Madhya Pradesh High Court
Dr. Brajendra Singh Chouhan vs State Of M.P. And Ors. on 25 May, 1994
Equivalent citations: AIR1995MP23, 1995(0)MPLJ331, AIR 1995 MADHYA PRADESH 23, (2000) 2 DMC 486, (1995) MPLJ 331, (1994) 3 SCT 360
JUDGMENT T.S. Doabia, J.
1. Dr. Brajendra Singh Chouhan prays that a writ of mandamus be issued directing the respondents to permit him to continue with course of study namely Diploma Course in the discipline of Clinical Pathology, to which discipline he was granted admission by the respondent authorities in G. R. Medical College, Gwalior on 30th of January 1993. A writ of Certiorari is also claimed and a prayer has been made to quash the action of respondents by which the admission was initially suspended on 1-2-1993 and later on cancelled.
2. The basic question involved in this petition is whether the petitioner should be permitted to continue his course of study in Diploma Course in the discipline of Clinical Pathology in the G.R. Medical College, Gwalior when the vacancy arose in the middle of academic session.
3. When this petition came up for final hearing before a Division Bench consisting of Sacheendra Dwivedi and S. K. Chawla, JJ., there was a defence of opinion. Dwivedi. J. was of the opinion that the petitioner having beep allowed to join the course was within his rights to pursue and complete the same and his admission could not be cancelled merely because another candidate having higher merit was given her due right. Principles of equitable estoppel were held to be attracted in the case. Dwivedi, J. also came to a conclusion that another vacancy having come in existence eight months after the start of session during the pendency of the petition, the petitioner should be adjusted against the same. It was accordingly concluded that the petitioner's prayer deserved to be granted. However S.K. Chawla, J. was of the view that grant of admission against a vacancy which had arisen in the ninth month of the academic session would be in violation of rules and it was accordingly held that the petition being without merit deserved to be dismissed. It is under the above circumstances this petition has been placed before me. Even though separate orders passed by Dwivedi, J. and S. K. Chawla, J. deals with facts in detail, 1 deem it appropriate to recapitulate them in brief.
4. On 16th of October, 1992 an office order was issued by G. R. Medical College, Gwalior, By this order candidates were selected for one year Diploma Course for the year 1992 in October, 1992. Seats were meant to be filled from the quota meant for institutional candidates. Three candidates namely, B. K. Gupta, Dr. Manoj Kumar, and Dr. Rajborwankar, were admitted against three seats in Diploma Course. These candidates figure at serial number 6, 11 and 12 in the merit list which was earlier issued on 25th of September, 1992. This list is Annexure R/3, After the admission was given to the aforementioned candidates, two-seats fell vacant in M. D. Pathology Course. These vacancies arose on account of the fact that two seats of all India quota in M.D. Pathology course reverted to the institutional candidates in G. R. Medical College. These were filled up on 30th of January, 1992. Dr. B. K. Gupta and Dr. Manoj Kumar who were initially given admission in Diploma Course were admitted to M. D. Course against the aforesaid vacancies. This resulted in two vacancies in the Diploma Courses, Dr. Sunil Gupta and Dr. Chouhan petitioner were given admission. Their names were at S. Nos, 17 and 20 in the merit list. This is Annexure P/ 3. When admission was given to Dr. Sunil Gupta and Brajendra Singh Chouhan, a representation was submitted by Dr. Meghmala Gupia. She submitted that she is higher in merit than Dr. Manoj Kumar. According to her she was entitled to admission in the Diploma course. The representation so made is Annexure R/4, with the reply filed by the respondents. This representation was considered by the respondent authorities. Her representation was accepted. She was held entitled to the admission. As a consequence of this the petitioner has to vacate the seat he being low in the merit list. The petitioner, as stated above, filed the present petition basing his claim on the plea of equitable estoppel.
5. The above petition came up for Motion Hearing on 11th of February, 1993. The operation of the order Annexure P/6 was stayed. However, the petitioner was not permitted to continue with the studies as Dr. Meghmala had joined and there was no vacancy. The petition came up for further hearing before the Division Bench on 6th of July, 1993. It was then pointed out that one more seat has fallen vacant. This vacancy arose as Dr. Rajborwankar was given admission in M.D. Course in Rewa Medical College. The petitioner accordingly contended that he should at least be adjusted against the vacancy so caused. The writ petition was however not amended. Only an oral prayer was made that the petitioner be permitted to urge that he is entitled to the seat which had fallen vacant on account of the vacancy caused by Dr. Rajborwankar joining another institution.
6. The above prayer was also not acceptable to the respondent authorities. According to them, admission could not be given against a seat which was of previous year. It was further pleaded that admission could not be granted after eight months of the commencement of academic session.
7. From the narration of above facts, it become apparent:--
(i) that in diploma course in the discipline of Clinical Pathology, admission started in October, 1992;
(ii) this diploma course is of a duration of one year;
(iii) two seats became available in Diploma course in January, 1993 as candidates who were given admission vacated the seats as they were admitted in M.D. Courses;
(iv) admission given to the petitioner on 30th January, 1993 was suspended on 1st of February, 1993;
(v) action of respondents in cancelling the admission was challenged in this Court. This writ petition came up for hearing in motion before the Bench on 11th February, 1993. A stay order was granted but the petitioner was not allowed to pursue the course of studies;
(vi) the suspension of the admission was on account of the fact that one Dr. Meghmala Gupta had submitted a representation on 1st February, 1993 seeking admission to the seat on the ground that she was higher in merit. This is Annexure R/4.
(vii) the matter was considered by respondent authorities and it was found that the claim of Dr. Meghmala Gupta was genuine, she was given admission and the final order cancelling the admission of petitioner was passed;
(viii) during the pendency of the writ petition, one seat in Diploma course fell vacant in the ninth month on 2nd of July, 1993 when Dr. Rajborwanker got admission in Rewa Medical College to pursue the studies in M.S. Surgery;
(ix) an oral prayer was made that the petitioner be accommodated against the vacancy so caused but this prayer was opposed by the State,
8. The claim of the petitioner is that he having been granted admission on 30th of January, 1993, he was entitled to continue with the course of studies and that the respondent authorities are estopped from cancelling the said admission. In nutshell, the plea is based on principles of equitable estoppel and it is contended that the respondent authorities with their open eyes gave admission to the petitioner. It is stated that there was no concealment of any fact so far as petitioner was concerned. According to him, he is entitled to continue with the course of study even if the admission was given on mistaken notion. He has also contended that opportunity of hearing was not granted to him before suspension or before cancelling the order of admission. According to him an order affecting civil rights if not passed consistently with the principles of natural justice is liable to be quashed, State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani, AIR 1967 SC 1269 has been cited in this regard. So far as the claim of equitable estoppel is concerned reliance has been placed on one of the earliest decisions on the subject reported as Registrar, University of Madras v. Sundara Shettij AIR 1956 Mad 309. In this case the petitioner appeared for Secondary School Leaving Certificate examination held by Government of Madras in March, 1952. Certificate was given by the University that he is eligible for admission to the University course of studies. He got admission in Madras University. While he was so undergoing his course of study, he was informed by the Principal of the College that his admission is liable to be cancelled as his name was not found mentioned in the list of candidates eligible for University course of study. This was challenged in the High Court. While dealing with this aspect of the matter Rajamannar, C.J. in para 15 observed :
"It was not suggested by the University that the petitioner in this case knew that he had not been declared eligible and that his action was mala fide in embarking on a course of University study.
Nor was it suggested that he had procured endorsement of eligibility by fraud or improper means. In these circumstances, we consider that a Mandamus should issue both to the University of Madras and to the Principal of the Thiagaraja College to forbear from preventing the petitioner to complete his intermediate course and appear for the intermediate examination in due course."
9. This principle of equitable estoppel was made applicable by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in K. Jagannadham v. District Collector Kurnool, AIR 1966 Andh Pra 59. In this case probationer was discharged on the ground that he was not competent to appear for competitive examinations. There was no concealment of facts on the part of the petitioner. The order of Government cancelling the appointment of the petitioner was quashed. The learned single Judge placed reliance on an unreported Division Bench decision of that Court in writ petition No. 332/57. This was noticed in para9 and reads as under:--
"A more direct decision was rendered on 9-12-1960 by a Division Bench of this Court composed of Chandra Reddy, C.J. and Ramachandra Rao, J. in W.P. No. 332 of 1957 (Andh. Pra.). The facts of that case are very close to the facts of the present case. The petitioner applied to the Service Commission for permission to sit for a competitive examination and it was granted. He passed the examination. Sometime later, he was informed that he was selected provisionally for appointment as Lower Division Clerk in the Office of the Director of Agriculture and Fisheries, Andhra. In pursuance of this, he was duly appointed and was given training for three months from 5-7-1956 to4-10-1956. But in April, 1957, the Public Service Commission sent a memorandum to him that he should have obtained 35 per cent of marks in the optional subject in his H.S.C. examination, for admission to the Ministerial Service Examination held by them and that as he had secured only 30 per cent in the optional subject in H.S.C. examination he did not possess the minimum general educational qualification and that he was therefore not eligible for appointment as a clerkly direci recruitment and his provisional selection as a clerk was consequently cancelled. This order was impugned in a writ petition filed under Article 226. The Division Bench allowed this writ petition and quashed the aforesaid order passed by the Public Service Commission. The learned Chief Justice stated :--
We do not think that this order can be allowed to stand. There can be little doubt that at the time when the petitioner sent in his application he had also sent a certificate of marks obtained by him, which revealed that he has secured only 30 per cent in the option subject. Notwithstanding this, the petitioner was permitted to sit for the competitive-examination and he was declared to have passed the test and it was only when he came out successful in the examination that he was appointed as a clerk to serve in Department of Agriculture. Thereafter, he was working for a number of months in different places in Andhra Pradesh in that department. That being the position, it is not open to the Public Service Commission to cancel his selection and remove him from service.
This decision applies on all fours to the present case."
10. The principle of law enunciated in aforementioned judgments would not be attracted to the facts of this case. The principle of equitable estoppel presupposes that the person claiming the benefit has been put into some disadvantageous position by the act of other side. In this case, there is no such plea taken in the petition. The petitioner enjoyed the benefit of the admission only for a short duration of three days. He was admittedly lower in merit. He was wrongly given admission. He has nowhere stated in the petition that on account of this admission, he has lost his chance to join some other, institution. He has not indicated in what manner he has been prejudiced. Thus, the doctrine of equitable estoppel would not apply to this case. As a matter of fact, the petitioner having realised the weakness of his case on this score shifted his plea and laid claim to the seat vacated by Dr. Rajborwanar.
11. Counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on a decision given by the Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Kumar Mehta v, Karnataka University, AIR 1986 SC 1448. This decision again cannot come to the rescue of the petitioner. In the above case, the students though not qualified were permitted to undergo their studies for almost four years, The Supreme Court noticed the fact that the future of the students would be blighted." It was, in 'these circumstances, the Supreme Court said that the students should not suffer for the "sins of the management", who had their eyes only on capitation fees. Similarly, no advantage can be had from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Chand Singhvi v. Jodhpur University, AIR 1989 SC 823 because in the above case applications were accepted after the last date of admission in the general seats had expired. After considering all the objections including those raised by the officer-in-charge, admission was granted. It was in these circumstances, the Court observed at page 826:--
"We are unable to accept the contention. It has been already noticed that both the Dean and the Vice-Chancellor considered the objections raised by the Officer-in-Charge, admissions, and thereafter direction for admitting the appellant was made. When after considering all facts and circumstances and also the objections by the office to the admission of a candidate, the Vice-Chancellor directs the admission of such a candidate, such admission could not be said to have been made through mistake."
12. Reliance has again been placed on the decision given by the Supreme Court in the case of Thaper Institute of Engg. and Technology, Patiala v. Abhinav Thaneja, AIR 1990 SC 1222. This case is of no assistance to the petitioner. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court was of the view that the High Court travelled beyond its jurisdiction and not only directed more students to be admitted than the institute could absorb but also students who were less meritorious were given admission. The Supreme Court took note of the fact that "no reason whatsoever was given by the High Court for exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction so peremptorily which resulted in injustice both to the appellant institute and also to students who stood higher in merit. However, the Supreme Court did not go to the extent of quashing the admission because more meritorious students could not avail of the admission due to lapse of time.
13. The second limb of the argument is that the petitioner may be considered against the vacancy caused by Dr. Rajborwarikar who left the diploma course in the ninth month to join the M. D. course in Rewa University. The counsel contends that the petitioner should be granted admission against the vacancy which fell vacant on 2nd of July, 1993. Even on this count, the petitioner is on slippery ground.
14. The claim of the petitioner has been strongly opposed by the State, the State placed reliance on Rule 2.3 of the Rules for admission to Postgraduate Diploma Courses in Medical Colleges. This reads as under:--
"2.3-- The seat of one particular year will be filled up in that year only. No candidate will be admitted for diploma courses against vacant seats of previous year."
The respondents further placed reliance on the decision given by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Ajay Pradhan v. State of M. P., AIR 1988 SC 1875, wherein similarly worded rule was interpreted. In paras 8 and 9, it was observed as under:--
"On a plain construction, Rule 10 is in two parts. The power to admit a student under the first part arises when a seat falls vacant in a particular year. The words 'filled up in that year' necessarily qualify the preceding words 'the seats available in any particular year.' It must logically follow that a necessary concomitant of the power under the first part of Rule 10 is the 'availability' of the seat being filled up in the academic year to which it pertains. The words Tilled up in that year' which follow clearly imply that the vacancy cannot be carried over to the next academic year or years. That construction of ours is reinforced by the second part of Rule 10 which, by the use of negative language, clearly creates a bar against the seat being filled up in the next or succeeding academic year. What is implicit in the first part of Rule 10 is made explicit in the second part. The use of the negative words in the second part 'no candidates will be admitted. . . . .etc.' are clearly prohibitory in nature and exclude the applicability of the carryforward rule. It follows that if a seat falls vacant for any reason, namely, that the candidate selected in order of merit does not join the PG course in MD/MS in a medical college or by reason of his death or otherwise, and due to inaction on the part of the authorities the seat is not filled up in the academic year to which it pertains, there is no question of the vacancy being carried forward to the next academic year.
Rule 10 is a specific provision made for the benefit of the merit candidates who are placed in the waiting list. Normally, the question of a seat being filled up must arise at the commencement of the academic year or soon thereafter. In our considered opinion on the terms of Rule 10 as it exists, no other view is possible. When a seat falls vacant in any particular academic year there is a corresponding duty cast on the authorities to take immediate steps to fill up the same. There is no question of a right of admission to a seat falling vacant in the midst or, or towards the end of, the academic year."
The concept behind the rule was highlighted by approving what Dr. T. N. Singh, J speaking for himself and R. M. Rustogi, J, who constituted Division Bench said in Ajay Pradhan's case. The relevant para which was approved by the Supreme Court reads as under:--
"An academic course cannot be compressed to accommodate any particular candidate who comes late. Because, no separate or 'special' arrangement can be made for a late comer for imparting instructions to him. Any other view would not make a reasonable reading or construction of the Rule in its context and setting for each candidate has to be not only examined periodically with respect to instructions imparted, the prerequisite therefor has also to be fulfilled by rendering instructions to him during the whole period pf the course. We have no doubt that when a seat is allotted a date has to be specified by which it has to be availed. Therefore, it shall not be deemed 'filled up' it is not availed. Indeed, it would then become the duty of the concerned authority to fill up the same by offering into any other eligible candidate according to merit. In such a case, a decision has obviously to be taken to do so either before the session commences or very soon thereafter so that the new comer does not suffer serious loss of the studies due to belated admission."
15. In this regard, reference may be made to another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Arati Gupta v. State of Punjab, AIR 1988. SC 481 wherein it was stated that that the standard of medical profession should not be compromised in national interest. The Court noticed that there has been perceptible fall in national standards and general efficiency in the professional institutions. It was accordingly said that nothing should be done which may affect the high standards and efficiency in professional institutions.
16. Reference may also be made to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U. P. v. Dr, Anupam Gupta, AIR 1992 SC 932 wherein the fact that vacant seats were available was noticed but the Court refused to grant admission on the ground that this would amount to compromising with efficiency. It was observed in para 14 as under:--
"Considering from this point of view, to maintain excellence the courses have to be commenced on schedule and to be completed within the schedule, so that the students would have full opportunity to study full course to meet their excellence and come at par excellence. Admission in the midstream would disturb the courses and also works an hardship to the candidates themselves to achieve excellence. Considering from this pragmatic point of view we are of the considered opinion that vacancies of the seats would not be taken as a ground to give admission and direction by the High Court to admit the candidates into those vacant seats cannot be sustained."
Thus, the trend is not to encourage disturbance in the professional colleges in the midstream. Half baked cake is not an acceptable commodity.
17. Merely because admission was granted earlier in mid-academic session is no ground to deviate and bend the rules again in this case. As a matter of fact, in Dr. Gagan Koine v. The State of M. P., M. P. No. 1863 of 1991, this Court refused to grant admission in midstream. This decision was given on 11th of December, 1991. Again, the claim on the basis that a seat is still lying vacant was declined by this Court in Dr. Sanjay Kumar Jain v. State of M. P., Misc. Petition No. 677/92. The order passed on 30th of March, 1993, reads as under :--
"The petitioner claims that since a seat of 1990 quota is still lying vacant, he should be permitted to prosecute his studies and be admitted under the rules prevailing in 1990. The petitioner is not entitled to admission under the new rules. Only one seat is lying vacant of the 1990 quota. This will not justify a direction from this Court particularly when the petitioner is not entitled to admission under the existing rules. No case for entertaining this petition is made out. Petition fails and is dismissed summarily."
18. The argument that Dr. Rajborwankar was granted admission in midstream is misconceived. The above candidate left the course which started in July, 1993. Thus, this plea is not based on proper appreciation of factual position.
19. There is yet another difficulty in the way of the petitioner. The State Government has amended the Rules. The diploma courses are no longer available. Admission is granted in M.D. courses only. The Rules as stand today dp not provide for diploma course. Any direction which may now be given to permit the petitioner to join diploma course would amount to amending the Rules. The Court may in extraordinary circumstances stretch a rule but it cannot take it to a breaking point. !t is settled law that this Court is to merely interpret Rules and does not enjoy any legislative authority to make any changes in the rules or the law applicable to the State.
20. Thus, looking from any point of view, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. I accordingly agree with the ultimate opinion expressed by S.K. Chawla J. I do not find any ground to interfere in this case. The petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.