Madras High Court
R.Vasanthi Stanley vs State Rep. By
Author: T.Mathivanan
Bench: T. Mathivanan
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED.24.01.2012 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE T. MATHIVANAN Crl.O.P.No.14759 to 14762 of 2011 R.Vasanthi Stanley ... Petitioner Vs. 1.State Rep. By Inspector of Police, Central Crime Branch, Team-XII, Egmore, Chennai 600 008. 2.HDFC Bank Ltd., Abdullah Complex No.22 Thirumurthy Nagar 1st Street, Nungambakkam, Chennai. (Crl.O.P.No.14759 of 2011) 3.M/s.Bank of India Housing Finance & Personal Loan Branch No.46, Cathedral Road, Chennai 600 086. (Crl.O.P.No.14760 of 2011) 4.M/s.Chief Branch Manager, Vijaya Bank No.71, G.N.Chetty Road, T.Nagar, Chennai 600 017. (Crl.O.P.No.14761 of 2011) 5.M/s.Syndicate Bank Mylapore Branch, Mylapore, Chennai 600 017.(Crl.O.P.No.14762 of 2011) ... Respondents Prayer: Petitions are filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C, praying to call for the records and to quash the criminal proceedings pending against the petitioner in C.C.No.1624/2010 on the file of the Learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai and C.C.Nos.5669/2010, 6258/2010 & 11697/2010 pending on the file of the Learned XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai. For Petitioner : Mr.Abudu Kumar Rajaratnam For Respondents: Mr.C.Iyyappa Raj Govt. Adv.(Crl. Side) For R1 in all Crl.O.Ps. M/s.Ganesh and Ganesh for R2 in Crl.O.P.No.14759 of 2011 Mr.V.Adhivarahan for R2 in Crl.O.P.No.14760 of 2011 No appearance for R2 in Crl.O.P.No.14761 of 2011 Mr.P.Sreenivasulu for R2 in Crl.O.P.No.14762 of 2011 O R D E R
Seeking the relief of quashing the criminal proceedings in the cases in C.C.Nos.1624 of 2010, 5668 of 2010, 6258 of 2010 and 11697 of 2010 pending on the file of the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai, and the learned XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai respectively, these four criminal original petitions have been filed by the petitioner after invoking the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
2. With the petitioner in all the criminal original petitions is one and the same, the subject matter which is in issue in all the criminal original petitions is common in nature and the first respondent Police is also one and the same, all these criminal original petitions are clubbed together, heard simultaneously and disposed of in this common order.
3. The facts, which led the petitioner to file these petitions are as under:
3.1. One Stanley P.Rajan is the husband of the petitioner herein. He had availed a sum of Rs.6,00,000/- as home loan from M/s.Centurion Bank (Bank of Punjab Ltd.,) later merged with H.D.F.C.Bank, for the development of his company under the name and style of 'Medicraffs Drugs' and availed another sum of Rs.25,00,000/- from the Bank of India, Cathedral Road Branch.
3.2. Besides this, he had also availed a sum of Rs.18,00,000/- from Vijaya Bank, G.N.Chetty Road Branch for the development of his company and Rs.12,00,000/- from Syndicate Bank, Mylapore Branch for the renovation of his house. In security thereof he had deposited the title deeds of his housing property.
3.3. It is significant to note here that the petitioner herein, who is none other than the wife of the said Stanley P.Rajan stood as co-applicant for all the loans availed by her husband. On verification, the banking authorities had found that the documents viz.the title deeds deposited by Stanley P.Rajan were fabricated and the property was also found to be mortgaged with M/s.Sundaram Home Finance for the loan taken. As the liability was not discharged the respective banking authorities have lodged complaints before the first respondent Police for taking criminal action against the said Stanley P.Rajan and the petitioner viz.R.Vasanthi Stanley and other two accused, who also stood as co-applicants.
3.4. Based on the complaints of the banking authorities, the first respondent Police has registered the cases in X.Cr.No.579/2006 under Sections 420 r/w 34, 467 r/w 34, 468 r/w 34, 471 r/w 468 and 34, 467, 468, 471 r/w 468 and 109 I.P.C., X.Cr.No.643/2006 under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 465 r/w 120(B) I.P.C., X.Cr.No.550/2006 under Sections 420, 465, 467, 468, 471 r/w 120(B) I.P.C., and Cr.No.206/2007 under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 r/w 467 and 120(B).
4. After completion of the investigation, the first respondent has laid the final reports before the above said Courts and the respective Courts have also taken the final report on their respective files as C.C.Nos.1624 of 2010, 5668 of 2010, 6258 of 2010 and 11697 of 2010. In C.C.Nos.1624 and 11697 of 2010, the petitioner herein has been ranked as A2, whereas in C.C.Nos.5668 and 6258 of 2010, the petitioner has been ranked as A1.
5. Mr.Abudu Kumar Rajaratnam, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner was not aware of any transactions done by her husband and since she was working as a public servant she was not aware of any business activities involved by her husband. He has also submitted that the petitioner had signed the documents as instructed by her husband without any intention or knowledge and even as per the prosecution cases there were no specific allegations against the petitioner saying that she had signed the loan applications intentionally and thereby cheated the complainant Banks.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that the petitioner's husband namely Stanley P.Rajan had passed away and after the demise of her husband the petitioner had come to know that the above cases are pending as against her due to the alleged involvement of her husband and immediately she had taken necessary steps to settle the entire dues to the complainant Banks and hence she had paid all dues in full quit to the complainant Banks and therefore the respective banking authorities had also issued no due certificates, which are tagged along with these petitions.
7. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has also urged that since the entire balance to the respective complainant banks had been repaid by way of final settlement, all the criminal proceedings in C.C.Nos.1624 of 2010, 5668 of 2010, 6258 of 2010 and 11697 of 2010 might be quashed.
8. On the other hand, the learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) appearing for the first respondent has adverted to that the petitioner, who was in employment in Commercial Tax Department in the rank of Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Taxes gave voluntary retirement after which taken her services to be used for public by becoming 'Rajya Sabha' member and that the petitioner could not plead ignorance of the transactions carried by her husband to which she had also subscribed her signature as co-applicant.
9. He has also canvassed that the petitioner being the co-applicant had also executed pronote jointly along with her husband as borrower besides signing loan agreement and that the petitioner had also given undertaking letters with irrevocable binding and undertaking for issuance of post dated cheques.
10. He has further submitted that the complainant banking authorities had found the title deeds deposited with them as forged documents and that the petitioner could not claim any immunity by stating that she had not been aware of the acts of her husband after availing loan. He has also submitted that the petitioner, as a guarantor is bound to repay the amount either jointly along with her husband or individually. He has also added that the same Modus Operandi had been adopted with two other banking institutions who had also set the law in motion.
11. The learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) has also submitted that even as per the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner if the banking dues were settled, still the criminality is remained and hence the criminal proceedings in the above calender cases could not be quashed.
12. In sofar as the petitions in Crl.O.P.Nos.14759, 14760, 14761 and 14762 of 2011 are concerned, the second respondent in Crl.O.P.No.14759 of 2011 has not filed any counter. But, it appears he has issued a letter of full and final settlement to the effect of closing loan account bearing No.91466582. It also appears that the letter dated 08.11.2010 seems to have been addressed to the Inspector of Police, Central Crime Branch, Egmore, who is the first respondent herein requesting him to treat the matter as settled and the offence compounded. Besides this, the banking authority has also requested the first respondent Police to initiate steps for closing the first information report.
13. In sofar as the other criminal original petition viz.Crl.O.P.No.14760 of 2011 is concerned, the second respondent banking authority in his counter has stated that the petitioner had settled the dues by paying a sum of Rs.22,15,000/- under one time settlement scheme upon which the loan account came to be closed and the bank had also issued the no due certificate on 09.02.2011.
14. With regard to other criminal original petition in Crl.O.P.14761 of 2011, the second respondent in his counter has stated that for the said loan account one time settlement arrived at and their bank had received a sum of Rs.16,14,000/- on 22.01.2011 and that the loan account was closed on 22.01.2011 in the books of Bank. Apart from this, they had also issued a no due certificate to the petitioner on 04.02.2011.
15. With regard to the fourth criminal original petition in Crl.O.P.No.14762 of 2011, the second respondent in his counter has stated that though the liabilities of the petitioner's husband availed with their Koyambedu Branch still continue unpaid, the respondent Bank had accepted the OTS offer of the petitioner towards housing loan only without prejudice to its rights regarding the pending case against her before the learned XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet. He has also stated that by accepting 11.25 lakhs of rupees under one time settlement scheme of the Bank, the Bank had also issued a receipt in favour of the petitioner stating that they had accepted the amount under OTS offer without prejudice to the criminal case initiated against the borrower and the guarantor.
16. In this connection, Mr.Abudu Kumar Rajaratnam, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has adverted to that since the second respondent banking authorities have accepted for the proposal of the petitioner for one time settlement of their dues and their dues are settled on the basis of one time settlement scheme and since the disputes between the petitioner and the second respondent have been settled amicably and the second respondent banking authorities have also issued no due certificate the technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of quashing of criminal proceedings as the continuance of the same would be a futile exercise. He has also maintained that no useful purpose would be served in continuing the criminal proceedings and keep the cases alive on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrates.
17. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon the following decisions:
i. Nikhil Merchant vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2008) 9 SCC 677, ii. Manoj Sharma vs. State and Others, MANU/SC/8122/2008, iii. State of Karnataka vs. L.Muneswamy, (1977) 2 SCC 699, iv. Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia and others vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and others, (1988) 1 SCC 692, v. Hira Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati vs. C.B.I., New Delhi, AIR 2003 SC 2545, and vi. Shiji alias Pappu and others vs. Radhika and another, (2011) 10 SCC 705.
18. In Nikhil Merchant vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2008) 9 SCC 677 the disputes between the Company and the Bank have been set at rest on the basis of the compromise arrived at by them whereunder the dues of the Bank have been cleared and the Bank does not appear to have any further claim against the Company. What, however, remains is the fact that certain documents were alleged to have been created by the appellant herein in order to avail of credit facilities beyond the limit to which the Company was entitled. The dispute involved herein has overtones of a civil dispute with certain criminal facets. Under this circumstance, a question was arisen as to whether the power which independently lies with the Supreme Court to quash the criminal proceedings pursuant to the compromise arrived at, should at all be exercised.
19. In this connection, in para No.31, the Apex Court has held that 31. On an overall view of the facts as indicated hereinabove and keeping in mind the decision of this Court in B.S.Joshi case and the compromise arrived at between the Company and the Bank as also Clause 11 of the consent terms filed in the suit filed by the Bank, we are satisfied that this is a fit case where technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way in the quashing of the criminal proceedings, since, in our view, the continuance of the same after the compromise arrived at between the parties would be a futile exercise.
20. In Manoj Sharma vs. State and Others, MANU/SC/8122/2008 a question was also arisen as to whether a first information report under Sections 420, 468, 471, 341 and 120(B) I.P.C., could be quashed either under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, when the accused and the complainant have compromised and settled the matter between themselves. This question was considered by the Division Bench comprising their Lordships Hon'ble Mr.JUSTICE ALTAMAS KABIR and Hon'ble Mr.JUSTICE MARKANDEY KATJU. While writing Judgment, His Lordship Hon'ble Mr.JUSTICE ALTAMAS KABIR has answered in the following manner in paragraph No.8:
'8. In our view, the High Court's refusal to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the criminal proceedings cannot be supported. The First Information Report, which had been lodged by the complainant indicates a dispute between the complainant and the accused which is of a private nature. It is no doubt true that the First Information Report was the basis of the investigation by the Police authorities, but the dispute between the parties remained one of a personal nature. Once the complainant decided not to pursue the matter further, the High Court could have taken a more pragmatic view of the matter. We do not suggest that while exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court could not have refused to quash the First Information Report, but what we do say is that the matter could have been considered by the High Court with greater pragmatism in the facts of the case. As we have indicated hereinbefore, the exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., or Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary to be exercised in the facts of each case. Accordingly, His Lordship has allowed the appeal and quashed the criminal proceedings before the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Karkardooma Court, Delhi.
21. While endorsing the view of His Lordship Hon'ble Mr.JUSTICE ALTAMAS KABIR in harmonious nature his Lordship Hon'ble Mr.JUSTICE MARKANDEY KATJU has given a concurring Judgment in view of the importance of the issue involved. In Paragraph Nos.17, 18 and 21 His Lordship has observed as follows:
17.Since Section 320 Cr.P.C., has clearly stated which offences are compoundable and which are not, the High Court or even this Court would not ordinarily be justified in doing something indirectly which could not be done directly. Even otherwise, it ordinarily would not be a legitimate exercise of judicial power under Article 226 of the Constitution or under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to direct doing something which the Cr.P.C., has expressly prohibited. Section 320(9) Cr.P.C., expressly states that no offences shall be compounded except as provided by that Section. Hence, in my opinion, it would ordinarily not be a legitimate exercise of judicial power to direct compounding of a non-compoundable offenc.
18.However, it has to be pointed out that Section 320 Cr.P.C., cannot be read in isolation. It has to be read along with the other provisions in the Cr.P.C., One such other provision is Section 482 Cr.P.C., which reads:
Saving of inherent power of High Court.- Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order of this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
21.However, in my opinion these judgments cannot be read as a Euclid's formula since it is well settled that judgments of a Court cannot be read mechanically and like a Euclid's theorem vide Dr.Rabir Singh Dalal vs. Chaudhari Devi Lal University 2008(8) JT 621, Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., and another vs. N.R.Vairamani and another, AIR 2004 SC 4778. In rare and exceptional cases a departure can be made from the principle laid down in the decisions referred to in para 20, as observed in B.S.Joshi's case (supra), which has also been followed in other decisions e.g., Nikhil Merchant's case (supra). Even in the judgment of this Court in Divisional Manager Aravalli Golf Club (supra) where emphasis has been laid on judicial restraint it has been mentioned that sometimes judicial activism can be resorted to by the Court where the situation forcefully requires it in the interest of the country or society (vide para 39 of the said Judgment). Judicial activism was rightly resorted to by the U.S.Supreme Court in Brown vs. Board of Education 347 U.S. 482, Miranda vs. Arizona 384 U.S. 436, Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113, etc., and by Lord Denning in England in several of his decisions.
22. In State of Karnataka vs. L.Muneswamy, (1977) 2 SCC 699, a three Judges Bench of Apex Court has held that the saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature.
23. It has been further held that in the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. Further, it has been held that considerations justifying the exercise of inherent powers for securing the ends of justice naturally vary from case to case and a jurisdiction as wholesome as the one conferred by Section 482 ought not to be encased within the strait-jacket of a rigid formula.
24. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia and others vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and others, (1988) 1 SCC 692, in Paragraph No.7, the Apex Court has held that 7.The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilized for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.
25. In Hira Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati vs. C.B.I., New Delhi, AIR 2003 SC 2545 the appellant was facing charges under Sections 420, 120(B) I.P.C., under Chapter IV Finance (No.2) Act (21 of 1998) and under Section 95 of Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998. It appears that the dispute was entered into compromise as a qua certificate was obtained under Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998 and the customs duty paid by the appellants Gujarat Cancer Society. It also appears that despite acknowledging this fact CBI initiated criminal proceedings under Penal Code against Gujarat Cancer Society on allegations of cheating Government of India in terms of evasion of duty and by concealment of facts obtained customs duty exemption certificate. Under this circumstance, the Apex Court has held in paragraph No.29 as follows:
29.We have carefully gone through the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998 and the certificate issued by the Customs Authorities. In our opinion, the GCS is immuned from any criminal proceedings pursuant to the certificates issued under the said Scheme and the appellants are being prosecuted in their capacity as office bearers of the Gcs. As the Customs duty has already been paid, the Central Government has not suffered any financial loss. Moreover, as per the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998 whoever is granted the benefit under the said Scheme is granted immunity from prosecution from any offence under the Customs Act, 1962 including the offence of evasion of duty. In the circumstances, the complaint filed against the appellants is unsustainable.
26. In countering the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, the learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) appearing for the first respondent has submitted that since the offences under Sections 467, 468 and 471 are non-compoundable in nature, even though the amounts due to the respective banks have been settled and the disputes between the petitioner and the banking authorities has been compromised the criminal liability of the petitioner is still in existence and therefore the criminal proceedings of the above said cases could not be quashed.
27. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has taken a stand of defence saying that since the amount in question has been paid to the banking authorities on OTS scheme, there was no monitory loss to the respective banks and therefore the question of continuation of criminal proceedings does not arise.
28. The learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) in support of his contention has placed reliance upon a decision in Sushil Suri vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and another, (2011) 5 SCC 708. In this case, the Apex Court has held that in the final analysis, we hold that merely because the dues of the Bank have been paid up, the appellant cannot be exonerated from the criminal liability. Therefore, the charge-sheet against him cannot be quashed. Before arriving at the above conclusion the Apex Court has found that having regard to the modus operandi adopted by the accused, as projected in the charge-sheet and briefly referred to in para 23 we have no hesitation in holding that it is not a fit case for exercising of jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., as also by this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. As noted above, the accused had not only duped PSB, they had also availed of depreciation on the machinery, which was never purchased and used by them, causing loss to the exchequer, a serious economic offence against the society.
29. While writing the Judgment on behalf of the Division Bench, His Lordship Hon'ble Mr.JUSTICE D.K.JAIN has referred the decision of Nikhil Merchant vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2008) 9 SCC 677 and B.S.Joshi vs. State of Haryana, (2003) 4 SCC 675. The Apex Court has accepted the contention of the appellant that the limitation imposed under Section 320 Cr.P.C., could be transcended and the orders should be passed quashing criminal proceedings even where non-compoundable offences were involved. In paragraph No.29, His Lordship has referred the decision in Nikhil Merchant vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2008) 9 SCC 677:
30.In the instant case, the disputes between the Company and the Bank have been set at rest on the basis of the compromise arrived at between them whereunder the dues of the Bank have been cleared and the Bank does not appear to have any further claim against the Company. What, however, remains is the fact that certain documents were alleged to have been created by the appellant herein in order to avail of credit facilities beyond the limit to which the Company was entitled. The dispute involved herein has overtones of a civil dispute with certain criminal facets. The question which is required to be answered in this case is whether the power which independently lies with this Court to quash the criminal proceedings pursuant to the compromise arrived at, should at all be exercised?
31.On an overall view of the facts as indicated hereinabove and keeping in mind the decision of this Court in B.S.Joshi case and the compromise arrived at between the Company and the Bank as also Clause 11 of the consent terms filed in the suit filed by the Bank, we are satisfied that this is a fit case where technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way in the quashing of the criminal proceedings, since, in our view, the continuance of the same after the compromise arrived at between the parties would be a futile exercise.
30. After going through the Nikhil Merchant's case, His Lordship has held that in our opinion Nikhil Merchant does not hold as an absolute proposition of law that whenever a dispute between the parties, having overtones of a civil dispute with criminal facets is settled between them, the continuance of criminal proceedings would be an exercise in futility and, therefore, should be quashed.
31. With regard to B.S.Joshi vs. State of Haryana, (2003) 4 SCC 675 a question as to whether the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint for offences which are not compoundable under Section 320 Cr.P.C., In this case, it was held that Section 320 cannot limit or affect the powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.,
32. While distinguishing these two cases, His Lordship has held in Paragraph No.32 as follows:
32.It needs little emphasis that even one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between the conclusions in two cases and blindly placing reliance on a decision is never proper. It is trite that while applying ratio, the Court may not pick out a word or sentence from the judgment divorced from the context in which the said question arose for consideration. [Zee Telefilms Ltd., vs. Union of India, (2005) 4 SCC 649.] In this regard, the following word of Lord Denning, quoted in Haryana Financial Corpn., vs. Jadamba Oil Mills, (2002) 3 SCC 496 are also quite apt:
22...... 'Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect. In deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide, therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive.
33. Denying emphatically the arguments advanced by the learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) appearing for the first respondent, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has canvassed that plenitude of power of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., by itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and caution. The width and the nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon a very recent decision of the Apex Court in Shiji vs. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705.
34. It is pertinent to note here that this decision has been rendered by the Division Bench of the Apex Court on 14.11.2011 i.e.subsequent to the decision of Sushil Suri vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and another, (2011) 5 SCC 708. In this case, while speaking on behalf of the Division Bench, His Lordship Hon'ble Mr.JUSTICE T.S.THAKUR has observed that the instant case had its origin in civil dispute between parties, which dispute was resolved by them. Hence, continuance of prosecution where complainant was not ready to support allegations would be a futile exercise. Section 482 could in such circumstances be justifiably invoked by High Court to prevent abuse of process of law and thereby preventing wasteful expenditure of time by courts below.
35. On coming to the instant case on hand, the no due certificate issued by the respective banking authorities would go to show that the balances, which were due to the respective banks were paid and settled by way of one time settlement scheme and hence the second respondent bank has also stated that the matter be treated as settled and the offences compounded. They have also decided to close the criminal proceedings, which were initiated against the petitioner.
36. Since the petitioner has paid the dues to the banks by way of one time settlement as rightly observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, the continuance of prosecution where the complainant was not ready to support the allegations would be a futile exercises. Under this circumstance, this Court is also of view that the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., can be pressed into service to prevent the abuse of process of law. Keeping in view of the above facts, this Court is inclined to allow these petitions.
37. In the result, these criminal original petitions are allowed. The criminal proceedings pending against the petitioner in C.C.No.1624/2010, on the file of the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai and C.C.Nos.5669/2010, 6258/2010 & 11697/2010, on the file of the learned XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai are quashed.
24.01.2012 Index :Yes/No Internet :Yes/No prm/krk To: 1.The Inspector of Police, Central Crime Branch, Team-XII, Egmore, Chennai 600 008 2.The Public Prosecutor, Madras High Court, Chennai T.MATHIVANAN,J prm/krk Crl.O.P.No.14759 to 14762 of 2011 24.01.2012