Kerala High Court
Ouseph Varghese vs Kunjoonju Alekutty And Ors. on 27 July, 1993
Equivalent citations: II(1993)ACC459, 1993ACJ981
JUDGMENT Viswanatha Iyer, J.
1. These appeals are by the 5th respondent in two claims under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, arising out of the same accident which took place on 22.9.1974. The question arising in these appeals is whether the appellant could be made liable for the amounts awarded, namely, Rs. 20,000/- in O.P. No. 657 of 1980 and Rs. 7,000/- in O.P. No. 661 of 1980.
2. The first respondent in the claims was impleaded as the owner of the vehicle. He contended that the vehicle belonged to the appellant and accordingly the appellant was brought on record as the owner of the vehicle. The appellant who was thus impleaded filed his objection stating that the first respondent was the registered owner of the vehicle and that the liability was his. He also stated that the statement in the claim petitions that he had purchased the bus on 22.9.1974 was false. Two witnesses were examined on the side of the claimants and some documents were also produced to prove the ownership of the vehicle in the 5th respondent. None was examined on the side of the appellant or for that matter on the side of any of the respondents in the claims. On an appreciation of the evidence, the Claims Tribunal came to the conclusion that the appellant was the owner of the vehicle and accordingly made him liable for the amounts awarded in the two claim petitions. These awards are challenged in these appeals.
3. As stated earlier, the question which arises for consideration is whether the appellant could be made liable for the amounts awarded. The third respondent, driver of the vehicle, has clearly averred that he was working as a driver under the appellant. The objections filed by the 5th respondent were not specific but evasive. He has not denied the contention of the claimants that he was the owner of the vehicle. The contention raised by him was that the first respondent before the Tribunal was the registered owner of the vehicle and, therefore, he should be made liable. The other contention raised by him was only that he had not purchased the vehicle on 22.9.1974. He has not chosen to deny anywhere that he was not the owner of the vehicle, or that he had not become the owner before that fateful day. If really he was not the owner of the vehicle on 22.9.1974, the appellant could have stated so in straightforward language in his statement of objections. His contentions .in the objection statement filed by him were halting, evasive and not specific. It must be remembered that even if he was not the registered owner of the vehicle, still he could be the owner thereof, as it is not necessary to have the registration transferred before the ownership of the vehicle could be transferred, the vehicle being a movable asset. Apart from all this, there is other evidence in the case to show that the appellant was the owner of the vehicle. We have already mentioned that the driver of the vehicle has specifically averred that he was working under the appellant. The report of the Motor Vehicles Inspector, namely, Exh. A-5 refers to the appellant as the owner of the vehicle. The charge-sheet filed in the case against the driver, namely, Exh. A-2 also refers to the appellant as the owner of the vehicle. This documentary evidence, as also the clear admission of the driver that he was working under the appellant, is liable to be accepted, there being absolutely no evidence in rebuttal. In this state of the pleadings and also the evidence the Claims Tribunal was justified in holding that the appellant was the owner of the vehicle on the day in question and that he was liable for the amounts of compensation awarded by it.
4. We do not find any merit in these appeals and they are accordingly dismissed with costs.
5. The matter was posted for being spoken to today at the request of the counsel for the appellant, for making further submissions in the matter. Parties were accordingly heard. It was the contention of counsel for the appellant that the registered owner of the vehicle, namely, the first respondent before the Tribunal as well as the second respondent insurer will continue to be liable, even assuming that there was transfer of the vehicle to the appellant. He also contended that there was denial of opportunity to the appellant to file additional feel that the matter is concluded by the decisions of this court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jameela Beevi 1991 ACJ 820 (Kerala) and Swaminathan v. Jayalakshmi Amma 1988 ACJ 261 (Kerala), both by Division Benches of this court. So far as this court is concerned the position is now well established that the transfer of a vehicle takes place irrespective of the transfer of registration, as it is a movable asset, which could be transferred by delivery. The requirement of transfer of registration is only for the purpose of the Motor Vehicles Act and not for the purpose of effecting transfer under the Sale of Goods Act. The two Division Benches have, therefore, held that the ownership of the vehicle stands transferred irrespective of the transfer of the registration. It is also held by the two Division Benches that the insurance policy lapses when the transfer is effected unless there is a condition or contract to the contrary. In the light of this established position in this court, we do not feel inclined to accept the contention of learned counsel for the appellant, based on the numerous decisions cited by him, that the registered owner and the insurer are also liable. We overrule this plea raised by counsel for the appellant. The order passed by us yesterday will remain. Appeals dismissed. written statement of objections by the Tribunal. According to him, there was a change of counsel on the day on which the case was posted for hearing and the new counsel made a request for time for filing additional objections, which was refused and the Tribunal proceeded to dispose of the case.
6. So far as the latter contention is concerned, we do not think that there is any denial of justice or denial of opportunity to the appellant. The claim petitions had been pending for a long time before the Tribunal, and the request for time for filing additional objections was made only on the date on which the case was disposed of. It is imperative that applications for compensation should be disposed of expeditiously. The appellant had had ample time to file any additional pleading with leave and it could not be said that the Tribunal acted arbitrarily or unreasonably in refusing to grant time after the matter was taken up for hearing. We are not inclined to accept the contention of counsel for the appellant that the alleged denial of opportunity to file additional written statement has resulted in violation of natural justice or that the award of the Tribunal requires to be set aside on that ground.
7. So far as the other point raised by counsel for the appellant is concerned, we