter as to from which date maintenance under Section 24 of the Act should be granted. The discretion of the Court would depend upon multiple circumstances which are to be kept in view, These could be the time taken to serve the respondent in the petition, the date of filing of the application under Section 24 of the Act; conduct of the parties in the proceedings averments made in the application and the reply thereto; the tendency of the wife to inflate the income out of all proportion and that of the husband to suppress the same; and the like. There has to be honesty of purpose for both the parties which unfortunately we find lacking in this case."
31. Reasonable standard of comfort and necessary expenses so as to enable the applicant to make her both ends meet in day to day life would be the basic factor to determine such application. The applicant would be entitled to the same financial and social status coupled with security to life as the applicant would have enjoyed if continued to live with the husband. Such principle would have to be enforced with greater rigours where the minor child from the marriage between the parties is also involved. There are compelling circumstances. Which justify that the wife had to live away from her husband and according to her it is even for the betterment and welfare of the minor child. In Criminal Revision No. 676 of 1998, the Court has already taken this view and I find no reason to differ with the view taken by the other Hon'ble Judge of this Court.
32. The husband has admittedly got proper Printing Press and he has failed to disclose his correct means before this court. This Court cannot believe unsubstantiated version of the husband that he is earning only Rs. 2,000/- per month. At the same time, it may not be possible for this Court to accept the version of the wife that the husband has the income of more than Rs. 15,000/- per month. But in the facts and circumstances of the case, it could safely be concluded that the husband is earning more than Rs. 7,000-8,000/- per month and obviously has some income from the property and business which admittedly belongs to him.
33. In view of the above detailed discussion and rejection of the submission? made on behalf of the respondent-husband, it would be just, fair and equitable for this Court to hold that the wife has no independent income sufficient to maintain herself and her minor child to the reasonable accepted standard of life.
34. Resultantly, the husband shall pay a sum of Rs. 1,800/- per month i.e. Rs. 1,000/- to the wife and Rs. 800/- to the minor child as maintenance pendente lite during the pendency of the appeal. Further he shall pay a sum of Rs. 5,000/-on account of litigation expenses to the wife. The maintenance shall be payable from the date of the application i.e. with effect from March, 1999.
35. Consequently, this application is allowed in the above terms. However, there shall be no order as to costs.