Gujarat High Court
Yunussalim Gulabnabi Mansuri vs Registrar General on 19 November, 2025
Author: Bhargav D. Karia
Bench: Bhargav D. Karia
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/19546/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/11/2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 19546 of 2017
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 20182 of 2017
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BHARGAV D. KARIA
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE L. S. PIRZADA
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
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YUNUSSALIM GULABNABI MANSURI
Versus
REGISTRAR GENERAL,
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Appearance:
MR PRABHAKAR UPADHYAY(1060) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
LAW OFFICER BRANCH(420) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
MR. KM ANTANI(6547) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BHARGAV D. KARIA
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE L. S. PIRZADA
Date : 19/11/2025
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BHARGAV D. KARIA)
1. Heard Mr. Prabhakar Upadhyay, learned advocate appearing for petitioner No.1, and learned Senior Advocate Mr. Gautam Joshi, assisted by learned advocate Mr. K. M. Antani, appearing for the respondent.
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2. Both these petitions are related to a common issue and therefore, the prayers made therein are also related in nature. Both these petitions were heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common Judgment and Order.
3. By this petition being Special Civil Application No.19546 of 2017, under Articles 226 and 311 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs:
"A. Your Lordship may kindly be pleased to issue appropriate Writ, Order, direction and thereby issue Writ of Mandamus to quash and set aside the impugned Order dated 14.02.2017 vide Order No.A.0734/2010 at Annexure-F to this petition, in the interest of justice;
B. Your Lordships may kindly be pleased to hold and declared that the punishment imposed by the Ld. Disciplinary Authority is ex-facie illegal, unjust, unfair & contrary to the facts and evidences and further be pleased to direct the present respondent to release the increment withheld by the present respondent in pursuance to the order dated 14.02.2017 vide Order No.A.0734/2010 and further be pleased to pay the arrears of salary and other Page 2 of 34 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Tue Dec 02 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Dec 12 21:24:01 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/19546/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/11/2025 undefined consequential benefits to the present petitioner in the interest of justice;"
4. Brief facts of the case are as under:
4.1 The petitioner was appointed to the post of Judicial Magistrate, First Class and Civil Judge (Junior Division) with effect from 15.04.2002 and was initially posted at Godhra, District Panchmahal. Thereafter, the petitioner was transferred to Patdi, District Surendranagar; to Siddhpur, District Patan; and at Garbada, District Dahod, as Judicial Magistrate (First Class).
4.2 The petitioner was promoted as Civil Judge (Senior Division) and Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate with effect from 13.07.2010 and was posted as 11th Senior Civil Judge and Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate at Jamnagar.
4.3 The respondent, by order dated 13.09.2010, placed the petitioner under suspension with effect from the date of service of the said order. It was further observed Page 3 of 34 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Tue Dec 02 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Dec 12 21:24:01 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/19546/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/11/2025 undefined therein that the petitioner would be paid Subsistence Allowance and other allowances as admissible under Rule 68 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Joining Time, Foreign Service, Deputation out of India, Payment During Suspension, Dismissal and Removal) Rules, 2002 (for short, 'the Rules, 2002'). It was also stipulated in the suspension order that the petitioner would not accept any private employment or carry out any profession or business while under suspension. The suspension was ordered pending finalization of the disciplinary inquiry initiated against the petitioner.
4.4 Thereafter, the petitioner was served with a Charge-
Sheet dated 23.12.2010 along with the statement of imputations, pursuant to initiation of a departmental inquiry, which came to be registered as D.I. No.2 of 2010.
The petitioner was also provided with the list of witnesses and the list of documentary evidence along with the Charge-Sheet.
4.5 The petitioner in response submitted a written Page 4 of 34 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Tue Dec 02 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Dec 12 21:24:01 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/19546/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/11/2025 undefined statement of defence on 31.01.2011. An Inquiry Officer was thereafter appointed and the departmental inquiry was proceeded with against the petitioner. Upon conclusion of the inquiry, the Inquiry Officer submitted his report on 24.07.2013, and on the same day a second Show-Cause Notice along with a copy of the Inquiry Report was served upon the petitioner.
4.6 The petitioner filed a reply dated 12.08.2013 to the second show-cause notice.
4.7 Thereafter, by Order dated 14.02.2017, this Court, on the administrative side, imposed upon the petitioner the penalty of withholding two increments in the time scale with future effect. Pursuant to the said order of punishment, the petitioner was reinstated in the cadre of Senior Civil Judge and Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamnagar, vide notification dated 14.02.2017.
4.8 Thereafter, the respondent issued a Show-Cause Notice dated 04.03.2017 calling upon the petitioner to Page 5 of 34 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Tue Dec 02 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Dec 12 21:24:01 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/19546/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/11/2025 undefined show cause as to why the period of suspension should not be treated as 'not spent on duty'. The petitioner submitted a reply dated 15.03.2017 to the said Show-
Cause Notice. However, by order dated 12.04.2017, the period of suspension came to be treated as 'not spent on duty'. Being aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has preferred the present petition.
5. Learned advocate Mr.Prabhakar Upadhyay submitted that out of the six charges levelled against the petitioner, the Inquiry Officer has found the petitioner guilty of only two charges, namely Charge Nos. III and VI.
It is, therefore, submitted that the impugned order treating the suspension period as 'not on duty' is not tenable.
6. It was further submitted that, on the administrative side also, the report of the Committee placed on record at page 228 of the petition, indicates in paragraph 12 that the extreme penalties of dismissal, removal, or reduction Page 6 of 34 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Tue Dec 02 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Dec 12 21:24:01 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/19546/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/11/2025 undefined in rank were not proposed. However, considering the charges found proved, the Committee recommended the penalty of withholding two increments in the time scale of pay with future effect. Learned advocate Mr. Upadhyay further invited the attention of the Court to the fact that Charge Article III was only partially proved and that the Committee was not in full agreement with the final findings of the Inquiry Officer, as stated in paragraph 9 of the said report. It was therefore submitted that the impugned order treating the period of suspension as 'not spent on duty' is liable to be quashed and set aside.
7. It was further submitted that the order of punishment of withholding two increments with future effect ought not to have been imposed upon the petitioner, considering the fact that Charge Article III was only partially proved and that the findings of the Inquiry Officer were not agreed by the Committee of Hon'ble Judges on the administrative side. Insofar as Charge Article VI is concerned, it pertains to the Page 7 of 34 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Tue Dec 02 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Dec 12 21:24:01 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/19546/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/11/2025 undefined purchase of immovable property in the name of the petitioner's parents and in his own name by making cash payments. The allegation of disproportionate assets was not proved; the only aspect proved was the omission to intimate the purchase of immovable property. It was therefore submitted that for such a minor infraction of duty, the imposition of penalty of withholding two increments with future effect was disproportionate to the charges ultimately proved in the departmental inquiry.
8. It was further submitted that, insofar as Article Charge No. III is concerned, the charge levelled against the petitioner is based on no evidence, and therefore the departmental authority was not justified in imposing the penalty of withholding two increments with future effect.
It was contended that the circular dated 21.02.1998 as well as the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 were not taken into consideration while passing the impugned order dated 14.02.2017 as the petitioner had conducted Criminal Case No. 1124 of 2007 strictly in Page 8 of 34 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Tue Dec 02 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Dec 12 21:24:01 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/19546/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/11/2025 undefined accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the accused in the said case was in judicial custody as an undertrial prisoner, and therefore the petitioner had appropriately accorded priority in the said matter as there were only six witnesses from the same company, and summons issued by the Court had been duly served upon them.
9. Learned advocate Mr.Upadhyay pointed out that Charge Article III levelled against the petitioner was held to be only partially proved, only for the trial of the Criminal Case No.1124 of 2007 without jurisdiction as against the circular dated 21.02.1998. The said circular reveals that the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and the District Judge should ascertain every month the cases narrated in the circular and to transfer such cases to the Court of the learned Senior Civil Judge.
10. Learned advocate Mr. Upadhyay submitted that the serious charges under Articles I, II, III, IV, and V have not Page 9 of 34 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Tue Dec 02 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Dec 12 21:24:01 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/19546/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/11/2025 undefined been proved during the course of the inquiry, and therefore, only with a view to ensure that the petitioner is punished with a penalty of withholding two increments, the impugned order has been passed by the respondent.
11. Per contra, learned Senior advocate Mr.Gautam Joshi with learned advocate Mr.K. M. Antani for the respondent, submitted that no jurisdictional error has been committed while passing the impugned order of withholding two increments with future effect, as no writ petition would be maintainable to challenge the quantum of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, particularly when the same has been imposed after following the due procedure.
12. Learned advocate Mr.Joshi referred to and relied upon the following averments made in the affidavit-in- reply filed on behalf of the respondent in support of his submissions, which are as under:
"5. I submit that while considering the Preliminary Inquiry Report in the matter Page 10 of 34 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Tue Dec 02 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Dec 12 21:24:01 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/19546/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/11/2025 undefined (V.C.Nos. 450/08, 342/08, 427/09 & 522/09), the decision was taken at the Standing Committee Meeting held on 07.09.2010, to suspend Mr.Y.G.Mansuri and to initiate departmental proceedings for the alleged charges. Pursuant to the above decision, the necessary orders as regards placing petitioner under suspension was issued vide High Court Order No.A.0734/2010, dated 13.09.2010 and the above-mentioned decision taken at the Standing Committee Meeting had also been ratified by the decision taken at the Chamber Meeting held on 27.09.2010. Thereafter, pursuant to the Orders passed by Their Lordships on Office Note dated 16.11.2010, Charge Sheet No.LOB/V.C.No.450/08 (D.I.No.02/2010), dated 23.12.2010, containing 06-Charges, Statement of Imputation, List of Witnesses and List of Documents had been supplied to petitioner and in response thereto, petitioner had submitted his Written Statement of Defence, vide his letter dated 31.01.2011. Annexed hereto and marked as Annexure R.1 is copy of said written statement of defence.
6. After conducting Departmental Inquiry No. 2 of 2010 initiated against petitioner, the Inquiry Officer had submitted Final Report dated 02.07.2013 containing conclusion as under: Annexed hereto and marked Annexure: R 2 is a copy of Inquiry report.
Charge No. Conclusion
1. Not proved
2. Not proved
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NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/19546/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/11/2025
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3. Proved
4. Not proved
5. Not proved
6. Partly proved
7. Thereafter, while considering the Inquiry Report dated 02-07-2013 submitted by Mr.G.M.Damodara, Inquiry Officer and (Ad-hoc) Additional District Judge, Patan, in the Departmental Inquiry No.2/2010 initiated against petitioner, a decision was taken at the Standing Committee Meeting held on 22.07.2013 to issue notice as to why he should not be dismissed from service.
8. Pursuant to the above decision, vide High Court letter No.LOB/V.C.No.450/2008 (D.I.No.2/2010), dated 24.07.2013, the said Notice had been issued. Thereafter, while considering the Reply dated 12.08.2013 submitted by the delinquent petitioner, in the Standing Committee Meeting held on 16.09.2013 decision was taken to form a Committee consisting of two Honourable judges of this hon'ble Court to consider the report of the Inquiry Officer and the answer given by the delinquent based on materials on record and to give the Report to the Standing Committee. The Committee constituted for the above-mentioned purpose had been reconstituted; which had prepared its report, which was placed before the Standing Committee, whose meeting was held on 02.02.2017. The Standing Committee accepted recommendations made by the Hon'ble Page 12 of 34 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Tue Dec 02 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Dec 12 21:24:01 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/19546/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/11/2025 undefined Committee and punishment of withholding of two increments in time scale of pay with future effect i.e. permanently was ordered to be imposed upon Mr.Y.G.Mansuri. It was further resolved that suspension of Mr.Y.G. Mansuri, be revoked and notice be issued to him to show cause as to why period of suspension should not be treated as "not spent on duty" The matter was placed in the Chamber Meeting.
9. The above-mentioned decision taken at the Standing Committee Meeting had been ratified by the decision taken at the Chamber Meeting held on 07.02.2017. The orders imposing the punishment of withholding of two increments and his re- instatement have been issued by High Court Order No.A.0734/2010, dated 14.02.2017 with the posting as 4th Additional Senior Civil Judge and Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamnagar. Upon approval of Draft Show Cause Notice as to why period of suspension should not be treated as "not spent on duty" at the Standing Committee Meeting held on 01.03.2017, vide High Court letter No. LOB/V.C.No. 450/2008, dated 04.03.2017, the said Notice had been issued.
Thereafter, considering the Reply dated 15.03.2017 submitted by petitioner, the decision was taken at the Standing Committee Meeting held on 06.04.2017. whereby the reply dated 15.03.2017 along with its attachment submitted by Mr.Y.G.Mansuri, 4th Additional Senior Civil Judge & Addl. CJM, Jamnagar, to the Show Cause Notice stood rejected. The Page 13 of 34 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Tue Dec 02 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Dec 12 21:24:01 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/19546/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/11/2025 undefined period of suspension, was ordered to be treated as the "not spent on duty" as the delinquent was not exonerated in the disciplinary proceedings and considering the allegations it could not be said that suspension was wholly unwarranted. Pursuant to the above decision, vide High Court letter No.LOB/V.C.No.450/08 (D.I.No.2/2010), dated 12.04.2017, petitioner had been informed accordingly."
13. Referring to the above averments, it was submitted that no interference be called for with the impugned order of imposing the penalty of withholding two increments with future effect.
14. So far as Special Civil Application No. 20182 of 2017 challenging the order dated 12.04.2017 is concerned, the following prayers have been made:
"(A) Your Lordship may kindly be pleased to issue appropriate Writ, Order, direction and thereby issue Writ of Mandamus to quash and set aside the impugned Order dated 12.04.2017 vide Order No.LOB/VC 450/2008 at Annexure-G to this petition, in the interest of justice;
(B) Your Lordships may kindly be pleased to direct the present respondent Page 14 of 34 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Tue Dec 02 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Dec 12 21:24:01 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/19546/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/11/2025 undefined to pay the full salary and all other consequential benefits to the present petitioner for the period from 13.02.2010 to 13.02.2017 and further be pleased to direct the present respondent to regularize the period of suspension for the period from 13.02.2010 to 13.02.2017 in the interest of justice;
(C) Your Lordship may kindly be pleased to pass such other and further relief which may deem fit in the interest of justice."
15. Learned advocate Mr. Upadhyay submitted that Rule 70 of the Rules, 2002 has not been properly taken into consideration by the respondent, and therefore, the order of punishment dated 14.02.2017 imposing the penalty of withholding two increments with future effect is unsustainable and considering the said order, the petitioner is entitled to full salary for the period of suspension by treating the said period as "on duty." It was therefore submitted that the impugned order is contrary to the provisions of Rules 68 and 70 of the Rules, 2002.
16. Per contra, learned Senior advocate Mr.Joshi heavily Page 15 of 34 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Tue Dec 02 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Dec 12 21:24:01 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/19546/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/11/2025 undefined relied upon Sub-rule (2) of Rule 70 of the Rules, 2002 and submitted that only when the disciplinary authority holds that the suspension was wholly unjustified, the employee should be paid the full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he not been suspended.
However, it was submitted that, in the present case, the disciplinary authority has concluded that the suspension was justified during the course of the disciplinary inquiry, and therefore the petitioner was treated as "not on duty,"
and the period of suspension was not considered as "spent on duty". It was further pointed out that, by the impugned order that the petitioner would be granted continuity of service. However, he would not be entitled to any monetary benefits for the period of suspension except the subsistence allowance, in accordance with Rule 70 of the Rules, 2002.
17. In support of his submissions, reliance was placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Balvantray Ratilal Patel v. State of Maharashtra, reported Page 16 of 34 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Tue Dec 02 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Dec 12 21:24:01 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/19546/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/11/2025 undefined in AIR (1968) SC 800, which are as under:
"4. The general principle therefore is that an employer can suspend an employee pending an Inquiry Into his misconduct and the only question that can arise in such suspension will relate to payment during the period of such suspension. If there is no express term relating to payment during such suspension or if there is no statutory provision in any enactment or rule the employee is entitled to his full remuneration for the period of his interim suspension. On the other hand, if there is a term in this respect in the contract of employment or if there is a provision in the statute or the rules framed thereunder providing for the scale of payment during suspension, the payment will be made in accordance therewith. This principle applies with equal force in a case where the Government is an employer and a public servant is an employee with this qualification that in view of the pecullar structural hierarchy of Government administration, the employer in the case of employment by Government must be held to be the authority which has the power to appoint the public servant concerned. It follows therefore that the authority entitled to appoint the public servant is entitled to suspend him pending a departmental enquiry into his conduct or pending a criminal proceeding, which may eventually result in a departmental enquiry against him. But what amount should be paid to the public servant during such suspension will depend upon the provisions of the Page 17 of 34 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Tue Dec 02 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Dec 12 21:24:01 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/19546/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/11/2025 undefined statute or statutory rule in that connection. If there is such a provision the payment during suspension will be in accordance therewith. But if there is no such provision, the public servant will be entitled to his full emoluments during the period of suspension. On general principles therefore the government like any other employer, would have a right to suspend a public servant in one of two ways. It may suspend any public servant pending departmental enquiry or pending criminal proceedings; this may be called interim suspension. The Government may also proceed to hold a departmental enquiry and after his being found guilty order suspension as a punishment if the rules so permit. This will be suspension as a penalty. As we have already pointed out, the question as to what amount should be paid to the public servant during the period of interim suspension or suspension as a punishment will depend upon the provisions of the statute or statutory rules made in that connection.
5. On behalf of the respondent Advocate- General of Maharashtra relied upon Rules 151 and 152 of Chapter VIII of the Bombay Civil Service Rules. These rules provide as follows:
"151. A Government servant under suspension is entitled to the following payments:
(a) In the case of a military officer who is liable to revert to military duty, to the pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he been suspended while in military employment.
(b) In any other case, to a subsistence grant at such rates as the suspending Page 18 of 34 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Tue Dec 02 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Dec 12 21:24:01 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/19546/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/11/2025 undefined authority may direct, but not exceeding one-fourth of the pay of the suspended Government servant.
Provided that the suspending authority may direct that the Government servant under suspension shall be granted in addition such compensatory allowances as the Government may sanction by general or special order for issue under this proviso.
Note 1. The grant of subsistence allowance cannot altogether be withheld."
"152. When the suspension of a Government servant is held to have been unjustifiable or not wholly justifiable; or when a Government servant who has been dismissed, removed or suspended is reinstated, the revising or Appellate Authority may grant to him for the period of his absence from duty-
(a) if he is honourably acquitted, the full pay to which he would have been entitled if he had not been dismissed, removed or suspended and, by an order to be separately recorded any allowance of which he was in receipt prior to his dismissal, removal or suspension; and
(b) if otherwise, such proportion of such pay and allowances as the revising or Appellate Authority may prescribe.
In a case falling under clause (a), the period of absence from duty will be treated as a period spent on duty. In a case falling under clause (b) it will not be treated as a period spent on duty unless the revising or Appellate Authority so direct....
Note 2. Under this rule the revising or Appellate Authority can convert a period spent under suspension Into one of leave admissible under the rules. The period of suspension cannot, however, be Page 19 of 34 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Tue Dec 02 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Dec 12 21:24:01 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/19546/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/11/2025 undefined converted Into leave without pay except in accordance with the conditions in Rule
752. Subsistence allowance pald under this rule should be adjusted or recovered from the Government servant when the period of suspension Is-converted into leave with or without pay."
On behalf of the appellant Mr Gokhale contended that Rule 151 applies only to a case where a Government servant is suspended by way of penalty and not to a case of interim suspension. We see no warrant for accepting this argument. Suspension is used in Rule 151 in a general sense and Rule 151 applies to all kinds of suspension, whether it is imposed by way of penalty or as an interim measure pending departmental inquiry or a criminal proceeding. We see no reason, either In the context or the language of Rule 151, to place a restricted Interpretation upon the meaning of the word "suspension" in that rule. On the contrary, the language of Rules 153 and 156 suggests that the suspension contemplated by these rules includes not only suspension by way of penalty but also interim suspension pending a departmental Inquiry or a criminal proceeding. Rules 153 and 156 state as follows:
"153. Leave may not be granted to a Government servant under suspension.
156. A Government servant committed to a prison either for debt or on a criminal charge should be considered as under suspension from the date of his arrest and therefore entitled only to the payments specified in Rule 151 until the termination of the proceedings against him when, if he is not removed or Page 20 of 34 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Tue Dec 02 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Dec 12 21:24:01 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/19546/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/11/2025 undefined dismissed from service, an adjustment of his pay and allowances should be made according to the conditions, and terms prescribed in Rule 152 the full amount being given only in the event of the Government servant being considered to be acquitted of blame, or, if the imprisonment was for debt, of its being proved that the Government servant's liability arose from circumstances beyond his control."
If the word "suspension" in Rules 153 and 156 contemplates suspension pending an inquiry we see no reason why it should be given a different Interpretation in Rules 151 and 152. We are accordingly of the opinion that Rule 151 empowers the State Government to withhold pay for the period of Interim suspension but the Government servant is entitled under that rule to a subsistence allowance at such rate as the suspending authority may direct but not exceeding one-fourth of his pay. It follows therefore that the order of the State Government dated February 13, 1950 suspending the appellant pending enquiry into his conduct was legally valid and the argument of the appellant on this aspect of the case must be rejected. The view that we have expressed Is supported by the ratio of the principle of the decision of this Court in R.P. Kapur v. Union of India. The question in that case arose with regard to the interpretation of Fundamental Rule 53 which provided for payment to a Government servant under suspension and which states as follows:
"53. (1) A Government servant under suspension shall be entitled to the following payments, namely:Page 21 of 34 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Tue Dec 02 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Dec 12 21:24:01 IST 2025
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(i) in the case of a Commissioned Officer of the Indian Medical Department or a Warrant Officer in Civil Employ who is liable to revert to Military duty, the pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he been suspended while in military employment;
(ii) in the case of any other Government servant-
(a) a subsistence allowance at an amount equal to the leave salary which the Government servant would have drawn If he had been on leave on half average pay or on half pay and in addition, dearness allowance, if admissible on the basis of such leave salary:
Provided that where the period of suspension exceeds twelve months, the authority which made or is deemed to have made the order of suspension shall be competent to vary the amount of subsistence allowance for any period subsequent to the period of the first twelve months as follows:
Fundamental Rule 54 is to the following effect:
"54.(1) When a Government servant who has been dismissed, removed, compulsorily retired or suspended is re-
instated or would have been re-instated but for his retirement on superannuation while under suspension the authority competent to order the reinstatement shall consider and make a specific order-
(a) regarding the pay and allowances to be pald to the Government servant for the period of his absence from duty or for the period of suspension ending with the date of his retirement on superannuation as the case may be; and
(b) whether or not the sald period Page 22 of 34 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Tue Dec 02 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Dec 12 21:24:01 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/19546/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/11/2025 undefined shall be treated as a period spent on duty.
(2) Where the authority mentioned in sub-rule (1) is of opinion that the Government servant has been fully exonerated or, in the case of suspension, that it was wholly unjustified, the Government servant shall be given the full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled, had he not been dismissed, removed, compulsorily retired or suspended, as the case may be."
It was held by the majority decision of this Court that Fundamental Rule 53 contemplates all kinds of suspension, whether it is a penalty or as an Interim measure pending departmental Inquiry or criminal proceeding. It is manifest that Rules 151 and 152 of the Bombay Civil Service Rules are couched in a similar language to that of Fundamental Rules 53 and 54 and it must be held for this reason also that Rules 151 and 152 of the Bombay Civil Service Rules comprise in their scope both kinds of suspension, whether it is a penalty or as an interim measure pending an Inquiry into the conduct of the Government servant concerned or criminal proceeding against him.
6. We proceed to consider the next question arising in this case l.e. whether the order of suspension came to an end on February 15, 1952 when the appellant was acquitted by the High Court in revision and whether in consequence the appellant is entitled to full pay for the period from February 15, 1952 to February 11, 1960 when he was ultimately dismissed. It was contended Page 23 of 34 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Tue Dec 02 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Dec 12 21:24:01 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/19546/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/11/2025 undefined on behalf of the appellant that he was suspended pending an inquiry into the charge for the criminal offence alleged to have been committed by him and as the proceedings in connection with that charge ended with the acquittal of the appellant by the High Court on February 15, 1952, the order of suspension must be deemed to have automatically come to an end on that date. We see no justification for accepting this argument. The order of suspension dated February 13, 1950 recites that the appellant should be suspended with immediate effect "pending further orders". It is clear therefore that the order of suspension could not be automatically terminated but it could have only been terminated by another order of the Government. Until therefore a further order of the State Government was made terminating the suspension the appellant had no right to be reinstated to service. On behalf of the appellant reliance was placed on the decision of the Orissa High Court in Narayan Prasad Rewany v. State of Orissa. But the facts of that case are clearly to be distinguished. The order of suspension in that case did not contain the phrase "pending further orders". Furthermore, the order of suspension was passed under Rule 93-A of the Orissa Service Code, Vol. 1, under which the Government servant could be suspended during the periods when he was not actually detained in custody or imprisoned. Having regard to the terms of that rule it was held by the Orissa High Court that the order ceased to be operative as soon as criminal proceedings had terminated. In the present case, however, the appellant was not suspended under any rule similar to Page 24 of 34 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Tue Dec 02 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Dec 12 21:24:01 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/19546/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/11/2025 undefined Rule 93-A of the Orissa Service Code, Vol. 1 and the decision of the Orissa High Court has therefore no relevance. We are therefore of the opinion that the order of suspension of the appellant made by the State Government on February 13, 1950 did not come to an end on the date of the order of acquittal made by the High Court and Counsel for the appellant is unable to make good his submission on this aspect of the case."
18. Having heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and considering the facts of the case, it emerges that the petitioner was found guilty of Charge Article III, which was held to be partially proved, whereas Charge Article VI was held to be fully proved. Charges under Article III and Article VI are reproduced hereunder:
"3. You, Mr.Y.G.Mansuri, while functioning as Civil Judge and JM.F.C. at Siddhpur, District Patan, during the period from 11/06/2007 to 10/09/2009, in violation of the High Court Circular No. D-2912/98 dated 21-02-1998, disposed of the Criminal Case No. 1124/2007 in favour of the accused, though the said case was triable by a Senior Judicial Officer like the Chief Judicial Magistrate. This action on your part, if proved, Page 25 of 34 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Tue Dec 02 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Dec 12 21:24:01 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/19546/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/11/2025 undefined amounts to exceeding your jurisdiction to give findings in favour of the accused and amounts to unbecoming of a Judicial Officer.
6. You, Mr. Y.G.Mansuri joined the judicial service on 15/04/2002. After joming judicial service, you have purchased immovable properties which are registered in the names of your parents, brothers and yourself by making cash payment from. unaccounted money of bribe, and you have also not intimated to the Honnourable the Honnourable High Court about the purchase of the said immovable properties. The aforesaid action on your part, if proved, amounts to dereliction to discharge of your duties as also misconduct."
19. The findings of the Inquiry Officer in relation to Charge Article III are as under:
"57. Having regards to the above facts and circumstances, I am of the opinion that the delinquent Judge has power to try the Criminal Case No.1124/2007 as per the provision of Criminal Procedure Code. But the delinquent Judge has held the trial of the Criminal Case No.1124/2007 in violation of the High Court Circular No.D.2912 dated 21/02/1998 and disposed of the said case in favour of the accused. So, I come to the conclusion that the Charge No.3 is proved against the delinquent."Page 26 of 34 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Tue Dec 02 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Dec 12 21:24:01 IST 2025
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20. So far as Charge Article VI is concerned, the findings of the Inquiry Officer are reproduced hereunder:
"131. But as I have already discussed in detail, the delinquent has admitted that his father has allotted the plots to all his brothers and his name also has been entered as a owner of the said plots. Having regards to the above facts, it is clear that delinquent's father has allotted the plots to the delinquent and the delinquent has also knowledge that his father has entered his name in the revenue record, it can be said that the delinquent has acquired these plots No.14, 15, 90, 91, 52 and 53 but he has not given any intimation to the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat regarding the acquisition of aforesaid plots. This act of the delinquent is in violation of the provisions contained in Rule-3 and Rule-19(2) Read with Rule 19(4) of the Gujarat Civil Services (conduct) Rules 1971.
So in my considered opinion the Charge No.6 against the delinquent Mr. Mansuri is partly proved."
21. The findings of the Committee on the administrative side, as reflected in the Report placed on record, read as under:
Page 27 of 34 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Tue Dec 02 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Dec 12 21:24:01 IST 2025NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/19546/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/11/2025 undefined "6. Under charge Article III, it was alleged that the High Court had issued circular dated 21.2.1998 providing that the cases involving offences punishable under sections 408, 472, ог 477-A and 420 of the PO being serious in nature, should be tried by a senior offer like the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Despite this, Shri Mar Mansiri while working as Civil Judge and JMFC, Siddhpur, had disposed of Criminal Case No.1124/2007 of accused S. Swaminathan involving offences punishable under sections 406, 420, 114 of the IPC. It was alleged that the accused was a Sales Manager and had committed breach of trust and cheating to the tune of Rs.27,99,248/-. The delinquent officer disposed of such case in a short time of two months and nine days and acquitted the accused by judgment dated 5.3.2008. In the process, he gave priority to this criminal case ahead of another Criminal Case No.862/2007 though in the said case, accused was in custody.
According to the charge-sheet, these circumstances would show oblique motive on part of the judicial officer.
7. The inquiry officer in his report concluded that though the delinquent officer had the jurisdiction to decide the criminal case, nevertheless, he ignored the High Court directives under circular dated 21.2.1998. To this extent, the charge was held to have been proved. The inquiry officer however, did not accept the angle of doubtful integrity for the expeditious disposal of the criminal case by making the following observations:
"54. Having regards to the above facts Page 28 of 34 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Tue Dec 02 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Dec 12 21:24:01 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/19546/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/11/2025 undefined and circumstances, it appears that the charge-sheet in criminal Case No. 1124/2007 was received on dated 27/12/2007 and the case was disposed of on dated 05/03/2008 like this the entire trial of the said Case was concluded within less than three months. But it is noted that in this case there were only 6 (siz) witnesses. The accused was under trial. It is provided u/s. 309(1) of Criminal Procedure Code that in every inquiry or trial the proceedings shall be held as expeditiously as possible and in particular when the examination of witness has once begun, the same shall be continue from day to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined."
8. The Inquiry Officer Held Article III of the charges as proved. He held first part of the charge that the magistrate disposed of the criminal case agamst the directives of the High Court circular as proved. He however, did not find that in doing so, the delinquent showed undue haste which showed doubtful integrity.
9. The fact that as per the High Court circular dated 21.2.1998, the delinquent officer ought to have desisted from deciding the Criminal Case No.1124/2007 is not in serious dispute and therefore, to that extent, the inquiry officer was correct in holding that the judicial officer acted against such circular. However, as noted, the main element of doubtful integrity in the process, has not been accepted by the judicial officer. In that serse, though he has concluded that Page 29 of 34 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Tue Dec 02 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Dec 12 21:24:01 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/19546/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/11/2025 undefined charge Article III is proved, it must be seen to have been partially proved. Be that as it may, insofar as final findings of the inquiry officer on this charge is concerned, we are not in full agreement.
10. Insofar as charge Article VI is concerned, it was alleged that after joining judicial service, the delinquent had purchased immovable properties in the name of his parents, brother and himself by making cash payment from unaccounted money of bribe and also had not intimated the acquisition to the High Court. In this respect, the inquiry officer did not accept the first part of the charge namely, that of acquisition of immovable properties by the officer through bribe money, but believed that his father who had purchased such properties allotted different plots to him and his brother. The delinquent had thus acquired immovable property and was therefore, required to intimate the High Court about the same. In this respect also, there cannot be any dispute. If the delinquent officer did not dispute that he had acquired certain immovable property, may be, given to him by his father, whatever the source of acquisition, as per the Service Rules, the delinquent officer, was required to intimate such acquisition of immovable property to the High Court which he had admittedly failed.
11. In the result, the findings of the inquiry officer that charge Article III (to the extent discussed above) and part of charge Article VI to have been proved, are confirmed.
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12. Coming to the quantum of punishment, in absence of any element of doubtful integrity having been established on record, we do not propose the extreme major penalties of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. Nevertheless, looking to the proved charges, the punishment of withholding of two increments in time scale of pay with future effect ie. permanently is recommended. In other words, the next two increments of the judicial officer falling due will be withheld and at the end of such period, the increments shall not be restored to him."
22. Considering the above, it cannot be said that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner for withholding two increments with future effect, is disproportionate to the charges proved, as the conduct of the petitioner has been found to be not befitting a judicial officer in view of the established charges against the petitioner.
23. So far as the challenge to the Order dated 12.04.2017, whereby the period of suspension was treated as "not spent on duty," is concerned, it would be pertinent to refer to Rule 70 of the Rules, 2002, which reads as under:
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1. Competent Authority's Order on Reinstatement:
- When an employee is reinstated after being dismissed, removed or suspended, the authority that reinstates must specifically order:
a) what pay and allowances the employee should receive for the period of their absence from duty; and
b) whether that period of absence should be treated as "duty" for service purposes.
2. Full Exoneration Case:
- If the authority believes the employee was fully exonerated, or (in suspension cases) that the suspension was wholly unjustified, then the employee should get:
(a) Full pay & allowances, i.e., what they would have drawn if they had never been dismissed/removed/suspended.
(b) The entire absence period shall be treated as duty for all purposes.
3. Partial or Not Fully Exonerated Case
- If the employee is not fully exonerated (or in proportional repayment case), then:
(a) They get a proportion of pay and allowances, as determined by the competent authority.
(b) Whether the absence is treated as duty depends on whether the authority Page 32 of 34 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Tue Dec 02 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Dec 12 21:24:01 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/19546/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/11/2025 undefined specifies so.
(c) The payments remain subject to usual conditions of allowances (i.e., other eligibility criteria)."
24. Upon perusal of the above Rules, the petitioner was placed under suspension during the pendency of departmental inquiry, the consequence of such suspension is required to be determined in accordance with Sub-rule 2 of Rule 70. In the present case, since the petitioner has not been fully exonerated in the departmental inquiry, the disciplinary authority was of the opinion that the suspension was justified. Therefore, in terms of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 70 of the Rules, 2002, the petitioner is not entitled to full pay and allowances as if he had not been suspended.
25. Therefore, the impugned order dated 12.04.2017, treating the period of suspension as "not spent on duty,"
is just and proper, and no interference is called for while exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.Page 33 of 34 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Tue Dec 02 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Dec 12 21:24:01 IST 2025
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26. In view of the foregoing reasons, both the petitions fail and are hereby dismissed, with no order as to costs.
(BHARGAV D. KARIA, J) (L. S. PIRZADA, J) STANCY GOMES Page 34 of 34 Uploaded by STANCY GOMES(HC02364) on Tue Dec 02 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Dec 12 21:24:01 IST 2025