Bombay High Court
Sher Singh S/O Hira Singh Fauji vs The State Of Maharashtra And Others on 6 March, 1995
Equivalent citations: AIR1995BOM367, 1995(4)BOMCR347, 1995(2)MHLJ306
ORDER Mane, J.
1. This petition under Art. 226 read with Art. 14 of the Constitution of India is filed by the member of the Gurudwara Board, Nanded, challenging the Government Notification dated March 30, 1994 issued by the respondent No. 2 Government of Maharashtra in exercise of the powers under S. 6(1)(v) of the Nanded Sikh Gurudwara Sachkhand Shri Hazur Apchalnagar Sahib Act, 1956 whereby the respondent No. 4 has been duly nominated as member of the Board.
2. The notification as well as the nomination of the respondent No. 4 is objected to only on the ground that the respondent No. 4 is not eligible and entitled for appointment as Member of the Board in view of the provisions contained in S.7(1)(e) of the Nanded Sikh Gurudwara Sachkhand Shri Hazur Apchalnagar Sahib Act, 1956 (for short, the Act). In this content the petitioner submits that the respondent No. 4 was convicted under S. 323 of the Indian Penal Code by the Criminal Court which conviction was affirmed by the High Court. It has been stated that on 11-10-1965 the respondent No. 4 was convicted by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Nanded, in Criminal Case No. 104 of 1965 for offence under S. 323 of the Indian Penal Code on the ground that when the application of the respondent No. 4's father for sanction of extra amount for the services rendered by him as Secretary of the Board was objected to by other members, the respondent No. 4 abused one of the members namely, Amarsingh and in fact beaten him by shoes in presence of other members in the holy premises of the Gurudwara. That conviction was not only upheld by the Sessions Court but also by the High Court on 7-12-1966.
3. The petitioner submits that in the year 1991 a new Board of Gurudwara was duty constituted with effect from 23-8-1991 when the term of members of the earlier Board which was constituted by the Government Notification on 7-3-1984 had come to an end. Under Section 6 of the Act there consists 17 members of the Board as follows :
1. Two members are nominated by the Government;
2. Three members are nominated by the Government Sikh of the State;
3. One member is nominated from the Sikhs of Hyderabad and Secunderabad cities;
4. One member is nominated by the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabhandak Committee, Amritsar from amongst the Sikhs of the State of M.P.;
5. Three members are nominated by S.G.P.C.;
6. Two members are elected by and from Sikh Members of Parliament;
7. One member is nominated by the Chief Khalsa Diwan of Amritsar.
8. Four members are nominated by Sachkhand Huzuri Khalsa Diwan.
Out of 17 members, 14 members in respective categories have been nominated by the Government under the Notification dated 23-8-1991. In order to nominate three more members by the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabhandak Committee (for short, the Committee) a proposal of three names was sent to the Government and the name of the respondent No. 4 is mentioned at serial No. 3. The Government, however, nominated two persons named therein as members of the Board and the respondent No. 4 was not nominated as member of the Board on the ground that he was not found eligible or entitled or qualified to become member of the Board. It has been submitted that the respondent No. 4 is disqualified to become member of the Board as the offence under which he was convicted is an offence involving moral turpitude. The petitioner, therefore, relies on the provisions of clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section of the Act which, inter alia, provides that a person shall be disqualified for being nominated or elected as a member of the Board if he has been convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude. In this context the petitioner points out that the respondent No. 4 being aggrieved by non-inclusion of his name as a member of the Board filed Writ Petition No. 2818 of 1991 and prayed for directions from the Court to include his name as a member of the Board but the same is pending in this Court. The petitioner submits that despite these facts the State Government included the name of the respondent No. 4 as a member of the Board under the impugned Notification issued on 30-3-1994. The petitioner, therefore, submits that since the respondent No. 4 is disqualified to become a member under Section 7(1)(e) of the Act his nomination as a member of the Board is bad in law and as such the notification is required to be quashed and set aside.
4. On behalf of the respondent No. 2, respondent No. 3, respondent No. 4 as well as respondent No. 5 respective returns have been filed. It is suffice to mention that according to the respondent No. 4, it is not open to the petitioner to contend that the respondent No. 4 is disqualified by reason of the provisions contained in S. 7(1)(e) of the Act. It has been submitted that in a representation made to the respondent No. 1 on 1-8-1992 the present petitioner was a signatory as the Secretary of the Board recommending the name of the respondent No. 4 for nominating him as the member of the Board along with other members of the Board. Moreover, in the affidavit filed by the respondent No. 5 it has been clearly stated that :
"Respondent No. 5 had knowledge about the conviction of the respondent No. 4 but as the conviction was in the year 1966 and there being reasonable time having passed the respondent No. 5 had no reason to treat the same as disqualification."
It has been further stated that :
". . . . before nominating the respondent No. 4, respondent No. 5 thoroughly considered the legal and factual position as far as the nature of the conviction of the respondent No. 4 was concerned and it is only when it was felt that this does not amount to disqualification it is then only the name of the respondent No. 4 was recommended."
It has also been stated that :
"..... respondent No. 4 also continued as member immediately after the conviction and, therefore, in fact, this aspect was condoned by all the concerned and it was never treated as a serious matter. Moreover, even the petitioner himself was in favour of the respondent No. 4 but it appears that due to some personal grudge this matter is treated otherwise by the petitioner and thereby the petition is filed."
5. Respondent No. 1 categorically stated that on reviewing the case it was found that the offence for which the respondent No. 4 was convicted did not involve moral turpitude. In other words, it has been stated that in paras 4 and 5 of the reply that though the respondent No. 4 was convicted under S. 323 of the Indian Penal Code, the conviction is not a sufficient ground for disqualification of the respondent No. 4 as member of the Board unless the conviction involves moral turpitude and that the conviction of the respondent No. 4 under S. 323 cannot be said to be a conviction involving moral turpitude. It has been further stated that :
"..... having considered the conviction of the respondent No. 4, State of Maharashtra, has, after application of mind, taken a decision to declare the name of the respondent No. 4 as member of the Board by the Government Gazette dated 30-3-1994."
It is equally important to mention that in the return filed by the respondent No. 3 it has been stated that :
"Even after the conviction by the Court the respondent No. 4 was confirmed as member of the Managing Committee for a period from 1964 to 1966 . . . . further from 22-8-1971 to 6-3-1984 ..... and then from 30-6-1989 to 23-8-1991 .... and lastly he is nominated as a member of the Board since 30-3-1994."
6. Mr. Mandlik, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits that there is no basis for the State Government to take a different view than the view already taken to disqualify the respondent No. 4 as member of the Board on the basis of conviction under S. 323 of the Indian Penal Code which was regarded as an offence involving moral turpitude. On the other hand, Mr. Deshpande, learned counsel for the respondent No. 4, submits that it is made explicitly clear in the return filed by the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 that it is only on due consideration of the question whether the offence with which the respondent No. 4 was found guilty amounts to an offence involving moral turpitude or not, the respondent No. 4 has been nominated as a member of the Board as the offence was not of such a nature which necessarily involves moral turpitude.
7. The only question which requires determination in the present case is whether the offence under S. 323 of the Indian Penal Code under which the respondent No. 4 was previously convicted is an offence involving moral turpitude and is a disqualification to become a member of the Board as expressly prohibited under S. 7(1)(e) of the Act. The learned counsel are in agreement that the term "moral turpitude" has not been defined in any statute and the term is rather vague and it may have different meanings in different contexts. The term has generally been taken to mean a conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals and contrary to what a man owes to a fellow man or society in general. In AIR 1963 SC 1330, this expression came in for interpretation by the Supreme Court. Their Lordships observed as follows :
"In dealing with this aspect of the matter, the expression "moral turpitude" or delinquency is not to receive a narrow construction. Whenever the conduct proved against an advocate is contrary to honesty or opposed to good morals or unethical it may safely be held that it involves moral turpitude."
It is therefore clear that the generally accepted view that any act constituting an offence which is contrary to honesty, modesty or contrary to what a man owes to a fellow man or society in general should be deemed to be an offence involving moral turpitude. In Buddha Pittai v. S.D.O (FB) it has been observed that :
"One of the tests for determining the nature of the offence is to see that it shocks the conscience of or is scorned at by public or society at large. Whether the offence involves moral turpitude will depend on its nature and the circumstances in which it is committed. An offence of certain class may be generally considered to involve moral turpitude but it may not be so if committed in particular circumstances, for example, an offence of murder, may ordinarily involve turpitude but if it is committed in a spirit of patriotism or with an laudable object, it may not shock the public conscience and instead of being desired by the public, the offender may be considered a hero ....."
Thus, the case of every offence will have to be judged in the light of the circumstances in which it is committed and it is not the gravity of the offence or quantum of punishment imposed on a person which will determine such a question. In the aforesaid decision reference to the decision reported in 61 RD 186 (All) is made. It has been observed that :
"an offence involves moral turpitude if the act punished by it is a departure from the standards of conduct laid down by the society or from accepted social norms, or is antisocial in character, or is regarded by the society with disapprobation."
It is important here to reproduce what has been stated in the case of Shiv Nand v. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Chunar, 1961 RD 186 (All) which has been strongly approved by the Full Bench. In that case it was observed that :
"Ideas of morals often undergo changes in different periods of a country's history. It is also true that different peoples of the world sometimes differ as to whether a particular act is moral or immoral Whenever a question has to be considered as to whether a certain act is moral or immoral, one has to consider as to how that act is viewed by the society or the community, as the case may be, and if the society or the community views such act as involving moral turpitude, then even though some particular individual may not consider it so will not make the act a moral one or a praiseworthy act. Therefore, whether an act involves moral turpitude or does not, has to be determined not necessarily on abstract notions of the rights and wrongs involved or the harm or good coming out of the act but how that act is looked upon (by) the society where the act has been committed ..."
Following the said ruling it was further observed in para 42 of the judgment (report) :
"The important question, therefore, is not what the ingredients of the offence are but how the community at large views the offence."
It may be stated that the entire averments in the petition are based on the allegations in the complaint before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nanded, in which the respondent No. 4 came to be convicted for offence under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code. We are rather hesitant to read the facts as mentioned in the petition because they are not the facts based on personal knowledge of the petitioner but they are based on hearsay knowledge. Besides, Section 42 of the Evidence Act precludes us to read them as admissible piece of evidence. Nevertheless the fact that the respondent No.4 was convicted for the act committed by him soon after the meeting of the Board was over on account of some provocative atmosphere, it is still then, if we consider the test which is approved by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court to be applied in the given case, in our opinion, that offence is not an offence involving moral turpitude. In this context we, therefore, strongly rely on the undisputed facts. The authority of the community to which the parties belong has not looked upon the act of the respondent No. 4 either as immoral or contrary to the conduct prescribed for acting as a member of the Board. It is clearly stated not only by the respondent No. 3 but also by the respondent No. 5 that at no point of time the act committed by the respondent No.4 was regarded as a disqualification of the respondent No. 4 as member of the Board. On the contrary, all the while the stand taken by the Committee is consistent with the theory that the act of the respondent No. 4 did not involve moral turpitude. Therefore, it is merely an abstract conviction under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code and which, in our opinion, does not fall under the category of cases to which Section 7(1)(e) of the Act applies.
8. In the result, we find no merit in the petition. The writ petition is dismissed. The interim relief stands vacated. There shall be no order as to costs. Rule is discharged.
9. Petition dismissed.