Gujarat High Court
Gruh Finance Limited vs District Magistrate - Rajkot & 3 on 23 August, 2017
Author: N.V.Anjaria
Bench: N.V.Anjaria
C/SCA/20847/2015 CAV JUDGMENT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 20847 of 2015
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.V.ANJARIA
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1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed
to see the judgment ? No
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? No
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of
the judgment ? No
4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of
law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of No
India or any order made thereunder ?
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GRUH FINANCE LIMITED....Petitioner(s)
Versus
DISTRICT MAGISTRATE - RAJKOT & 3....Respondent(s)
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Appearance:
MR HARSHADRAY A DAVE, ADVOCATE for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR MANAN MEHTA, AGP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
MR NK MAJMUDAR, ADVOCATE for the Respondent(s) No. 4
SERVED BY AFFIX.-(R) for the Respondent(s) No. 2 - 3
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.V.ANJARIA
Date : 23/08/2017
CAV JUDGMENT
This petition came to be filed by the
petitioner-Gruh Finance Limited seeking direction
against respondent No.1 authority-the District
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Magistrate to take possession of the mortgaged
property situated at Mavdi Revenue Survey No.35 (Old)
paiki, new Survey No.120 paiki Plot No.3 paiki, 'Shri Gayatri Krupa', Girnar Society Street No.3-Guruprasad Chowk, Rajkot and hand over the possession thereof to the petitioner. It was further prayed to quash the order dated 23rd October, 2015 passed by respondent No.1 District Magistrate whereby the District Magistrate rejected the application of the petitioner filed under Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002.
2. It appears that loan to the tune of Rs.25,50,000/- was obtained from the petitioner by second and third respondents. The abovesaid property was mortgaged in the transaction. As the loanees committee default in making repayment of the loan, their accounts could be classified as non-performing assets and the petitioner initiated proceedings under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 ('SERFAESI Act' for short) for recovery of the due amount. In the process, application under Section 14 of the SERFAESI Act was filed before District Magistrate seeking to recover the possession of the secured assets which culminated into the order impugned.
2.1 This very petition had been decided by this Court as per oral judgment dated 07th December, 2016. It was inter alia observed and held in the said Page 2 of 17 HC-NIC Page 2 of 17 Created On Thu Aug 24 03:04:01 IST 2017 C/SCA/20847/2015 CAV JUDGMENT judgment dated 07th December, 2016 as under.
"4. Looking at the order of the District Magistrate rejecting application under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, the said authority has reasoned that the Bank gave finance to two different persons by mortgaging one property; that though loan is obtained, documents were lying with the different Bank; that the possession of the property remained with the seller and that the parties have been litigating for their civil rights before the civil court as well as before the High Court. It was reasoned that since in relation to the secured assets there were questions of law involved and the parties were litigating, order under Section 14 could not be passed. The District Magistrate also referred to Civil Suit No.279 of 2013, order below Exhibit 22 passed in the Civil Suit, further observing that the Civil Suit was pending and was not finally decided. The District Magistrate thereafter stated that in view of pendency of the civil litigation, notice was necessary to be issued to the occupant of the property. It held that for all those reasons, decision was not required to be taken for handing over of the possession of the secured assets to the Bank.
7. For the foregoing discussion and reason, the present petition is required to be allowed. The order dated 23rd October, 2015 passed by the District Magistrate, Rajkot rejecting the application of the petitioner under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 is hereby set aside. The District Magistrate shall pass a fresh order in accordance with law within three days from the date of receipt of the writ of this order for rendering the assistance to the petitioner for taking possession of the mortgaged properties/ secured assets."
2.3 Thus it was on the ground and for the reason that the District Magistrate had entered into adjudicatory arena and had gone into the merit aspect while deciding the application under Section 14 of the SERFAESI Act, the order was set aside and the District Magistrate was directed to render assistance to the petitioner for taking possession of the mortgaged property.
3. It appears that respondent No.4 herein who Page 3 of 17 HC-NIC Page 3 of 17 Created On Thu Aug 24 03:04:01 IST 2017 C/SCA/20847/2015 CAV JUDGMENT was not a party in the original pleadings, preferred Letters Patent Appeal No.413 of 2017 seeking leave to appeal to challenge the aforesaid judgment dated 07th December, 2016. It was the case of the said person- respondent No.4 herein that he was holding the property by virtue of Gift Deed and that petitioner could not have taken steps to recover the possession under the SERFAESI Act.
3.1 The Division Bench observed in its judgment dated 14th March, 2017 as under.
"4. At the outset, it is required to be noted that by the impugned judgment and order the learned Single Judge has quashed and set aside the order passed by respondent no.2 District Magistrate, Rajkot dated 23/10/2015 which as such was in favour of the appellant herein and even the same was passed after considering the submissions made by the appellant. It is the case on behalf of the appellant that before any order is passed by the learned Single Judge quashing and setting aside the order passed by the District Magistrate, Rajkot dated 23/10/2015, which was in favour of the appellant, the appellant was required to be heard. On the other hand, it is the case on behalf of respondent no.1 that as per catena of decisions of this Court in the proceedings under Section 14 of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, District Magistrate is not required to adjudicate the dispute between the parties, and therefore, the appellant was not required to be heard before the District Magistrate.
5. After making some submissions, Shri Harshadray Dave, learned advocate appearing on behalf of respondent no.1, under instructions from respondent no.1 original petitioner, has stated at the bar that to avoid any further delay in realizing the amount by taking possession of the disputed property in question and realizing the amount by selling the property, which was mortgaged with respondent no.1, he has no objection if the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside and the matter is remanded to the learned Single Judge to decide the same afresh in accordance with law and on its own merits and after giving an opportunity to all the Page 4 of 17 HC-NIC Page 4 of 17 Created On Thu Aug 24 03:04:01 IST 2017 C/SCA/20847/2015 CAV JUDGMENT concerned, including the appellant herein, however, has requested to make suitable observations that all the contentions /defences, which may be available to the original petitioner, with respect to the locus of the appellant and /or at the stage of getting assistance from the District Magistrate under Section 14 of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 whether the objector like the appellant is required to be heard or not, be kept open.
6. Shri Majmudar, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant has stated at the bar that he has no objection if such suitable observations are made.
7. In view of the above broad consensus between the learned advocates appearing on behalf of the respective parties recorded hereinabove and without further entering into the merits of the case and without expressing anything in favour of either parties, the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge passed in Special Civil Application No.20847/2015 is hereby quashed and set aside and the matter is remanded to the learned Single Judge to pass an appropriate order in accordance with law on its own merits after giving an opportunity to all the concerned, including the appellant herein, who shall now be respondent no.4 in the main Special Civil Application. All the contentions and defences, which may be available to the respective parties, including the appellant herein are kept open, which may be considered by the learned Single Judge in accordance with law and on its own merits. Learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant to file the Vakalatnama in the main Special Civil Application on or before 20/03/2017."
3.2 The Letters Patent Appeal came to be allowed as per the aforesaid judgment. Accordingly the present petition came to be again posted before this Court for hearing and decision afresh after hearing all the parties.
3.3 Respondent No.4 herein - the appellant in the Letters Patent Appeal has put-forth his case stating that he holds the Gift Deed, that his father executed a registered Gift Deed No.1421/2002 dated 10th April, 2002 and that upon execution of the said Gift Page 5 of 17 HC-NIC Page 5 of 17 Created On Thu Aug 24 03:04:01 IST 2017 C/SCA/20847/2015 CAV JUDGMENT Deed, right, title and interest as well as the ownership of the property in question came to be transferred in his favour. It is the further case of respondent No.4 that he availed financial facilities from State Bank of Saurashtra, now merged with State Bank of India, and that the subject matter property came to be mortgaged with the said Bank. It is stated that respondent No.4 had already instituted Civil Suit No.279 of 2013 for setting aside the Sale Deed executed in favour of private respondent No.2.
4. Learned advocate for the petitioner Mr.Harshadray Dave reiterated the submissions on the scope of powers exercisable under Section 14 of the SERFAESI Act by the District Magistrate. He submitted that application of the Bank made under Section 14 of the Act before the District Magistrate was an application properly made in law, upon which the District Magistrate ought to have passed necessary orders. He submitted that though it was not open to the District Magistrate to go into the merit aspects of the case of the either side, he visited the merit area and on that basis refused to exercise the powers. As regards the right and interest claimed by respondent No.4 on the secured asset, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that it is open to respondent No.4 to avail alternative remedy of preferring Appeal before the Debts Recovery Tribunal as per Section 17 of the SERFAESI Act.
4.1 On the other hand, learned advocate Mr.Nirav Majmudar for respondent No.4 raised a contention that Page 6 of 17 HC-NIC Page 6 of 17 Created On Thu Aug 24 03:04:01 IST 2017 C/SCA/20847/2015 CAV JUDGMENT it is the petitioner who ought to have availed remedy under Section 17 of the Act. According to his submission, petitioner could have filed Appeal against the impugned order instead of filing petition before this Court in asmuch as order under Section 14 passed by the District Magistrate, submitted learned advocate for the respondent No.4, was a measure post-Section 13(4) of the Act and therefore, the same could have been appealed against by the petitioner by resorting to Section 17 of the Act.
4.2 The submission that the petitioner-Gruh Finance Limited has remedy under Section 17 of the SERFAESI Act, was sought to be buttress by relying on these many judgments in which, the Court refused to entertain the petition relegating the petitioner to the remedy of appeal under Section 17 of the SERFAESI Act-(i) Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev v. State of Maharashtra [(2011) 2 SCC 782], (ii) Rameshbhai Polabhai Jadav v. District Magistrate being Special Civil Application No.15903 of 2016 decided on 14th December, 2016, (iii) Mahendrasinh Bharatsinh Chudavat v. Cosmos Cooperative Bank Limited being Special Civil Application No.16431 of 2015 decided on 06th February, 2017, (iv) Om Shiv Lumbers Private Limited v. Corporation Bank being Special Civil Application No.2337 of 2017 decided on 13th February, 2017 and (v) M/s.Cure Life care Private Limited v. Authorised Officer being Special Civil Application No.15799 of 2016 decided on 12th January, 2017.
4.3 Raising several other submissions, it was Page 7 of 17 HC-NIC Page 7 of 17 Created On Thu Aug 24 03:04:01 IST 2017 C/SCA/20847/2015 CAV JUDGMENT submitted by learned advocate for respondent No.4 that since the Gift Deed was executed in his favour, he had acquired right and interest in the property. Secondly, it was submitted that the property was mortgaged by obtaining financial assistance from State Bank of Saurashtra merged in the State Bank of India, which was a necessary party without presence of which, the petitioner could not proceed under the SERFAESI Act. It was thirdly submitted that in the civil suit instituted by respondent No.4, application under Order VII Rule 11, CPC, was preferred by the petitioner which was rejected, Revision Application before this Court against the said order came to be allowed and the matter is pending before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal. It was next submitted that since respondent No.4 never obtained any financial facility from the petitioner herein, petitioner could not proceed against respondent No.4. It was next contended that the petitioner took steps under the SERFAESI Act without diligence and without verifying the correct facts. It was also the submission of respondent No.4 that the petitioner had not followed the requisite procedure under the Act.
4.4 Learned advocate for respondent No.4 relied on decision of the Supreme Court in Vishal Kalsariya v. Bank of India [2016(1) SCALE 172] as well as decision in Indian Bank v. M/s.Nippon Enterprises South [2016 (3) SCALE 378] to submit the principle laid down therein that a tenant cannot be arbitrarily evicted by using the provisions of the Act and once tenancy is created, the tenant can be evicted only Page 8 of 17 HC-NIC Page 8 of 17 Created On Thu Aug 24 03:04:01 IST 2017 C/SCA/20847/2015 CAV JUDGMENT after following the due process of law prescribed under the provisions of the Rent Control Act. He further relied on decision in Harshad Govardhan Sondagar v. International Assets Reconstruction Company Limited [(2014) 6 SCC 1] for similar proposition. Also pressed into service was the decision in Sanjivkumar Suraj v. State Bank of India [2016 (6) SCALE 724], in which the Apex Court disposed of the appeal before it by directing the District Magistrate to conduct inquiry with regard to genuineness of the tenancy created by the third respondent with the appellant, further observing that pendency of the inquiry before Magistrate shall not stand in way of Bank to proceed against landlord in accordance with law.
4.5 Learned advocate for respondent No.4 thereafter proceeded to submit that for various grounds, the petitioner was not entitled in law to successfully challenge the Gift Deed in question by virtue of which respondent No.4 acquire interest in the property. The further submission was that there were no pleadings on the said count. Learned advocate sought to rely on several decisions including in Ram Sarup Gupta (Dead) By LRs. v. Bishnu Narain Inter College [AIR 1987 SC 1242] to submit that there must be a properly pleaded case on the relevant aspects. The decision in Abdul Rahim v. Sk. Abdul Zabar [(2009) 6 SCC 160] was relied on, on the question of interpretation of Gift Deed.
5. In pursuance of the aforementioned order of Page 9 of 17 HC-NIC Page 9 of 17 Created On Thu Aug 24 03:04:01 IST 2017 C/SCA/20847/2015 CAV JUDGMENT the Letters Patent Bench, this Court considered the rival submissions canvassed on behalf of the petitioner as well as for respondent No.4, so as to reexamine the legality and validity of the impugned order of the District Magistrate who exercised his powers under Section 14 of the SERFAESI Act and dismissed the application of the petitioner.
5.1 Now, adverting to the impugned order, according to District Magistrate, petitioner gave finance to two different persons and mortgaged one property for the same. It was reasoned that the documents were lying with different Bank, that the possession of the property was not handed over and remained with the seller and that the litigation was going on in the Civil Court as well as High Court. It was, therefore, reasoned by the District Magistrate that since the parties were litigating by way of civil suit etc., powers under Section 14 would not be exercised by him. It was evident from these reasoning that the District Magistrate entered into the realm of adjudication in deciding the application under Section 14 of the Act.
5.2 The proposition of law with regard to the scope, ambit and nature of powers of the Magistrate functioning under Section 14 of the SERFAESI Act is well settled. In United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC 110] it was observed that upon an application under Section 14 of the SERFAESI Act made by the secured creditor, the Magistrate concerned is obliged to take possession of the secured assets Page 10 of 17 HC-NIC Page 10 of 17 Created On Thu Aug 24 03:04:01 IST 2017 C/SCA/20847/2015 CAV JUDGMENT which are within his jurisdiction. The Division Bench of this Court in Bank of India Vs Pankaj Dilipbhai Hemani [2007 (2) GLH 326] inter alia held as under.
"Hence, the Authority who is called upon to act under Section 14 of the Securitisation Act can only assist, nay, is bound to assist the secured creditor in taking possession of the secured asset. Any dispute between the parties regarding the secured asset raised before the Authority cannot be gone into by the Authority; the Authority has to relegate the aggrieved person to seek statutory remedy under the Securitisation Act after taking possession and handing over to the secured creditor. The Authority cannot be permitted to read anything beyond this is Section 14 of the Securitisation Act." (Para 9) 5.3 The same proposition and view has been reiterated and reasserted by this Court in several decisions including Bharatbhai Ramniklal Sata Vs Collector and District Magistrate [2010 (2) GLR 985], Transcore Vs Union of India [(2008) 1 SCC 125], Canara Bank Vs Sulay Traders through Bipin Kantilal Vakta [2010 (1) GLR 770], I.D.B.I. Bank Ltd. vs. Hytaisun Magnetics Ltd. [2011 (2) GLH 1438], Mansa Synthetic Private Limited Vs Union of India being Special Civil Application No.1829 of 2012, Consumer Protection and Analytic Committee Vs State of Gujarat [2013 (4) GLR 3642], Gruh Finance Limited Vs District Magistrate & Collector [2012 (2) GCD 1288], Kotak Mahindra Bank Vs District Magistrate being Special Civil Application No.8326 of 2011, Kotak Mahindra Bank Vs District Magistrate being Special Civil Application No.7512 of 2014, Gruh Finance Limited Vs District Magistrate being Special Civil Application No.4838 of 2015 and Gruh Finance Limited Vs District Magistrate, Surat being Special Civil Application Page 11 of 17 HC-NIC Page 11 of 17 Created On Thu Aug 24 03:04:01 IST 2017 C/SCA/20847/2015 CAV JUDGMENT No.18551 of 2015.
5.4 It has to be, therefore, observed that the District Magistrate traveled beyond his statutory territory and entered into the arena of merits to reject the application of the petitioner. This was clearly impermissible in law. In view of binding decisions of the Supreme Court as well as of this Court regarding nature of powers exercisable by the Magistrate under Section 14 of the SERFAESI Act, the impugned order would not sustain in eye of law. In this regard, no different view could be taken than one taken in judgment dated 07th December, 2016 earlier.
6. Dealing with the contention raised on behalf of the respondent No.4 that the petitioner could have filed appeal under Section 17 of the SERFAESI Act and the petitioner may be relegated to the said recourse, the contention is not well maintained, rather it is misconceived. Section 17, as it now stands in the Act is as under.
"17. Application against measures to recover secured debts.- (1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorised officer under this Chapter, may make an application alongwith such fee, as may be prescribed to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within forty-five days from the date on which such measure had been taken:
PROVIDED that different fees may be prescribed for making the application by the borrower and the person other than the borrower.
(1A) An application under sub-section (1) shall be filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction-Page 12 of 17
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(a) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises;
(b) where the secured asset is located; or
(c) the branch or any other office of a bank or financial institution is maintaining an account in which debt claimed is outstanding for the time being.
(2) ... ... ...
(3) ... ... ...
(4) ... ... ...
(5) ... ... ...
(6) ... ... ...
(7) ... ... ..."
6.1 Section 17 of the Act contemplates for an
application which may be made against the measures to recover secured debts, and says that any person including the borrower aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13 which are "taken by the secured creditor or his authorised officer under this chapter" may make an application before the Tribunal. Sub-section (2) provides that the Debts Recovery Tribunal shall consider as to whether the measures taken by the secured creditor under Section 13 are in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Sub-section (3) again says that the Tribunal shall examine the evidence adduced by the parties to come to a conclusion whether steps taken by the secured creditor meet with the requirement of law.
6.2 Even though several decisions were cited by learned advocate for respondent No.4 to contend that petitioner-secured creditor has remedy under Section 17 of the Act, it is to be noted that in none of those decisions being Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev Page 13 of 17 HC-NIC Page 13 of 17 Created On Thu Aug 24 03:04:01 IST 2017 C/SCA/20847/2015 CAV JUDGMENT (suupra), Rameshbhai Polabhai Jadav (supra), Mahendrasinh Bharatsinh Chudavat (supra), Om Shiv Lumbers Private Limited (supra) and M/s.Cure Life care Private Limited (supra), such was a case. In all those decisions, it was the aggrieved person or borrower was relegated to the remedy before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. From those judgments, the proposition could hardly emanate that the secured creditor could also initiate proceedings by filing application or appeal before Debts Recovery Tribunal against order under Section 14 of the Act passed by the District Magistrate.
6.3 Therefore, it is clear that the proceedings in form of application/appeal before the Debts Recovery Tribunal is contemplated against the measures initiated and steps taken by the secured creditor under the provisions in Chapter III of the SERFAESI Act. Any person aggrieved by such measures has a right to approach the Tribunal. When the remedy is against the measures taken under Section 13(4) and post-13(4) steps by the secured creditor, it necessarily means and implies that secured creditor cannot be a person who can file appeal under Section 17. The application or appeal is against the action of the secured creditor and by a person other than secured creditor. A person who may move under Section 17 of the Act is an aggrieved person, not necessarily the borrower, but other than the secured creditor. The appeal being against the action taken by the secured creditor under Chapter III of the Act for enforcement of the security interest and since the Tribunal will be examining the Page 14 of 17 HC-NIC Page 14 of 17 Created On Thu Aug 24 03:04:01 IST 2017 C/SCA/20847/2015 CAV JUDGMENT legality and validity of such actions, steps and measures, it is evident and obvious that the secured creditor cannot file appeal under Section 17 of the Act. "Any person" referred to in Section 17 has to a person other than secured creditor.
6.4 Respondent No.4 falls within the category of "any person aggrieved" contemplated under Section 17 of the Act. Therefore, it is the petitioner who is required to take recourse to the remedy before Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act. The phrase "any person" in Section 17 is wide enough to include the aggrieved respondent No.4 who is to be relegated to the said remedy. Debts Recovery Tribunal which is the competent forum before whom the proceedings would lie, has powers to seek evidence from the parties and has further powers to pass necessary orders including the interim orders.
6.5 Various other submissions sought to be raised by learned advocate for respondent No.4 about acquisition of right under the Gift Deed and enforceability of his such right to oppose the action of the Bank under the SERFAESI Act, were all thoroughly misdirected in so far as present proceedings are concerned. For adjudicating all these issues, respondent No.4 has got statutory alternative efficacious remedy. All the contentions on merits proposed to be raised by respondent No.4 could be better examined by the Tribunal in the proceedings which may be filed by respondent No.4. They could not be gone into in the present proceedings. Nor the forum Page 15 of 17 HC-NIC Page 15 of 17 Created On Thu Aug 24 03:04:01 IST 2017 C/SCA/20847/2015 CAV JUDGMENT of District Magistrate acting under Section 14 of the Act is the proper platform where the petitioner could get his grievance tried elaborately and settled by leading evidence, having regard to the limited jurisdiction of the District Magistrate who may at the best act summarily but cannot take up adjudicatory process. Therefore, the proper and efficacious remedy for respondent No.4 is to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal by preferring application under Section 17 of the Act.
6.6 While on one hand, the impugned order of the District Magistrate is found to be not sustainable for the reasons stated above, on the other hand, respondent No.4 is entitled to seek and pursue his remedy in accordance with law to assert and establish his case as he is in possession of the secured assets and is a person aggrieved because of the measures taken by the petitioner under the SERFAESI Act. Respondent No.4, therefore, has to be given opportunity to pursue his alternative efficacious remedy of appeal under Section 17 of the Act. As far as various contentions on merits raised by respondent No.4, this Court has not gone into them nor has expressed any opinion thereon in asmuch as respondent No.4 is relegated to the remedy under Section 17 of the Act where it would be open for him to raise all contentions to be considered in accordance with law.
7. In view of the above discussion and reasons, the present petition is allowed with following order and directions.
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(i) Impugned order dated dated 23rd October, 2015 passed by District Magistrate, Rajkot rejecting the application of the petitioner under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 is hereby set aside;
(ii) Respondent No.4 who claims his rights and interest in the secured asset, shall be entitled to approach, within six weeks from today, Debts Recovery Tribunal by initiating appropriate proceedings under Section 17 of the SERFAESI Act, 2002 together with interim stay application, if any. If such proceedings are filed, the same shall be decided by the Tribunal on its own merits in accordance with law;
(iii) The District Magistrate shall pass appropriate order under Section 14 of the Act only after expiry of period of six weeks contemplated above to enable respondent No.4 to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal, provided any protective or prohibitory order or injunction is not passed by the Tribunal in the proceedings which may be commenced by respondent No.4.
Petition stands disposed of as per the above order. Rule is discharged. No costs. Direct service is permitted.
(N.V.ANJARIA, J.) Anup Page 17 of 17 HC-NIC Page 17 of 17 Created On Thu Aug 24 03:04:01 IST 2017