Karnataka High Court
B H Nagaraju vs The Prl., Secretary on 30 January, 2026
Author: Suraj Govindaraj
Bench: Suraj Govindaraj
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®
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 30TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ
WRIT PETITION NO. 30719 OF 2025 (GM-POLICE)
BETWEEN
B H NAGARAJU
S/O. HANUMANTHAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS,
R/AT. C/O. RENT HOUSE OF SRI MANU,
NO.12, NYANAPPANAHALLI,
BEGUR HOBLI,
BENGALURU SOUTH TALUK,
BENGALURU
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI. H. PAVAN CHANDRA SHETTY.,)
AND
1. THE PRL., SECRETARY
Digitally signed HOME DEPARTMENT,
by SHWETHA GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA,
RAGHAVENDRA
VIDHANA SOUDHA,
Location: HIGH
COURT OF BENGALURU- 560 001
KARNATAKA
2. THE POLICE COMMISSIONER,
BENGALURU CITY, INFANTRY ROAD,
BENGALURU- 56 0001
3. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
BENGALURU SOUTH,
BENGALURU.
4. THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE,
HULIMAVU POLICE STATION,
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BENGALURU CITY
5. B.H. KEMPARAJ
S/O HANUMANTHAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS
RESIDING AT SHOURYA FARM,
STUDIO ROAD, BETTAHALLI VILLAGE,
KADABAGERE POST,
DASANAPURA HOBLI,
BENGALURU NORTH TALUK,
BENGALURU-562130
6. SMT. BINDYA K. RAJ
W/O B.H. KEMPARAJ,
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS,
RESIDING AT SHOURYA FARM,
STUDIO ROAD, BETTAHALLI VILLAGE,
KADABAGERE POST,
DASANAPURA HOBLI,
BENGALURU NORTH TALUK,
BENGALURU-562130
.... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. B. RAVINDRANATH., AGA FOR R1 TO R4;
SRI. D.R. RAVISHANKAR., SR. ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. S. HEMANTH BHANDARY., ADVOCATE FOR R5 & R6)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO DIRECT THE
RESPONDENT NO.4 TO CONSIDER THE PETITIONER'S COMPLAINT
EFFECTIVELY MADE ON 29.09.2025 TO REGISTER THE FIR AGAINST
THE PROPOSED ACCUSED AS PER COMPLAINT FOR THE OFFENCE
PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 318(1), 318(2), 318(3), 318(4),
319(2), 324(2), 336(2), 336(3), 316(2), 314, 351(1) OF BHARATIYA
NYAYA SANHITA, 2023 AS PER ANNEXURE-A AND ETC.
THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDERS AND HAVING
BEEN RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 18.12.2025, THIS DAY, THE
COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ
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CAV ORDER
1. The Petitioner is before the Court seeking for the
following reliefs:
a. Direct the Respondent No.4 to consider the
Petitioner's complaint effectively made on 29.09.2025
to register the FIR against the proposed accused as per
complaint for the offence punishable under section
318(1), 318(2), 318(3), 318(4), 319(2), 324(2),
336(2), 336(3), 316(2), 314, 351(1) of Bharatiya
Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 as per ANNEXURE-A.
b. Issue any other writ, order or direction and such
other order or direction as this Hon'ble Court may
deems fit to grant in the facts and circumstances of the
case.
2. The Petitioner and Respondents No.5 and 6 were
partners of a partnership firm by name M/s. Mithila
Land Developers, registered under the provisions of
the Indian Partnership Act. Respondent No.5 is the
brother of the Petitioner and Respondent No.6 is the
wife of Respondent No.5, and consequently the
sister-in-law of the Petitioner. For the purpose of
conducting the business of the firm, a bank account
was opened at Canara Bank, Madanayakanahalli
Branch, Bengaluru. The Petitioner had executed a
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registered General Power of Attorney dated
15.02.2018 in favour of Respondent No.5, B.H.
Kemparaju, before the Sub-Registrar, Dasanapura,
Bengaluru.
3. In the year 2023, the partnership firm undertook
development of land bearing Survey No.29,
measuring 4 acres and 39 guntas, situated at
Kammasandra, Bengaluru, in which the Petitioner
was also actively involved. It is the specific case of
the Petitioner that despite the development activities
generating profits, none of the amounts that were
required to be credited to the bank account of the
partnership firm were deposited therein. Upon
making enquiries with Respondents No.5 and 6 in
this regard, the Petitioner did not receive any
satisfactory explanation.
4. Subsequently, the Petitioner came to know that
Respondents No.5 and 6, without his knowledge or
consent, had constituted another partnership firm
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under the very same name and style, M/s. Mithila
Land Developers, and had opened a separate bank
account, into which all the amounts arising from the
development were being remitted. According to the
Petitioner, this parallel and purportedly bogus
partnership firm was created while he continued to
remain a partner in the original firm, without any
concurrence on his part.
5. It is further stated that when the Petitioner
attempted to raise these grievances, Respondent
No.5 assaulted their father, in respect of which an
FIR came to be registered in Crime No.663/2024 on
07.08.2024 for offences punishable under Sections
323, 324, 504 read with Section 34 of the Indian
Penal Code. Thereafter, the Petitioner submitted a
complaint dated 29.09.2025 before Respondent No.4
- Police, alleging the creation of a parallel
partnership firm and siphoning of funds. Since no
action was taken on the said complaint, the
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Petitioner has approached this Court seeking the
reliefs prayed for.
6. Sri. H. Pavana Chandra Shetty, learned counsel
appearing for the Petitioner, would submit as follows:
6.1. That the complaint dated 29.09.2025 discloses
commission of a cognizable offence and,
therefore, Respondent No.4 was under a
statutory obligation to register a case and
proceed with investigation in accordance with
law. In support of this contention, learned
counsel places reliance on the definition of
"cognizable offence" as contained in clause (g)
of Section 2 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as
"BNSS, 2023").
6.2. He further submits that in terms of Section 2(g)
of BNSS, 2023, any offence for which a police
officer is empowered to effect arrest without
warrant would qualify as a cognizable offence,
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and once such disclosure is made in a
complaint, registration of a First Information
Report is mandatory, leaving no discretion with
the police authorities to decline or defer such
registration.
6.3. He relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Lalita Kumari vs.
Government of Uttar Pradesh1 and submit
that if an information discloses commission of a
cognizable offence, the police are duty bound to
register the FIR and investigate matter and in
this regard, he relies upon Para 120, which is
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
120. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold:
120.1. The registration of FIR is mandatory under
Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses
commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary
inquiry is permissible in such a situation.
120.2. If the information received does not disclose a
cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an
inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only
1
(2014) 2 SCC 1
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to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or
not.
120.3. If the inquiry discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered. In
cases where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the
complaint, a copy of the entry of such closure must be
supplied to the first informant forthwith and not later
than one week. It must disclose reasons in brief for
closing the complaint and not proceeding further.
120.4. The police officer cannot avoid his duty of
registering offence if cognizable offence is disclosed.
Action must be taken against erring officers who do
not register the FIR if information received by him
discloses a cognizable offence.
120.5. The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to
verify the veracity or otherwise of the information
received but only to ascertain whether the information
reveals any cognizable offence.
120.6. As to what type and in which cases preliminary
inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case. The category of cases in
which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under:
(a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes
(b) Commercial offences
(c) Medical negligence cases
(d) Corruption cases
(e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in
initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over 3
months' delay in reporting the matter without
satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay.
The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive
of all conditions which may warrant preliminary
inquiry.
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120.7 [Ed.: This correction is based on para
120.7 as corrected vide order in Lalita Kumari v.
State of U.P., (2023) 9 SCC 695.] . While ensuring
and protecting the rights of the accused and the
complainant, a preliminary inquiry should be made
time-bound and in any case it should not exceed
fifteen days generally and in exceptional cases, by
giving adequate reasons, six weeks' time is provided.
The fact of such delay and the causes of it must be
reflected in the General Diary entry.
120.8. Since the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily
Diary is the record of all information received in a
police station, we direct that all information relating to
cognizable offences, whether resulting in registration
of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be mandatorily
and meticulously reflected in the said diary and the
decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry must also be
reflected, as mentioned above.
6.4. Learned counsel would submit that in the
present case, Respondent No.4 - the Station
House Officer, has not applied his mind to the
contents of the complaint dated 29.09.2025 at
all. The complaint has neither been enquired
into nor acted upon in any manner, thereby
leaving the Petitioner without any effective
redress.
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6.5. It is further submitted that the Petitioner along
with Respondents No.5 and 6 had formed two
residential layouts at Ravathanahalli and
Pillahalli in Bangalore North Taluk, wherein 104
sites and 130 sites respectively, of varying
measurements, were carved out. Approximately
80% of the sites were sold in favour of third-
party purchasers on behalf of the partnership
firm by Respondent No.5, who was acting as
the General Power of Attorney holder of the
Petitioner. Under the original partnership deed
dated 14.03.2017, each of the partners was
entitled to one-third share in the profits and
losses of the firm. A General Power of Attorney
had been executed in favour of Respondent
No.5, the brother of the Petitioner, to enable
him to carry out day-to-day transactions and
activities of the partnership firm.
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6.6. It is specifically alleged that Respondent No.5
remitted only the guidance market value of the
sale consideration to the firm and
misappropriated substantial amounts received
in cash directly from purchasers. When the
Petitioner demanded audit of the firm's
accounts and his due share, neither the
accounts nor any amounts were furnished,
compelling the Petitioner to cancel the General
Power of Attorney granted in favour of
Respondent No.5.
6.7. Learned counsel would further submit that
Respondent No.5 diverted funds from the
original partnership firm to the duplicate
partnership firm, thereby misappropriating the
monies of the firm and causing substantial
financial loss both to the Petitioner and to the
partnership. Apart from amounts being received
in the bank account of the newly created firm,
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even the monies lying in the bank account of
the original firm were transferred to the new
account. Thus, Respondent No.5 is alleged to
have misappropriated the entire sale proceeds,
whether received through banking channels or
in cash. These specific allegations having been
set out in the complaint, it is contended that
the complaint clearly discloses cognizable
offences, mandating registration of an FIR,
investigation and further action in accordance
with law by Respondent No.4.
6.8. Learned counsel submits that once the
complaint, on the face of it, discloses
commission of cognizable offences, the
obligation of the police is to register an FIR and
investigate the matter, and it is not open to the
police to adjudicate upon the merits of the
dispute or refuse registration on a prima facie
appreciation of facts.
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7. Sri. S. Hemanth Bhandary learned counsel for
Respondent 5 and 6 would submit that
7.1. The Petitioner has alternative remedies
available under law. In the event of refusal by
the Station House Officer to register an FIR, the
Petitioner is entitled to approach the superior
officers of the concerned police station, and in
the event of continued inaction, to initiate
proceedings by way of a private complaint,
which under the erstwhile Code of Criminal
Procedure was under Section 200, and under
the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
is now traceable to Section 173(4).
7.2. He relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Sakiri Vasu vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh and others2, more particularly,
2
(2008) 2 SCC 409
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Paras 11, 13, 15, 16 and 25 thereof, which are
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
11. In this connection we would like to state that if a
person has a grievance that the police station is not
registering his FIR under Section 154 CrPC, then he
can approach the Superintendent of Police under
Section 154(3) CrPC by an application in writing. Even
if that does not yield any satisfactory result in the
sense that either the FIR is still not registered, or that
even after registering it no proper investigation is
held, it is open to the aggrieved person to file an
application under Section 156(3) CrPC before the
learned Magistrate concerned. If such an application
under Section 156(3) is filed before the Magistrate,
the Magistrate can direct the FIR to be registered and
also can direct a proper investigation to be made, in a
case where, according to the aggrieved person, no
proper investigation was made. The Magistrate can
also under the same provision monitor the
investigation to ensure a proper investigation.
13. The same view was taken by this Court in Dilawar
Singh v. State of Delhi [(2007) 12 SCC 641 : JT
(2007) 10 SC 585] (JT vide para 17). We would
further clarify that even if an FIR has been registered
and even if the police has made the investigation, or
is actually making the investigation, which the
aggrieved person feels is not proper, such a person
can approach the Magistrate under Section 156(3)
CrPC, and if the Magistrate is satisfied he can order a
proper investigation and take other suitable steps and
pass such order(s) as he thinks necessary for ensuring
a proper investigation. All these powers a Magistrate
enjoys under Section 156(3) CrPC.
15. Section 156(3) provides for a check by the
Magistrate on the police performing its duties under
Chapter XII CrPC. In cases where the Magistrate finds
that the police has not done its duty of investigating
the case at all, or has not done it satisfactorily, he can
issue a direction to the police to do the investigation
properly, and can monitor the same.
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16. The power in the Magistrate to order further
investigation under Section 156(3) is an independent
power and does not affect the power of the
investigating officer to further investigate the case
even after submission of his report vide Section
173(8). Hence the Magistrate can order reopening of
the investigation even after the police submits the
final report, vide State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha
[(1980) 1 SCC 554 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 272 : AIR 1980
SC 326] (SCC : AIR para 19).
25. We have elaborated on the above matter because
we often find that when someone has a grievance that
his FIR has not been registered at the police station
and/or a proper investigation is not being done by the
police, he rushes to the High Court to file a writ
petition or a petition under Section 482 CrPC. We are
of the opinion that the High Court should not
encourage this practice and should ordinarily refuse to
interfere in such matters and relegate the Petitioner to
his alternating remedy, first under Section 154(3) and
Section 36 CrPC before the police officers concerned,
and if that is of no avail, by approaching the
Magistrate concerned under Section 156(3).
7.3. By relying on Sakiri Vasu's case, his
submission is that if a person has a grievance
that the police station is not registering his FIR
under section 154 of CrPC, then he can
approach the Superintendent of Police under
Section 154 (3) of CrPC by an application in
writing and even if that does not yield any
satisfactory results, it is open to the aggrieved
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person to file an application under Section 156
(3) of CrPC before the learned Magistrate.
When the Magistrate can direct the FIR to be
registered and proper investigation to be made.
7.4. His submission is that it is only under
subsection (3) of Section 156 of CrPC that the
exercise of powers by the Magistrate provides a
check for the exercise of powers by the police.
His submission is also that if a FIR has not been
registered at the police station, a writ petition
under Section 482 of CrPC would not be
maintainable. This Court should not encourage
the practice.
7.5. He relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Velji Raghavji Patel vs.
State of Maharashtra3, more particularly
Paras 8 and 9 thereof, which are reproduced
hereunder for easy reference:
3
1964 SCC Online SC 185
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8. Mr Chatterjee who appears for the respondent
sought to show that here was special agreement in this
case. According to him, by virtue of certain decisions
taken at a meeting of the partners held on January 7,
1959 the appellant had been entrusted with the duty of
making recoveries of monies from the debtors of the
firm and, therefore, this was a case of specific
entrustment. All that he could point out was Item 15 in
the minutes of that meeting which runs thus:
"Shri Veljibhai agrees to recover the monies due by
Shri Kablasingh immediately and shall deposit the
same with the Bankers of the firm."
He has, however, not been able to explain the next
item in the minutes, the relevant portion of which runs
thus:
"(16) If in future any further moneys are required to
be spent the same shall be spent out of the recoveries
of the firm and no partner shall be bound or
responsible to bring in any further moneys..."
Reading the two together the meaning seems to be
only this that as working partner the appellant should
carry on the work of recovery of the dues of the
partnership and that in respect of the dues from one
Kablasingh it was decided that they should be
deposited in the bank. It does not follow from this that
any of the other partners was precluded from making
the recoveries. Further, even if this is said to be a
mandate to the appellant Item 16 authorises him to
spend the money for the business of the partnership.
That is to say, if the money was required for the
business of the partnership it was not obligatory upon
the appellant to deposit it in the bank. In our opinion,
therefore, the appellant cannot be said to have been
guilty of criminal breach of trust even with respect to
the dues realised by him from Kablasingh and in not
depositing them in the bank as alleged by the
prosecution.
9. Mr Chatterjee finally contends that the act of the
appellant will at least amount to dishonest
misappropriation of property even though it may not
amount to criminal breach of trust and, therefore, his
conviction could be altered from one under Section 409
to that under Section 403. Section 403 runs thus:
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"Whoever dishonestly misappropriates or converts to
his own useany movable property, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term,
which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with
both."
It is obvious that an owner of property, in whichever
way he uses his property and with whatever intention
will not be liable for misappropriation and that would
be so even if he is not the exclusive owner thereof. As
already stated, a partner has, undefined ownership
along with the other partners over all the assets of the
partnership. If he chooses to use any of them for his
own purposes he may be accountable civilly to the
other partners. But he does not thereby commit any
misappropriation. Mr Chatterjee's alternative
contention must be rejected.
7.6. By relying on Velji Raghavji Patel's case, his
submission is that the dispute being in civil
nature, criminal proceedings cannot be
initiated. There is no dishonesty on part of the
Respondents No.5 and 6.
7.7. The Petitioner, having filed proceedings before
civil courts, more particularly arbitration
proceedings having been filed which are
pending, the arbitral tribunal would be deciding
the matter. The Petitioner is trying to short-
circuit the process by availing of dual remedies,
one by approaching this Court for initiation of
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criminal proceedings and other for recovery of
money before the arbitrator. Arbitration
proceedings have been commenced by the
respondent by filing the proceedings under
Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act 1996, (for short, 'A and C Act, 1996').
7.8. An arbitrator has been appointed by this Court
on an application filed under Section 11. Claim
petition has also been filed before the Arbitral
Tribunal. His submission is that the Arbitral
Tribunal now being seized of the disputes, a
parallel criminal proceeding cannot be initiated
in respect of a civil wrong relating to a
partnership dispute between the parties.
7.9. Further, there is several distinctions that he
seeks to make as regards various properties, by
contending that these properties were
individually acquired by Respondents No.5 and
6. They are not joint family properties as
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alleged otherwise. His submission is that all
the allegations which have been made by the
Petitioner against the Respondent is only in
relation to the business ventures. None of
them can be said to make out a criminal
offence. There is no mens rea on part of the
Respondents No.5 and 6 to try and cheat the
Petitioner. Arbitration proceedings having been
filed, the said proceedings would decide the lis
between the parties, this Court ought not to
exercise the discretion by directing the
Respondent police to investigate the matter.
8. Sri Pavana Chandra Shetty, learned counsel for the
petitioner in reply submits that:
8.1. He once again relies on the judgment of Lalita
Kumari's case, more particularly Para 93 of
the said judgment which is reproduced
hereunder for easy reference:
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93. The object sought to be achieved by
registering the earliest information as FIR is
inter alia twofold : one, that the criminal
process is set into motion and is well
documented from the very start; and second,
that the earliest information received in relation
to the commission of a cognizable offence is
recorded so that there cannot be any
embellishment, etc. later.
8.2. By relying on para 93, his submission is that
the criminal process is required to be set into
motion at the earliest point of time so as to
enable efficient and proper investigation.
8.3. His submission is that subsection (4) of Section
173 deals with refusal on the part of the officer
in charge of a police station to record the
information and only in such a situation, the
complainant would have to send the substance
of such information to the Superintendent of
Police, who if satisfied that it discloses
cognizable offence can either investigate the
case by himself or direct an investigation to be
made by any police officer subordinate to him
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failing which the party can make an application
to the Magistrate.
8.4. His submission is that subsection (4) of Section
173 only provides for refusal of registration,
whereas in the present case, the complaint
made by the Petitioner has been rejected.
8.5. Subsection (4) of Section 173 does not
contemplate rejection, but only contemplates
refusal. There being serious allegations which
have been made which give rise to a cognizable
offence, the father of the Petitioner and
Respondent No.5 having been assaulted by
Respondent No.5, the father suffering from
serious injuries on the head requiring multiple
stitches, Respondent No. 5 has used his good
office with the police authorities not to reject
the complaint filed by the Petitioner. The
Petitioner can exercise rights both under the
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civil law remedy as also the criminal law
remedy.
8.6. Insofar as arbitral proceedings and other civil
proceedings are concerned, they relate to
recovery of monies due to the Petitioner. Apart
therefrom, there being offences made out
under criminal enactments, it is for the
jurisdictional police to investigate those
matters. On that ground, he submits that the
petition is required to be allowed and
Respondent No.4 be directed to register a
complaint and investigate the matter.
9. Learned A.G.A. would submit that the police
authorities would abide by any orders passed by this
Court.
10. Heard Sri.H.Pavana Chandra Shetty, learned counsel
for the petitioner, Sri.B.Ravindranath, learned AGA
for Respondents No.1 to 4, Sri.D.R.Ravishankar,
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learned Senior counsel for Sri.Hemanth Bharadwaj,
learned Counsel for Respondents No.5 and 6.
Perused papers.
11. The points that would arise for determination are:
1) Whether subsection (4) of Section 173 of
BNSS, 2023 deals with rejection of a
complaint or is only restricted to refusal to
register a complaint?
2) Whether rejection of a complaint would also
require the complainant to follow the
procedure under subsection (4) of Section
173 of BNSS, 2023 requiring the complainant
to take up the matter with the
Superintendent of Police and thereafter with
the Magistrate if not satisfied with the
decision of the Superintendent of Police?
3) Whether the Petitioner has been able to
make out a cognizable offence vide his
complaint which has been rejected by the
respondents?
4) Whether any criminal offences have been
made out or would the parties be required to
agitate their rights in the pending arbitral
proceedings?
5) What order?
12. I answer the above points as follows:
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13. Answer to point No.1: Whether subsection (4)
of Section 173 of BNSS, 2023 deals with
rejection of a complaint or is only restricted to
refusal to register a complaint?
13.1. Subsection (4) of Section 173 of BNSS, 2023 is
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
173. Information in cognizable cases. (4) Any
person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an officer
in charge of a police station to record the information
referred to in sub-section (1), may send the substance
of such information, in writing and by post, to the
Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied
that such information discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence, shall either investigate the case
himself or direct an investigation to be made by any
police officer subordinate to him, in the manner
provided by this Sanhita, and such officer shall have all
the powers of an officer in charge of the police station
in relation to that offence failing which such aggrieved
person may make an application to the Magistrate.
13.2. A plain reading of sub-section (4) of Section
173 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023 would indicate that any person aggrieved
by a refusal on the part of the officer in charge
of a police station to record information relating
to the commission of a cognizable offence may,
in writing and by post, approach the
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Superintendent of Police concerned, setting out
such grievance. Upon such representation, if
the Superintendent of Police is satisfied that the
information discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence, he may either investigate
the case himself or direct an investigation to be
carried out by any police officer subordinate to
him. In the event the Superintendent of Police
also does not exercise jurisdiction or grant relief
to the complainant, the aggrieved person is
entitled to approach the jurisdictional
Magistrate by way of a private complaint,
invoking the statutory remedy provided under
law.
13.3. Sri. Hemanth Bharadwaj, learned counsel
appearing for Respondent No.5, would submit
that the Petitioner could not have directly
invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this
Court merely on account of inaction or refusal
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by the Station House Officer. According to
learned counsel, the statutory scheme under
Section 173(4) of BNSS, 2023 mandates that
the Petitioner must first approach the
Superintendent of Police and, if still aggrieved,
avail the remedy of a private complaint before
the jurisdictional Magistrate. Per contra, Sri.
Pavana Chandra Shetty, learned counsel for the
Petitioner, seeks to draw a distinction between
a refusal to register a complaint and a rejection
thereof. It is his submission that where there is
a mere refusal or inaction, the remedy under
Section 173(4) would be attracted; however,
where the complaint is consciously rejected by
the police on the premise that no criminal
offence is made out and that the dispute is
purely civil in nature, sub-section (4) of Section
173 would not be applicable, and the Petitioner
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would be entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of
this Court.
13.4. This Court finds considerable substance in the
submission advanced by learned counsel for the
Petitioner. A refusal by an officer in charge of a
police station to record information, without
application of mind or without taking a
conscious decision, stands on a materially
different footing from a rejection of a complaint
after forming an opinion that the allegations do
not disclose any cognizable offence and pertain
only to civil disputes. In the former situation,
the statutory remedy under Section 173(4) of
BNSS, 2023 would ordinarily require the
complainant to approach the Superintendent of
Police. However, where the complaint is
rejected outright on jurisdictional or substantive
grounds, thereby foreclosing the statutory
process at the threshold, such rejection cannot
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be equated with a mere refusal, and the
complainant cannot be non-suited on the
ground of availability of an alternate remedy.
13.5. The details of the complaint filed by the
Petitioner have been stated supra. The
endorsement which has been issued on the said
complaint is reproduced hereunder for easy
reference:
4. ೆ ೆದು ೊಂ ರುವ ಕ ಮ / Action Taken:
ಅ ಾರರು ೕ ೆ ದೂರು ೕಕ ಾ ಾ ನಂ. 1011/2025 ರ
ನಮೂ ರು ೆ.
5. !ಂಬರಹದ $ವರಗಳ' / Endorsement Details :
ಈ ಮೂಲಕ ಮ ೆ *+ಯಪ ಸುವ/ ೇ0ೆಂದ1ೆ ೕವ/ 0ಾಂಕ:
29.09.2025 ರಂದು ಹು+2ಾವ/ 3 ೕ4 ಾ ೆಯ .. 5 ೕ 6.7ೆ8 ೆ
5 ೕಮ* 6ಂ ಾ ೆ 1ಾ9 ಮತು ಇತರರ $ರುದ< ೕ ದ ದೂರನು= ೕಕ
ಹು+2ಾವ/ 3 ೕ4 ಾ ಾ >ಷ@ ನು. DP.102 ರ ಾಖ ದುB, ೕವ/
ೕ ದ ದೂರು C $DಾರEಾFರುವ/ದ ಂದ ಸಂಬಂಧಪಟI
0ಾJKಾಲಯದ ಸಮLೆJಯನು= ಬ ೆಹ ೊಳ'Mವ/ದು 7ಾಗೂ ಈ $ಷಯದ
ಕು ತು ಾನೂನು ಸುವ ವLೆN ೆ ಧ ೆOKಾಗದಂ ೆ 0ೋ ೊಳ'Mವಂ ೆ ಈ
ಮೂಲಕ ಸೂP ರು ೆ.
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13.6. A perusal of the endorsement issued by
Respondent No.4 would indicate that the
complaint was initially received and taken on
record, whereafter the Station House Officer
formed an opinion that the dispute between the
parties was civil in nature and, on that basis,
directed the Petitioner to approach the
jurisdictional civil court. Consequently,
registration of a criminal case was declined. It
is therefore evident that the present case does
not involve a mere refusal to receive or register
the complaint, but a conscious rejection of the
complaint after it was taken on record, by
characterising the allegations as giving rise only
to a civil dispute.
13.7. Paragraph 93 of the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari, which has
been extracted hereinabove, mandates that
where information discloses commission of a
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cognizable offence, registration of an FIR is
mandatory and the criminal law must be set
into motion at the earliest. Though reliance has
been placed on Sakiri Vasu, it is to be noted
that Sakiri Vasu was decided on 07.12.2007,
whereas Lalita Kumari is a subsequent
judgment of a Constitution Bench rendered on
12.11.2013, and would therefore hold the field.
13.8. The decision in Sakiri Vasu proceeded on the
premise of providing a system of checks and
balances against police inaction. It held that
where an FIR is not registered, or where even
after registration a proper investigation is not
carried out, the aggrieved person may avail the
statutory remedies under Section 154(3) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure by approaching the
Superintendent of Police, and thereafter invoke
Section 156(3) before the jurisdictional
Magistrate.
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13.9. Sakiri Vasu dealt with a situation where the
police had failed or refused to register an FIR.
At paragraph 25 of the said judgment, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that ordinarily
the High Court should not encourage the
practice of entertaining writ petitions in such
matters and should relegate the complainant to
the alternate statutory remedies available
under Sections 154(3) and 156(3) of the Code.
However, as noticed hereinabove, that was a
case of non-registration simpliciter and not one
where the complaint was rejected by a
reasoned endorsement. In the present case,
Respondent No.4 has rejected the complaint
after recording a finding that the dispute is civil
in nature. Thus, the situation before this Court
is not a mere refusal to register an FIR and
squarely falls within the category of rejection of
a complaint.
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13.10. Accordingly, I answer Point No.1 by holding
that the statutory scheme governing non-
registration applies to cases of refusal and not
to cases of rejection of a complaint by a
reasoned order.
14. Answer to Point No.2: Whether rejection of a
complaint would also require the complainant
to follow the procedure under subsection (4) of
Section 173 of BNSS, 2023, requiring the
complainant to take up the matter with the
Superintendent of Police and thereafter with
the Magistrate if not satisfied with the decision
of the Superintendent of Police?
14.1. The scheme of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023, insofar as it relates to
registration of information and remedies
against police inaction, makes a clear and
deliberate distinction between refusal to record
information and a decision taken upon such
information. Sub-section (4) of Section 173 is
designed as a corrective mechanism in
situations where the officer in charge of a police
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station fails or declines to perform the
ministerial act of recording information relating
to the commission of a cognizable offence. The
legislative intent underlying the provision is to
provide an internal supervisory remedy against
inertia, apathy, or arbitrary non-registration by
the police.
14.2. A refusal contemplated under Section 173(4) is
thus one where the police officer either does
not receive the complaint at all, or having
received it, chooses not to record it as required
under law, without entering into any
adjudicatory assessment of the allegations. In
such circumstances, the statute obligates the
complainant to first approach the
Superintendent of Police, and only thereafter, if
the grievance remains unredressed, to invoke
the jurisdiction of the Magistrate.
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14.3. Rejection of a complaint, however, stands on a
fundamentally different footing. Rejection
presupposes that the complaint has been
received, taken on record, and consciously
considered by the police authority, culminating
in a decision that the allegations do not warrant
registration of a criminal case. Such rejection is
not a failure to act, but an exercise of decision-
making power, albeit one that is subject to
judicial review. Once the police authority
proceeds to classify the dispute as civil in
nature and declines to set the criminal law in
motion, the grievance of the complainant shifts
from one of administrative inaction to one of
jurisdictional overreach or erroneous exercise of
discretion.
14.4. In the present case, the endorsement issued by
Respondent No.4 clearly reflects that the
complaint was examined and rejected on the
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premise that the dispute between the parties is
civil in nature. The Station House Officer has
thereby assumed unto himself the role of
adjudicating the nature of the dispute at the
pre-registration stage, a function which is
neither contemplated nor sanctioned by the
statutory framework governing registration of
FIRs. This conscious rejection transforms the
character of the grievance and removes it from
the ambit of Section 173(4).
14.5. To insist that a complainant must still traverse
the remedies under Section 173(4) even after a
reasoned rejection would amount to conflating
refusal with rejection, thereby rendering the
distinction meaningless. Such an interpretation
would not only dilute the statutory scheme but
would also permit the police to effectively
insulate their decisions from judicial scrutiny by
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the mere issuance of an endorsement, however
erroneous or unsustainable it may be.
14.6. The remedy under Section 173(4) is neither
intended nor structured to function as an
appellate mechanism over a police officer's
decision that a complaint discloses no
cognizable offence. It is a remedy against non-
performance of duty, not against wrongful
performance. Where the complaint is rejected
on merits, the complainant is entitled to
challenge the legality of such rejection directly,
including by invoking the writ jurisdiction of this
Court, without being compelled to exhaust
remedies that are inapposite to the nature of
the grievance.
14.7. Further, relegating the complainant to the
remedy of a private complaint under Section
200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as a
matter of course, in cases of rejection would
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have the effect of bypassing the mandatory
obligation cast upon the police to register an
FIR where cognizable offences are disclosed.
Such an approach would invert the statutory
hierarchy, transforming an exception into a
norm and undermining the constitutional
mandate of access to justice.
14.8. It is also to be borne in mind that a private
complaint entails procedural burdens, including
examination of the complainant and witnesses,
which are neither intended nor required at the
stage where the law mandates automatic
registration of an FIR. Compelling a
complainant to undertake such a course despite
disclosure of cognizable offences would impose
an unwarranted and disproportionate
procedural barrier.
14.9. In light of the aforesaid analysis, I'am of the
considered opinion that where a complaint is
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rejected by the police after being taken on
record and upon forming an opinion that no
criminal offence is made out, the complainant is
not required, as a condition precedent, to
invoke the remedies under sub-section (4) of
Section 173 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023, nor is the complainant bound to
initiate proceedings by way of a private
complaint under Section 200 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
14.10.Accordingly, I answer Point No.2 by holding
that the procedure prescribed under Section
173(4) of BNSS, 2023 applies exclusively to
cases of refusal to record information and does
not extend to cases of rejection of a complaint
by a reasoned endorsement.
15. Answer to Point No.3: Whether the Petitioner
has been able to make out a cognizable offence
vide his complaint which has been rejected by
the respondents?
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and
Answer to Point No.4: Whether any criminal
offences have been made out or would the
parties be required to agitate their rights in the
pending arbitral proceedings?
15.1. A comprehensive examination of the complaint
lodged by the Petitioner, produced at
Annexure-A, reveals that the allegations
levelled against Respondents No.5 and 6 are
specific, detailed, and structured, and are not in
the nature of bald assertions or general
accusations. The complaint sets out a clear
factual narrative relating to the constitution of
the partnership firm, entrustment of authority,
execution of a registered General Power of
Attorney, handling of partnership funds,
development and sale of immovable property,
and the eventual diversion of funds to the
exclusion of the Petitioner.
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15.2. The allegations are supported by admitted
foundational facts. Even before this Court,
there is no serious dispute with regard to the
existence of two partnership firms bearing the
identical name and style, namely M/s. Mithila
Land Developers. The registration of two such
firms, the operation of separate bank accounts,
and the conduct of transactions through the
second firm stand acknowledged. The
controversy pertains not to the existence of
these entities, but to the circumstances, intent,
and consequences surrounding the creation and
operation of the second partnership firm.
15.3. The Petitioner asserts that while he continued
to be a one-third partner in the original
partnership firm, Respondents No.5 and 6,
acting in breach of fiduciary duty and without
his knowledge or consent, constituted a second
partnership firm with the same name and style,
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opened a separate bank account, and
channelled all revenues arising from the
development and sale of sites into the said
account. The gravamen of the allegation is not
merely exclusion from profits, but deliberate
diversion of partnership assets and income
through a parallel entity.
15.4. The principal defence raised by Sri. Hemanth
Bharadwaj, learned counsel for Respondents
No.5 and 6, is that the dispute is essentially
civil in nature and that the Petitioner, having
participated in arbitral proceedings, must
confine himself to remedies before the Arbitral
Tribunal. It is further contended that execution
and cancellation of various documents negate
any element of criminality and that criminal
proceedings would amount to abuse of process.
15.5. I find the said submission to be misconceived
both on facts and in law. At the outset, the
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record unmistakably discloses that the arbitral
proceedings were initiated by Respondents No.5
and 6 themselves, by invoking Section 11 of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, pursuant to
which an arbitrator has been appointed by this
Court. The Petitioner is a respondent in those
proceedings and has raised counterclaims
therein.
15.6. A perusal of the statement of claims filed by
Respondents No.5 and 6 before the Arbitral
Tribunal reveals that they have sought
extensive reliefs, including appointment as
receivers of the partnership firm, authority to
complete pending transactions, defend
litigation, receive amounts payable to the firm,
declaration of properties as partnership
properties, and closure and settlement of
accounts. Correspondingly, the Petitioner has
raised counterclaims seeking rejection of the
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said claims, audit and rendition of accounts
from 2017 to 2024, and payment of amounts
due to him.
15.7. Thus, the subject-matter of the arbitral
proceedings predominantly concerns civil
consequences flowing from partnership
relations, such as accounting, ownership of
assets, authority to manage the firm, and inter
se rights and liabilities of partners. These are
matters squarely within the jurisdiction of the
Arbitral Tribunal.
15.8. However, it is a settled principle of law that the
existence of civil or arbitral remedies does not
bar criminal prosecution, where the allegations
disclose ingredients of criminal offences. Civil
liability and criminal culpability operate in
distinct fields and are governed by different
considerations. The mere fact that a transaction
gives rise to civil consequences does not efface
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its criminal character, if the factual allegations
disclose dishonest intention, misappropriation,
or abuse of trust.
15.9. In the present case, the complaint alleges that
Respondents No.5 and 6, while occupying a
position of trust as partners and as a General
Power of Attorney holder, dishonestly diverted
funds, created a parallel firm with an identical
name to camouflage such diversion, and
deprived the Petitioner of his lawful share. The
alleged acts involve entrustment, dominion
over property, dishonest intention, and
conversion to one's own use, which are the core
elements of cognizable offences such as
criminal breach of trust and cheating.
15.10.The contention that execution or cancellation of
documents nullifies criminality is untenable at
the threshold stage. Whether such documents
were executed bona fide or as part of a larger
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design to exclude the Petitioner is a matter that
can only be determined after investigation. At
the stage of registration of an FIR, the police
are not expected to weigh defences or
adjudicate upon disputed facts.
15.11.The existence of two partnership firms with the
same name, the diversion of funds to the
second firm, and the exclusion of the Petitioner
from the financial stream are not natural
commercial acts, but are circumstances which,
taken cumulatively, prima facie indicate mens
rea sufficient to attract criminal law. These are
not matters that can be conclusively labelled as
"civil" without investigation.
15.12.The allegation of assault by Respondent No.5
on the father of the Petitioner, resulting in
multiple stitches on the head and registration of
a criminal case, though arising from a separate
incident, provides contextual corroboration of
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the deteriorated relationship and the intensity
of the dispute. While the said incident by itself
does not determine the present issue, it cannot
be wholly ignored while assessing the
plausibility and seriousness of the allegations.
15.13.The endorsement issued by Respondent No.4
discloses no analysis of these material aspects.
The Station House Officer has proceeded on a
broad and impermissible assumption that the
dispute is civil in nature, without examining
whether the allegations, if taken at face value,
disclose cognizable offences. Such an approach
amounts to premature adjudication and
abdication of the statutory duty to register an
FIR where cognizable offences are disclosed.
15.14.The function of the police at the pre-registration
stage is not to determine culpability, but merely
to ascertain whether the information discloses
the commission of a cognizable offence. By
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rejecting the complaint outright, Respondent
No.4 has effectively foreclosed the criminal
process at inception, contrary to settled law.
15.15.I'am therefore of the considered opinion that
the Petitioner has clearly made out, on a prima
facie reading of the complaint, the commission
of cognizable offences by Respondents No.5
and 6. The pendency of arbitral proceedings
does not operate as a legal bar to initiation of
criminal proceedings, and both remedies are
entitled to proceed independently in their
respective spheres.
15.16.I answer Point No. 3 by holding that the
Petitioner has been able to make out a prima
facie case disclosing cognizable offences in the
complaint rejected by Respondent No.4.
15.17.I answer Point No. 4 by holding that that the
disputes between the parties are not confined
exclusively to the realm of civil or arbitral
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adjudication, and that the pendency of arbitral
proceedings does not preclude initiation and
continuation of criminal proceedings arising out
of the same factual matrix.
16. Answer to Point No.5: What order?
16.1. In view of my findings to Points No.1 to 4
above, I pass the following:
ORDER
i) The Writ Petition is allowed.
ii) Respondent No.4 is directed to register the complaint filed by the Petitioner on 29.9.2025 within 7 days of receipt of a copy of this order and investigate the alleged offences independently without being influenced by any part of this order. The said investigation to be completed within a period of 90 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
SD/-
(SURAJ GOVINDARAJ) JUDGE PRS, List No.: 2 Sl No.: 4