Madhya Pradesh High Court
The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Sangram Singh on 5 March, 2015
M.Cr.C No.1617/2014
5.3.2015
Ajay Tamrakar, Panel Lawyer for the
applicant/State.
Shri Abhinav Dubey, counsel for the
respondent.
Heard on IA. No.2190/2014, an application for condonation of delay in filing the present application.
After considering the reasons mentioned in the application, it appears that the State could not file the present leave application within time and delay of 101 days was caused. The grounds appear to be satisfactory and therefore, delay of 101 days in filing the present leave application is hereby condoned.
The State has preferred the present leave application against the judgment dated 20.7.2013 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Anuppur in ST No.92/2010 whereby, the respondent was acquitted from the charge of Section 306 of I.P.C.
The prosecution's case in short is that on 20.2.2010 the respondent assaulted the deceased Sunita by a spade causing a grave injury in her hand. Thereafter, she was admitted in the hospital for pretty longer period but, the respondent had defamed the deceased Sunita that she was admitted for abortion in the hospital. After discharge of the deceased Sunita from the hospital the appellant was continuously telling her such words that she aborted a child and she should have died and therefore, on 7.4.2010 the deceased Sunita had consumed some poison and thereafter, she had died during the treatment.
The trial Court after considering the evidence adduced by the parties acquitted the respondent from the charge of Section 306 of I.P.C.
After considering the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, it appears that the witnesses could not show any nexus between the admission of the deceased Sunita in the hospital with assault caused by the respondent. According to the document Ex.P/11, an FIR was lodged by the deceased Sunita that on 20.2.2010 the respondent assaulted her with a spade causing injury near her right eye and a second stroke was given on her left hand. The respondent assaulted the deceased with the presumption that she was loosening the valve of the tube of his bicycle without any reason. Looking to the injuries as mentioned in the FIR Ex.P/11, there is no possibility that she would be admitted in the hospital for a longer period. The various witnesses including father and mother of the deceased have stated that she was admitted in the hospital and on 15.3.2010 she was referred to Medical College, Raipur and she was admitted there for two days. However, no treatment papers of the deceased were produced by the Police before the trial Court. Looking to the injuries caused to the deceased Sunita as mentioned in the FIR Ex.P/11, she did not sustain any injury on the abdomen and therefore, there was no possibility of vaginal bleeding due to that injury caused to the victim. Hence the testimony of father and mother of the deceased Sunita cannot be believed that she was admitted in the hospital in continuation of treatment of her injuries. That initial incident was caused on 20.2.2010 and fracture caused in the hand of Sunita would have united within six weeks. When treatment papers of Sunita were not produced before the trial Court then an adverse inference would be drawn that the deceased Sunita was admitted in the hospital for any other reason and there was no connection of her admission with the injuries caused by the appellant. The Additional Sessions Judge in his judgment has categorically mentioned that there was no relation for the deceased with the appellant so that presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act may apply. There was no allegation against the respondent that he was teasing the deceased due to some bad intention. The incident dated 20.2.2010 took place suddenly because the respondent thought that she was removing air from the tube of his bicycle. If the respondent had told the deceased Sunita for so many times that she was admitted in the hospital to get abortion done then her grievance could be redressed by her parents by lodging an FIR for offence under Section 500 of the I.P.C. For consideration of offence under Section 306 of I.P.C., it is for the prosecution to prove the ingredients of Section 107 or 109 of I.P.C. If it is presumed that the respondent had told the deceased that she did abortion of a child then by such talk it cannot be said that the overt act of the respondent falls within the purview of Sections 107 or 109 of I.P.C. There should be a direct nexus between the incident of suicide and overt act done by the accused. The trial Court has rightly relied upon the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of "Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar Vs. State of M.P." AIR 2002 SC 1998 in which it is mentioned that for offence of abatement of suicide there must be some ingredient of provocation to commit suicide. If such words are told during a quarrel that go and die then still no offence for abatement to commit suicide is made out. It is also the settled view of the Apex Court that if someone says orally that to go and die or due to the overt act of the deceased she was required to commit suicide then by uttering such words it cannot be said that the accused abated the deceased to commit suicide.
Under these circumstances, the trial Court has rightly acquitted the respondent from the charge of Section 306 of I.P.C. there is no reason to interfere in the judgment passed by the trial Court. Consequently, there is no reason to grant leave for filing of an appeal. Leave application filed by the State is hereby dismissed at motion stage.
Copy of the order be sent to the Court below along with its record for information.
(N.K. Gupta) Judge bina