Bombay High Court
Bombay Gas Public Ltd. vs Laxman Dhaku And Ors. on 12 September, 1996
Equivalent citations: [1997(75)FLR125], (1997)ILLJ1209BOM
Author: B.N. Srikrishna
Bench: B.N. Srikrishna
JUDGMENT
1. This writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India impugns an order dated October 23, 1987, made by the Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, commonly in Application (IT) Nos. 46 of 1984, 57 to 65 of 1984 under the provisions of Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').
2. At the outset, it is to be noticed that the writ petition stands dismissed with effect from December 1, 1995 as against Respondents 2, 5 and 9, who are the Respondent workmen before the Industrial Tribunal in Application (IT) Nos. 58 of 1984, 61 of 1984 and 65 of 1984. The order made by the Industrial Tribunal in Application (IT) No. 46 of 1984, in which Gangaram Ramchandra Chawan was the Applicant workman, does not appear to have been challenged. Thus, today the writ petition subsists only in respect of the common order dated October 29, 1982 made in Application (IT) Nos. 57, 59, 60, 62, 63 and 64 of 1984.
3. The petitioner is a Public Limited Company which used to carry on the business of manufacture of piped domestic gas. Respondents 1, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 are its ex-workmen. Respondent No. 10 is the Tribunal itself.
4. At the material time, there was an industrial dispute between the Petitioner Company and its workmen which was referred for adjudication under the provisions of the Act to the Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, vide Reference (IT) No. 76 of 1982. During the pendency of the said reference, the petitioner issued charge sheets to the Respondent workmen on February 22, 1984 and suspended them pending the domestic enquiry. The Respondent workmen were suspended pending enquiry between the period February 22, 1984 to August 17, 1984, on which date they were dismissed from service. It is admitted that none of them was paid the subsistence allowance payable during the period of suspension, under the Certified Standing Orders. The Petitioner Company filed applications for approval of its order dated (sic) 33(2)(b) of the Act before the Industrial Tribunal and simultaneously despatched money orders of one month's wages to the Respondent workmen and sought approval of the dismissal order dated August 17, 1984 issued to the Respondent workmen.
5. Neither party led any evidence before the Industrial Tribunal. The Industrial Tribunal heard the parties and by its impugned order dated October 23, 1987, made commonly in all the approval applications, rejected the applications. The Tribunal rejected the applications for four reasons : (a) that the cash equivalent of quarter litre of milk and four pro-biscuits, at the rate of 0.40 paise per day, had not been included in the one month's wages despatched to the Respondent workmen, (b) that the workmen were not paid 31 days' wages since they were dismissed in August 1984, (c) that in any event the enquiry was improperly conducted contrary to the principles of natural justice and (d) that during the period of suspension the workmen were not paid the subsistence allowance payable to them under the applicable Certified Standing Orders. Being aggrieved, the Petitioner Company is before this Court.
6. Despite notices served, Respondents 1, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 have not appeared before the Court. I have heard the learned Advocate Mr. Pawaskar on behalf of the Petitioner Company and with his assistance perused the record, but I am not satisfied that the impugned order needs to be interfered with for reasons which follow.
7. The first question on which the Industrial Tribunal held against the Petitioner Company was that there was non-compliance with the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the Act in that one month's wages were not tendered to the Respondent workmen as required thereunder. Admittedly the amount paid was wages for 30 days and the days in the month of August are 31 days. This was non-compliance with the requirement of the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, in the opinion of the Tribunal. In my view, this reasoning is unsound and the contention as urged could not have been accepted by the Industrial Tribunal. It is well known that in the Gregorian Calendar the month of February is of 28 days or 29 days in the leap year and other months are of 30 or 31 days. If one were to define a 'month' in such a vague manner with four variable parameters, it would be impossible to conduct any business in an orderly manner, without affecting the legal rights of parties. For this reason, the General Clauses Act, 1897 defines the expression 'month' to mean a period of 30 days according to the British Calendar. Generally this definition is is applied in interpreting the word "month" used in all Central Statutes, unless the context indicates an intention to the contrary. The month in which a workman may be dismissed from service may fortuitously be February, September or August is and the amount of statutory payment required under the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the Act cannot be allowed to fluctuate from wages of 28 to 31 days due to this fortuitous circumstance. Uniformity in application is an essential requirement of any reasonable law. An interpretation which renders the meaning of a statutory provision to fluctuate with vagaries of situations must be eschewed by the Court. Irrespective of the month in which the workman is dismissed, in my view, the amount of one 'month's wages to be paid under the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) should be for a period of 30 days at the applicable rate. The Tribunal also held against the petitioner Company on the ground that in the one month's wages the petitioner company had not included the cash equivalent of quarter litre milk and four biscuits, which the concerned workmen were entitled to under the applicable settlement. This conclusion appears to be correct in view of the definition of the expression "wages" under Section 2(rr) of the Act as inclusive of the value of any amenity or of any concessional supply of food-grains or other articles to which the workmen were entitled to. The Tribunal also took the view that there was short-fall in the amount of Dearness Allowance paid. These are findings of fact incapable of being impugned in the writ petition. The net effect is that the Tribunal was justified in its conclusion that the requirement of the proviso of Section 33(2)(b) of the Act has not been complied with.
8. After analysing the evidence on record, the Industrial Tribunal has come to the conclusion that there was non-compliance with the provisions of the Standing Orders and natural justice, in that, instead of recording the statements of witnesses in the presence of the delinquent workmen, the delinquent workmen were confronted with pre-recorded statements during the domestic enquiry. In the circumstances, the Tribunal was of the view that the workmen did not have adequate opportunity of defending themselves. This again is a conclusion which is difficult to disagree with.
9. Finally, the Tribunal following the observations of the Supreme Court Fakirbhai Fulabhai Solanki v. The Presiding Officer & Anr. (1986-II-LLJ-124), was of the view that the failure of the Petitioner Company to pay the suspension allowance of the suspended Respondent workmen during the period February 22, 1984 to o August 17, 1984, also vitiated the domestic enquiry. Even this conclusion of the Tribunal appears to be justified on the facts of the case.
10. Mr. Pawaskar contended that the Petitioner Company had made an application way back in the year 1987 requesting for an opportunity, to lead evidence, in case the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the enquiry was bad. He, therefore, pleaded that the Court should remand the application for trial on the merits of the case. I am unable to agree. It is not as if the Tribunal has accepted the contention of the Petitioner Company that there was compliance with the statutory provisions of Section 33(2)(b) of the Act and then disagreed with the legality and validity of the domestic enquiry. The Tribunal has held against the Petitioner Company on all points. If the Petitioner Company failed to comply with the statutory requirements of the proviso of Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, the Petitioner Company cannot now be heard to seek a further opportunity of making good the omission.
11. In my view, the writ petition must fail. I see no reason to interfere with the impugned order which renders adequate justice to the parties.
12. Writ petition dismissed. Rule discharged with no order as to costs.