Delhi District Court
State vs Parmod on 5 July, 2014
State Vs Parmod
IN THE COURT OF SH. PAWAN KUMAR JAIN
ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE-01 (CENTRAL),
TIS HAZARI COURTS: DELHI
SC No. : 77/2013
ID No. : 02401R0076932013
FIR No. : 90/12
Police Station : Nabi Karim
Under Section : 307 IPC
State
Versus
PARMOD
S/o Madan Saini
R/o H.No. B-40, DDA Flats
Mata Sundari Road,
New Delhi.
.........Accused
Date of Institution : 11.02.2013
Date of Committal of case : 11.04.2013
Date of judgment reserved on : 05.06.2014
Date of judgment announced on : 03.07.2014
Present: Sh. R.K. Tanwar, Additional Public Prosecutor for the
State.
Sh. Padam Singh, Advocate, counsel for the accused.
SC No. 77/13 Page 1 of 38
State Vs Parmod
JUDGMENT:-
1. Briefly stated facts of prosecution case are that on April 19, 2012 at about 7 PM, an intimation was received from operator that acid had been poured upon a female at gali Telmill near dustbin (कूङादान) at Amar Puri. Said information was recorded vide DD No. 31A (Ex.PW2/A) and same was assigned to SI Amrit Lal, who was informed on telephone.
(i) It was alleged that on receipt of the information, SI Amrit Lal (PW11) reached the spot along with constable Viney where it was revealed that injured had already been taken to RML hospital. Accordingly, after leaving constable Viney to safeguard the spot, PW11 left for RML hospital and on reaching there, he collected the MLC of victim named Ms. Shashi (PW1). As per the MLC, victim had sustained acid burn injuries.
Thereafter, PW11 recorded the statement of victim Ms. Shashi @ Jaya and same is exhibited as Ex. PW1/A.
(ii) Victim in her statement Ex. PW1/A alleged that on April 19, 2012 she was returning to home from her job and when at about 7 PM, she reached near kudakhatta (कूङादान) gali Telmill, Nabi Karim, accused Parmod was already standing there, to whom she knew previously. It was alleged that as soon as accused passed through her, he had poured acid upon back portion of her body. It was alleged that when she turned back, she saw that accused was running towards Laxman Puri chowk. Due to acid, she started feeling burn itching and her clothes were also burnt and she started crying due to pain. It was alleged that in the mean time her mother- in-law Rani Devi (PW3) also reached there and brought her to RML hospital. It was alleged that at about three months ago, accused had SC No. 77/13 Page 2 of 38 State Vs Parmod misbehaved with her, accordingly, she had made a complaint at police station Pahar Ganj.
(iii) It was alleged that at that time accused had threatened her that he would disfigure her face by throwing acid upon her. It was alleged that accused had poured acid upon her with an intention to kill her. Upon her statement, PW11 made an endorsement Ex. PW11/A and got registered an FIR for the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC.
(iv) During investigation, investigating officer seized the burnt clothes of victim. Accused was arrested on April 20, 2012. Pursuant to his disclosure statement, efforts were made to recover the container of acid but it could not be recovered. As per MLC, victim had sustained grievous burn injuries.
2. After completing investigation, challan was filed against the accused for the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC.
3. After complying with the provisions of Section 207 Cr. P.C, case was committed to the Court of Sessions on April 4, 2013, thereafter the case was assigned to this Court on April 11, 2013. Accordingly, case was registered as SC No. 77/2013.
4. Vide order dated May 28, 2013, a charge for the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC was framed against the accused to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. It is pertinent to state that there is a typographical error in the charge as the father's name of accused is mentioned as Mohd. Saini whereas his father's name is Madan Saini. Accordingly, the same is rectified and be read as Madan Saini.
SC No. 77/13 Page 3 of 385. In order to bring home the guilt of accused, prosecution has examined as many as following twelve witnesses:-
PW1 Smt. Shashi @ Jaya, injured, material witness PW2 HC Preet Singh, duty officer, formal witness PW3 Smt. Rani Devi, mother-in-law of PW1, material witness PW4 HC Subhash Chand, MHC(M), formal witness PW5 Dr. L.K. Makhija, Head of Department (Burn & Plastic Surgery) PW6 Mr. Amit Rawat, Sr. Scientific Officer PW7 Const. Kailash Chand, proved the PCR form No.1, formal witness PW8 Const. Nafees Mohd, joined the investigation with investigating officer PW9 Dr. Rashmi, proved the MLC of victim PW10 Const. Viney, joined the investigation with investigating officer PW11 SI Amrit Lal, investigating officer PW12 HC Vishnu Dutt, proved previous Kalendra, formal witness
6. On culmination of prosecution evidence, accused was examined under Section 313 Cr. P.C wherein he admitted that he knew the victim previously and he was working in Gym at Pahar Ganj. Besides this, he denied each and every incriminating evidence led by prosecution and submitted that he was lifted by the police from the Gym on April 19, 2012 and was detained illegally in the police station and further stated that he had not made any disclosure statement before the police. He further SC No. 77/13 Page 4 of 38 State Vs Parmod submitted that he was working in the Gym as coach. PW1(victim) came to the Gym along with her brother for his admission and made inquiry about the charges of the Gym, accordingly he told her that monthly fee is ` 250/-. It was submitted that PW1 made a request to give some concession, accordingly he talked with owner of the Gym and on his request, owner of the Gym reduced the fee amount from ` 250/- to ` 150/-. It was stated that victim used to visit Gym along with her brother but he told her not to come to Gym and further stated that in this way friendship was developed between them and they started to meet with each other and they also visited several places together. He further submitted that he used to give money to the victim as and when demanded by her. He further submitted that in 2009 his marriage was solemnized, consequently, he started maintaining distance from the victim. It was further stated that victim told him if he failed to make payment like previously, she would implicate him in a false case. It was stated that in the year 2010, he blessed with a daughter but PW1 continued to demand money from him.
(i) It was stated that on July 13, 2011 victim had demanded ` 9000/- from him. Consequently, he arranged the amount and asked her to collect the same but victim asked him to deposit the said amount in her bank account as she was unable to come to collect the amount and she gave her account number to the accused, consequently, he deposited the amount in her bank account. It was submitted that thereafter victim used to demand ` 4,000/- every month and he used to pay some time ` 4000/- and some time less and some time used to deposit in her bank account. It was further submitted that on December 12, 2011, victim called him at her house and demanded ` 1 lac from him. Since he failed to make the payment, victim had falsely implicated him in a false case after inflicting self injury upon her arm, accordingly, he was arrested in a Kalendra. He further SC No. 77/13 Page 5 of 38 State Vs Parmod submitted that in December 2011, he stopped making payment to her, thereafter victim called him at her house on December 12, 2011 and threatened that this time she had implicated the accused in a minor case and if payment was not paid, she would implicate him in a serious matter and submitted that due to that reason, victim had falsely implicated him in this case.
7. In order to prove his innocence, accused examined Mr. Harun Hussain, clerk of PNB to prove the fact that he had deposited ` 9000/- in the bank account of victim.
8. Learned counsel appearing for the accused vehemently contended that there is inordinate delay in lodging the FIR as the alleged incident had taken place at about 7 PM whereas the FIR was lodged at 10.15 PM, thus, there was sufficient opportunity for deliberation and consultation. It was further contended that since the copy of FIR was received by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate on April 20, 2012 at about 10 AM, hence, there was inordinate unexplained delay in sending the copy of FIR to the concerned Metropolitan Magistrate. It was further argued that since there is not only delay in registration of FIR but also unexplained delay in sending its copy to the learned Illaqua Magistrate, reliance can not be placed on the prosecution version and accused is entitled for acquittal on this ground alone. In support of his contentions, he relied upon the judgment Gopal Singh & Others v/s. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2010 (6) SCC 407.
(i). Learned counsel further astutely contended that no reliance can be placed on the testimony of victim as victim did not disclose the name of assailant to the doctor who examined her first at RML hospital. It SC No. 77/13 Page 6 of 38 State Vs Parmod was submitted that victim had not disclosed the name of accused before the doctor as accused was not present at the time of alleged incident and later on to extract money from the accused, victim had falsely named the accused in the FIR, which is belated and in support of his contention, learned defence counsel relied upon the judgments Rehmat v/s. State of Haryana AIR 1997 SC 1526 and K. Ramachandra Reddy & Another V/s. The Public Prosecutor, 1976 CRI. L.J. 1548 (1) Supreme Court.
(ii) Learned defence counsel further energetically contended that no reliance can be placed on the testimony of victim as her version is not corroborated by any independent witness. It was argued that as per prosecution version, numerous public persons were present at the time of incident, despite that investigating officer failed to record the statement of any of public persons to support the claim of victim. In support of his contention, learned counsel relied upon the judgments State v/s. Prem Sagar & others, 2011 (2) JCC 861, Sunita vs. State of NCT of Delhi & others, 2011 (3) JCC 2008 and State vs. Raje Ram & others 2011 (2), JCC 756.
(iii). Learned defence counsel further perspicaciously contended that being the victim, PW1 is an interested witness, hence no reliance can be placed on her testimony in the absence of any corroboration. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the judgment Bir Singh & Others vs. State of U.P 1977 (4) SCC 420)
(iv). Learned counsel appearing for the accused further vigorously argued that the victim had inflicted self injury by pouring acid on her back portion and this fact is proved from the testimony of PW5 Dr. L. K . Makhija SC No. 77/13 Page 7 of 38 State Vs Parmod who avoided the question by stating that he cannot make any comment whether the injuries were self-inflicted or not. It was argued that in these circumstances, the defence version became more probable that victim had falsely implicated the accused after inflicting self injury on her non-vital parts due to previous enmity.
(v). It was further contended that since in the instant case two views are possible i.e. one in favour to the prosecution and another in favour of accused, benefit of doubt shall go to the accused and in support on his contention he relied upon the judgement Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v/s. State of Maharashtra 1984 Crl. L.J.1738.
(vi). It was further energetically contended that the investigation is tainted as police failed to recover the jug in which accused was allegedly carrying the acid. Even investigating officer also failed to take photographs of the spot or to pick up any sample from the spot to show that any acid was used in the alleged incident. It was contended that there are material contradictions between the testimony of PW8, PW10 and PW11 and from the testimony of PW4, it is proved that he had not conducted the investigation diligently. It was argued that since the investigation is not fair, benefit of doubt should go to the accused.
(vii). At last, learned counsel appearing for the accused sagaciously contended that there is no iota of evidence to prove the guilt of accused for the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC. It was urged that it is admitted case of prosecution that the acid was not poured on any vital part of the body of victim and further contended that PW5 in his cross- examination admitted that the injuries caused to the victim were not dangerous to life in any manner. It was, thus, submitted that since the SC No. 77/13 Page 8 of 38 State Vs Parmod injuries were not fatal in nature, accused cannot be held guilty for the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC.
9. On the other hand, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State refuted the said contentions by arguing that from the Kalendra, it is established that accused had threatened the victim that he would disfigure her face by throwing acid upon her and in order to materialize the said threat, accused had poured acid upon her with an intention to kill the victim. It was further contended that the testimony of victim cannot be discarded mere on the ground that investigating officer failed to record the statement of any independent witness or that victim failed to disclose the name of assailant to the doctor. It was further contended that there was no inordinate delay in lodging the FIR and if there is any such delay, same is not fatal to the prosecution case in any manner. It was further contended that lapses pointed out by learned defence counsel in the investigation are trivial in nature, hence not fatal to the prosecution case in any manner. It is pertinent to state that learned Additional Public Prosecutor did not cite any case law in support of his contentions.
10. I have heard the rival submissions advanced by counsel for both the parties, perused the record carefully and gave my thoughtful considerations to their contentions.
Contentions relating to delay in lodging the FIR as well as in sending its copy to the concered learned Illaqua Magistrate:-
11. It is undisputed fact that the police had received the intimation of the incident vide DD No. 31A, which was received at police station Nabi Karim at 7 PM. It means that the alleged incident had taken place prior to 7 SC No. 77/13 Page 9 of 38 State Vs Parmod PM. From the MLC Ex. PW9/A, it is established that victim reached RML hospital at about 7.25 PM. Perusal of the MLC reveals that after examination, she was referred to Surgery-12. From the case-sheet Ex.PW5/B, it is established that she was admitted in the Surgery department at 8.11 PM where she was examined by the specialist of Burn Department. PW11 in his deposition categorically deposed that when he reached the hospital, victim was under treatment and thereafter, he recorded the statement of victim. It means that when PW11 reached the hospital, victim was at Surgery-12 and was under treatment. As per endorsement (Ex. PW11/A), rukka was sent at about 10.15 PM from the spot. Since, the place of incident was located in the area of police station Nabi Karim whereas investigating officer had recorded the statement of victim in the hospital, thus investigating officer must have taken at least 30 minutes to reach the spot. It means that he had recorded the statement of victim prior to 9.45 PM and this fact is proved from the testimony of PW11 as in his cross-examination he deposed that he stayed in the hospital till 9.30 PM /9.45 PM. Since, the victim met with the police first time in the hospital, it cannot be said that there was any delay on the part of victim in lodging the FIR. Similarly, it cannot be said that there was any delay on the part of PW11 in recording the statement of victim. In these circumstances, I do not find any substance in the contention of learned defence counsel that there was a delay of about three hours in lodging the FIR.
12. The issue of delay in sending the special report to the Illaqua Magistrate was dealt with by the Apex Court in detail in Bijoy Singh v/s State of Bihar, AIR 2002 SC 1949 wherein it was held:-
Para 7. "Sending the copy of the special report to the Magistrate as required under Section 157 of the Criminal Procedure Code is the only external check on the working SC No. 77/13 Page 10 of 38 State Vs Parmod of the police agency, imposed by law which is required to be strictly followed. The delay in sending the copy of the FIR may by itself not render the whole of the case of the prosecution as doubtful but shall put the Court on guard to find out as to whether the version as stated in the Court was the same version as earlier reported in the FIR or was the result of deliberations involving some other persons who were actually not involved in the commission of the crime. Immediate sending of the report mentioned in Section 157, Cr. P.C. is the mandate of law. Delay wherever found is required to be explained by the prosecution. If the delay is reasonably explained, no adverse inference can be drawn but failure to explain the delay would require the Court to minutely examine the prosecution version for ensuring itself as to whether any innocent person has been implicated in the crime or not. Insisting upon the accused to seek an explanation of the delay is not the requirement of law. It is always for the prosecution to explain such a delay and if reasonable, plausible and sufficient explanation is tendered, no adverse inference can be drawn against it."
(emphasis supplied)
13. In the light of above settled proposition of law, facts of the case in hand will be analyzed.
14. It is admitted case of prosecution that FIR was registered on April 19, 2012 at about 10.30 PM. On the FIR Ex PW2/C, there is an endorsement of learned Metropolitan Magistrate to the effect that FIR was received at 10 AM on April 20, 2012. This shows that the copy of FIR was not sent to learned Illaqua Magistrate through special messenger but it was sent to the concerned court in a routine manner on the next day. On the basis of said gap, learned defence counsel raised the plea that there was inordinate delay in sending the copy of FIR to the Illaqua Magistrate. This delay remained unexplained during trial. However, in view of the law laid down in Bijoy Singh (supra), the whole case of prosecution can not be SC No. 77/13 Page 11 of 38 State Vs Parmod discarded on this ground alone; rather its case is required to be examined minutely to ensure that no innocent person had been falsely implicated in this case. Accordingly, the case of prosecution is required to be examined minutely to ensure that the accused has not been falsely implicated in this case.
Contentions relating to non-joining of public persons:-
15. During the course of arguments, learned counsel strongly relied upon the judgment State vs. Prem Sagar and another, 2011 (2) JCC 861 and Sunita Vs. State 2011 (3) JCC 2008.
16. I have perused both the judgements carefully and I am of the view that both the judgements are not helpful to the accused in any manner as the facts of both the cases were quite different from the facts of the case in hand. In the former case, 4-5 boys boarded the bus from the front and near gate and one of them was standing in the middle of front foot-board of the bus and when the helper of bus asked the said boy to leave the foot- board of the bus, but he did not follow his instructions. Accordingly, said helper caught hold his hand and pulled him up and at that time one of the associates of said boy took out a knife and started attacking the said helper. When helper raised the alarm, conductor got down from the bus and came to him on the next bus stop. At that time, the assailant also gave a blow of knife at the chest of conductor, but knife was snatched and the said boy was beaten by the conductor and driver. Accordingly, driver drove the bus to the police station. Later on, the said boy succumbed to his injuries. Hon`ble Court noticed several major contradictions between the testimony of witnesses examined by prosecution. In those peculiars facts and circumstances, Hon'ble Court held that :
SC No. 77/13 Page 12 of 38State Vs Parmod "The contradictions on all major aspects of the prosecution case coupled with the delay of four hours in recording of the FIR, not joining independent public witnesses who were readily available (and had gone to the PS along with PWs 1, 2 and 3) shows that the incident had not taken place in the manner alleged by the prosecution. It is apparent that the true facts were withheld by the prosecution, perhaps to shelter the culprits who were responsible for causing culpable homicide/murder of Shejad @ Tinda.
(emphasis supplied)
17. Similarly, the facts of Sunita vs. State of NCT of Delhi (supra) were totally different from the facts of the case in hand. In the said case though allegations were levelled against the husband and mother-in- law that victim was set on fire by pouring kerosene oil but no burn injury was found on her body. Though the dupata (दुप टा ) was found burnt but it was burnt at the end and not at the centre. Hon'ble Court observed that if the kerosene oil had been poured upon a person and the ignite match stick had been thrown upon such person then as soon as flame or burning match stick landed on the dupata (दुप टा ), it would have engulfed not only the dupata (दुप टा ) but almost entire body of the person in flame instantaneously besides that Hon`ble Court also observed numerous deficiencies in the prosecution case. In those peculiar facts, Hon`ble Court observed that even not a single person in the neighbourhood had come to know about the alleged incident which is quite improbable. Thus, I am of the view that said case is also not helpful to the accused in any manner.
18. Similarly, the judgment State vs. Raje Ram and others (supra) is also not helpful to the accused in any manner as the facts of the said case were also totally different from the instant case. In the said case, SC No. 77/13 Page 13 of 38 State Vs Parmod there was previous enmity between both the parties and numerous contradictions on material points were found between the testimony of witnesses examined by prosecution. In those peculiar facts, Hon'ble Court observed that if two shots were fired as alleged by the respondents, the attention of neighbours would have been attracted to the spot immediately on hearing such gunshots. But investigating officer preferred not to examine any person even if not in respect of the actual incident, but, at least to the respondents escaping from the scene of crime, on hearing the gun shot. In the instant case, there is nothing on record which may show that neighbours and shopkeepers come to know about the alleged incident instantaneously. On the contrary, from the testimony of victim, it is established that when victim turned back, she saw that accused was running towards Laxman Puri Chowk. It suggests that the alleged incident had taken place within few seconds. No doubt, PW1 also deposed that public persons poured water upon her to give her relief from the said burn injuries, but it does not prove that the said persons had either seen the accused to pour acid upon the victim or saw the accused while fleeing from the spot. Mere fact that investigating officer failed to record the statement of any public person including the persons who poured water upon the victim is ipso-facto not sufficient to discard the testimony of victim if it is otherwise trustworthy.
Contentions relating to non-disclosure of name of accused before the doctor:-
19. Learned defence counsel relied upon the judgment Rehmat vs. State of Haryana (supra) and K. Ram Chander Reddy vs. Public Prosecutor (supra) in support of his contention that since victim failed to disclose the name of the assailant to the doctor despite the fact that she SC No. 77/13 Page 14 of 38 State Vs Parmod had an opportunity and she was conscious, no reliance can be placed on her testimony.
20. I have perused both the judgements carefully and I am of the considered opinion that both the judgements are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case as the facts of both the cases are totally different from the facts of the case in hand. In the former case, there was previous enmity between both the parties and as per prosecution case accused was apprehended at the spot. Though there were as many as 13 injuries on the body of accused, yet prosecution miserably failed to explain how the accused had sustained said injuries. None of the witnesses deposed that they had caused any injury to the accused. Besides the peculiar facts, Hon'ble Court also considered an additional lacuna in the prosecution case as victim failed to disclose the name of assailant at the first opportunity when he was taken to the Primary Health Centre for medical examination. Admittedly, in the instant case, accused had not sustained any injury. In the latter case, the deceased had made multiple dying declarations and the issue before the Hon`ble Apex Court was whether the said dying declarations were trustworthy or not as there were three clear occasions with the deceased to disclose the name of assailants but he failed to disclose the same. In the said case even the doctor was known to the deceased despite that deceased did not disclose the name of assailants to the doctor. Learned Magistrate who recorded the dying declaration of the deceased deposed before the Court that injured was suffering from pain and he was not in a position to sign, so his thumb impression was taken. Hon`ble Court further noticed that as per post- mortem report deceased had sustained as many as 48 injuries and 28 incised wounds were on various parts of the body. In view of the nature of injuries, Hon`ble Court opined that it is difficult to believe that deceased SC No. 77/13 Page 15 of 38 State Vs Parmod would have a fit state of mind to make the dying declaration. Needless to say that maker of dying declaration is not available for cross-examination whereas in the instant case, victim was thoroughly cross-examined. Thus, I am of the view that the said judgment is also not helpful to the accused in any manner.
21. No doubt, as per Ex. PW5/B, at one place it is mentioned "acid burn injury (vitriol-age) on road by unknown people" and it is also undisputed fact that when victim was taken to the hospital by her mother-in- law the alleged history was given only as 'acid burn injury'. Thus, in the MLC, the name of assailant is not mentioned. On the basis of said lapses, it was argued by the counsel for accused that victim had not disclosed the name of accused because accused had not thrown acid upon her. But I do not find any substance in the said contention as no question was asked, in this regard, from the victim during her cross-examination. In other words, no opportunity was given to the victim to explain why she had not disclosed the name of assailant to the doctor. Since she had sustained acid burn injuries, there is every possibility that she might have not disclosed the name of assailant due to pain as her first priority must be to get treatment and relief from the pain.
22. In this regard, the observations of Hon`ble High Court in case Sachin @ Ajay Kumar vs. State in Crl. A. No. 7/2011 decided on April 27, 2012 by the High Court of Delhi, are quite relevant and same are reproduced as under:
"Moving on to the issue of absence of the name of the appellant in DD entry and MLC, it must be noted that the purpose of DD entry is to notify the police of any incident that takes place and not for the purpose of disclosing the name of any accused or suspect in the case or the details of the incident. Its sole purpose is to notify the police SC No. 77/13 Page 16 of 38 State Vs Parmod officials regarding any incident that requires attention and there is absolutely no provision of mentioning name of accused persons or even the details of the incident. Similarly, the sole objective of preparing an MLC is to ascertain the nature of injuries suffered by the victim and not to divulge the names of the accused persons. It is not an instrument for the purpose of making assumptions regarding the person responsible for the offence, but for the purpose of ascertaining the medical status of the victim. Hence, the name of the appellant could not possibly be present in any of the two documents and consequently, the contention of the counsel for the appellant stands rejected."
(emphasis supplied)
23. Thus, mere fact that the name of accused is not mentioned in the MLC is not sufficient to discard the testimony of victim particularly when no opportunity was given to her during her cross-examination to explain the same.
Contentions relating to the issue as to whether the testimony of victim can be discarded being an interested witnesses:-
24. This issue was dealt with in detail by the High Court of Delhi in case Manjeet Singh v/s. State (NCT) of Delhi Crl. 51/98 decided on March 19, 2014, relevant paras are 15 to 17 and same are read as under:
15. It is a settled legal position, that if the testimony of an eye witness is found reliable, the conviction can be based solely on the testimony of an eye witness. In the matter of Alil Mollah and Another vs. State of West Bengal reported in AIR1996SC3471, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:
"It is now well established that conviction can be based on the testimony of a single eye witness provided the court finds from the scrutiny of his evidence that he is a wholly SC No. 77/13 Page 17 of 38 State Vs Parmod reliable witness. Where, however, the court is of the opinion that the single eye witness is only partly reliable, prudence requires that corroboration of his testimony in material particulars should be sought before recording conviction."
16. In the matter of Abdul Sayeed Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & other reported in (2010) 10 SCC 259), the question of the weight to be attached to the evidence of a witness that was himself injured in the course of the occurrence has been extensively discussed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment are reiterated as follows:
26. The question of the weight to be attached to the evidence of a witness that was himself injured in the course of the occurrence has been extensively discussed by this Court. Where a witness to the occurrence has himself been injured in the incident, the testimony of such a witness is generally considered to be very reliable, as he is a witness that comes with a built-in guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone. "Convincing evidence is required to discredit an injured witness"....
27. While deciding this issue, a similar view was taken in, Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab (2009) 9 SCC 719, where this Court reiterated the special evidentiary status accorded to the testimony of an injured accused and relying on its earlier judgments held as under:
Darshan Singh (PW 4) was an injured witness. He had been examined by the doctor. His testimony could not be brushed aside lightly. He had given full details of the incident as he was present at the time when the assailants reached the tubewell. In Shivalingappa Kallayanappa v. State of Karnataka 1994 Supp (3) SCC 235, this Court has held that the deposition of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies, for the reason that his presence on the scene stands established in case it is proved that he suffered the injury during the said incident.....
The law on the point can be summarized to the effect that SC No. 77/13 Page 18 of 38 State Vs Parmod the testimony of the injured witness is accorded a special status in law. This is as a consequence of the fact that the injury to the witness is an in-built guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and because the witness will not want to let his actual assailant go unpunished merely to falsely implicate a third party for the commission of the offence. Thus, the deposition of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein. The evidence of the stamped witness must be given due weightage as his presence on the place of occurrence cannot be doubted. His statement is generally considered to be very reliable and it is unlikely that he has spared the actual assailant in order to falsely implicate someone else. The testimony of an injured witness has its own relevancy and efficacy as he has sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence and this lends support to his testimony that he was present at the time of occurrence. Thus, the testimony of an injured witness is accorded a special status in law. Such a witness comes with a built-in guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone. "Convincing evidence is required to discredit an injured witness". Thus, the evidence of an injured witness should be relied upon unless there are grounds for the rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein."
17. In State of U.P. v. Kishan Chand reported in (2004) 7 SCC 629, a similar view has been reiterated observing that the testimony of an injured witness has its own relevance and efficacy. The relevant paras of the judgment are reiterated as follows: "The fact that the witness sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence, lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. In case the injured witness is subjected to lengthy cross- examination and nothing can be elicited to discard his testimony, it should be relied upon."
(emphasis supplied)
25. In view of above settled proposition of law, I do not find any SC No. 77/13 Page 19 of 38 State Vs Parmod substance in the contention raised by learned defence counsel and further I am of the view that judgment Bir Singh & others vs. State of UP (supra) cited by learned defence counsel is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case.
Contentions relating to the issue whether the injuries were self inflicted or not:-
26. PW5 in his cross-examination deposed that he could not make any comment whether the burn injuries were self-inflicted or not. Taking cue from his deposition, learned defence counsel argued that victim had caused self-inflicted injuries by pouring acid upon her non vital parts. In this regard the cross-examination of PW1 is quite relevant. During the cross-examination of PW1, a suggestion was given to the victim that the acid was thrown upon her by some unknown person. Certainly, the said suggestion was denied by the victim. However, by putting the said suggestion, defence ruled out the possibility that it was a case of self- inflicted injury. If defence intent to show that victim had caused self-inflicted injury, proper opportunity should have been given to the prosecution witness i.e. victim to rebut the defence version. But no such case was put up to the victim. On the contrary, a suggestion was given that acid was thrown by some unknown person and not by the accused. In these circumstances, I do not find any substance in the defence version.
Contentions relating to the deposit of amount in the bank account:-
27. Defence version is that accused used to deposit the amount in the saving account of victim frequently and on July 13, 2011 appellant had deposited ` 9,000/- in the account of victim. In order to prove this fact, accused had examined bank clerk as DW1. In his deposition, he admitted SC No. 77/13 Page 20 of 38 State Vs Parmod that account No. 0130000121196783 INR 013000 belonged to Shashi and a sum of ` 9,000/- was deposited in her account vide cash receipt Ex. DW1/C. In his cross-examination, he clarified that since the receipt Ex. DW1/C was signed by one Chander, he presumed that the said amount was deposited by Chander. Thus, as per the deposition of DW1, the amount of ` 9000/- was deposited by one Chander and not by accused. This is neither a case of accused that Chander is his nick name or that he deposited the said amount in the fake name of Chander nor it is the case of defence that accused had sent any Chander to deposit the said amount. Thus, mere fact that the sum of ` 9000/- was deposited in the account of victim by one Chander is not sufficient to draw an inference that accused used to deposit the amount in her account frequently or that accused used to pay the the amount to the victim as and when demanded by her. During trial, accused failed to produce any other cogent evidence to prove his plea that he used to pay the amount frequently to the victim.
Contentions relating to the love affair of accused and victim:-
28. Learned defence counsel contended that accused and victim were in love affairs and since after his marriage, accused started maintaining distance from her and stopped paying the amount to the victim, victim had falsely implicated the accused in this case. Admittedly, during trial accused had not adduced any evidence to prove this fact. During the course of arguments, learned counsel has strongly relied upon the statement Ex.PW1/D1 made before the Special Executive Magistrate in Kalendra (Ex.PW12/A). But to my mind, the said statement is not helpful the accused in any manner because in her cross-examination Ex.PW1/D1, victim categorically deposed that she did not know the accused previously. She denied all the suggestions relating to her previous familiarity with the SC No. 77/13 Page 21 of 38 State Vs Parmod accused. Similarly, during her cross-examination PW1 categorically denied the suggestions that she was in love affair with the accused. No doubt, PW1 in her examination-in-chief deposed that she knew the accused previously and PW11 in her cross-examination deposed that despite asking, PW1 failed to disclose how she knew the accused previously. If the victim knew the accused previously, she was supposed to disclose how she knew the accused previously. Since, she failed to disclose how she knew the accused previously, certainly it creates a little doubt in mind. But that doubt is not sufficient to draw an inference that she was in love with the accused. Assuming for the sake of arguments that victim was in love with the accused but defence counsel failed to convince the Court how the same is helpful to the accused to prove his innocence. It is not a case of defence that accused had taken the extreme step of throwing acid upon the victim due to failure in love or that victim was ignoring him. Since, it is also admitted case of accused that he knew the victim previously, there is no chance of any confusion in the identification of assailant. In the absence of any cogent evidence on record, defence version does not inspire any confidence.
Contentions relating to lapses in the investigation:
29. PW11 SI Amrit Lal in his cross-examination admitted that he did not prepare the site plan prior to April 24, 2012. He also admitted that he had not shown the direction from which victim was coming at the time of incident. Needless to say that it was the duty of PW11 to show the direction of the victim as well as accused but he failed to do so. He also admitted in his cross-examination that if acid is fallen on road, some patches would appear on the road but swiftly added that it depends upon the quality of acid. But simultaneously deposed that he had seen some patches at the SC No. 77/13 Page 22 of 38 State Vs Parmod place of incident. If he had seen such patches at the place of occurrence, it was his duty to depict the same in the site plan but he failed to do so. He also admitted that he had not mentioned this fact in the record. If he had noticed such patches at the place of occurrence, it was his duty to bring the same on the record but he failed to do so. Nor he had taken the photographs of the said patches. The above lapses show that PW11 has not acted diligently.
30. The prosecution has set up a case that accused was arrested on April 20, 2012 from Dev Health Club Gym on receipt of secret information. But the manner in which accused was arrested causes reasonable doubt over the prosecution version that accused was arrested from the said health club on April 20, 2012. PW11 in his cross-examination admitted that at the time of arrest, 5-7 public persons were present in the gym but he did not know their name and address as they went away after seeing the police party. He further deposed that he did not know who was the owner of the said gym and also did not know whether there was any owner, manager, caretaker or peon in the gym or not. He further deposed that accused was working there as a coach. He further deposed that he did not handover the custody of gym to anyone when he apprehended the accused and further deposed that he even did not close the gym and left it opened and unattended. He further clarified that he did not take any step to protect the instruments lying in the gym before leaving it unattended and opened. Though he admitted that it was the duty of investigating officer to take necessary steps to protect the property before leaving it unattended, but deposed that he had not taken any such step in the present case. He further deposed that key of the gym was not recovered from the accused and he did not make any inquiry from the accused who opened the gym and also did not make any effort to ascertain the name of owner, manager SC No. 77/13 Page 23 of 38 State Vs Parmod or caretaker of the said gym. If accused was arrested from the gym as projected by prosecution, PW11 should have taken precaution to protect the instruments and premises before taking the accused from the said gym. This itself creates a doubt over the prosecution version that accused was apprehended in the manner as projected by investigating agency. Accused in his examination recorded under Section 313 Cr. P.C. categorically deposed that he was lifted from the gym in the night of April 19, 2012. In these circumstances, probability of defence version cannot be ruled out. It further looks unbelievable that the gym users could leave the gym without the permission of police officer. Further, it shows that PW11 had not joined any independent witness in the proceedings deliberately. Since, no independent person witnessed the arrest, thus, it can not be ruled out that he was lifted in the night as alleged by the accused.
31. But the question arises as to whether the said lapses on the part of PW11 are fatal to the prosecution case or not? I am of the considered view that the said lapses are not fatal to the prosecution case in any manner as there are other cogent evidence on record to prove that victim had sustained burn injuries by acid and there are also other cogent evidence to prove that it was accused, who had poured acid upon the victim. The same will be discussed in the subsequent part of the judgement.
32. No doubt in the instant case, police failed to recover the jug in which the culprit was allegedly carrying the acid. On the basis of said lapse, it was argued that accused has been falsely implicated in this case. PW11 in his cross-examination deposed that accused did not tell him about the specific place where he had thrown the said jug nor he pointed out the place where he had thrown the said jug. In this regard, the disclosure statement Ex.PW8/D is relevant wherein he disclosed that he had thrown SC No. 77/13 Page 24 of 38 State Vs Parmod the said jug in the gali while running. He did not disclose the exact place where he allegedly thrown the said jug. Since, no recovery had been effected pursuant to the information disclosed in Ex.PW8/D, no reliance can be placed on the disclosure statement Ex.PW8/D as the same is hit by Section 25 of Indian Evidence Act. Admittedly, the alleged jug was not recovered from the said gali. No doubt, it was the duty of investigating agency to search the place of incident thoroughly to recover the container of acid but it appears that no such search was made. No doubt, this is again a lapse on the part of PW11 but to my mind the said lapse is not sufficient to discard the testimony of PW1, if it is otherwise trustworthy.
33. No doubt, PW8 in his cross-examination deposed that when accused pointed out the place of occurrence, number of public persons were present in the gali and shops were opened but investigating officer did not ask any public person to join the proceedings at that time. No doubt, it was the duty of investigating officer to make sincere efforts to join independent witness at the time when accused pointed out the place of occurrence. But to my mind, the said lapse on the part of investigating officer is not fatal to the prosecution case in any manner because pointing out of place of occurrence by the accused has no evidential value in the eyes of law as place of occurrence was already in the knowledge of investigating officer, thus no new distinct fact was discovered during the interrogation of the accused.
Testimony of PW1:-
34. Though prosecution has examined 12 witnesses, yet prosecution case is based on the sole testimony of PW1. PW1 in her deposition categorically deposed that on April 19, 2012 while at about 7 SC No. 77/13 Page 25 of 38 State Vs Parmod PM, she was returning to home from her office and reached Gali Tel Wali near KudaKhatta (कूङादान), accused met her, to whom she knew previously. It is pertinent to mention here that victim knew the accused previously is not disputed by the accused; rather it was admitted by the accused during the cross-examination of PW1 as well as in his statement under Section 313 Cr. P.C. PW1 further categorically deposed that as soon as accused passed through her, all of sudden, accused had thrown acid on her back. Victim had shown acid burn marks on her back portion near neck. She further deposed that accused was carrying acid in a plastic jug and in her cross- examination, she clarified that jug was of blue colour. She further deposed that when accused had thrown acid upon her, she turned back and at that time, she saw the jug in the hands of accused and further deposed that after throwing acid, accused ran away towards Laxman Puri Crossing. From the testimony of PW1, it becomes abundantly clear that she knew the accused previously; he met her on the way; he poured acid upon her as soon as accused passed through her; when acid was thrown upon her, she turned back immediately and saw that accused was running towards Laxman Puri Crossing and he was having a jug in his hand. Thus, it is limpid from the testimony of PW1 that it was the accused, who had poured acid on her back portion.
(i) PW1 further deposed that due to acid burn she started feeling burn pain and her clothes were also burnt and she started raising hue and cry. Consequently, public persons gathered there. This shows that public gathered at the spot when she raised hue and cry and not prior to that. Though public persons were present near the place of incident but generally public persons used to remain busy in their work and their attention attracts to a particular incident when they hear any hue and cry or commotion. From the testimony of PW1, it is explicit that no hue and cry SC No. 77/13 Page 26 of 38 State Vs Parmod had taken place when accused passed through her, rather she raised hue and cry when she started feeling the effect of acid burn, thus, in these circumstances, if any public person failed to see the accused to throw acid upon the victim is not unnatural. Moreover, the mere fact that other public persons failed to see the accused to throw acid is not sufficient to discard the testimony of victim. It is also pertinent to state that during trial accused failed to adduce any cogent evidence to show that he was not present at the place of incident at the relevant time.
(ii) PW1 further deposed that due to acid burn, her kurta was also burnt. She further deposed that her mother-in-law (PW3) also reached there and she took her to the hospital. She identified her clothes Ex.P1. It is pertinent to state that her clothes i.e. kurta, pajama, dupatta and Bra ( कु रता , पजामा , दुप टा , ब्रा ) all were having burn marks at different places. She identified her clothes.
(iii). PW5 also corroborated the testimony of PW1 that she had sustained acid burn injuries. From the case sheet Ex.PW5/B, it is pellucid that victim had sustained burn injuries on her entire back portion i.e. from her neck to lower legs. Thus, it is proved that she had sustained extensively acid burn injuries on her entire back portion.
(iv). No doubt, PW1 in her cross-examination admitted that shops and houses were located on both sides of the place of occurrence and also admitted that there is one meat shop at the corner of the place of occurrence and also admitted that there is another shop of fish and also admitted that it is a congested place. But this does not prove itself that all the said persons had seen the incident. Moreover, during trial accused SC No. 77/13 Page 27 of 38 State Vs Parmod failed to bring any of them in the witness box to establish that no such alleged incident had taken place or that he was not present there at the time of alleged incident. If accused thought that the statement of above shopkeepers would help him to prove his innocence, he should have produced them in the witness box. Mere fact that the investigating officer failed to record the statement of public persons is ipso-facto not sufficient to discard the testimony of injured, which is appearing otherwise trustworthy.
(v). PW1 in her cross-examination deposed that when she saw the accused first time, he was at the distance of about 5-6 paces. This further proves that there was no occasion for any confusion in the identification of culprit. Since, PW1 knew the accused previously, she could easily identify the assailant i.e. accused from such a short distance.
(vi). PW1 in her cross-examination also deposed that she was crying and asked public persons to pour water upon her, then, someone had poured water upon her from the meat shop. This further indicates that attention of public persons diverted towards her when he raised alarm and asked for help. No doubt, she failed to disclose the name and identity of the person who poured water upon her, but this lapse on her part is not sufficient to discard her testimony in any manner. Admittedly, she had sustained acid burn injuries, thus, certainly she must be feeling acute pain at that time and her priority was to get relief. In these circumstances, it cannot be expected from the victim to do remember the name and other particulars including description of the person, who helped her in one way or another way. It is pertinent to state that it is not the defence version that she knew the said person previously, thus, mere fact that she failed to disclose the name of said person is not sufficient to discard her testimony.
SC No. 77/13 Page 28 of 38(vii). PW3 Rani Devi corroborated the testimony of PW1 by deposing that when she came to know through some children that one girl was crying in burnt condition in gali, she rushed the spot due to curiosity and when she reached the spot, she found that the said girl was her daughter-in-law (PW1). Accordingly, she covered her body with her saree and took her to the hospital immediately. No doubt, she failed to disclose the name of children, who informed her about the said incident, but to my mind, the same is not fatal to the prosecution case in any manner as it is undisputed fact that victim was taken to the hospital by PW3.
(viii). PW6 Amit, Sr. Scientific officer in his deposition deposed that he examined the exhibits i.e. Ex.1A to 1D i.e. clothes of victim and testified that on examination the said exhibits were found containing sulphuric acid. This further proves the testimony of PW1 that she had sustained acid burn injuries. The testimony of PW1 and PW6 is also corroborated by PW5 by deposing that she had sustained acid burn injuries. No doubt PW5 in his cross-examination admitted that in discharge summary report, it is mentioned that 20.5% superficial burn but he clarified that it was an inadvertent error in the report and further clarified that chemical burns are usually deep. He further deposed that he opined that victim had sustained grievous injury because she had sustained deep chemical injuries which resulted in hyper-tropic scaring resulting disfigurement of the patient.
35. From the testimony of PW1, PW5 and PW6 it is proved beyond reasonable doubts that victim had sustained grievous chemical burn injuries and from the testimony of PW1 it is established beyond all reasonable doubts that accused was the person who had caused the said injuries.
SC No. 77/13 Page 29 of 38State Vs Parmod Contentions relating to the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC:
36. In case Parsuram Pandy and others vs. State of Bihar, (2004 ) 13 SCC 189, it was held that:-
To constitute an offence under Section 307 two ingredients of the offence must be present:
(a) an intention of or knowledge relating to commission of murder; and
(b) the doing of an act towards it. For the purpose of Section 307 what is material is the intention or the knowledge and not the consequence of the actual act done for the purpose of carrying out the intention. The section clearly contemplates an act which is done with intention of causing death but which fails to bring about the intended consequence on account of intervening circumstances. The intention or knowledge of the accused must be such as is necessary to constitute murder. In the absence of intention or knowledge which is the necessary ingredient of Section 307, there can be no offence "of attempt to murder". Intent which is a state of mind cannot be proved by precise direct evidence, as a fact it can only be detected or inferred from other factors. Some of the relevant considerations may be the nature of the weapon used, the place where injuries were inflicted, the nature of the injuries and the circumstances in which the incident took place.
(emphasis supplied)
37. In the light of aforesaid settled proposition of law, the testimony of PW1 will be analysed to ascertain as to whether her testimony is sufficient to attract the provisions of Section 307 IPC or not.
38. No doubt PW1 in her testimony categorically deposed that it was accused who poured acid upon her back portion but she did not SC No. 77/13 Page 30 of 38 State Vs Parmod depose that accused had any intention to kill her. Moreover, from the act of accused, it is clear that accused had no such intention. Had accused any intention to kill the victim, he would not have chosen the non vital parts of the victim at the time of pouring acid upon her. Since, he poured acid on non-vital part of her body, this proves that he had no intention to commit the murder of victim. In this regard the testimony of PW5 is also quite relevant wherein he deposed that injuries were not dangerous to her life in any manner. Mere fact that victim had sustained acid burn injuries is not sufficient to prove that accused had any intention to kill her. No doubt PW1 also deposed that about three months ago accused had threatened her that he would disfigure her face by throwing acid upon her. But the said threat only proves that accused had an intention to cause injury but not to kill her. Moreover, despite the said threat, accused did not threw acid upon her face; rather threw the acid on her back portion which clearly indicates that he had no intention to kill her. It is also pertinent to state that as per the testimony of PW1, accused was coming from opposite direction, it means that accused had an opportunity to throw acid on her face and other vital parts of her body such as breast but he chose to pour acid on her non-vital part of body. This again proves that he had no intention to kill her.
39. Accordingly, I am of the considered opinion that the testimony of PW1 is insufficient to bring home the guilt of accused for the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC. However, her testimony is sufficient to prove the guilt of accused for the offence punishable under Section 326 IPC as he voluntarily caused grievous injuries by pouring acid upon her.
SC No. 77/13 Page 31 of 38State Vs Parmod Conclusion:
40. Pondering over the ongoing discussion, I am of the considered opinion that prosecution has succeeded to prove the guilt of accused Parmod beyond the shadow of all reasonable doubts for the offence punishable under Section 326 IPC, thus, I hereby hold him guilty thereunder. He be taken into custody.
Announced in the open Court on this 03rd day of July, 2014 (PAWAN KUMAR JAIN) Additional Sessions Judge-01 Central district, Tis Hazari, Delhi SC No. 77/13 Page 32 of 38 State Vs Parmod IN THE COURT OF SH. PAWAN KUMAR JAIN ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE-01 (CENTRAL), TIS HAZARI COURTS: DELHI SC No. : 77/2013 ID No. : 02401R0076932013 FIR No. : 90/12 Police Station : Nabi Karim Under Section : 307 IPC State Versus PARMOD S/o Madan Saini R/o H.No. B-40, DDA Flats Mata Sundari Road, New Delhi.
.........Convict Present: Sh. R.K. Tanwar, Additional Public Prosecutor for the State.
Sh. Padam Singh and Sh. Bhanu Pratap Singh, Advocates, counsels for the convict ORDER ON THE POINT OF SENTENCE:-
1. Vide separate judgment dated July 3, 2014 accused Parmod SC No. 77/13 Page 33 of 38 State Vs Parmod has been held guilty for the offence punishable under Section 326 of Indian Penal Code (in short IPC).
2. Learned counsel appearing for the convict requests for a lenient view on the grounds that convict is a young married person aged about 34 years having no criminal antecedents and he has two minor daughters aged about three years and one year. It is further submitted that convict is a sole bread earner of the family and if convict be sent behind bars, his family will be affected adversely especially the life of his minor daughters. It is further submitted that the minor daughters shall also be deprived from love and affection of his father, for which they are otherwise entitled.
Accordingly, learned defence counsel requests to release the convict on probation of good conduct.
3. Per contra, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State requests for maximum sentence on the ground that convict had voluntarily caused grievous injuries by pouring acid on the body of victim.
4. I have heard rival submissions advanced by counsel for both the parties, perused the record carefully and gave my thoughtful considerations to their contentions.
5. Before dealing with the submissions advanced by counsel for both the parties, I deem it appropriate to refer Section 326A and 326B of Indian Penal Code. By way of amendment Act 13 of 2013 w.e.f. February 3, 2013, Section 326A and 326B IPC were inserted in the Indian Penal Code. Both the sections were enacted to deal with menace of acid attack cases. Under Section 326A IPC, if a person causes permanent or partial damage or deformity to, or burns or maims or disfigures or disables, any part of the SC No. 77/13 Page 34 of 38 State Vs Parmod body of a person or causes grievous hurt by throwing acid, minimum punishment for such offence is prescribed imprisonment for ten years which may extend to imprisonment for life, and with fine. The amended provisions indicate how seriously legislature has taken the acid attack cases. No doubt, in the instant case punishment can not be awarded under the amended provisions as the offence in question was committed much prior to the enforcement of amended provisions. But at the time of determining the quantum of sentence, Court is also supposed to keep in mind the intention of legislature.
6. From the submissions advanced by counsel for the convict, mitigating factors that emerge are; that convict is a young married person aged about 34 years; that he is the sole bread earner of the family; that he has two minor daughters; that he has no criminal antecedents; that there is no evidence that he can not be reformed; that there is apprehension that if he be sent to jail, his family particularly future of his minor daughters will be affected adversely.
7. In addition to the above, I also notice one more extenuating circumstance in favour of the convict that he had not thrown acid on vital parts of the victim despite the fact that he had an opportunity to do so.
8. Now coming to the aggravating factors and same are that he had thrown acid on the body of a person to whom he loved in past; that there was no immediate instigation of any kind from the side of victim; that victim was taken by aback when he threw acid upon her; that since convict was already waiting for the victim with acid, it proves that the committed offence was premeditated; that victim had sustained grievous injuries from neck to lower leg; that victim still has acid burn marks; that the act of SC No. 77/13 Page 35 of 38 State Vs Parmod throwing acid in itself is an inhuman act; that such incidents create a feeling of insecurity among members of society especially among females; that society abhors such cases.
9. In the light of above overwhelming aggravating factors and the intention of legislature, I am of the considered opinion that convict does not deserve the benefit of benevolent provisions of Probation of Offenders Act. Simultaneously, in view of the extenuating circumstances as highlighted above, I am also of the considered opinion that convict also does not deserve maximum sentence as prayed by learned Additional Public Prosecutor.
10. After considering the aggravating and extenuating factors, I hereby sentence the convict Parmod rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years and a fine of ` 50,000/- in default further simple imprisonment for a period of six months for the offence punishable under Section 326 IPC. Benefit of Section 428 Code of Criminal Procedure, if any, be given to the convict.
11. Since, the victim had not only sustained grievous injuries but also sustained mental agony and trauma, thus, to my mind, victim is also entitled for compensation. Accordingly, in terms of Section 357A Cr.P.C. this Court recommends suitable compensation to the victim. Copy of order be sent to the Secretary Delhi Legal Service Authority (Central District) to assess the quantum of compensation and its payment. In the meantime, fine amount, if paid, be given to the victim as compensation, however, same shall be deducted from the total amount of compensation assessed by the Secretary DLSA, Central District. If the fine amount is paid after the release of amount of compensation as determined by the DLSA, SC No. 77/13 Page 36 of 38 State Vs Parmod fine amount shall be diverted to the Victim Compensation Fund, DLSA, Central District. However, the amount of compensation shall not be released to the victim before the expiry of period of appeal and, if any, appeal is filed then till the decision of such appeal or order passed by the appellate court.
12. No doubt, it is very difficult for the victim to forget the trauma to which she had undergone particularly when the burn marks are still in existence, which must be reminding her about the incident every day. Admittedly, it is not possible for any institution to remove the scars of unfortunate incident from the mind of victim, but being the welfare State, it is the duty of State to make all sincere efforts to remove every scar of the incident from her body. Thus, State i.e. Government of NCT of Delhi is directed to bear all expenses of her medical treatment including plastic surgery etc. Secretary, DLSA, Central District shall provide all necessary assistance to the victim to ensure that State shall provide all financial help to the victim in her treatment.
13. During the course of arguments learned counsel appearing for the convict raised apprehension that if convict be sentenced for imprisonment, future of his minor daughters is likely to be affected adversely. It is pertinent to state that every child below the age of fourteen years has a fundamental right to get education, thus, it is the responsibility and duty of the State to ensure that both the daughters of convict shall get education in a good school. On being asked counsel submits that the elder daughter is presently studying in Nursery class, thus State shall ensure that her education be not affected due to any financial crisis. If their mother is unable to bear financial burden or desires financial help for the education of her daughters, State shall bear all expenses for the education of both the SC No. 77/13 Page 37 of 38 State Vs Parmod daughters.
14. Copy of judgment along with order on the point of sentence be given to the convict free of cost. Copy of this order be also sent to Secretary DLSA, Central District and Chief Secretary to Government of NCT Delhi for compliance. Intimation be also sent to the victim.
Announced in the open Court on this 05th day of July, 2014 (PAWAN KUMAR JAIN) Additional Sessions Judge-01 Central district, Tis Hazari, Delhi SC No. 77/13 Page 38 of 38