Karnataka High Court
B.M. Kalanaika vs The Deputy Commissioner, Mysore ... on 6 November, 1997
Equivalent citations: 1998(4)KARLJ620
ORDER
1. The petitioner's learned Advocate points out to me that the grantee had died and that the notice taken out on the sou of the grantee is also returned with an endorsement that he is also dead. The case records indicate that the whereabouts of this person are not known and it is pointless directing the petitioner to make any more efforts to serve the L.Rs of the allottee. On merits, the petitioner's learned Advocate points out to me that the first necessary ingredient namely the finding that the allottee belongs to SC/ST is not based on any tangible evidence. The learned Government Pleader submits that the Assistant Commissioner has held that the allottee did belong to the Backward Class but to my mind, the manner in which this finding has been recorded is wholly unjustified. Secondly, the original grant certificate has not been produced despite which, the authorities came to the conclusion that the 15 year bar applies. More importantly, where none of the beneficiaries are traceable, I do not see the wisdom behind passing an order for resumption of the land. The learned Government Pleader submitted that if a breach is established, that the land must vest in the State even if there are no other claimants. On the facts of this case, I do not consider such a course of action desirable.
2. The learned Government Pleader at this stage drew my attention to the Division Bench ruling of this Court in Pedda Reddy v State of Karnataka and Others. He submitted that assuming that this Court has come to the conclusion that the orders in this case are defective, that the correct course would be to remand the matter to the Assistant Commissioner for re-determination of the issues and that merely quashing the orders would not be the desirable course of action. The learned Government Pleader relied on the fact that the Division Bench found in the case referred to supra that the requisite findings had not been recorded under all the 3 heads and therefore remanded the matter to the Assistant Commissioner for fresh determination. His submission is that this Court ought to follow the same course of action. I do not dispute at all that the submission canvassed by the learned Government Pleader would hold good in that category of cases wherein the quashing of the order would result in a miscarriage of justice or a failure of justice which are the two essential tests that are required to be applied. Courts do remand matters in appropriate cases where the ends of justice would require a re-determination. This is an exception to the rule of finality which normally applies in judicial proceedings and it is not to be wrongly assumed that whenever orders are carelessly or hopelessly or lightly passed, that the High Court or the appeal Court will immediately give the State and its Officers one more round of litigation to correct their so called mistakes. One cannot lose sight of the fact that there are two parties in all litigations and showing unlimited and undue indulgence to one side correspondingly causes an equal amount of harassment and injustice to the opposite party which is a principle that the Courts are required to carefully bear-in-mind. There are therefore situations in which a Court would refuse a remand because a remand is an exception or an option and not a rule. On the facts of the present case, I am more than satisfied that no useful purpose will be served by re-routing the litigation that has gone on for the last several years and in this view of the matter, the submission oi the learned Government Pleader that the case requires to be remanded cannot be upheld.
3. The learned Government Pleader also submitted that merely because the beneficiary is not traceable or there may be cases in which the beneficiary is non-existent, that this should not be a ground on which a Court will interfere with the order which is otherwise sustainable because the Act itself contains a provision whereby if the breach is established, the lands will vest in the State and the State will distribute these lands to other landless persons who belong to the weaker sections. His submission is that the intention behind the legislation is to restore the lands to persons belonging to weaker sections and that the Court must uphold this objection at all times. Again, I do not dispute the correctness of this argument but there are certain reservations which will have to be considered in certain cases. The dominant purpose behind the legislation was in order to restore the lands to persons belonging to weaker sections who have been deprived of their lands and in instances where those persons are not traceable, the subsidiary intention was that if a breach has been committed, the land should be taken away from the wrong doer and re-distributed to persons belonging to the weaker sections through the medium of the lands vesting in the State. Again, there are exceptions to this rule because the Court will first have to be satisfied that the orders passed are sustainable. If the orders passed are not sustainable, then there would be no question of upholding a situation whereby lands could vest in the State because the first ingredient is condition precedent. It is in these circumstances that I do not consider any worthwhile purpose being served through a remand in this case.
4. Having regard to the aforesaid situation, the petition is allowed. The impugned orders are quashed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.