Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Kailash Chandra vs Sri Kishan on 28 January, 1998
Equivalent citations: AIR1998RAJ131, 1998WLC(RAJ)UC273
Author: Bhagwati Prasad
Bench: B.S. Chauhan, Bhagwati Prasad
JUDGMENT Bhagwati Prasad, J.
1. The Court of Additional District Judge No. 1, Jodhpur made the instant reference to this Court under Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure (referred to hereinafter as 'C.P.C.') and Order 46, Rule 1, C.P.C. as the said Court was seized of a Misc. Appeal in which the following question was involved :--
"Whether, in a suit for eviction under Section 13(1)(a) of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, hereinafter referred to as Rent Act) on the ground of alleged second default, if it is expected from the trial Court, to provisionally determine the rent as per provisions of Section 13(1) of the Rent Act."
While making the aforesaid reference, the Court of Additional District Judge took into consideration various judgments of this Court i.e. Hanuman Prasad v. Gardilal, 1973 Raj LW 584: (AIR 1974 Raj 41), wherein a learned single Judge observed as under (at P. 42 of AIR):--
"It may be pointed out that Sub-sections (4) and (5) have been introduced for the benefit of the tenant so that in case of first default he may protect himself against ejectment by making the required deposit or payment as provided therein. But in case of a tenant who has committed a second default, as mentioned in the proviso to Sub-section (7) no such benefit is available. It is a principle of jurisprudence that rights and liabilities are correlative. Consequently if a certain provision of law provides a benefit to a class of persons on performance of the act mentioned therein the penalty prescribed for non-performance of the act cannot be meted out to a person who cannot avail of the benefit of such provision. It would, thus be incongruous to say that even though the defendant cannot save himself from ejectment by making the deposit or payment under Sub-section (4) or Sub-section (5) of Section 13 of the Act, yet he is liable to have his defence struck out on account of non-compliance of the same. It appears to me therefore that subsection (6) of Section 13 cannot be pressed into service against a tenant to whom the benefit under Sub-section (7) is not available. Since the case of the defendant falls under the proviso to Sub-section (7), the penalty provided under subsection (6) of striking out the defence cannot be meted out to him."
2. In this regard, the second case considered by the said Court was in the matter of Hanspuri v. Bhanwar Lal, 1987 Raj LW 395, wherein this Court observed as under :--
"The exercise of determination of the rent under Section 13(3) in such a second suit would be futile inasmuch as the proviso to Sub-section (6) of Section 13, clearly provides that the tenant will not be entitled to the relief under Sub-section (6) if he has already taken advantages of it in a previous suit."
3. The said Court also considered the judgment in Ram Lal v. Goverdhan Lal, (1988) 1 Rajasthan LR 669, wherein this Court held as under :--
"This scheme of Section 13 of the Act clearly provides for determination of rent under Section 13(3) of the Act, when the suit is on the ground of default in payment of rent with or without any other grounds. This order under Sub-section (3) of Section 13 is to be passed either on the first date of hearing or not more than three months after the filing of the written statement and in any case before the framing of the issues. In other words such an order is to be passed as early as possible after the service of summons on the defendants. This determination is not subject to the proviso to Sub-section (6) of Section 13. In other words whether the tenant would be able to get protection of Sub-section (6) of Section 13, or not, is not to be looked into at the stage of determining rent under Sub-section (3) of Section 13. The determination of rent under Section 13(3) of the Act and payment of the same would not by itself entitle the tenant to protection against eviction. The availability of protection to him would depend upon other conditions. Thus determining the amount under Section 13(3) of the Act and allowing the tenant to deposit the same would not confer any right on him which would entitle him to get the suit of the landlord dismissed on the ground of default. This matter is dependent on different considerations. It may be that in some cases the Court is not able to decide the question as to whether the tenant has obtained benefit of Section 13(6) on a previous occasion or not before the issues are framed and in such a case the Court should not postpone the framing of the issues merely because the question of availability of protection to the tenant has not been decided. What the Court should do is to determine the rent under Section 13(3) and take up the matter of protection under Section 13(6) later on at the time of the decision of the suit. In my view the provisions of Section 13(3) and (4) are applicable to all suits for eviction which are on ground of default, irrespective of whether it is the first suit for default or a second suit for default or protection under Section 13(6) or 13A has been taken on a previous occasion or not. The suit has to be under Section 13( 1 )(a) with or without any other ground in order to attract Section 13(3) of the Act. Determination of the rent under Section 13(3) cannot cause any prejudice to the plaintiff-landlord in the second suit. On the contrary it would avoid the situation where it is subsequently held that the tenant had not taken benefit of Section 13(6) or 13-A on a previous occasion and the rent has not been determined and deposited so now in the subsequent suit, how to protect the tenant against eviction in that case? He would be denied the right of protection because the Court did not determine the rent under Section 13(3) of the Act. Determination of rent has nothing to do with the question of availing of the benefit or protection against eviction. If in the present case, the amount of rent due is determined along with interest under Section 13(3), and deposited by tenant, then merely because of this deposit he would not become entitled to protection under Section 13(6) of the Act if such benefit has already been obtained by him on a previous occasion. Hence in not determining the rent the Courts below have refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in them which was necessary to be exercised,"
4. The other case noticed by the learned Additional District Judge is in the matter of Choit Ram v. Ramdeen, an unreported judgment of this Court in S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 38 of 1991, decided on August 28, 1991, wherein this Court held as under :--
"After going through the provisions of Section 13(3) to 13(6) of the Act, and the intention behind the Act, I agree with the view taken by Hon'ble K.S. Lodha, J. in the aforesaid case and in my opinion, at the benefit of Sub-section (6) of Section 13 of the Act was not available to the defendant and the defendant cannot save himself from the ejectment by making the payment or to deposit the rent under Section 13(4) of the Act and, therefore, the compliance of Sub-section (3) by pro visionally determining the rent is not necessary as the provisions of Sub-section (6) of Section 13 cannot be pressed into service in case of second default. When the provisions of subjection (6) of Section 13 of the Act cannot be pressed into, service in the case of second default then the provisions of Sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) of Section 13 are not attracted in the present case and, therefore, the determination of the provisional rent was not necessary."
5. The next case noticed by the learned Additional District Judge is in the matter of Gauri Lal v. Gujar Mal through his L.Rs., (1992) 1 Rajasthan LR 75, wherein the learned single Judge observed as under :--
"The provisions of Sections 13(3) and 13(4) are applicable to all suits for eviction based on the ground of default irrespective of whether it is a first suit of default or the second suit of default and protection under Sections 13(6) and 13-A of the Act has been taken on previous occasion or not. The suit has to be under Section 13(1 )(a) with or without any other ground in order to attract Section 13(3) of the Act."
6. Having noticed and considered all these cases, the said Court came to the conclusion that there were conflicting views on this issue : one expressed in the cases of Hanunian Prasad (AIR 1974 Raj 41), Hanspuri (l987 Raj LW 395) and Choit Ram (supra) and another in Ram Lal (1988 (1) Rajasthan LR 669) arid Gauri Lal's cases (1992 (1) Rajasthan LR 75) (supra) as mentioned above. However, the learned Additional District Judge observed that the views expressed by the Hon'ble Judges in the judgments in the matter of Ram Lal and Gauri Lal are sound and logical because in appeal if the finding on first default is set aside, the trial of suit based on alleged second default will be bad and without provisional determination of rent as per Section 13(3) of the Rent Act. He was further of the view that the ratio taken in the other judgments in the cases of Hanuman Prasad, Hanspuri and Choit Ram (supra) is based on the notion that the suit on the basis of second default is always filed after the finding on first default attains finality i.e. confirmed up to the Apex Court, which according to the learned Additional District Judge is not the correct position. Appeals after appeals do not allow the courts to finally confirm the finding of the first default so easily and more often than once a second suit is filed within limitation as and when the second default is alleged to have been committed. He has expressed opinion that there would be no harm if the Courts are directed to determine the provisional rent in suits based on alleged second default.
7. On such a reference being made to this Court, the matter was placed before the Division Bench of this Court and on 13-10-1997 the Division Bench ordered that the matter be listed before the Chief Justice for constitution of a larger Bench of three Judges and Hon'ble the Chief Justice constituted the present Bench and referred the question for decision in the following terms :--
"That, provisional determination of rent under S. 13(3) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 is not a futile exercise even in eviction suits based on alleged second default, because if first default stands not proved before the appellate Court, the second suit will be deemed to have been filed as if it is based on the first default only, thereby making provisional determination of the rent, a mandatory requirement again."
8. Mr. N.P. Gupta was appointed as amicus curiae to assist the court. Mr. G.R. Singhvi appeared for Kailash Chandra and Shri R.M. Bhansali for Sri Kishan. The other counsel who addressed the Court as intervenes were Sarva Shri B. M. Bhojak, D. C. Sharma, S.D. Vyas, R.R. Nagori, A.L. Chopra and R.K. Soni etc. etc.
9. Mr. G. R. Singhvi emphasised that the law laid down by this Court in the matter of Hanuman Prasad v. Gaindi Lal (AIR 1974 Raj 41) (supra) is good law because the non-performance of an act cannot be meted out to a person who cannot avail the benefit of that provision. If a benefit has been taken by the tenant under the proviso to subsection (6) of Section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (referred to hereinafter as 'the Act') then in the suit based on alleged subsequent default, no benefit can be given to the tenant in the subsequent suit and, therefore, the consequence of determination will follow as provided in Sub-section (6) of Section 13 of the Act and this will become onerous to the tenant. The Act being a beneficial legislation to the tenants cannot render harshness to them. Any hardship to the tenant will be against the basic intention of the legislature and would not be in conformity with the aims and objects of the Act. If it is held that even in second suit provisional rent is to be determined then such an interpretation will be inconsistent within itself which would be lacking propriety and would be unsuitable to the principles of Interpretation of Statutes.
10. Mr. N.P. Gupta, learned Amicus Curiae emphasised that the Act was no doubt conceived and promulgated for the benefit of the tenant but the nature of the tenant which was thought and conceived at the time of the framing of law was a tenant who is ready and willing to pay rent as has been mentioned in the opening part of Section 13(1) of the Act. The statutory provisions mandate the Court not to pass any decree or make any order, in favour of a landlord and against a tenam as long us such tenant is ready and willing to pay rent to the full extent allowable by the Act. Thus, the premise on which a tenant can take the benefit of the Act is that he is ready and willing to pay rent.
11. The law as was laid down in Hanuman Prasad v. Gaindi Lal's case (AIR 1974 Raj 41) (supra) was in the backdrop that until 1973 the law regarding striking off defence has been very strict. The defaults were construed very Strictly. No relaxation was conceivable but after 1973 there is a sea change in the law and now the striking off the defence on account of non-payment of rent is not mandatory and any inadvertence or delay in payment under compelling circumstances is condonable. An accidental non-payment or a non-payment occasioned on circumstances which were beyond the control of the tenant, the tenant is not made to suffer and such acts have now been taken note of by the Courts. Delayed payments have not been construed as to be a contingency which has always to result into striking out of the defence.
12. Mr. Gupta has further stressed that the law has been enacted to ameliorate the condition of such a tenant who is "ready and willing to pay rent" and by providing for determination of provisional rent in a suit based on second default is providing an opportunity to the tenant to establish his bona fides. However, he expressed a doubt that if two suits on default get instituted then if the second suit is decided first then the deposil made in the second suit should be construed to be the benefit under the proviso to Sub-section (6) of Section 13 of the Act because it is after such benefit being taken that if a tenant again makes a default then he is not entitled to the benefit of Sub-section (6) of Section 13 of the Act. However, this contingency is not the subject-matter of the present reference, therefore, is left to be decided by the appropriate Court, at 'the appropriate time.
13. Mr. B.M. Bhojak while addressing the Court said that as and when a determination is made under Sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Act and the tenant makes the deposit, he establishes his bona fides of such a tenant who has been "ready and willing to pay rent". Such payments made under the provisions of Sections 13(3), (4) and (6) of the Act do not go waste and at the time of the final decision of the suit under Sub-section (8) of Section 13 of the Act such deposits are accounted for because any deposit under subsections (3) and (4) of Section 13 of the Act is only provisional and, therefore, such provisional character of rent should not be held to be not mandatory because that will facilitate a tenant who can somehow or the other way linger on the first litigation and then in the second suit on account of non-determination of provisional rent refuses to pay and thus enjoys the premises without making any payment.
14. Mr. D. C. Sharma has drawn the attention of the Court towards the language of Sub-section (3) of Section 13 therein the language used is "in a suit for eviction". It is "a suit". Such "a suit" is neither first suit nor second suit. As and when "a suit" is filed on the grounds set forth in Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 then the determination of provisional rent is a must.
15. Mr. S. D. Vyas submitted that a tenant has either to pay rent to the landlord and obtain a receipt from him apart from making personal payments. The tenant may remit or deposit the rent by any of the methods such as postal money Orders, deposit in bank etc. In case of certain doubts, as enumerated in Section 19-A of the Act, the rent can be deposited in the Court also. There is a Complete scheme which provides for as to how the tenant Will pay the rent to the landlord. The Act though intended to, give benefit to the tenant has also taken, care of the interest of the landlord and has provided that the landlord also gets paid his rent amount. Non-determination of rent in a second suit based on alleged default would give premium to a tenant who is not ready and willing to pay rent to the landlord.
16. Mr. R.R. Nagori emphasised that when a law is to be interpreted it has to be done first by giving literal construction to the language of the statute. The statute nowhere states that the determination will not be made in a suit which is second or third based on the grounds of default as envisaged in Sub-section (1)(a) of Section 13 of the Act. It is a simple narration that in a suit for eviction on the grounds set forth in clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 the Court shall on the first date of hearing provisionally determine the amount of rent. Thus, if the theory of literal interpretation of the statute is followed then there is no escape from concluding that in every suit, as and when the same is filed on the ground of default, the Court is under an obligation to determine the rent provisionally to be deposited in the Court or be paid to the landlord. This is not in abstract that such a provision has been made. Such determination has to be for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of the month previous to that in which such determination is made. Thus, every such determination is for the period for which the tenant might have made default and as alleged in the suit. He illustrated his point by saying that if there is an averment in the suit that the defendant has taken the benefit under, the proviso to subsection (6) of Sec, 13 of the Act but failed to prove it by some inadvertence, and if there was no determination of provisional rent, it would lead to a situation where the intention of the legislature would get defeated. He further showed that sometimes even when there is a determination then by oversight the defence is not struck off in such cases at the time of final judgment, it can always be seen whether the compliance has been made under Section 13(6) of the Act and if such compliance is not found then appropriate orders will be passed by the concerned Court. He further emphasised that Section 13 of the Act is a self-contained Code. Therefore, the analogies of general law are not to be imported. The determination is for the benefit of the tenant because he has to make payment of rent in accordance with law and it is such deposit only which gives him advantage of continuing as a tenant.
17. Mr. A.L. Chopra emphasised that if in the first suit the benefit of Section 13(6) of the Act is given and the suit is decreed on any other ground than the ground of default and if an appeal is filed in such a case and the appellate Court holds that the ground of Section 13(1)(a) was not available to the landlord then the benefit which was conferred by the trial Court under Sub-section (6) of Section 13 will not be taken into reckoning and if the second suit comes into being then any such case where the second suit has been filed on the ground of default, the determination is an advantageous condition for the tenant. The determination under Sub-section (3) of Section 13 is a conscious determination and not a mechanical act and such a determination should not be seen as putting additional burden on the tenants to pay additional amount, firstly, in case of a conscious determination there is ho question of additional amount being paid, secondly any amount deposited is liable to be adjusted finally at the time of decision of the suit finally. Further such determination is of an amount round about six months because it is this much of the period which gives right to the landlord to file the suit. Such amount cannot be of such a high quantum so as to give the tenant any apprehension.
18. Mr. R.K. Soni urged that unless the first lis ends no second suit can be filed on the ground of default and, therefore, there is no question of determination of rent in a second suit.
19. The discussion contained hereinabove shows that the judgments which have been rendered by this Court in the matters of Hanuman Prasad v. Gaindi Lal, (AIR 1974 Raj 41); Hanspuri v. Bhanwar Lal, (1987 Raj LW 395) and Choit Ram v. Ramdeen (supra) turned out on the basis of the consequences which will fall on the determination in second suit. The law relating to interpretation of statute is that if the meaning of the statute is plain, the effect must be given to it irrespective of the consequences. It is only when that the language of the statute is capable of bearing more than one constructions then in selecting the true meaning, regard must be given to the consequences resulting from adopting the alternative construction. If the words of the statute are susceptible to only one meaning and no alternative construction is reasonably open then only such a construction is possible which gives the general meaning of the words. Any consideration that it will result into hardship, inconvenience, injustice, has to be rejected and preference is to be given to that construction. Vide Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes Twelfth Edition, Page 29 :
"Where, by the use of clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning, anything is enacted by the legislature, it must be enforced, however, harsh or absurd or contrary to common sense the result may be. The interpretation of statute is not to be collected from any notions which may be entertained by the Court as to what is just and expedient : words are not to be construed, contrary to their meaning, as embracing or excluding cases merely because no good reason appears why they should not be embraced or excluded. The duty of the Court is to expound the law as it stands, and to "leave the remedy (if one be resolved upon) to others."
20. Therefore, in this background of the rules of interpretation, this has to be seen that is there only one meaning possible or there are more than one meaning susceptible from the statute and it is only when more than one meaning is possible of the statute that the Court will be required to adopt that meaning which is just, reasonable and sensible than the one which causes hardship. 21. To decide this controversy the words used in Section 13(3) are to be looked into. Section 13(3) has used the term "in a suit for eviction on the grounds set forth in Clause (a) of Sub-section (1)", the Court shall on the first date of hearing after hearing the parties and on the basis of the material on the record provisionally determine the amount of rent for which the tenant may have made default. The relevant extracts of Sub-section (3) thus, when read does not create any doubt or suspicion that the legislature has intended to anything beyond what the plain meaning of these words communicate. Vide Jugal Kishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd., AIR 1955 SC 376, it has been held as under :--
"The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statutes literally, that is, by giving to the words their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning, the Court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation. In the present case the literal construction leads to no apparent absurdity and, therefore, there can be no compelling reason for departing from that golden rule of construction."
22. By this rule, it has been approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that if the literal construction does not lead to apparent absurdity then there is no reason why the literal construction should be avoided. The Section 13 by itself, does not stand diluted by any other provisions of Section 13, therefore, meaning of the term 'a suit' is to be taken as a suit. Therefore, as and when a suit is filed, that suit is to be read as a suit, and this can be a first suit or any subsequent suit.
23. The interpretation given by this Court in the judgments of Choit Ram v. Ramdeen, Hanuman Prasad v. Gaindi Lal, (AIR 1974 Raj 41) and Hans Puri v. Bhanwarlal, (1987 Raj LW
395) (supra) when taken into consideration, this will be seen that in those judgments the Court has not expressed itself on the possible literal meaning of the section. If the literal meaning of the section had been seen then the Court would have come to (he conclusion that it is not susceptible to any other meaning and thus, the doctrine of consequences was not required to be imported in the context of this particular interpretation because as and when a word or phrase in a statute comes for consideration the first question which is to be asked is what is the natural or ordinary meaning of the word or phrase in the context of the statute. It is only when that the meaning leads to some result which cannot reasonably be supposed to have been the intention of the legislature, that it is proper to look for some other possible meaning of the words or phrase. In the instant case, the ordinary meaning of the expression 'a suit' in Section 13(3) of the Act does not reasonably mean anything else than any suit first or subsequent. The legislature had thought of providing the benefit under the Act to a tenant, who is ready and willing to pay rent and, therefore, the determination of provisional rent is only a device to get the tenant an opportunity to update his payments. In Mahadev Lal v. Administrator General of W. B., (AIR 1960 SC 936), it has been held :
"In their anxiety to advance the beneficent purpose of legislation Courts must not yield to the temptation of seeking ambiguity when there is none."
24. it may also be noted here that when the Courts have been emphasising that the Rent Control Acts have been enacted for the benefit of the tenants. They have always meant a tenant who is ready and willing to make the payment of the due rent and not a tenant who by his designs wants to escape the liability of making payment of rent and intends to take refuge behind some technicalities of law. This never was and can be the intention of the legislature.
25. This can further be seen that the Courts would see the objects and reasons for enactment only when there was an ambiguity in the words used in the statute. Vide Nelson Motis v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 1981, it is well established that if the words of a statute are clear and free from any vagueness and are, therefore, reason-ably susceptible to only one meaning, it must be construed by giving effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. In the instant case, neither there appears to be any ambiguity nor the words used are capable of any other meaning, than the one, that as and when "a suit" is filed determination of rent should be made, so as to keep the character of the tenant to be one, who is ready and willing to pay rent. The question of travelling to the objects of the Act comes secondary as the language is neither ambiguous nor capable of bearing more than one construction. "In construing the provisions of a statute it is essential for a Court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used therein if those words used are clear enough" vide S.A. Venkataraman v. State, AIR 1958 SC 107.
20. The learned single Judge of this Court, therefore, in Hanuman Prasad v. Gaindi Lal, (AIR 1974 Raj 41) fell in error in looking to the consequences for the defendant. In a second suit for default if determination is made, and the defendant makes a deposit then too it will not save him from ejectment. This attempt of the learned single Judge was to look for the consequences. If the exercise of looking to the consequences was to be made then that could only be made as discussed above by first arriving at a conclusion that the words used in Sub-section (3) of Section 13 are capable of more than one meaning or are ambiguous. Without arriving at such a conclusion, the consequences could not have been made the basis for interpretation which resulted into the law laid down in Hanuman Prasad v. Gaindi Lal's case (supra). Thus, it can be Said that the learned Judge in Hanuman Prasad v. Gaindi Lal's case (supra) has not applied the principle of constitution of a particular provision if law in its right perspective and, therefore, has not been able to lay down correct law.
27. The law laid down in the matter of Choit Ram v. Ramdeen (supra) is also silent about this aspect of the matter. Before going to determine the consequences of the statute following the judgment in Hanuman Prasad v. Gaindi Lal, (AIR 1974 Raj 41) (supra), the Court has not taken care to address itself on this aspect of the matter i.e. whether the language of the section is capable of a clear meaning or not. Before the consequences are examined, clear meaning of the words has to be assessed and if there is no ambiguity or duality of the meaning detectable then what has to follow is the literal construction of the statute. Similar is the fate in the finding of the case of Hanspuri v. Bhanwarlal, (1987 Raj LW 395). Thus, these cases do not lay down correct law.
28. The matter can be viewed from yet another angle also. A tenant could have taken benefit under Section 13-A once, that may be before determination of the provisional rent in that suit.
Under such circumstances also he is barred from taking any advantage under Sub-section (6) of Section 13 by making deposit. Thus, in a suit in which the determination was not made at some stage the benefit was taken by the tenant under Section 13-A then too that tenant will not be able to take benefit again in a suit on default, though it may be seen that in that suit, the determination will be for the first time. Thus, the benefit is independent of determination. They are not interlinked. The benefit is provided under the Act for the tenant to establish his bona fides and get established himself as a tenant who is "ready and willing to pay rent". Thus, in this perspective also, the plain meaning of the words used in sub section (3) required to be given their literal meaning. Support for the above can be seen from a Division Bench judgment of this Court rendered in the matter of M/s. Batliboi & Company Pvt.
Ltd. v. Govind Narain, 1981 Raj LW 225, wherein it has been observed as under :--
"The plain reading of the proviso to Subsection (6) of Section 13 shows that a tenant shall not be entitled to any relief under the sub-section if having obtained such benefit or benefits under Section 13-A in respect of such accommodation and, and thereafter the words are "if he again makes a default in the payment of rent of that accommodation for six months. Thus, as regards applicability of the proviso (sic) is by the landlord except that tenant had earlier occasion. In our view it is not at all necessary to make an inquiry in the second suit whether the tenant had made a default or not. The intention of the legislature in laying proviso was to find out whether such tenant had obtained benefit or benefits under Section 13-A or not. Once such benefit was obtained under Section 13-A on an earlier occasion it was a sine qua non for a tenant to resist a second suit on the basis of default in the payment of rent for six months. The word "again" used in the context and background here means nothing more than a subsequent action of making a default in the payment of rent for six months. As already observed above Section 13-A was brought into force as a matter of general benefit to all the tenants against whom suits were pending on the ground of default. Once having taken that benefit, legislature clearly laid down a mandate in the proviso to Sub-section (6) of Section 13 that such tenant shall not be entitled to get determination of rent and the Benefit of its deposit as contemplated in Sub-section (4) of Section 13. In this view of the matter there hardly arise any question of holding an inquiry in the second suit about the question whether a tenant was in fact defaulter or not in the earlier suit, if he had obtained such benefit under Section 13-A, the intention of the legislature also becomes clear from the fact that in the proviso to Sub-section (6), only the circumstances regarding benefit obtained under Section 13-A has been mentioned and it does not speak of any benefit derived by the tenant where he had paid or tendered the amount of arrears of rent on the first date of hearing in the earlier suit, or had paid or deposited the amount after determination of such amount on his application moved under Sub-section (6) of Section 13 of the "Act as it stood prior to the Amending Act No. 14 of 1976. This shows a clear intention of the legislature that no inquiry can be held in case where benefit has been obtained on an earlier occasion under Section 13-A. We are further of the opinion that when under the provisions of Section 13-A itself no inquiry was contemplated, how could it be granted in proceedings in a subsequent suit."
29. In Hanuman Prasad v. Gaindi Lal's case (AIR 1974 Raj 41) (supra), the learned Judge has taken a narrow meaning of the Act that it has only one purpose i.e. providing relief to the tenant.
30. In Gauri Lal v. Gujar Mal, (1992 (I) Rajasthan LR 75) (supra) it has been noticed that the Act has been enacted with manifold objects. It has been observed as under :--
"Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 has been enacted with manifold objects. The main purpose of the Act is to solve the problem of housing accommodation in the cities and towns of the State of Rajasthan which arose due to influx of refugees from Pakistan, rise in local urban population and a tendency of rural population to go to the cities and towns. The shortage of accommodation tempted the owners of the residential and commercial buildings to charge exorbitant rent?
and with the purpose of getting higher rent to seek eviction of existing tenants. The Legislature had also in mind that several Acts were operating in the field of landlord and tenant's relation in different States. Therefore, a consolidated enactment was brought into existence for the purpose of regulating the relations between the landlord and tenants by controlling rent and eviction."
31. Thus, what follows from above discussion is that as and when a language in a statute has to be interpreted, firstly an attempt should be made to give the language its literal meaning. If the literal meaning is given to the term a "suit" it can be seen that this term has a very wide amplitude and with this scope it will include in its fold a Suit filed in the first instance or any subsequent suit, When such a meaning is assigned to this term, it necessarily follows that the Court seized of Such a suit has to determine the provisional rent as claimed by the plaintiff. The law laid down in the judgments of Hanuman Prasad v. Gaindi Lal, Choit Ram v. Ramdeen and Hanspuri v. Bhanwarlal being based on the consequences of the determination and without looking for the meaning of the words and then without concluding that the language is capable of one meaning or any other meaning, is thus cannot be a good law.
32. Thus, the golden rule of interpretation i.e. the literal interpretation was violated and. therefore, the law laid down in the cases of Hanuman Prasad v. Gaindi Lal. (AIR 1974 Raj 41); Choit Ram v. Ramdeen and Hanspuri v. Bhanwar Lal, (1987 Raj LW 395) is held not to be a good law. The question referred to this Bench is answered accordingly and it is held that as and when a suit, first or subsequent, is filed, the Court seized of the suit is required to determine the provisional rent as provided under Section 13(3) of the Act.
33. In the result, the reference is answered to the affirmative. The case may be returned back to the trial Court for its decision according to law.