Jharkhand High Court
Bhim Munda vs Ranchi Municipal Corporation on 13 October, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
2025:JHHC:31612-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No. 310 of 2025
------
Bhim Munda, aged about 72 years, Son of Late Ship Charan
Munda, Resident of Opposite Nath hospital, P.O.- Kadru, P.S.
Argora, District- Ranchi (Jharkhand).
... ... Appellant/Petitioner
Versus
1. Ranchi Municipal Corporation, through Municipal
Commissioner, having its office at Near Kutchery Road, P.O.-
G.P.O., P.S. - Kotwali, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand.
2. Deputy Administrator, Ranchi Municipal Corporation, Near
Kutchery Road, P.O.- G.P.O., P.S. - Kotwali, District- Ranchi,
Jharkhand.
3. Dr. Nishi Kumari, Wife of Virendra Prakash, Resident of Q.
No. 23/R3, Harmu Housing Colony, P.O. & P.S. - Argora,
District - Ranchi.
... ... Respondents/Respondents
With
C. Rev. No. 33 of 2025
----
Bhim Munda, Aged about 72 years, son of Late Shiv Charan
Munda, Resident of Opposite Nath Hospital, P.O. - Kadru,
P.S. - Argora and District - Ranchi.
... ... Appellant/Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. The Deputy Commissioner -cum- Registrar, Government of
Jharkhand, Office of the Deputy Commissioner, Kutchary
Chowk, P.O. G.P.O. and P.S. Kotwali, District - Ranchi.
3. The District Sub-Registrar, P.O. G.P.O. & P.S. Kotwali, and
District Ranchi.
4. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, P.O. G.P.O., & P.S.
Kotwali, District Ranchi.
5. The Circle Officer, P.O. Doranda & P.S. Argora, Argora,
Ranchi.
6. A.G. Office Employees Co-Operative House Construction
Society, having its registered office at New A.G. Cooperative
Colony, Kadru, P.O. Kadru, P.S. Argora, District - Ranchi.
7. Dr. Nishi Kumari, Wife of Birendra Prakash, Resident of
Qtr. No. 23/R/3, Harmu Housing Colony, P.O. Kadru, P.S.
Argora, District Ranchi, Jharkhand.
8. Ranchi Municipal Corporation, Near Kutchery Road, P.O.-
G.P.O., P.S.- Kotwali and District - Ranchi, Jharkhand.
... ... Respondents/Opp. Parties
1
2025:JHHC:31612-DB
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
------
For the Appellant : Mr. Ajit Kumar, Sr. Advocate
: Mr. Nitin Kumar Pasari, Advocate
For the Respondent No.3 : Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate
: Mr. Sankalp Goswami, Advocate
For the Resp. RMC : Mr. Prashant Kr. Singh, Advocate
: Mr. Karbir, Advocate
[in LPA No. 310 of 2025]
For the State : Mr. Ranjan Kumar, AC to Sr. SC-I
[in C. Rev. No. 33 of 2025]
------
C.A.V. on 08.09.2025 Pronounced on 13.10.2025
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.:
1. Both the matters have been tagged together as per the order dated 05.08.2025 passed in Civil Review No.33 of 2025 and, therefore, both the matters have been heard together.
2. The instant Letters Patent Appeal being L.P.A. No.310 of 2025 is directed against the order/judgment dated 02.05.2025 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(C) No.239 of 2025 whereby and whereunder the learned writ court has refused to interfere with the order of demolition dated 12.05.2018 passed by the respondent No.1 in Unauthorized Construction Case No.19 of 2018 as well as the notice dated 10.01.2025.
3. The Civil Review No.33 of 2025 has been preferred seeking review of the order/judgment dated 26.06.2024 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No.102 of 2024 wherein the Division Bench has dismissed the appeal which 2 2025:JHHC:31612-DB was filed against the dismissal of the writ petition in W.P.(C) No. 1204 of 2018 by order dated 30.01.2024.
4. The subject matter of Civil Review No.33 of 2025 which has been filed for review of judgment dated 26.06.2024 passed in Letters Patent Appeal being L.P.A. No.102 of 2024, has been filed in a factual situation which is identical to that of the judgment dated 02.05.2025 passed in W.P.(C) No. 239 of 2025 against which the instant L.P.A. No.310 of 2025, has also been filed, save and except the deed of registration is different but the Khata Number, Plot Number and all other issues are identical.
5. The learned counsel for the parties have submitted at Bar that the judgment passed in W.P.(C) No.239 of 2025 which is the subject matter of L.P.A. No.310 of 2025 will depend upon the outcome of the Civil Review No.33 of 2025 by advancing the argument that if the judgment sought to be reviewed in Civil Review No.33 of 2025 will be reviewed, then certainly the same will govern the fact of judgment impugned in L.P.A. No.310 of 2025. Therefore, this Court thought it proper to first hear Civil Review No.33 of 2025 in which judgment passed in L.P.A. No.102 of 2024 has been sought to be reviewed. Civil Rev. No. 33 of 2025 with I.A. No.4205 of 2025
6. The instant civil review is barred by limitation of 241 3 2025:JHHC:31612-DB days and for which the delay condonation application has been filed by invoking the jurisdiction conferred to this Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, hence, the argument has been advanced in the instant interlocutory application being I.A. No.4205 of 2025 for consideration of the issue of condonation of delay so that the matter may be heard on merit. Submission of the learned senior counsel appearing for the review petitioner:
7. Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the review petitioner, has submitted that there is delay of 241 days in filing the instant review which has been caused due to the reason beyond the control of the review petitioner as per the statement made at paragraph-4 of the interlocutory application.
8. It has been contended that the reason referred in paragraph-4 may be considered to be sufficient cause explaining the delay in filing the instant review petition. Submission of the learned senior counsel appearing for the State respondent:
9. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State has submitted that the explanation so furnished and sought to be accepted by this Court at paragraph-4 cannot be said to be sufficient cause to condone the delay of 241 days.
10. Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel, has submitted 4 2025:JHHC:31612-DB that although no Vakalatnama has been filed in the instant review petition but the Vakalatnama has been filed in the Letters Patent Appeal being L.P.A. No.310 of 2025 on being called upon by this Court.
11. It has further been submitted that since due appearance is there in the Letters Patent Appeal being L.P.A. No.310 of 2025 and, as such, he has also advanced argument in the instant review petition by adopting the grounds taken on behalf of the State.
Analysis
12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the averments made in the instant interlocutory application.
13. Statement made in Paragraph-4 of the instant interlocutory application is quoted herein below for ready reference-
"That the order impugned before this Hon'ble Court is dated 26.06.2024, as against which the Appellant had preferred S.L.P Case No. 22971 of 2024 well within time, which was dismissed in limine vide order dated 21.10.2024.
However, the cause of action for filling the present civil review arose owing to development that has taken place inasmuch as taking aid of the order impugned for a property 5 2025:JHHC:31612-DB situated adjacent to the property in question in the earlier writ petition as also the Letters Patent, the Appellant has been facing demolition notices and for which demolition notices have been challenged in W.P.(C) No.239/2025."
14. This Court, after going through the explanation furnished, needs to consider as to whether the fresh cause of action as per the reason shown at paragraph-4 of the interlocutory application can be said to be ground to review the order which has already been barred by the Act of limitation?
15. This Court without going into merit of the instant petition, is of the view that it would be relevant to refer herein the settled proposition of law on the issue of civil review rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court.
16. It is settled position of law that the High Court is having jurisdiction/power to rectify its error apparent on the face of the order or any facts could not have been brought to the notice of the Court in spite of due diligence. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, [(1954) 2 SCC 42, particularly at paragraph-32 which reads as under: --
"32. Before going into the merits of the case it is as well to bear in mind the scope of the application for review which has given rise to the present appeal. It is needless to emphasis that the scope of an application for review is much more 6 2025:JHHC:31612-DB restricted than that of an appeal. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order XLVII, Rule I of our Civil Procedure Code, 1908, the Court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. It may allow a review on three specified, grounds, namely (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record and (iii) for any other sufficient reason."
17. Likewise, in the case of Col. Avatar Singh Sekhon v. Union of India, 1980 Supp SCC 562, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that a review of an earlier order cannot be done unless the court is satisfied that the material error which is manifest on the face of the order, would result in miscarriage of justice or undermine its soundness. The observations made are as under:
"12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved to hear Shri Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party has been hurt without being heard. But we cannot review our earlier order unless satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. In Sow Chandra Kante v. Sheikh Habib (1975) 1 SCC 674 this Court observed:
'A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. ..... The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality."
18. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kamlesh 7 2025:JHHC:31612-DB Verma v. Mayawati, (2013) 8 SCC 320 has observed that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC. As long as the point sought to be raised in the review application has already been dealt with and answered, parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment only because an alternative view is possible. The principles for exercising review jurisdiction were succinctly summarized as under:
"20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:
20.1. When the review will be maintainable:
(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;
(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;
(iii) Any other sufficient reason.
The words "any other sufficient reason" has been interpreted in Chajju Ram v. Neki, and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasiusto mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule". The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd.,.
20.2. When the review will not be maintainable: --
(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.
(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.8
2025:JHHC:31612-DB
(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.
(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error.
(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.
(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.
(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.
(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived."
19. It is evident from the aforesaid proposition of law that the jurisdiction of the Court who is to review the order, is very limited and the same can only be exercised if there is error apparent on the face of the order or any facts could not have been brought to the notice of the Court in spite of due diligence.
20. It is evident that while power of review may be inherent in the High Court to review its own order passed in a writ petition, the same has to be exercised on well-recognised and established grounds on which judicial orders are reviewed. Review can also be sought when the order discloses some error apparent on the face of record or on grounds analogous thereto. These are all grounds which find mention in various 9 2025:JHHC:31612-DB judicial pronouncements right from the earliest time as well as in the Rules of Order 47 of the Civil Procedure Code as permissible grounds of review.
21. The term "mistake or error apparent" by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.
22. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected‟. There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the latter only can be corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction. A review 10 2025:JHHC:31612-DB petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise".
23. In the very recent judgment in the case of Sanjay Kumar Agarwal v. State Tax Officer (1) & Anr., reported in (2024) 2 SCC 362, the Hon'ble Apex Court while interpreting the provision of Order 47 Rule 1 of the C.P.C. the proposition has been laid down to entertain the review, as has been held at paragraph 16.1 to 16.7 which reads as under:-
"16.1. A judgment is open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record.
16.2. A judgment pronounced by the court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so.
16.3. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record e justifying the court to exercise its power of review.
16.4. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected".
16.5. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise".
16.6. Under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have already been addressed and decided.
16.7. An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should 11 2025:JHHC:31612-DB not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions.--"
24. Since the present review petition is barred by limitation therefore this Court has to see whether the sufficient cause is available for condonation of delay in filing the instant petition.
25. There is no dispute about the fact that generally the lis is not to be rejected on the technical ground of limitation but certainly if it has been filed after inordinate delay, then the duty of the Court is to consider the application to condone the delay before entering into the merit of the lis.
26. It requires to refer herein that the Law of Limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time, as has been held in the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Brijesh Kumar & Ors. Vrs. State of Haryana & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 351.
27. In "P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala", (1997) 7 SCC 556, the Hon'ble Apex Court while considering a case of condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay had been given, held at paragraph-6 as 12 2025:JHHC:31612-DB under:
"6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds."
28. While considering the similar issue, the Hon'ble Apex Court in "Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy", (2013) 12 SCC 649, wherein, it has been held as under:
"21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.9. (ix) the conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go-by in the name of liberal approach.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters."
29. It is settled position of law that when a litigant does not act with bona fide motive and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part, the period of limitation for filing the case expires, such lack of bona fide and gross inaction and negligence are the vital factors which should be taken into consideration while considering the question of condonation of 13 2025:JHHC:31612-DB delay.
30. The Hon'ble Apex Court in "Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd.", (1962) 2 SCR 762, has held that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of the given case, there is no right to the appellant to have delay condoned. At paragraph 12, it has been held as hereunder:-
"12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in 14 2025:JHHC:31612-DB dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. In the present case there is no difficulty in holding that the discretion should be exercised in favour of the appellant because apart from the general criticism made against the appellant's lack of diligence during the period of limitation no other fact had been adduced against it. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant's application for condonation of delay only on the ground that it was appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground."
31. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay condonation application, the Court of Law is required to consider the sufficient cause for condonation of delay as also the approach of the litigant as to whether it is bona fide or not as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a right is accrued in favour of the other side and as such, it is necessary to look into the bona fide motive of the litigant and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part. 35. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of 'sufficient cause'.
32. The consideration of meaning of 'sufficient cause' has been made in "Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer", [(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein, it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder:-
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the 15 2025:JHHC:31612-DB word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause"
means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953] , Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 :
(2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629] .)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a "good cause" and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause".
11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is 16 2025:JHHC:31612-DB possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.
"A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
"605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence." An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 17 2025:JHHC:31612-DB 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448]
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 ] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul 17 Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225].
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
33. Thus, it is evident that the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously.
34. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, 18 2025:JHHC:31612-DB and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The Court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been held in "Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Bhutnath Banerjee & Ors.", AIR 1964 SC 1336; "Lala Matadin Vrs. A. Narayanan", (1969) 2 SCC 770; "Parimal Vrs. Veena @ Bharti", (2011) 3 SCC 545 and "Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai", (2012) 5 SCC 157.
35. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the expression 'sufficient cause' should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. v. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 195, wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:-
"12. Thus, it becomes plain that the expression "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should 19 2025:JHHC:31612-DB receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute "sufficient cause" or not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way."
36. This Court from the aforesaid judicial pronouncements has found that the delay can be condoned irrespective of period of delay but the said consideration must be passed upon the explanation if found to be sufficiently explained.
37. Moreover, herein it is also evident from the statement made at paragraph-4 of the instant interlocutory application 20 2025:JHHC:31612-DB that the review petitioner himself has admitted that the same is fresh cause of action and further it appears that only due to that reason the writ petition has been preferred being W.P.(C) No.239 of 2025 and against the order passed in the said writ petition Intra-Court Appeal being LPA 330 of 2025 has been preferred.
38. In the present case issue is answered against the review petition reason being that the judgments on civil review delivered by the Hon'ble Apex Court, as has been referred hereinabove, do not stipulate that the fresh cause of action is to be taken as a ground to review the order that too, the same is in consequence of the judgment passed by this Court in writ petition being W.P.(C) No.1204 of 2018, upheld in L.P.A. No. 102 of 2024 against which Special Leave Petition being S.L.P. Case No. 22971/2024 has also been dismissed by the Hon'ble Apex Court.
39. Hence, applying the position of law holding the field of civil review, this Court is of the view that the fresh cause of action is not to be taken as a ground to review the order and the same is not sufficient ground to condone the delay. No, ground has been made by the learned counsel for the petitioner to hear this civil review application.
40. Accordingly, the I.A No. 4205 of 2025 and this civil review application stands dismissed.
21
2025:JHHC:31612-DB L.P.A. No.310 of 2025
41. The instant Letters Patent Appeal being L.P.A. No.310 of 2025 is directed against the order/judgment dated 02.05.2025 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(C) No.239 of 2025 whereby and whereunder the learned writ court has refused to interfere with the order of demolition dated 12.05.2018 passed by the respondent No.1 in Unauthorized Construction Case No.19 of 2018 as well as the notice dated 10.01.2025.
42. The brief facts of the case as incorporated in the memo of appeal and has also been referred in the impugned judgment, need to be refer herein which reads as under:
(i) The writ petitioner (appellant herein) had purchased two plots of lands vide two separate Sale Deeds being Sale Deed No. 12269 dated 12.11.2002 in respect of plot no. 288/A ad-
measuring an area of 2 kathas 8 chhataks (hereinafter to be referred as L1 plot) and Sale Deed No. 17396 dated 05.11.2007 in respect of Plot No. 288 (Part), ad-measuring an area of 3 kathas 8 chhataks, 36 Sq.ft. (hereinafter to be referred as L2 plot).
(ii) Since 2002 and 2007 respectively, the appellant 22 2025:JHHC:31612-DB had been enjoying peaceful possession over the same, although, the subject matter of the present dispute is in relation of plot no. 288 (Part), admeasuring an area of 3 katha 8 Chattaks registered vide Sale Deed No. 17396.
(iii) The construction of residential premises was carried out by the appellant in respect of plot ad- measuring an area of 3 kathas 8 chhataks and the appellant is living and enjoying peaceful possession over the same.
(iv) So far as the other plot of the appellant is concerned, a fraudulent registration case was filed vide Fraudulent Registration Case No. 13/2017-18 challenging the registration of Sale Deed No. 12269 of the year 2002, in respect of 2 kathas 8 chhataks of land registered in the name of appellant. Based upon which an order was passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, dated 02.02.2018, cancelling the registered sale deed and directing the District Sub-Registrar, Ranchi, to register an F.I.R also.
(v) Further, an F.I.R. was registered vide Kotwali P.S. Case No. 56/2018 corresponding to G.R. Case No. 1492/2018, in which the appellant 23 2025:JHHC:31612-DB being the purchaser was also made an accused.
(vi) Aggrieved by the order of cancellation, the appellant challenged the same before this Hon'ble Court in W.P.(C)No. 1204 of 2018.
(vii) In the said writ petition, the writ-petitioner (appellant herein) had also challenged the order passed by the Municipal corporation (Respondent No.1) dated 12.05.2018 in Un- authorized Construction Case No. 19/2018, by filing independent Interlocutory Application, being I.A. No. 4750 of 2018.
(viii) The aforesaid writ petition was disposed of vide order 30.01.2024 inter alia setting aside the order of Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, passed in Fraudulent Registration Case No. 13/2017-18, however, leaving the appellant to avail appropriate remedy and the order of the Municipal Commissioner, Ranchi, was not interfered with.
(ix) Immediately after the writ petition was disposed of, the possession of the land in question being Plot No. 288 (Part) was forcibly entered into by the claimant and the construction in full swing 24 2025:JHHC:31612-DB had begun and as on the date of filing of the present writ application, the construction has almost been completed.
(x) After the orders have been passed by the Writ Court, the appellant filed a Recall Application dated 23.04.2024 before the Respondent No.1.
(xi) Aggrieved of the F.I.R., the appellant had challenged the same before this Court in Cr.M.P. No. 214 of 2022, which was quashed by this Court vide order dated 08.05.2024.
(xii) Being aggrieved of the order passed in the writ petition, the appellant had challenged the order dated 30.01.2024 passed in W.P.(C) No. 1204 of 2018 before this Court in L.P.A. No. 102 of 2024 and the said appeal was dismissed vide order 26.06.2024.
(xiii) Aggrieved of the order passed by Division Bench of this Court, the appellant had also preferred Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 22971 of 2024, which was dismissed by the Hon'ble Apex Court vide order dated 21.10.2024.
(xiv) Further, so far the liberty given to the appellant by the Writ Court is concerned, the appellant has 25 2025:JHHC:31612-DB already preferred a Title Suit vide Title Suit No. 411 of 2024, which is pending adjudication before the Civil Court, Ranchi.
(xv) During the pendency of the Title Suit, the appellant represented before the Municipal Corporation informing therein that the appellant has already preferred a title suit and till the title suit is decided or adjudicated, no action be taken pursuant to the earlier order dated 12.05.2018. (xvi) The appellant was yet again served with the notice of demolition pursuant to the orders of the Hon'ble Apex Court vide letter dated 02.12.2024. (xvii) On 10.01.2025, the appellant has been served with a Notice of Demolition referring to earlier order passed by Municipal Commissioner fixing the date of demolition as on 19.01.2025, although, in respect of the plot in which the construction is sought to be demolished, has already been in possession of the party who had claimed earlier by Fraudulent Registration Case No. 13/2017-18.
43. Aggrieved of the actions of the respondent, the petitioner moved before this Court by filing writ petition being W.P.(C) 26 2025:JHHC:31612-DB No.239 of 2025 which has been dismissed by impugned order dated 02.05.2025 against which the present appeal has been preferred.
Submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant
44. The leaned senior counsel has submitted that the learned Single Judge has committed error in passing the impugned judgment without taking into consideration the issues.
45. He has further submitted that the Learned Single Judge erred in invoking the doctrine of constructive res judicata to hold that the petitioner's right over the L2 plot could not be agitated since it was not raised earlier in W.P.(C) No. 1204 of 2018. The said writ pertained exclusively to L1 plot, whereas L2 plot (covered under Sale Deed No. 17396 dated 05.11.2007) is a distinct parcel of land. The cause of action for L2 arose only upon the issuance of fresh demolition notice dated 10.01.2025, which was not the subject of previous adjudication.
46. It has been contended that the Learned Single Judge erred in holding that the demolition order dated 12.05.2018 in UC Case No. 19/2018 was specifically in relation to the construction made under Building Plan No. 80/2003 on L1 plot. The impugned judgment fails to appreciate that no 27 2025:JHHC:31612-DB sanctioned plan or demolition direction exists for L2 plot. Hence, applying the 12.05.2018 demolition order to L2 plot is manifestly illegal and without jurisdiction.
47. Learned senior counsel has further submitted that the Learned Single Judge erred in not taking note of the fact that the petitioner was not afforded an opportunity of hearing in relation to the L2 plot either during the UC proceedings of 2018 or prior to issuance of the fresh notice dated 10.01.2025. Demolition of construction over L2 plot without affording specific hearing constitutes violation of principle of natural justice.
48. It has been submitted that that the Learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the petitioner's title over L2 plot is currently under adjudication in Original (Title) Suit No. 411 of 2024. Demolition during pendency of a civil suit without adjudication on title rights undermines the authority of the civil court and causes irreparable prejudice.
49. It has further been submitted that the impugned judgment erroneously holds that since L1 plot's sale deed was declared void, the subsequent sale deed for L2 plot must also be void, despite the fact that L2 plot was not the subject of prior demolition orders or adverse orders. Each sale deed must be independently tested for validity. Also, this Hon'ble Court has erred in deciding the validity of the sale deed and the title 28 2025:JHHC:31612-DB of the appellant in W.P.(C). No. 1204/2018.
50. Further, the Learned Single Judge erred in holding that even if sale deed of L1 plot is void, it does not automatically render L2 plot void unless specifically challenged and adjudicated. The impugned judgment incorrectly applies a blanket finding to distinct transactions, violating the principle of severability of rights and transactions.
51. Learned senior counsel has contended that the Learned Single Judge failed to take note that no independent inquiry or report has been made to determine whether the construction on L2 plot is unauthorized or whether it was ever covered under the plan cancelled in 2018. The dismissal overlooks the need for a fact-based inquiry before a drastic step like demolition.
52. The further ground has been taken that the Learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that applying a demolition order passed in 2018 to a structure not covered under that proceeding, in the absence of fresh findings of unauthorized construction, is arbitrary, excessive, and contrary to the principle of proportionality laid down in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545.
53. Learned senior counsel has submitted that the learned Judge has wrongly relied upon the judgment rendered in the 29 2025:JHHC:31612-DB case of Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal reported in (2020) 8 SCC 129 without appreciating that Section 24(2) of Land Acquisition Act, 2013, operates differently when possession is with the petitioner and compensation was not paid to his vendor. The petitioner's uninterrupted possession since 2007 raises a genuine issue under Section 24(2) which merits examination.
54. Learned senior counsel has further submitted that the impugned judgment fails to appreciate the settled law that in matters where long possession exists, equitable considerations may override rigid technicalities.
55. It has also been submitted that the Learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate that the RMC proceeded to execute a demolition on the basis of an order passed in a different context (i.e., construction over L1 plot). The application of such an order to a different plot (L2), which was neither covered under the original UC Case No. 19/2018 nor subject to demolition notice earlier, amounts to jurisdictional overreach. This violates the principle that administrative authorities must act within the four corners of their statutory powers.
56. Learned senior counsel has taken the ground that the Learned Single Judge erred in only taking note of the dismissal of the injunction petition filed in the Original Title Suit No.411/2024 and failed to take note of the pendency of the 30 2025:JHHC:31612-DB Original Title Suit No. 411/2024 before the Civil Court, any administrative or coercive action affecting title or possession over the disputed land ought to have been stayed. Failure to consider the applicability of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act (doctrine of lis pendens) is a patent error of law.
57. Learned senior counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the impugned order needs interference.
Submission made on behalf of the Respondent No.3
58. Per contra, Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No.3, has submitted that the identical issue has already been decided by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the judgment dated 30.01.2024 passed in W.P.(C) No.1204 of 2018, upheld by the Division Bench vide judgment dated 26.06.2024 passed in L.P.A. No.102 of 2024 against which the special leave petition has been preferred being S.L.P. No.22971 of 2024 which has also been dismissed vide order dated 21.10.2024.
59. It has been contended that since the issues are identical to that of L.P.A. No.102 of 2024 arising out of W.P.(C) No.1204 of 2018 and the order passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court dismissing the Special Leave Petition being S.L.P. No.22971 of 2024, hence the matter may be decided in terms of the order 31 2025:JHHC:31612-DB already passed by this Court since the learned Single Judge has also taken into consideration the aforesaid matter. Analysis
60. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the pleadings made in the writ petition incorporated in the memo of appeal as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment.
61. This Court, in order to come to the conclusion whether the factual aspects in both the cases are identical or not, needs to refer herein the factual aspect separately, revolving around L.P.A. No.102 of 2024 arising out of W.P.(C) No.1204 of 2018. The factual aspect of the case as referred in judgment dated 30.01.2024 of W.P.(C) No. 1204 of 2018 is referred hereinbelow-
(i) The case of the petitioner in brief is that the petitioner is a member of Schedule Tribe and is ex-army personnel. He purchased a land which was acquired by the Government prior to his purchase from his vendor in the year 1961 without knowing that such acquisition made by the Government of 2 ½ khata of land which roughly comes to 3.75 decimals.
(ii) Before purchase of the said land, the petitioner sought necessary permission from the Deputy Commissioner, 32 2025:JHHC:31612-DB Ranchi as per Section 46 of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act.
(iii) The petitioner came to learn by the order dated 02.02.2018 of the Deputy Commissioner-cum-Registrar, Ranchi that the Deputy Commissioner-cum-Registrar, Ranchi annulled the registered sale deed of the petitioner. The petitioner only after that came to know that the land in question along with other lands were acquired for the AG Office Employees Co-operative Society in the year 1961 and on the basis of the application made by the District Sub-Registrar for annulment of the registered sale deed of the petitioner by the respondent no.7 over which the petitioner has constructed his house for an area admeasuring 10 decimals, recommendation was made for carrying the proceeding of annulment.
62. The reference of these facts is being made in order to come to the conclusion as to whether the factual aspect involved in the instant Letters Patent Appeal is identical to that of subject matter/issues of Civil Review No.33 of 2025 seeking review of the order/judgment dated 26.06.2024 passed in L.P.A. No.102 of 2024.
63. It is evident from the assessment of factual aspect that the issue involved in the present Letters Patent Appeal is identical to the factual aspect involved in W.P.(C) No.1204 of 2018, which has already been dismissed by the learned Writ 33 2025:JHHC:31612-DB Court and the same is upheld by the Division Bench vide judgment dated 26.06.2024 passed in L.P.A. No.102 of 2024 and against which the special leave petition has been preferred being S.L.P. No.22971 of 2024 and the same has also been dismissed by the Hon'ble Apex Court vide order dated 21.10.2024, save and except the deed of registration.
64. All other issues are identical as has been dealt with by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment dated 02.05.2025 passed in W.P.(C) No.239 of 2025, as would be evident from the reference of the factual aspect as referred in the judgment aforesaid which is being referred herein: -
(i) The petitioner had purchased two plots of land vide Sale Deed No. 12269 dated 12.11.2002 (with respect to plot no. 288/A admeasuring an area of 2 kathas 8 chhataks) (hereinafter to be referred as "L1 plot") and Sale Deed No. 17396 dated 05.11.2007 (with respect to Plot No. 288 (Part) ad-measuring an area of 3 kathas 8 chhataks, 36 Sq.ft.) (hereinafter to be referred as "L2 plot").
(ii) The construction of residential premises was carried out by the petitioner over L2 plot and he has been still living and enjoying peaceful possession over the same.
(iii) A fraudulent registration case was filed before the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi by the respondent no. 3 vide 34 2025:JHHC:31612-DB Fraudulent Registration Case No. 13 of 2017-18 challenging the registration of Sale Deed No. 12269 with respect to L1 plot and the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, vide order dated 02.02.2018, cancelled the said sale deed.
(iv) The said order was challenged by the petitioner by filing a writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 1204 of 2018 which was disposed of vide order dated 30.01.2024 setting aside the order dated 02.02.2018 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, however I.A No. 4750 of 2018, which was filed challenging the order dated 12.05.2018 passed by the respondent no. 1 in Un-authorized Construction Case No. 19/2018, was dismissed. But, in this writ petition liberty was given to the petitioner to avail appropriate remedy.
(v) Thereafter, the petitioner filed an application dated 23.04.2024 before the respondent no. 1 for recall of the order dated 12.05.2018 passed in U.C Case No. 19 of 2018. The petitioner also preferred L.P.A. No. 102 of 2024 against the order dated 30.01.2024 passed in W.P.(C) No. 1204 of 2018, however the learned Division Bench of this Court, vide order 26.06.2024, dismissed the said appeal.
Subsequently, the Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 22971 of 2024 filed by the petitioner was also dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order dated 21.10.2024. 35
2025:JHHC:31612-DB
(vi) The petitioner has preferred Original (Title) Suit No. 411 of 2024 claiming title over L1 & L2 plots which is pending adjudication before the Civil Court, Ranchi and during the pendency of the said title suit, the petitioner has represented the Ranchi Municipal Corporation requesting inter alia not to take any action pursuant to the earlier order dated 12.05.2018, however vide letter dated 02.12.2024, the petitioner has been served a notice for removal of unauthorized construction. The petitioner has also been served a notice of demolition dated 10.01.2025, referring to earlier order passed by the respondent no. 1 fixing the date of demolition as on 19.01.2025.
65. For comparison, the reference of the factual aspect in the impugned judgment, the factual aspect of L.P.A. No.102 of 2024 [subject matter of Civil Review No.33 of 2025], is also being referred herein: -
(i) Appellant had purchased 2 ½ khata and 8 Chattak of land(in short, subject property) through registered sale deed dated 12th November 2002 from Manual Oraon, Bijla Oraon and Anand Oraon, who are legal heirs and successors of Budhwa Oraon.
(ii) On application by respondent no. 7 (respondent no. 3 herein) to the District Sub-Registrar alleging fraudulent transfer made in favour of appellant, Fraudulent 36 2025:JHHC:31612-DB Registration Case No. 13/2017-18 was registered.
(iii) In the said proceeding, the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, passed an order on 2nd February 2018, holding that Anand Oraon by misrepresenting himself as owner fraudulently transferred the subject property through sale deed No. 12269 of 2002 and therefore, annulled the said sale deed and directed the District Sub-Registrar to lodge a First Information Report.
(iv) The Ranchi Municipal Corporation instituted UC Case No.19 of 2018 and in the said proceeding the appellant was called upon to show case why the construction made over the subject property be not demolished.
(v) Thereafter, Municipal Commissioner passed an order on 12th May 2018 for demolition of the residential building constructed over the subject property.
66. It is evident from the comparative analysis of the factual aspect of the cases refereed hereinabove i.e. W.P.(C) No.1204 of 2018 and L.P.A. No.102 of 2024 (arising out of W.P.(C) No.1204 of 2018), as also the consideration so made by this Court in the order passed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment dated 30.01.2024 passed in W.P.(C) No.1204 of 2018, upheld vide judgment dated 26.06.2024 passed in L.P.A. No.102 of 2024, is identical to that of the judgment passed by 37 2025:JHHC:31612-DB the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(C) No.239 of 2025 dated 02.05.2025, which is the subject matter of the present appeal.
67. Learned Senior for the appellant has submitted that the learned Single Judge erred in invoking the doctrine of constructive res judicata to hold that the petitioner's right over the L2 plot (Deed No. 17396 dated 05.11.2007) could not be agitated since it was not raised earlier in W.P.(C) No. 1204 of 2018.
68. But, ongoing through the record, we find that firstly, in W.P.(C) No. 1204 of 2018, the order of demolition dated 12.05.2018 passed in U.C Case No. 19/2018 was challenged by filling I.A. No. 4750 of 2018. This court by judgment dated 30.01.2024 had dismissed the said I.A. No. 4750 of 2018 and held at paragraph-13 that sale deed no. 12269 of 2002 being void as the vendor was not having any title at the time of executing the sale deed. Paragraph-13 of judgment dated 30.01.2024 passed in W.P.(C) No. 1204 of 2018, is quoted herein below for ready reference-
"13. So far as the I.A. No. 4750 of 2018 is concerned, as this Court has already held that even without the order of the Deputy Commissioner passed in the said Fraudulent Registration Case No. 13/2017-18 dated 02.02.2018 otherwise also, the sale deed no. 12269 of 2002 being a void one as the vendor was not having any title at the time of executing the sale deed certainly, the petitioner is not 38 2025:JHHC:31612-DB entitled to any relief against the respondent no. 8 as prayed for in I.A. No. 4750 of 2018 hence, I.A. No. 4750 of 2018 being without any merit is dismissed."
69. Thereafter, again in second round of litigation in W.P.(C) No.239 of 2025, which is subject matter of present Letters Patent Appeal, the same demolition order dated 12.05.2018 was challenged, but, this time subject matter was Sale Deed No.17396 dated 05.11.2007. The writ court dismissed the prayer holding that issue cannot be permitted to be raised in this proceeding in the light of the doctrine of constructive res judicata.
70. At paragraph-33 of the impugned judgment dated 02.05.2025, writ court held that in previous proceedings i.e. in W.P.(C) No. 1204 of 2018 and in U.C Case No. 19/2018, petitioner did not disclose the fact about purchase of L2 plot (Sale Deed No. 17396 dated 05.11.2007) apart from L1 Plot (Sale Deed No. 12269 dated 12.11.2002) and any construction made over the said plot and the petitioner concealed the said fact till the order of demolition was passed by the respondent No.1 which attained finality upto the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Hence, writ court held that such an issue cannot be permitted to be raised in these proceedings in the light of doctrine of "constructive res judicata". Paragraph-33 of order dated 02.05.2025 passed in W.P.(C) No.239 of 2025, is being quoted herein below-
39
2025:JHHC:31612-DB "33. Moreover, it was open to the petitioner in previous proceedings i.e., W.P.(C) No. 1204 of 2018 and U.C Case No. 19 of 2018 to disclose the fact about purchase of L2 plot apart from L1 plot and any construction made over the said plot, however the petitioner concealed the said fact till the order of demolition was passed by the respondent no. 1 which attained finality upto the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Had the said fact been disclosed by the petitioner in earlier proceedings, there would have been determination on the said point as well. No reasonable explanation has been offered by the petitioner as to why he had not earlier raised the said issue. Therefore, I am of the view that such an issue cannot be permitted to be raised in this proceeding in the light of the doctrine of "constructive res judicata"."
71. Hence, the common issue between both the writ petitions i.e. W.P.(C) No. 1204 of 2018 and W.P.(C) No.239 of 2025, is the order of demolition dated 12.05.2018 passed in U.C Case No.19/2018 and in both these writ petitions, the learned writ Court has refused to interfere with the order of demolition dated 12.05.2018 passed in U.C Case No. 19/2018.
72. Therefore, in the subsequent writ petition, the learned writ court by the impugned order dated 02.05.2025 passed in W.P.(C) No.239 of 2025 had rightly concluded that such issue cannot be permitted to be raised in the light of doctrine of constructive res judicata.
73. Here, it would be pertinent to mention the case of M. Nagabhushana v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 3 SCC 408, 40 2025:JHHC:31612-DB wherein Hon'ble Apex Court was hearing the appeal filed by the appellant challenging the acquisition proceedings.
74. In this case Hon'ble Apex Court has noted the litigative adventure by the appellant was clearly against the principles of res judicata as well as principles of constructive res judicata and principles analogous thereto. Appellant therein disregarding the clear finding of the Hon'ble Apex Court, on identical issues, further filed a new writ petition out of which the appeal arose before the Apex Court. The writ petition, was rejected both by the learned Single Judge and by the Division Bench in clear terms. In this case Hon'ble Apex Court laid down that principle of finality of litigation is based on high principle of public policy. In the absence of such principle great oppression might result under the colour and pretence of law inasmuch as there will be no end of litigation and a rich and malicious litigant will succeed in infinitely vexing his opponent by repetitive suits and actions. The relevant paragraphs of M. Nagabhushana (supra), case is quoted herein below for ready reference-
"11. We find that disregarding the aforesaid clear finding of this Court, the appellant, on identical issues, further filed a new writ petition out of which the present appeal arises. That writ petition, as noted above, was rejected both by the learned Single Judge and by the Division Bench in clear terms. It is obvious that such a litigative adventure by the present appellant is clearly against the principles of res 41 2025:JHHC:31612-DB judicata as well as principles of constructive res judicata and principles analogous thereto.
12. The principles of res judicata are of universal application as they are based on two age-old principles, namely, interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium which means that it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation and the other principle is nemo debet bis vexari, si constat curiae quod sit pro una et eademn causa meaning thereby that no one ought to be vexed twice in a litigation if it appears to the court that it is for one and the same cause. This doctrine of res judicata is common to all civilised system of jurisprudence to the extent that a judgment after a proper trial by a court of competent jurisdiction should be regarded as final and conclusive determination of the questions litigated and should for ever set the controversy at rest.
13. That principle of finality of litigation is based on high principle of public policy. In the absence of such a principle great oppression might result under the colour and pretence of law inasmuch as there will be no end of litigation and a rich and malicious litigant will succeed in infinitely vexing his opponent by repetitive suits and actions. This may compel the weaker party to relinquish his right. The doctrine of res judicata has been evolved to prevent such an anarchy. That is why it is perceived that the plea of res judicata is not a technical doctrine but a fundamental principle which sustains the rule of law in ensuring finality in litigation. This principle seeks to promote honesty and a fair administration of justice and to prevent abuse in the matter of accessing court for agitating on issues which have become final between the parties."
75. The matter since is identical and the claim of the writ petitioner has already been rejected by the learned Single Judge vide judgment dated 30.01.2024 passed in W.P.(C) No.1204 of 2018, upheld by the Division Bench vide judgment 42 2025:JHHC:31612-DB dated 26.06.2024 passed in L.P.A. No.102 of 2024 against which Special Leave Petition being Special Leave to Appeal(C) No. 22971/2024 has also been dismissed by the Hon'ble Apex Court and the Civil Review No.33 of 2025 against the judgment dated 26.06.2024 passed in L.P.A. No.102 of 2024 has already been dismissed as hereinabove, hence, there is no reason to take distinct view in the present appeal.
76. Consequently, this Court is of the view that no interference is required in the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge dated 02.05.2025 in W.P.(C) No.239 of 2025 impugned in the present appeal.
77. The instant Letters Patent Appeal is hereby dismissed.
78. Both the matters, i.e., Civil Review No.33 of 2025 and L.P.A. No.310 of 2025, stand dismissed.
79. Interlocutory application, if any, also stands disposed of.
I agree (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Arun Kumar Rai, J.) (Arun Kumar Rai, J.)
Dated : 13 October, 2025
Birendra/A.F.R.
Uploaded on 14.10.2025
43