Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Working As Ldc At vs Union Of India on 18 July, 2008
Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench O.A. No. 1060/2007 With OA No. 1061/2007 MA No. 1150/2007 OA No. 1064/2007 MA No. 1152/2007 OA No. 1066/2007 MA No. 986/2008 New Delhi this the 18th day of July, 2008 Honble Mr. L.K. Joshi, Vice Chairman (A) Honble Mrs. Meera Chhibber, Member (J) OA No. 1060/2007 Shri Jagla Paswan S/o Shri Nathni Prasad R/o Quarter No.912, Sector-3, Rama Krishna Puram, New Delhi-110 022. Working as LDC at Room No. 465-B, M/o Rural Development, Krishi Bhawan, New Delhi. Applicant OA 1061/2007 1. Shri Ram Babu S/o Late Sh. Anant Ram Sector-II, S-I, DIZ Area Mandir Marg, New Delhi 2. Sh. Shahazad Khan S/o Late Sh. Kiram Bux B-44, South Ganesh Nagar, Patpar Road, New Delhi-92 Applicant OA 1064/2007 1. Shri Omvir Singh, S/o Late Shri Rattan Singh, Village- Sabhapur, Delhi-94 2. Shri Balwan Singh, Sh. Late Godhe Ram, B-91, Moti Bag-I, New Delhi 3. Shri Sher Singh S/o Chiranji Singh 98/10 Sector-I, Pushp Vihar, Saket, New Delhi. .Applicant OA 1066/2007 Shri Prem Prakash S/o Late Sh. Kanshi Ram R/o House No.177, Post Office Pushpa Bhavan, Village-Devli, New Delhi-110062 Working at LCD at Room No.565, SGSY-I Section M/o Rural Development, Krishi Bhavan, New Delhi. .Applicant By Advocate: Shri R.K. Sharma for Shri Y.S. Chauhan. Versus 1. Union of India Through Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Rural Development, Krishi Bhawan, New Delhi. 2. Secretary, Department of Personnel and Training, North Block, New Delhi. ..Respondents By Advocate: Shri R.V. Sinha with Shri R.N. Singh. ORDER
By Honble Mrs. Meera Chhibber, Member (J) In all these 4 OAs, common point has been raised and counsel are also same therefore with their consent all the 4 cases are being disposed off at admission stage itself by passing a common order. For stating the facts, OA 1060/07 is being taken as leading case.
2. Applicants have sought the following relief:-
(i) To quash and set aside order dated 13.2.2007 passed by the Respondent No.1 and to direct the said respondent to grant promotion to the post of UDC as well as ACP with all consequential benefits from the date their immediate juniors have been promoted and granted financial upgradation.
(ii) To direct the respondents to fix the seniority in accordance and with effect from the date which the applicants have been continuously working as LDC by counting the period of ad hoc service as well.
(iii) To direct the respondents to pay arrears of pay and allowances accruing to them in the event of promotion and financial upgradation with penal interest @ 12% per annum.
3. The brief facts as stated by applicants are that they were initially appointed as LDC against long term vacancies on the basis of their education qualification and eligibility for LDC on 2.4.2984. They have passed the typing test also conducted by SSC, therefore, their appointment was done as per rules. Since they were being reverted, they filed OA 1487/91 which was disposed off on 25.1.96 by directing the respondents to take steps for regularization of applicants as LDC in consultation with SSC by relaxing upper age limits if necessary.
4. It is stated by the applicants that since they have rendered more than 20-24 yrs of service as LDC they are entitled for promotion as UDC and for 1st and 2nd financial upgradation.
5. It is submitted by the Counsel for applicant while computing their seniority and promotion, their service as LDC has to be taken in to effect from the initial date of appointment on ad hoc basis, as done in the case of Dr. A.K.Jain. He also relied on Rudra Kumar Sain vs. UOI & Others reported in JT 2000 (9) SC 299. Counsel for the applicants submitted in OA No.19.10.2006 decided on 19.10.06, this Tribunal had directed the respondents to reexamine the issue of seniority and retrospective regularization and consideration for promotion and grant of ACP by a detailed and speaking order. The Speaking Order was passed on 13.2.07 on the ground that ad hoc appointment was not as per recruitment rules since they were appointed as LDC as stop gap arrangement due to administrative exigencies, they were reverted also in between, therefore, it was not continuous. They have rightly been granted seniority from the date of approval granted by Staff Selection Commission (hereinafter referred to as SSC) in compliance with Tribunals judgment. No person junior to them has been promoted either as UDC or granted ACP. It is this order which has been challenged now.
6. Respondents have opposed this OA. They have taken following preliminary objections:-
OA is barred by rule 10 as multiple reliefs have been sought.
OA is barred by limitation as they are seeking seniority from the adhoc appointment by filing present OA in 2007 whereas in 1996 they knew that they have been appointed as LDC w.e.f. 7.10.96.
OA is bad for non-joinder of parties as none of those, whose rights are likely to be affected have been impleaded as parties.
7. On merits they have explained applicant was appointed as Peon on 1.3.81 on direct recruitment basis. Subsequently he had been appointed as LDC on ad hoc basis on 13.1.1984. His ad hoc appointment was continued from time to time but there were breaks in different spells of his ad hoc appointment.
8. It was only pursuant to the directions dated 25.01.1996 of the Honble CAT in OA No.1487/1991, that SSC was requested to consider their appointment as LDC on regular basis, therefore, the applicant along with some other ad hoc LDCs, were appointed as LDC on regular basis with effect from 7.10.1996, i.e., the date on which the SSC had conveyed its approval for their appointment as LDCs on the recommendation of the Evaluation Committee/Selection Committee. They have further stated that in July, 1991 itself DOP&T had issued the instructions vide their OM NO.22011/04/91-Estt.(D) dated Ist July, 1991 (Annexure R-1) to the effect that regularization of the ad hoc officers will be with effect from the date indicated on the letter of UPSC conveying their decision for regularization of ad hoc employees. In view of this, regularisation of these LDCs was rightly counted with effect from the date, indicated in the letter of SSC. Even in the case of Shyam Singh (OA No. 1483/1991) relied upon by the applicant, respondents have regularized his service from the date, SSC had conveyed its approval. The same criteria has been followed in the instant case too, therefore, there is no disparity.
9. On the question of Assured Career Progression (hereinafter referred to as ACP), they have explained financial upgradation under ACP is given twice in the entire span of service career, first on completion of 12 years and the 2nd on completion of 24 years of service if no promotion is earned. In the case of applicant, who was initially appointed as a peon, the first promotion to next grade was that of Daftry or Jamadar and then to the post of LDC. Since the applicant along with similarly placed 6 LDCs has been appointed as LDC on 7.10.1996 on regular basis, relief sought by the applicant on ACP cannot be granted to him as he has already received two promotions/upgradations. As far as promotion to the post of UDC is concerned, they have stated mere rendering continuous service of 20-24 years does not entitle any Government servant to promotion until and unless a promotional post becomes available and eligible candidate for the purpose is available as per its laid down criteria. In the instant case, even after being appointed as LDCs on 7.10.1996 in pursuance of Honble CATs order in OA No.1487/1991 and as per SSCs recommendation, the applicant does not have the minimum required qualifying service for regular promotion to the pot of UDC and hence is not eligible.
10. They have relied on the following judgments:-
(i) Excise Commissioner, Karnataka and Another Vs. Sreekanta reported in AIR 1993 SC 1564.
(ii) Ram Ganesh Tripathi and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others reported in 1997 (1) SCC 621.
(iii) Union of India Vs. S.K. Sharma, 1992 SCC 728.
(iv) Chief of Naval Staff and Another Vs. G. Gopalakrishna Pillai and Others, 1996 (10) SCC 521.
11. They have submitted as per DPC guidelines, the promotion of officers included in the panel would be regular from the date of validity of the panel or from the date of their actual promotion, which ever is earlier.
12. They have also objected that the applicant has neither cited the names of his juniors who have been promoted as UDCs or who have been given ACP in the scale of Rs.4000-6000 nor any relevant Rules/instructions have been quoted by him in support of his claim. It is specifically stated that no person junior to the applicant in the Ministry of Rural Development has been promoted as UDC. Applicant has been appointed as LDC neither through direct recruitment nor through Departmental examination. It has been clarified by the competent authority that if the peon is appointed directly as LDC through departmental qualifying examination conducted by the SSC, the second ACP in the UDC grade (Rs.4000-6000) is permissible but if the peon has been appointed as regular LDC, he would not be entitled for second financial upgradation to the grade of UDC. Since the applicant has not been appointed either through open examination or departmental examination, his claim for grant of ACP is not covered under the relevant guidelines. They have thus prayed that OA may be dismissed.
13. We have heard both the counsel and perused the pleadings as well.
14. Applicants have not disputed the fact that they were initially appointed as Peon in 1981, and then as ad hoc LDC in 1984. Before we proceed further, it would be relevant to see how applicants were appointed as LDC. Office order dated 13.1.1984 (page 25) for ready reference reads as under:-
S/Shri Hari Chand Paswan and Jaglal Paswan, Peons, are appointed as LDCs in the Ministry on a purely temporary and ad hoc basis with effect from the forenoon of the 13th January, 1984 and until further orders.
The ad hoc appointment will not confer on these officials any right to regularization in the grade of LDC. They will be reverted when regular incumbents become available.
15. Perusal of this clearly shows that it was neither promotion on seniority basis nor appointment by way of LDCE as alleged by the counsel for applicant. It was purely by way of stop gap arrangement as it is clearly stated that they would be reverted when regular incumbents become available meaning thereby that applicants were not appointed after regular selection. Moreover, had the applicants been appointed after holding Limited Departmental Competitive Examination (hereinafter referred to as LDCE), as alleged by their counsel, they would have opposed it then and there, as to why they are being appointed on ad hoc basis. The applicants never challenged their ad hoc appointment. It was only when they were being reverted in 1990-91 that they approached this Tribunal by filing OA No. 1487/1991. In this case they had only stated that they have passed typing test conducted by SSC. It was not even their case that they had passed LDCE as is being suggested now by the counsel for applicants. It goes without saying LDCE is different than the typing test. Under the rules, only three modes of recruitment were permissible for LDC as per the CSCS Rules, 1962, which are as follows:-
(i) Direct recruitment through open competitive examination (85%);
(ii) Departmental Examination conducted by SSC exclusively for Group D staff working in the Ministries/Departments participating in the CSCS (10%); and
(iii) Promotion of Group D employees by seniority (5%).
16. Applicants have not stated that they had appeared in the test through SSC pursuant to same advertisement or notice, nor they were promoted by seniority against 5% quota. They have only stated they had passed typing test. This is mandatory for LDCE for earning their increments. Therefore, this cannot be equated with LDCE.
17. It is settled law that any appointment made without following the procedure would be de hors the rules and only as a stop gap arrangement.
18. It is also relevant to note that the only direction given by this Tribunal was to take steps for regularization of applicants in the post of LDC in consultation with SSC by relaxing upper age limit by evaluating the confidential reports in terms of OA No. 1483/1991 filed by one Shri Shyam Singh and Dr. A.K. Jains case.
19. Pursuant to above directions, respondents passed orders dated 20.11.1996 as follows:-
With the approval of the Competent Authority the following seven LDCs working on ad hoc basis are appointed to post of LDCs (CSCS) in the Ministry on regular basis with effect from 7.10.1996 (FN), i.e., the date the SSC conveyed its approval for their appointment as LDCs on the recommendations of the Selection Committee constituted in compliance with Honble CATs judgment in OA No.1487/1991 dated the 25th January, 1996 (Shri Ram Babu and Others Vs. Union of India through Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Rural Development) until further orders:
S/Shri Ram Babu Shahzad Khan Balwan Singh Omvir Singh Jaglal Paswan Sher Singh Prem Parkash
2. The seniority of the abovementioned LDCs will be fixed in the select List 1996 as per the provisions of Rule 17 (3) II ( C) of CSCS Rules, 1962.
20. It is relevant to note that respondents have categorically stated that even in case of Shyam Singh seniority was given from the date SSC had conveyed its approval which fact is not disputed by the applicants. Moreover, this was also based on OM dated 1.7.1991 issued by Government of India, Ministry of Personnel which for ready reference reads as under:-
New Delhi: 1.7.1991. Office Memorandum
Subject: Question as to the date from which appointment is to treat as regular in the case of a Govt. servant who is already holding a post of ad hoc basis and is later selected for regular appointment thereto.
The undersigned is directed to say that a question recently arose as to the date from which an appointment should be deemed regular when a Government servant who is already holding a post on ad hoc basis is later selected by the UPSC for regular appointment thereto. The question has been examined and it has been decided that in such cases the appointment may be treated as regular from the date of advice of UPSC, i.e., the date of the Commissions letter conveying their recommendations in the matter.
All Ministries/Departments are requested to bring the above decision to the notice of all concerned for information and suitable action.
21. From above, it is clear that applicants were fully aware that they have been appointed as LDC on regular basis w.e.f. 7.10.1996 and their seniority will be fixed in the select list of 1996 as per Rule 17 (3) 11 (C) of CSCS Rules, 1962. None of the applicants challenged this order at that time meaning thereby they accepted it. In other words they had acquiesced to the situation.
22. It goes without saying that after they were regularly appointed in 1996 their seniority must have been fixed and seniority list also must have been issued. Thus they knew their placement but did not challenge even those seniority lists. Even now leave alone challenging any seniority list, applicants have not even annexed any seniority list, therefore, it is not known how they are saying, their juniors have been promoted. Number of persons would have been promoted or appointed as LDC from 1984 to 1996 on regular basis, naturally applicants would have been placed below them as per their regular appointment letter. Today, if applicants relief, that they should be granted seniority with effect from 1984 or date of appointment as LDC on ad hoc basis is to be allowed, definitely it would affect the rights of those persons. None of those persons have been impleaded as parties. The law is well settled that orders cannot be passed to the detriment of others, without impleading them as parties, therefore, this OA is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. In the case of State of Bihar Vs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh reported in 2000 (9) SCC 94 (L&S) 845 Honble Supreme Court held as follows:-
In absence of persons likely to be affected by the relief prayed for Writ Petition should normally be dismissed unless there existed specific reasons for non-impleadment of the affected persons. It was also held in that case that officiation period cannot be counted when appointment to the officiating post is not in accordance with the rules but is purely ad hoc bad stop gap arrangement.
23. Even otherwise it is alleged by applicants that some of their juniors have been given further promotions as UDC and they should also be promoted from same date. Here neither any particulars of so called juniors are given nor their names are given so averments are absolutely vague, therefore, on this ground also this OA is liable to be dismissed. It is elementary law that if comparison is being drawn with another person, at least his full particulars should be given so that the case may be examined accordingly. In the absence of name or details, this exercise cannot even be exercised. In any case, if some persons have already been promoted as UDC, applicants cannot be allowed to seek seniority above them in the lower grade of LDC at this stage as it would unsettle the settled position. Delay in such cases is fatal.
24. In Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others Vs. M.A. Kareem and Others reported in 1991 Supp.(2) SCC 183 Honble Supreme Court held that where petitioners had approached the court after 13 years, courts and the tribunals should be slow in disturbing the settled affairs in a service after such a long period. Moreover, the respondents did not implead their colleagues who have been prejudically affected by the impugned judgment. It cannot be assumed that the respondents had no knowledge about them. They did not implead even the respondent mentioned by them. These two technical objections itself are sufficient to reject the appeal. It was further held that Writ Petition filed after 8 years after the impugned order would be fatal.
25. In Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal Vs. Union of India and Others reported in 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 195 Honble Supreme Court held if Writ Petition is dismissed on the ground of delay of 11 years after the impugned order, there is no illegality. It was further held even any subsequent order passed by the Government in compliance with the Supreme Courts order that the representation, if not already decided, should be disposed of at an early date, would not have the effect of curing the said defect.
26. This judgment is cited because counsel for the applicant had submitted that he has filed present OA against order dated 13.2.2007. This order cannot cure the defect of delay because it was passed pursuant to directions given by this Tribunal on 19.10.2006 in OA No. 180/2005 otherwise cause of action, if any had arisen in 1996 when regular appointment was given to the applicants, therefore, as per Honble Supreme Courts judgment this order would not cure the delay.
27. In B.V. Sivaiah Vs. K. Addanki Babu reported in 1998 (6) SCC 720 it was held by Honble Supreme Court as under:-
Appellants were seeking inter se seniority. Honble Supreme Court held their claim was rightly rejected.
28. In Union of India Vs. S.S. Kothiyal reported in 1998 (8) SCC 682 it was held as under:-
Repeated representations do not extend the limitation. Cause of action had arisen when 1st representation was rejected. Similarly in the instant case cause of action had arisen when they were informed that they are regularly appointed w.e.f. 7.10.1996 and seniority would be fixed in select list of 1996.
29. In view of above judgments applicants claim that their seniority should be counted from 1984 at this stage has to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches and non-impleadment of necessary parties.
30. Counsel for the applicants submitted their case is covered by Rudra Kumar Sains case. However, it is seen applicants seniority was determined in 1996, which was accepted by them whereas judgment of Rudra Kumar Sains case came only in the year 2000, therefore, that judgment cannot be relied upon by the applicants after accepting their regular appointment. Even otherwise in the said case, the dispute was between direct recruits and promotees. There was a categorical finding recorded by Honble Supreme Court that appointment of promotees were made under Rule 16 and 17 after due consultation with and or approval of the High court. The appointees satisfied the qualifications required under the rules. Moreover, the question of seniority in that case was already decided in an earlier case of O.P. Singla 1985 (7) SCR 351 wherein it was held that so far as controversy regarding the fixation of the seniority list between the promotees and direct recruits, the same will not be guided by Joginder Nath's case inasmuch as in Joginder Nath's case, the Court construed the Delhi Judicial Service Rules, 1970 in the context of seniority and confirmation and not in the context of inter se seniority between the promotees and direct recruits. In Singla's case it was observed, after noticing a representative order of appointment under Rule 16 as follows:-
"The appointments were neither ad hoc, nor fortuitous, nor in the nature of a stop-gap arrangement. Indeed, no further orders have ever been passed recalling the four promotees and other similarly situated, to their original posts in the subordinate Delhi Judicial Service. Promotees who were under Rule 16 have been officiating continuously, without a break, as Additional District and Sessions Judges for a long number of years. It is both unrealistic and unjust to treat them as aliens to the Service merely because the authorities did not take up to the necessity of converting the temporary posts into permanent ones, even after some of the promotees had worked in those posts from five to twelve years."
In Singla's case, it was also categorically held by Honble Supreme Court that quota rota principle had broken down and as such, seniority cannot be determined by taking recourse to the 'quota and rota' provided under Rule 8(2) but on the basis of continuous length of Service, provided the promotees have been promoted after due consultation with and/or approval of the High Court under Rules 16 or 17 and they did possess the requisite qualification for promotion, as provided under Rule 7.
31. Perusal of above would show that there was a definite finding recorded that officers were promoted under Rule 16 and 17 with the approval of High Court. It was also held that quota rota principle had broken down, therefore, seniority cannot be decided by taking recourse to quota and rota rule.
32. The above facts would demonstrate that the facts of Rudra Kumar Sain were absolutely different from the present case because in the present case neither applicants appointment was not done as per the rules as they do not fall in any of the three modes stipulated under the rules. On the contrary, it was purely a stop gap arrangement which is evident from the language of ad hoc appointment order itself, therefore, applicants appointment was de hors the rules. In these circumstances, the judgment of Rudra Kumar Sain would not advance the case of applicants at all.
32. The point as to how seniority of such persons has to be computed is laid down by Honble Supreme Court in catena of judgments.
33. At this juncture it would be relevant to refer to the judgment of V. Sreenivasa Reddy (Supra) wherein it was clearly held as follows:-
14. It is now well settled law that appointment/promotion must be in accordance with the Rules. Direct recruit takes his seniority from the date on which he starts discharging the duty of the post borne on the cadre while a temporary appointee appointed de hors the rules or on ad hoc basis or to a fortuitous vacancy gets seniority from the date of regular appointment.
34. In Direct Recruits Class II Officers Association v. State of Maharashtra, JT 1990 (2) SC 264, it was held that appointment in accordance with Rules is a condition precedent to count seniority. Temporary or ad hoc or fortuitous appointments etc. is not an appointment in accordance with the Rules and the temporary service cannot be counted towards the seniority.
35. In K. C. Joshi v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 272 : (AIR 1991 SC 284), it was held the seniority is to be counted from the date on which appointment is made to the post in accordance with the rules. In Union of India v. S. K. Sharma, (1992) 2 SCC 728 Honble Supreme Court had further held that the approval of the UPSC for continuation in ad hoc post for the purpose of granting pay and allowances, would not amount to regular appointment and such ad hoc services cannot be counted for seniority. In Vijay Kumar Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 95) it was held on regular selection by PSC, earlier service on ad hoc basis cannot be counted for seniority. His seniority can be taken only from the date of his selection by the PSC. In D. N. Agrawal Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1990)2 SCC 553, it was held that seniority cannot relate back to the date of temporary appointment if it is not in accordance with rules.
36. From above judgments, it is absolutely clear that any appointment made as a stop gap arrangement not as per rules cannot be counted for seniority if subsequently regular appointment is given.
37. Counsel for the applicant relied on Corollary (b) of Direct Recruits (Supra) which for ready reference reads as under:-
(ii) To sum up, we hold that:
(A) Once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to rule, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of his confirmation.
The corollary of the above rule is that where the initial appointment is only ad not and not according to rules and made as a stop gap arrangement, the officiation in such posts cannot be taken into account for considering the seniority.
(B) If the initial appointment is not made by following the procedure laid down by the rules but the appointee continues in the post uninterruptedly till the regularization of his service in accordance with the rules, the period of officiating service will be counted.
However, in State of West Bengal Vs. Aghore Nath Dey reported in 1993 (3) SCC 371 the conclusion A and B of direct recruits case were further explained by Honble Supreme Court as follows:-
22. There can be no doubt that these two conclusions have to be read harmoniously, and conclusion (B) cannot cover cases which are expressly excluded by conclusion (A). We may, therefore, first refer to conclusion from the date of initial appointment and not according to the date of confirmation, the incumbent of the post has to be initially appointed 'according to rules'. The corollary set out in conclusion (A), then is, that 'where the initial appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules and made as a stopgap arrangement, the officiation in such posts cannot be taken into account for considering the seniority'. Thus, the corollary in conclusion (A) expressly excludes the category of cases where the initial appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules, being made only as a stopgap arrangement.
38. From above it is absolutely clear that Honble Supreme Court had clearly laid down that where initial appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules and made only as a stop gap arrangement, such officiation cannot be considered for seniority, therefore, applicants case gets no support from Direct Recruits case also. Applicants case according to us would fall in category A of Direct Recruits judgment, therefore, they would not be entitled to count seniority from the initial date of appointment as LDC on ad hoc basis.
39. Counsel for the applicant next argued that while deciding OA 180/2005 decided on 10.10.2006, this Tribunal had held this case is covered by R.K. Sains judgment but perusal of judgment dated 19.10.2006 shows that some observations were made in the body of judgment but in the penultimate para, OA was disposed off with a direction to the respondents to reexamine the issue of grant of seniority and retrospective regularization and also for promotion and grant of ACP by a detailed order in accordance with law. It was thus open to the respondents to reexamine the issue. It cannot be stated that any positive directions were given, otherwise directions would have been to grant them seniority form initial date of ad hoc appointment.
40. At this juncture, it would be relevant to refer to the judgment in the case of Employees State Insurance Corporation Vs. All India ITDC Employees Union and Others reported in 2006 (4) SCC 257 wherein it was held as under:-
The direction was to consider and in that sense there was no positive direction.
We may, in this context, examine the significance and meaning of a direction given by the court to consider a case. When a court directs an authority to consider, it requires the authority to apply its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and then take a decision thereon in accordance with law.
41. In view of above, since direction was to reexamine and pass orders in accordance with law, it cannot be stated that any positive direction was given by the Tribunal in OA No. 180/2005.
42. Since applicants whole relief is that their seniority should be counted from the initial date of ad hoc appointment as LDC and that is not permissible, in view of settled law as discussed above, OA is found to be bereft of merit. The same is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.
Let a copy of this order be placed in other OAs also.
(Mrs. Meera Chhibber) (L.K. Joshi)
Member (J) Vice Chairman (A)
Rakesh