Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Ram Prasad Etc. Etc. vs State Of Rajasthan And Ors. on 13 May, 1992
Equivalent citations: (1993)ILLJ766RAJ, 1992(1)WLN389
JUDGMENT J.R. Chopra, J.
1. These five writ petitions raise common questions of law and so, they were heard together and are being disposed of by a common judgment.
2. Briefly stated, the facts of each case are as follows:
(1) Radheshyam's case: (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 907/87).
It has been contended by the petitioner that he was appointed as L.D.C. w.e.f. December 1, 1985, on daily wages basis @ Rs. 15/- per day and he was allowed to continue till May 4, 1986. Thereafter, he was again appointed as L.D.C. with effect from May 5, 1986 for a period of three months on daily wages basis @ Rs. 15/-per day and he was allowed to continue up to October 6, 1986. Thereafter, his services were terminated. Again, he was appointed as L.D.C. on daily wages basis @ Rs. 15/- per day with effect from February 2, 1987 to February 28, 1987 through Employment Exchange vide order Annexure-2 dated January 30, 1987. He has, therefore, contended that he was continuously remained in service with effect from December 1, 1985 to October 6, 1986 without any break.
(2) Vimlesh Sukhwal's case : (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 908/87) The contention of the petitioner is that he was appointed as L.D.C. with effect from July 20, 1985 vide Order Annexure-1 dated July 29, 1985. No record has been produced to show that he was allowed to join on July 20, 1985. Thereafter, vide order Annexure-2 dated October 5, 1985, he was again appointed as L.D.C. on daily wages basis @ Rs. 15/- per day. It is alleged that no order of termination was made prior to this order. However, vide order Annexure 3 dated October 15, 1985, his services were brought to an end from the afternoon of October 15, 1985, but it is alleged that he was very much on work even after October 15, 1985. By order Annexure-4 dated May 14, 1986, he was again appointed as L.D.C. for a period of three months on daily wages basis with effect from May 5, 1986. It is alleged that after the expiry of three months his services were not terminated and he was allowed to continue till October 5, 1986. He was again appointed as L.D.C. on daily wages basis @ Rs. 15/- per day with effect from February 2, 1987 to February 28, 1987 vide order Annexure-5 dated January 30, 1987. Thus, he has contended that he has continuously remained in service with effect from July 20, 1985 to October 5, 1986.
(3) Heeralal's case: (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 913/1987) The contention of the petitioner is that he was appointed as Peon vide order Annexure-1 dated August 3, 1984 on daily wages basis @ Rs. 9/-per day and his services were brought to an end with effect from the afternoon of May 25, 1985 vide order Annexure-2, By order Annexure-3 dated May 27, 1985, he was again appointed on daily wages basis at the rate of Rs. 9/- per day and his services were brought to an end with effect from October 3, 1985 vide order Annexure-4 dated October 1, 1985. However, vide order Annexure-5 dated October 1, 1985 he was appointed as peon with effect from October 5, 1985. Thereafter, the petitioner was appointed as Lower Division Clerk with effect from March 13, 1986. He has submitted that this order is not available with him and whenever he comes to lay his hands on it, it will be produced. While this appointment was there, another order dated May 14, 1986 was made appointing him as a L.D.C with effect from May 4, 1986 for a period of three months on daily wages basis at the rate of Rs. 15/- per day. He has contended that the work has been taken from him and he has been paid wages right up to October 6, 1986. Thereafter, he was selected and appointed as L.D.C. w.e.f. February 2, 1987 through Employment Exchange vide order Annex.-7 dated January 30, 1987 and he continued up to February 28, 1987.
(4) Rampal's case (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 912 of 1987) It has been contended that the petitioner was appointed as L.D.C. on daily wages basis @ Rs. 15/- per day vide order Anenxure-1 dated April 25, 1985 and his services were brought to an end vide order Annexure-3 dated August 1, 1985 with effect from the mid-day of July 30, 1985. However, by order dated August 3, 1985, he was again appointed on daily wages basis @ Rs. 15/- per day with effect from August 1, 1985. He has contended that though his services were terminated with effect from July 30, 1985 but he worked on July 30, 1985, July 31, 1985 and on August 1, 1985. According to him, his services were brought to an end vide order dated August 1, 1985 with effect from July 30, 1985 and he has been again appointed vide order August 3, 1985 with effect from August 1, 1985. Then the order dated October 1, 1985 came to be made purporting to bring to an end the services of the petitioner with effect from October 3, 1985 but an order dated October 5, 1985 was made once again appointing him, this time with effect from October 5, 1985. He has contended that though his services were brought to an end with effect from October 3, 1985, he was made to work till October 4, 1985. Thereafter, it is alleged that his services were terminated w.e.f. October 15, 1985 vide order Annexure-8. However he has again been appointed as L.D.C. with effect from May 5, 1986 vide order Annexure-9 dated May 14, 1986 and his services were brought to an end on August 5, 1986 and the work was taken from him and wages were paid right up to August 30, 1986.
(5) Ramprasad's case: (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 911/1987) The case of the petitioner is that he was appointed as L.D.C. with effect from December, 7, 1985 on daily wages basis @ Rs. 15/- per day and he was allowed to continue till May 4, 1986. By order dated May 14, 1986, he was again appointed with effect from May 5, 1986 and he was allowed to continue till October 6, 1986. Thus, he has contended that he has remained continuously in service from December 7, 1985 to October 6, 1986. Thereafter, vide order dated January 30, 1987, he was appointed as L.D.C. on daily wage basis @ Rs. 15/- per day through Employment Exchange and his services were brought to an end on February 28, 1987.
3. Having stated these individual facts, it has been contended by the petitioners that their termination from service with effect from October 6, 1986 is against the provisions of Section 25F(a) and (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short 'the Act'). They have contended that they being clerks of the State Insurance and Provident Fund Department are workmen within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act and the State Insurance and Provident Fund Department is an Industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Act. According to them, their termination in the aforesaid manner is a case of retrenchment being effected within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Act. It was submitted that they immediately could not challenge their termination because of the lack of knowledge of law. The termination of their services is wholly arbitrary so as to be violative of Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution. It was contended that though the provision of Sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act are not attracted in this case but if they are attracted in the opinion of the Court, then they be declared ultra vires for the aforesaid reasons, because they are wholly arbitrary, unconscionable and unreasonable being violative of Articles 14 , 21 and 23 of the Constitution read with Article 39(d) of the Constitution. They have also claimed equal pay for equal work in the relief. They have prayed for the following reliefs by issuing an appropriate writ, order or direction:
"(a) Directing the respondents to continue the petitioners in service as Lower Division Clerks in the pay scale of L.D.C.
(b) Directing the respondents to put the petitioners back in the service as if the aforesaid orders were never made and give them all consequential benefits thereto.
(c) The respondents be directed to pay to the petitioners salary in the pay scale of Rs. 490-840 (old) and revised to Rs. 880-1680 on and from the date from which the petitioners came in service after deducting whatever has been paid to them.
(d) If for giving aforesaid reliefs, it be considered necessary the provisions of Sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act may be declared to be invalid and may be struck down.
(e) The respondents may be directed to pay interest @ 12% per annun on the amount of which he stands deprived of.
(f) The petitioners may also be awarded appropriate damages for the harassment caused to them on account of termination of their services without fulfilling the conditions laid down by the law.
(g) Costs of the writ be awarded."
4. No separate replies to the writ petitions were filed. A detailed reply to the stay petition has been filed in Radbeyshyam's case. Counter-affidavits have been filed by one Shri Ram Mohan Vyas. Addl. Director, State Insurance arid Provident Fund Department, Jaipur.
5. In reply to the stay petition that has been filed in Radheyshyam's case, it has been contended that the State Government vide its order No. F.3 (25) FD/ EXP/III/86/341 dated April 8, 1987 sanctioned some temporary daily wages posts of the Lower Division Clerks up to November 30, 1987, which were further extended vide order dated December 1, 1987 upto February 29, 1988. It was submitted that the petitioners had worked in the Department and so, the preference was given to them and they were engaged on the work against the temporary sanction of posts granted by the State Government upto February 29, 1988. Their appointments were against temporary posts and, therefore, the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act are not attracted. The Government is already giving preference in appointments to them on the basis of their experience and, therefore, they are not entitled to any relief.
6. In the counter-affidavit, that has been filed in Radheyshyam's case, it has been contended that the petitioner has wrongly stated that he was continued up to May 4, 1986. He has suppressed an important fact that on April 30, 1986, he resigned from the service. The photostat copy of his resignation letter has been submitted and marked as Ex. R. 1. Actually, it has been claimed in the counter-affidavits filed in all the writ petitions that they have resigned from service with effect from April 30, 1986 except petitioner Ramprasad, who resigned on April 19, 1986 with effect from April 20, 1986. It has further been contended that the petitioners were engaged on work for a fixed term and were allowed to continue to serve even after the expiry of the fixed term in anticipation of the sanction of competent authority and when no sanction was received, their services were discontinued with effect from October 6, 1986. It was also contended that during the pendency of these writ petitions, certain posts were sanctioned by the Department and these petitioners who had experience were preferred in the Department. As regards the compliance of the provisions of Section 25(a) and (b) of the Act, it was contended that the State Insurance and General Provident Fund Department is not an industry and the appointments being for a specific term or as per the stipulation mentioned in the order, discontinuation from service does not attract the provisions of Sub-section (bb) Section 2(oo) of the Act. Moreover, the petitioners have not completed 240 days' in preceding twelve calendar months from the date of retrenchment.
7. It was contended that regular L.D.Cs. are appointed after their selection from R.P.S.C. The work assigned to the daily rated employees is quite different from the work discharged by the regular L.D.Cs. The duties and responsibilities of regular L.D.Cs. cannot be equated with the work assigned to the daily rated employees who are being engaged for completing up to date posting entries on account of enforcing of new G.P.F. Compulsory Scheme, The petitioners were engaged on the work on daily wages basis mainly for a specific job of posting of G.P.F. accounts in relevant registers. The work assigned to them was of specific nature and they have to work under the guidance of the regular staff. In these circumstances, it has been claimed that their services have rightly been terminated and the petitioners are entitled to no relief.
8. In rejoinders to the counter-affidavits, it has been claimed that resignation letters were obtained from the petitioners on this false representation that unless the letters of resignation are given by them, they will not be appointed in future. It has been submitted that after the resignations were obtained from them, they were again appointed after the expiry of 4 days. According to them, they had worked from May 1, 1986 to May 5, 1986. It is indeed a wonderful coincidence that all the persons so engaged and resigned almost in identical terms should again start working just 4 days later and they should be appointed within 4 days of the resignation being tendered. According to them, the resignation purported to have been given by them was to give examinations and as a matter of fact, no examination was going on at that time. Thus, it has been claimed that the resignations are manoeuvred and have been obtained by the officers to show that break has occurred in services of the petitioners.
9. We have heard Mr. M. Mridul, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Mr. S.S. Bhandawat and Mr. S.K. Vyas, the learned Additional Government Advocates appearing for the respondents and have carefully gone through the record of the cases.
10. It has been contended by Mr. M. Mridul, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, that the State Insurance and Provident Fund Department of the Government of Rajasthan is an Industry as defined in Section 2(0) of the Act. In support of this submission he has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Arun Kumar (Civil Special Appeal No. 33 of 1986, decided on March 19, 1986). He has further submitted that this decision in Arun Kumar's case (supra) was quoted with approval in a Division Bench decision of this Court in Shiva Nand v. State of Raj. (Civil Writ Petn. No. 1238 of 1987, decided on September 23, 1987).
11. On the other hand, Mr. S.K. Vyas, the learned Addl. Government Advocate has contended that against the judgment of this Court in State of Rajasthan's case (supra), a special appeal has been preferred before their Lordships of the Supreme Court, but operation of the judgment has not been stayed. In these circumstances, we are left with no option but to hold that the State Insurance and Provident Fund Department of the Government of Rajasthan is an Industry as defined in Section 2(j) of the Act.
12. It was next argued by Mr. Mridul that the Industrial Tribunals are intended to adjudicate industrial disputes between the management and the workmen, settle them, and pass effective awards in such a way that industrial peace between the employers and the employees may be maintained so that there can be more production to benefit all concerned and for the above purpose, the Industrial Tribunals as far as practicable should not be constrained by the formal rules of law and should avoid inability to arrive at an effective award to meet justice in a particular dispute. In this respect, he has placed reliance on a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Workmen, Williamson Magor & Co. v. Williamson M.& Co., 1982-I-LLJ-33. He has also drawn our attention to a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court rendered in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation AIR, 1986 SC 180, wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed that the right of life includes the right to livelihood. The sweep of the right to life conferred by Article 2, is wide and far-reaching. It does not mean merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by the imposition and execution of the death sentence, except according to procedure established by law. It is, therefore, essential that the procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of his fundamental right must conform to the norms of justice and fairplay. Procedure which is unjust or unfair in the circumstances of a case, attracts the vice of unreasonableness, thereby vitiating the law which prescribed that procedure and consequently, the action taken under it. Any action taken by a public authority which is invested with statutory powers has, therefore, to be tested by the application of two standards; the action must be within the scope of the authority conferred by law and secondly, it must be reasonable.
13. Mr. M. Mridul, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, has contended that although the question of validity of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act was raised before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in S. Govindaraju v. Karnataka S.R.T.C. 1986-II-LLJ-351 but as the matter was decided on some other point, that question was left open. Their Lordships observed that the validity of Section 2(oo)(bb) was not challenged before us. In that case, it was contended before their Lordships that if the view of the High Court is accepted, it would enable unscrupulous employers to provide a stipulation in the contract of service for terminating the employment of the employees to escape the rigours of Section 25F of the Act. This would further confer arbitrary powers on the employers which would be destructive of the protection granted by the Act to the employees. Their Lordships further observed (at p. 353):
"We do not consider it necessary to express any opinion on this question as in our opinion the appellant is entitled to succeed on another short question i.e. the termination order being violative of principles of natural justice."
In that case, the termination was made on the ground of unsuitability and, therefore, it was held that it cannot be done without holding an enquiry. Mr. Mridul has, therefore, contended that the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act are arbitrary and unreasonable being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
14. His contention is that these provisions are absolutely arbitrary because a helpless employee can be obliged to accept a fixed term appointment and his termination can be brought about without attracting the liability to pay the meagre amount of compensation payable under Section 25Fof the Act. This will result in encouraging wholly unconscionable contracts and contracts which will be contrary to the public good. A workman in this country is hardly equal to an employer and can always be dictated by the employer. The result will be that whether the vacancy be of a short duration or not, the employer will always give a fixed term of appointment to a workman. He has submitted that this is what has actually happened in this case, inasmuch as the petitioners who were given appointment on July 19, 1984 or sometime before or thereafter had continued in service till October 6, 1986 and again from February 2, 1987 to February 28, 1987, which clearly means that the vacancies to which they were appointed did exist at least for this much of period but they were purported to be given appointment in bits. Not only the mechanism of giving fixed term appointment was resorted to, but even the petitioners were made to work on daily wages and some time without wages Mr. Mridul has submitted that this makes it abundantly clear that the employer was taking advantage of the utter helplessness of the petitioners on account of their poverty and subjected them to arbitrary terms of appointments, and hence, provisions of. Sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) will result in putting premium on a wholly unconscionable, arbitrary and unequal contracts. Even otherwise, these provisions will operate in a discriminatory manner because one employee may choose to keep a person in service for years together by resorting to the mechanism of fixed term appointment being given and this situation may continue for years together. Another person may be lucky to get temporary ad hoc appointment, which will not be on a fixed term. Yet a person who may put long service as compared to another who has put in much less service, though not in terms of fixed term appointment, will be in a disadvantageous position. There is nothing in law anywhere providing as to in what circumstances a fixed term appointment should be given and in what cases, the fixed term appointment should not be given. Thus it is left to the sweet will of the employer. The whole mattermay turn on a fortuitous circumstance. A person with a longer period of service cannot be put in a position of disadvantage as compared to a person having a lesser period of service but this will be the result of sub-sec (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act. He has, therefore, contended mat the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act be declared as invalid as it is arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
15. In this respect, our attention has been drawn to a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in D. Chenniah v. The Divisional Manager, A.P. State Transport Corporation, 1987 Lab IC 1259. That was a case in which the Conductor was found guilty of irregularities and his termination order showed that it was a termination simpliciter. It was held that it amounted to retrenchment and was also penal in nature. It was observed as under:
"Section 2(oo)(bb) does not take in a stipulation in the contract of employment reserving a unilateral right by the employer to terminate the services of an employee at any time and that too without any notice and without assigning any reasons. It contemplates a contract which expressly provides for certain circumstances or situation in which the contract can be terminated."
This authority does not say that the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act itself are ultra vires.
16. Our attention was next drawn to a decision of the Bombay High Court in DilipM. Shirke v. Zilla Parishad, Yavatmal, wherein it has been observed as follows 1990-I-LLJ-445 at 448:
"Sub-clause (bb) of Clause (oo) of Section 2 of the I.D. Act takes out a class of employment from the definition of "retrenchment" and that class is where the termination of service is on account of non-renewal of a service contract between the workmen and the employer or where contractual employment comes to an end on the basis of stipulation contained therein. The exception as contained in Sub-clause (bb) has to be strictly construed as it takes away certain rights of workmen which such workmen have been enjoying earlier to the amendment. The terminations which are included in Sub-clause (bb) are those which are brought about either because of non-renewal of the contract or because of expiry of time stipulated in the contract of employment. It needs no further explanation but the probability of the employer exploiting the labour by giving fixed tenure appointments can never be overruled and, therefore, it would be improper and unwise simply to decide the nature of employment on the basis of letter of appointment issued by the employer. The nature of employment will have to be determined with reference to the nature of duties performed by the workman and type of job the workman was entrusted with. If the workman is engaged to do a particular job which may require him to do actual work for more than 240 days in twelve calendar months, such employment would be covered by the amended sub-clause because the employ comes to an end with the completion of the work. A stipulation in the contract that the employment would be for a specific period or till completion of the work may also fall within the scope and ambit of this sub-clause. But if the employer resorts to contractual employment as a device to simply take it out of the principal Clause (oo) irrespective of the fact that the work continues or nature of duties which the workman was performing are still in existence such contractual engagements will have to be tested on the anvil of fairness, propriety and bona fides. May be that such fixed tenure employments are made to frustrate the claim of the workman to become regular or get himself confirmed as a permanent employee either under the Rules applicable to such employment or even under the Standing Orders. It is always open to the Court adjudicating the dispute to examine each and every case in its proper perspective and to protect the workman against the abuse of the amended provision. If this protection is not afforded, the benefit flowing from retrenchment to which every termination succumbs, would be rendered nugatory. The amended Sub-clause (bb) would apply only to such cases where the work ceases with the employment or the post itself ceases to exist or such other analogous cases where the contract of employments is found to be fair, proper and bona fide."
Thus, the learned Judge has not held that the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act itself are ultra vires. The learned Judge has only cautioned that the exception as contained in sub- Clause (bb) has to be strictly construed as it takes away certain rights of workmen, which such workmen have been enjoying earlier to the amendment. The terminations which are included in Sub-clause (bb) are those which are brought about either because of non-renewal of the contract or because of expiry of time stipulated in the contract of employment. It is always open to the Court adjudicating the dispute to examine each and every case in its proper perspective and to protect the workman against the abuse of the amended provision. Thus, it has been held that this provision itself is not invalid, but if it is misutiltsed then, of course, it can be set right by the Courts.
17. Here, it will be useful to quote the material portion of Section 2(oo) of the Act.
"Section 2(oo): 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include
(a)..........:or
(b)....................:or (bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or
(c)....................:or We may state here that in certain cases, where the work is for a limited nature, persons can be employed for a limited period so that as soon as the work is completed, services of those persons can be terminated. In this case also, there is a regular staff, which has been employed in the Department of State Insurance and General Provident Fund but since recently, a scheme of compulsory G.P.F. has been made effective, in order to properly maintain the Registers of the G.P.F. A/c. of the State Employees, certain additional staff was required for posting of certain entries and, therefore, some temporary posts were created for a temporary period. It can be possible that the work may be of a permanent nature and the unscrupulous employer in order to avoid regularisation of the services of employees may resort to fixed term appointments but that does not render the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act as arbitrary. Simply a provision is being misused by unscrupulous employer, it cannot make that provision arbitrary. The work may be of a casual nature and may be of a limited scope and in such cases, the employer cannot be saddled with making permanent employment and, therefore, this provision by itself is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. If the Court comes to a conclusion that the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act are being misutilised by the unscrupulous employers, it can grant relief to the employees. In this view of the matter, we are unable to hold the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act as arbitrary being violative of the provisions of Articles 14, 19, 21, 23 and 39(d) of the Constitution.
18. Having dealt with the challenge to the validity of the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, now we come to the facts of each case.
19. It is true that in these cases, the work was of a casual nature. On account of the application of compulsory deduction of the amount of General Provident Fund from the salaries of the State Employees, from a particular date, certain work of temporary nature arose which could not be coped up by the regular staff and, therefore, it was thought fit to employ some temporary staff to clear the arrears of work. It can definitely be said that work was of a clerical nature and it could not have been performed by the peons. For clearance of those arrears, posts were sanctioned for a temporary period so that the work may be got completed. Thus, it cannot be said that it was a work of permanent nature. Be that as it may, in this case, appointments have been made by showing temporary breaks in service and that, of course, is an unfair labour practice. Appointments have been given ex post facto. Thus, the practice of giving artificial break in service deserves to be condemned on the part of the benevolent employer like the State of Rajasthan.
20. However, in this case, disputed questions of facts have been raised. In all these writ petitions except in the writ petition filed by petitioner Ramprasad, the petitioners have tendered their resignations from service with effect from May 1, 1986 whereas the petitioner Ramprasad tendered his resignation with effect from April 20, 1986. If they have tendered their resignations as aforesaid, their past services would automatically be forfeited and they cannot be counted for the purpose of Section 25F(a) and (b) of the Act. The contention of the petitioners is that their resignations were manoeuvred and they were re-appointed after the break of 3-4 days. Whether the resignations were manoeuvred or not is a disputed question of fact, which cannot be decided without bringing evidence on record. Such a disputed question of fact cannot be gone into in the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution by this Court. If actually, the resignations were tendered and the petitioners have stopped from coming to work with effect from the dates they have tendered their resignations, then it would certainly result in forfeiture of their earlier working days and they will not be completing 240 days in a calendar year and hence, application of Section 25F of the Act would not arise in this case. To decide these disputed questions of facts, the petitioners should approach appropriate Tribunal by raising an industrial dispute as to whether the resignations were manoeuvred or they were tendered voluntarily for the reasons mentioned in their applications whereby they have tendered their resignations. In these circumstances, it is difficult to hold whether the termination of the services of the petitioners has been brought about in violation of the provisions of Section 25F(a) and (b) of the Act.
21. So far as the contention of Mr. Mridul as regards equal pay for equal work is concerned, we have already observed that the work for which the petitioners were employed is of a clerical nature and, therefore the petitioners are entitled to the minimum of the pay scale of a L.D.C. along with D.A., and additional D.A. permissible under the Rules for the period work has been taken from them by deducting the payments that have already been made to them.
22. In the result, these writ petitions are allowed in part and the respondents are directed to give minimum of the pay scale of L.D. Cs. along with D.A., Additional D.A. permissible under the Rules, for the period work has been taken from the petitioners by deducting the payments that have already been made to them. However, the contention of the petitioners that the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act are arbitrary and unreasonable being violative of Articles 14, 21 and 39(d) of the Constitution being devoid of force is rejected. So far as the contention of the petitioners that their termination has been brought about in violation of Section 25F(a) and (b) of the Act is concerned, the petitioners should approach appropriate Tribunal by raising an Industrial Dispute before it as this matter involves disputed questions of fact which have been raised in these writ petitions, and they cannot be gone into by this Court in its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
23. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs of these writ petitions.