Bombay High Court
Chimanlal Narsaji Suhan vs Parasmal Mithalal Parmar & Another on 5 August, 1997
Equivalent citations: 1998(1)BOMCR624
Author: A.P. Shah
Bench: A.P. Shah, B.B. Vagyani
ORDER A.P. Shah, J.
1. This appeal by the original plaintiff is directed against the order dated 18th February, 1997 whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the plaintiff's notice of motion for interim injunction, me appellant is manufacturer and dealer in buckets, milk cans, containers and sieves and other similar goods. The appellant alleges that he has adopted trade mark and label mark consisting of the words "OM PRABHAT" written in English and device of "COW in respect of buckets, milk cans and sieves in the year 1972. The trade mark and label are at Exs. A-1 and A-2 to the plaint. The essential features of the trade mark given in Ex. A-1 are the device of cow within two curved lines. Above the said device of cow, the words "OM PRABHAT" are represented along the top curved line and the bottom curved line similarly followed alongwith the word "BOMBAY" so as form the ground or base of the said device. The trade mark Ex. A-2 consist of the words "OM PRABHAT" written with an oval like device and is embossed on the product in addition to the printing on the outer package. On 20th August, 1975 the appellant applied for registration of the trade mark Ex. A-1 under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (hereinafter called "the Act") and the same has been registered under No. 307852 in respect of buckets included in Class 21 for sale in the State of Maharashtra, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu on 18th July, 1979. The trade mark OM PRABHAT was registered under the Act as a trade mark No. 351518 in respect of sieves, milk cans and winnowing baskets. According to the appellant, the device of cow is the most essential integral and memorable part of the trade mark registered under No. 307852. The milk dhabbas, milk cans and buckets of the appellant bearing the said label are identified by the members of the public as the COW BRAND products of the appellant alone and of none else in the market. In or about 1990 the appellant added the words "GAI CHAAP" above the upper curved line and commenced describing the said device in Devnagiri script also. The said trade mark is continued to be used till today in respect of buckets including milk cans. According to the appellant the products bearing the aforesaid trade mark of the appellant are very popular. The appellant has annexed to the plaint the sale figures of the appellant's product at Ex. B.
2. The appellant has alleged that in or about 1993 he came across an advertisement in the Trade Mark Journal dated 16th November, 1994 for a label mark sought to be registered by the first respondent in respect of milk cans and buckets in respect of which the appellant's trade mark is already registered. The essential features of the said trade mark sought to be registered was a device of cow enclosed within two curved lines. The words COW BRAND were written under the top curved line and the word BOMBAY was written below the bottom curved line. Since the said trade mark was nothing but a slavish copy of the appellant's trade mark No. 307852, the appellant opposed the registration of the said trade mark by filing a notice of opposition in or about 9th March, 1994. In the reply filed by the respondents to the opposition, it was contended that the first respondent had applied for registration of another trade mark bearing No. 493496 having a device of Ox and has been using both the trade marks. On taking search at the Trade Marks Registry, the appellant found that the said trade mark had been advertised in the Trade Marks Journal No. 1064 dated 1st October, 1993 in respect of milk cans in Class 21. The essential features of the said trade mark sought to be registered was a device of an Ox enclosed in two similar curved lines. The word OX BRAND was written under the top curved line and the word BOMBAY ;s appearing below the bottom curved line. The trade mark was proposed to be used respect of milk can. Thereafter the appellant came across another advertisement in the Trade Mark Journal No. 1102 dated 1st May, 1995 of a trade mark consisting of the device cow within two curved lines and words COW BRAND written above the said device and the word BOMBAY below the bottom curved line. The said trade mark was advertised under Application No. 493946-8. This was stated to be the correct mark to be read and deemed under the said application. This application was also opposed by the appellant. It is stated that the entire label under application referred to above is also a slavish copy of the appellant's registered label mark except that the words OM PRABHAT have been replaced with the words COW BRAND. On enquiries having been made the appellant found that no goods bearing the marks COW BRAND and OX BRAND were available. However, it came to the appellant's notice in July, 1995 that the respondents have commenced the sale of milk cans and buckets bearing the trade marks COW BRAND and OX BRAND and has embossed the same on his goods. The appellant also learnt that in or about the first week of August, 1995 the respondents had commenced sale of sieves bearing the trade mark OM PARAS which is deeptively similar to the word OM PRABHAT. Hence it is pleaded that the respondents have infringed the appellant's registered trade mark Nos. 307852 and 351518. The appellant by an Advocate's notice called upon the respondents to cease and desist from infringing the appellant's trade mark and further from using the said marks so as to pass off their goods as and for that of the appellant. These facts have been reiterated in the affidavit in support of the notice of motion.
3. In reply, the respondents have contended that the appellant's trade mark consisting of the words OM PRABHAT and the device of a cow is registered only in respect of buckets whereas the respondents are using the trade mark OX BRAND and COW BRAND along with the devices of an ox and cow respectively only in respect of milk cans. As far as the sieves are concerned, the appellant's mark OM PRABHAT (word per se) is registered subject to a disclaimer of the word OM whereas the respondents are using the trade mark OM PARAS which is visually, phonetically and conceptually quite different. The product of the respondents are sold under a totally different trade mark. Similarly on the question of alleged passing off, the claims of the appellant are not supported by any documentary evidence. It was also contended that the trade mark OM PRABHAT (word per se) are registered in respect of, inter alia, sieves, subject to a disclaimer of the word OM. Consequently the appellant has no right to use the word OM. It was also contended that the words GAI CHAAP in the trade mark were used only since the year 1990. On the other hand, the respondents have been using the words OX BRAND and COW BRAND in respect of milk cans since the year 1988. Hence the application of the respondent No. 1 for registration of these two marks dated 6th July, 1988. Thus the rights of the respondents are protected under section 33 of the Act. It was contended that the respondents have been selling the products under the disputed trade marks over the last seven years to the full knowledge of the appellant. Having slept over the matter, the appellant cannot be granted any interim relief. There is no similarity let alone any deceptive similarity between OM PRABHAT on the one hand and OX BRAND, COW BRAND and OM PARAS on the other. The respondents made a grievance that the appellant failed to offer inspection of the invoice books for the period relied commencing from 1986 upto the date of commencement of the suit.
4. Before the learned Single Judge at the time of hearing of the notice of motion, learned Counsel for the respondents made a statement that as far as cow brand is concerned, the first respondent will not use the same in relation to the milk can during the pendency of the proceedings. The learned Single Judge expressed that it would be difficult to conclude that the device of "cow" is likely to be confused with the device of a "bull". A milkman who is going to buy the "can" for selling milk would be able to distinguish a "bull" from a "cow". So far as OM PRABHAT and OM PARAS are concerned, the learned Single Judge observed that they are logos printed in English. Any customer who is going to buy on the basis of the English trade mark would obviously be familiar with the English language. These words are not likely to be confused with each other. In that view of the matter, the learned Judge dismissed the notice of motion.
5. We have heard Shri Tulzapurkar for the appellant and Shri Kane for the respondents. The trade mark of the respondents consists of a device of an OX enclosed in two similar curved lines. The words OX BRAND is written under the top curved line and the word BOMBAY is appearing below the bottom curved line. In the first place we find that the manner in which the two curved lines are placed in the respondents' trade mark and the words OX BRAND and BOMBAY are written, is very similar to the appellant's trade mark. It is true that while the picture device used by the respondents consist of an OX, the device in the appellant's trade mark consist of COW. Nevertheless both the devices bear a clear resemblance. Moreover, in comparing marks, regard must be had not only to their form as they appear on the Register but also to the appearance they would present in actual user. It is pertinent to note that these marks are embossed on the milk cans manufactured by the parties. The embossed milk cans were produced for our examination. The embossed version on the milk cans looks almost identical. It is therefore not possible to agree with the view taken by the learned Judge that the device of cow is not likely to be confused with the device of ox. One cannot compare two trade marks by putting them side by side by trying to find out similarities and differences in the two marks. What one has to see is the overall impression which the trade mark gives. Because this is what the members of the public carry in their minds, (see: M/s. National Chemicals & Colour Co. v. Reckitt & Colman of India Ltd.) .
6. Kerly in his Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names, 12th Edition, paragraph 17-08 states :
"Two marks, when placed side by side, may exhibit many and various differences, yet the main idea left on the mind by both may be the same. A person acquainted with one mark, and not having the two side by side for comparison, might well be deceived, if the goods were allowed to be impressed with the second mark, into a belief that he was dealing with goods which bore the same mark as that with which he was acquainted. Thus, for example, a mark may represent a game of football;" another mark may show players in a different dress, and in very different positions, and yet the idea conveyed by each might be simply a game of football. It would be too much to expect that persons dealing with trade-marked goods, and relying, as they frequently do, upon marks, should be able to remember the exact details of the marks upon the goods with which they are in the habit of dealing. Marks are remembered rather by general impressions or by some significant detail than by any photographic recollection of the whole. Moreover, variations in details might well be supposed by customers to have been made by the owners of the trade mark they are already acquainted with for reasons of their own."
7. In Durga Dutt Sharma v. N.P. Laboratories, Ayyangar, J., speaking for the Bench, observed :
"When once the use by the defendant of the mark which is claimed to infringe the plaintiff's mark is shown to be "in the course of trade" the question whether there has been an infringement is to be decided by comparison of the marks. Where the two marks are identical no further questions arise; for then the infringement is made out. When the two marks are not identical, the plaintiff would have to establish that the mark used by the defendant so nearly resembles the plaintiff's registered trade mark as is likely to deceive or cause confusion and in relation to goods in respect of which it is registered. Where the question arises in an action for infringement the onus would be on the plaintiff to establish that the trade mark used by the defendant in the course of trade in the goods in respect of which his mark is registered, is deceptively similar. This has necessarily to be ascertained by a comparison of the two marks - the degree of resemblance which is necessary to exist to cause deception not being capable of definition by laying down objective standards. The persons who would be deceived are, of course, the purchasers of the goods and it is the likelihood of their being deceived that is the subject of consideration. The resemblance may be phonetic, visual or in the basic idea represented by the plaintiff's mark. The purpose of the comparison is for determining whether the essential features of the plaintiff's trade mark are to be found in that used by the defendant. The identification of the essential features of the mark is in essence a question of fact and depends on the judgment of the Court based on the evidence led before it as regards the usage of the trade. It should, however, be borne in mind that the object of the enquiry in ultimate analysis is whether the mark used by the defendant as a whole is deceptively similar to that of the registered mark of the plaintiff."
8. In the case of F. Hoffimann La Roch and Co. Ltd. v. Geoffery Manners and Co. Pvt. Ltd., , the Supreme Court has laid down test for determining whether one mark is deceptively similar to another. It has held that the marks must be compared as a whole. It is not right to take a portion of the word and say that because that portion of the word differs from the corresponding portion of the word in the other case there is no sufficient similarity to cause confusion. The true test is whether the totality of the proposed trade mark is such that it is likely to cause deception or confusion or mistake in the minds of persons accustomed to the existing trade mark. The Supreme Court cited with approval the test formulated by Lord Parkar in Pianotist Co. Ltd.'s case, in 1906(23) R.P.C. 774:
"You must take the two words. You must Judge them, both by their look and by their sound. You must consider the goods to which they are to be applied. You must consider the nature and kind of customer who would be likely to buy those goods. In fact, you must consider all the surrounding circumstances; and you must further consider what is likely to happen if each of those trade marks is used in a normal way as a trade mark for the goods of the respective owners of the marks. If, considering all those circumstances; you come to the conclusion that there will be a confusion - that is to say not necessarily that one man will be injured and the other will gain illicit benefit, but that there will be a confusion in the mind of the public which will lead to confusion in the goods then you may refuse the registration, or rather you must refuse the registration in that case."
9. Reference may also be made to the observations of the Division Bench of this Court in M/s. Hiralal Prabhudas v. M/s. Ganesh Trading Co., A.I.R. 1984 Bombay 219.
"What emerges from these authorities is (a) what is the main idea or salient features, (b) marks are remembered by general impressions or by some significant detail rather than by a photographic recollection of the whole, (c) overall similarity is the touchstone, (d) marks must be looked at from the view and first impression of a person of average intelligence and imperfect recollection, (e) overall structure, phonetic similarity and similarity of idea are important and both visual and phonetic tests must be applied, (f) the purchaser must not be put in a state of wonderment, (g) marks must be compared as a whole, microscopic examination being impermissible, (h) the broad and salient features must be considered for which the marks must not be placed side by side to find out differences in design and (i) overall similarity is sufficient. In addition, indisputably must also be taken into consideration the nature of the commodity, the class of purchasers, the mode of purchase and other surrounding circumstances."
10. In the case of M/s. National Chemicals & Colour Co. (supra), the trade mark sought to be registered by the appellants therein consisted of a picture of two birds sitting on a twig. One bird was partially hidden by the other bird. The words "Bul Bul" were written on either side of the two birds. "Bul" on one side and "Bul" on the other side. As against this, the registered trade mark of the respondent consisted of the picture of a single bird sitting on a twig with the words "Robin Ultra Marine Blue". The two birds on the proposed trade mark were very similar in appearance to the bird in the registered trade mark. Both the trade marks covered goods of the same description of the same class. It was held that the trade mark proposed to be registered was deceptively similar to the registered trade mark and was also likely to cause confusion in the minds of the customers in respect of the same description of goods. It was also held that from the general impression which the trade marks give, both the trade marks appear to be very similar. What would normally be retained in mind, after looking at the trade marks, would be the picture of a bird sitting on a twig. Whether the picture carries the legend, "Bul Bul" or "Robin" does not make much difference to the overall similarity of the two trade marks.
11. In the present case we are of the view that even though the respondents have used a device of ox instead of cow, the respondents' mark is likely to cause confusion and is also deceptively similar to the registered trade mark of the appellant. In our opinion, the learned Judge was not right in observing that a milkman who is going to buy a milk can would be able to distinguish an "ox" from a "cow". It has to be borne in mind that ordinary purchaser has only "an ordinary memory". In such cases the question is not whether if a person is looking at two trade marks side by side there would be a possibility of confusion; the question is whether the person who sees the proposed trade mark in the absence of other trade mark, and in view only of his general recollection of what the nature of other trade mark was, would be liable to be deceived and to think that the trade mark before him is the same as the other, of which he has a general recollection, (see: Sandow (1914) 31 R.P.C. 196 Per Sargaint, J. at 205). When such picture device is embossed on milk cans, it becomes more difficult to note the difference between the two marks. Both the parties deal in same type of goods. In fact the colour, shape and size of the milk cans manufactured by the parties are almost similar. Thus not only there is a likelihood of confusion in the minds of the customers but the goods manufactured by the appellant may be mistaken for the goods manufactured by the first respondent. Shri Kane for the respondents strenuously contended that the appellant's mark (Ex. A-1) is registered in respect of buckets.
The general meaning of "bucket" is that open ended vessel whereas "can" is closed ended vessel. The respondents are using their trade mark OX BRAND only in respect of the milk cans and not buckets and, therefore, there is no infringement. It is not possible to accept the contention of Shri Kane for more than one reason. In the first place, although the goods are not similar, they fall in the same class i.e. Class 21. In any event, the argument of Shri Kane is hardly an answer to the claim in passing off. The appellant has produced on record voluminous evidence to show that he has been using the mark Ex. A-1 for milk cans as well as buckets since prior to 1980. The invoices and cash memos for the relevant years are produced on record. On the other hand, the respondents on their own showing started their production in 1988. Even this position is seriously contested by the appellant. According to the appellant, the respondents started selling their goods under the trade mark Ox brand or Cow brand only from 1995. There is hardly any convincing evidence to show that the respondents started using the mark in question from 1988. It is true that the respondents have produced affidavits of their customers to the effect that they were purchasing the goods of the respondents under the trade mark Ox Brand and Cow brand. However, the bills and invoices annexed to the affidavits do not described the goods as Ox Brand or cow Brand. In our opinion, the appellant has made out a strong prima facie case for grant of temporary injunction so far as mark Ex. A-1 is concerned.
12. Now coming to trade mark Ex. A-2 i.e., Om Prabhat, as indicated earlier, the word "Om" has been disclaimed. The respondents have given convincing explanation as to how they invented the word "Om Paras". It seems that "Paras" is derived from the first name "Parasmal" of the first respondent. We are not satisfied with the appellant's case as Ex. A-2 is concerned.
13. In the result, appeal is partly allowed. The impugned order of the learned Single Judge so far as Ex. A-1 is concerned, is hereby set aside. Notice of Motion is made absolute in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (c). Needless to say that the observations made in this order are only tentative observations and shall not prejudice the rights and contentions of the respective parties in the pending proceedings before the Registrar of the Marks.
On the oral application made by the learned Advocate for the respondents, the operation of this order is stayed for eight weeks.
14. Appeal partly allowed.