Karnataka High Court
Urban Infrastructure Trustee Limited vs Ozone Propex Private Limited on 10 February, 2022
Author: S.Sujatha
Bench: S.Sujatha
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 10TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2022
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE S.SUJATHA
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.I.ARUN
W.A.No.3833/2019 (GM - RES) c/w
W.P.No.3415/2020 (GM - RES)
IN W.A.No.3833/2019:
BETWEEN :
URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE TRUSTEE LIMITED
A COMPANY REGISTERED
UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT, 1956
AND HAVING ITS REGISTERED
OFFICE AT 46-47, 4TH FLOOR,
MAKER CHAMBER-VI,
NARIMAN POINT,
MUMBAI-400 021 (MAHARASHTRA)
REP BY ITS AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY
Mr. DEVESH VYAS. ...APPELLANT
(BY SRI ARUNKUMAR K., SENIOR COUNSEL A/W
SRI ANIND THOMAS, ADV.)
AND :
OZONE PROPEX PRIVATE LIMITED
A COMPANY REGISTERED
UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT, 1956,
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE
AT NO.38, ULSOOR ROAD
BANGALORE-560 042, KARNATAKA
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REP BY ITS AUTHORISED SIGNATORY
Mr. GANAPATI JOSHI ...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI S.S.NAGANAND, SENIOR COUNSEL A/W
SRI PERIKAL K. ARJUN, ADV.)
THIS WRIT APPEAL FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE
ORDER DATED 25.09.2019, PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE
JUDGE IN WRIT PETITION NO.41710/2019.
IN W.P.No.3415/2020:
BETWEEN :
OZONE PROPEX PRIVATE LTD.,
A COMPANY WITHIN THE MEANING
CONTAINED IN THE COMPANIES ACT,
1956, HAVING ITS REGISTERED
OFFICE AT NO.38, ULSOOR ROAD,
BANGALORE-560042, KARNATAKA
REP BY ITS AUTHORISED
Mrs. SHOBHA ACHARYA ...PETITIONER
(BY SRI S.S.NAGANAND, SENIOR COUNSEL
A/W SRI PERIKAL K. ARJUN, ADV.)
AND :
URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE TRUSTEE LTD.,
A COMPANY WITHIN THE MEANING
CONTAINED IN THE COMPANIES
ACT, HAVING OFFICE AT 46-47,
4TH FLOOR, MAKER CHAMBER VI,
NARIMAN POINT, MUMBAI CITY,
MAHARASHTRA-400021
REP. BY DIRECTOR. ...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI K.G.RAGHAVAN, SENIOR COUNSEL A/S
SRI ADITYA V. BHAT, ADV.)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO CALL FOR
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THE RECORDS OF THE COMPANY APPEAL (AT) (INSOLVENCY)
NO.204 OF 2020. CALL FOR THE RECORDS OF C.P.(IB)
NO.111/BB/2019 ON THE FILE OF THE NATIONAL COMPANY
LAW TRIBUNAL, BENGALURU AND QUASH AND SET ASIDE THE
ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 03, 2020 PASSED BY THE NATIONAL
COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL IN COMPANY APPEAL
(AT) (INSOLVENCY) NO.204 OF 2020 VIDE ANNEXURE-A
AND ETC.
THIS WRIT APPEAL ALONG WITH WRIT PETITION HAVING
BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT, THIS DAY, S. SUJATHA, J.,
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
Since the common and akin issues are involved in these matters, they are taken up together and disposed of by this common judgment.
2. These matters are taken up for final disposal with the consent of the learned Senior counsel appearing for both the parties.
3. W.A.No.3833/2019 is filed by the appellant - M/s. Urban Infrastructure Trustees Ltd., challenging the order dated 25.09.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.41710/2019. -4-
4. W.P.No.3415/2020 has been filed by the petitioner - M/s. Ozone Propex Private Ltd., challenging the order dated 03.02.2020 passed by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No.204/2020 (Annexure - A) and the order dated 07.02.2020 passed by the CP(IB) No.111/BB/2019 on the file of the National Company Law Tribunal, Bengaluru (Annexure - B). Facts of the case:
W.A.No.3833/2019:
5. The appellant - Urban Infrastructure Trustees Ltd., has instituted Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) proceeding under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 ('IB Code' for short) in C.P. (IB) No.111/BB/2019 (Petition) before the National Company Law Tribunal, Bengaluru, (NCLT) on 18.01.2019 against the respondent. In the said proceedings, the respondent - Ozone Propex Private -5- Ltd., had filed I.A.No.229/2019 under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ('Act, 1996' for short) seeking to refer the disputes raised in the petition to Arbitration. The said I.A.No.229/2019 came to be dismissed by the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) vide order dated 26.08.2019. The appellant had filed a caveat before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). However, the respondent had challenged the said order dated 26.08.2019 passed by the NCLT before the writ Court in W.P.No.41710/2019. The writ Court vide order dated 25.09.2019 has passed the order impugned, whereby the order dated 26.08.2019 passed by the NCLT on I.A.No.229/2019 has been quashed remitting the matter to the NCLT to decide the application afresh in accordance with law and to pass a speaking order. Being aggrieved by the said order of the learned Single Judge, this Writ Appeal has been filed by the appellant.
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W.P.No.3415/2020:
6. The Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) by its order dated 17.12.2019 considering the pendency of the matter before this Court, decided to take up the petition filed under Section 7 of the IB Code after the disposal of the matter before this Court. Being aggrieved by the said order, Urban Infrastructure Trustees Ltd., filed Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No.204/2020 before the NCLAT, New Delhi, wherein a caveat was filed by the Ozone Propex Pvt. Ltd., the NCLAT having heard the learned counsel appearing for both the parties, placing reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Innoventive Industries Ltd., vs. ICICI Bank and another1 held that in the absence of any interim order of stay passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka and in the light of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Innoventive Industries Ltd.,1, 1 (2018) 1 SCC 407 -7- the petition under Section 7 of the IB Code should have been decided within 14 days.
7. Pursuant to the said order, NCLT by its order dated 07.02.2020 in CP (IB) No.111/BB/2019 observed that as per the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Innoventive Industries Ltd.,1 the Adjudicating Authority has to ascertain the existence of a default within a period of 14 days on the date of receipt of the application and if the Adjudicating Authority is satisfied with the requisite contentions as prescribed under the extant provisions of the code, the application/petition must be admitted. In the light of clarificatory orders dated 25.11.2019 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in the present appeal proceedings and also the orders of the NCLAT dated 03.02.2020, NCLT decided to hear the petition filed under Section 7 of the IB Code on merits, subject to the result of the present writ appeal and thereby posted the -8- matter for hearing on 12.02.2020. Being aggrieved by these two orders, W.P.No.3415/2020 has been filed by Ozone Propex Pvt. Ltd.,
8. This court while admitting the Writ Appeal keeping open the issue whether the power exercised by the learned Single Judge was under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution of India to be finally decided at the time of final hearing of the appeal, granted stay of the impugned order of remand till the disposal of the appeal vide order dated 11.11.2019.
Again by order dated 25.11.2019, it was clarified that the effect of the interim order passed by the Division Bench on 11.11.2019 is very limited. It was made clear that the order of remand passed by the learned Single Judge directing the disposal of the application under Section 8 of the said Act, 1996 will remain stayed. Thus, there was no order passed by the Division Bench preventing the NCLT from proceeding with the pending -9- matter in accordance with law. It has been categorically observed as under:
"Suffice it to say that there is no direction issued by this Court to the adjudicating authority not to take up the matter till the disposal of the appeal."
9. Considering the interim order granted in W.P.No.3415/2020 to the effect that the NCLT shall not precipitate the matter till 24.02.2020, the said interim order was extended till the next date of hearing vide order dated 25.02.2020 which was further extended by order dated 23.03.2020. But the interim order was not extended subsequently. As per order dated 31.08.2021, this Court rejected the prayer of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant to list the matter since the appeal has been admitted and no good ground was found to take up the appeal out of turn, thereby directed to list these matters for hearing in the usual course.
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10. I.A.No.1/2022 has been filed on behalf of Ozone Propex Pvt. Ltd., seeking clarification of the order dated 31.08.2021 passed in the present proceedings and consequently to extend the interim order. It was contended in the affidavit accompanying the application that as a result of inadvertent omission in the order dated 31.08.2021, the NCLT took up the matter on 02.12.2021 and has fixed the matter for considering the IBC Petition on 19.01.2022. An order of NCLT adjudicating upon the IBC Petition would render the writ appeal and the writ petition infructuous. This application was strongly opposed by the other side. Statement of objections were filed stating that the applicant is attempting to obtain a fresh interim order in the guise of an extension, which got expired long back inter alia raising other grounds for the dismissal of the writ petition.
11. However, at this juncture, learned Senior counsel appearing for both the parties prayed for final
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hearing of the matter on merits in view of the order of the NCLT fixing the date of hearing for arguments on the main petition filed under Section 7 of the IB Code. In this background of the case, the matters are taken up for final disposal.
Preliminary Objection.
12. Learned Senior counsel Sri. S.S. Naganand appearing for Ozone Propex Pvt. Ltd., has raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the Writ Appeal. Learned Senior counsel referring to the judgment of this Court in the case of Gurushanth Pattedar vs. Mahaboob Shahi Kulburga Mills and another2 and Sardar Veerannagouda Patil vs. Basantkumar3 argued that though the Writ Petition No.41710/2019 was filed by Ozone Propex Pvt. Ltd., under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the power exercised by the writ Court is amenable to 2 ILR 2005 KAR 2503 3 ILR 2019 KAR 643
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Article 227 of the Constitution of India. As such, no intra Court appeal is maintainable against the order passed by the writ Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
13. In reply, learned Senior counsel Sri. K.G. Raghavan appearing for the Urban Infrastructure Trustees Limited placing reliance on the judgment of the larger bench decision of seven Hon'ble Judges of this Court in Tammanna and others vs. Miss. Renuka and others4 submitted that an appeal has been provided under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961 against an order of the learned Single Judge, when it is passed in exercise of the original jurisdiction. The ratio laid down in Gurushanth Pattedar2 is a binding precedent only in the case of an order passed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India which arise out of an order deciding an issue in the course of a suit or proceeding 4 ILR 2009 KAR 1207
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passed by any Court subordinate to the High Court, not finally disposed of and is attracted by Section 115 of CPC. The order passed by NCLT, the subject matter of W.P.No.41710/2019, at any stretch of imagination cannot be construed as an order passed by the Court subordinate to the High Court where Section 115 of CPC is not at all attracted. In sum and substance, it was argued that the writ appeal is maintainable.
14. We have carefully considered the arguments of the learned Senior counsel appearing for the parties.
15. W.P.No.41710/2019 has been filed by the Ozone Propex Pvt. Ltd., under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order dated 26.08.2019 passed by NCLT whereby the application filed by Ozone Propex Pvt. Ltd., under Section 8 of the Act, 1996 has been rejected.
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16. Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961 reads thus:
"4. Appeals from decisions of a Single Judge of the High Court.-
An appeal from a judgment, decree, order or sentence passed by a Single Judge in the exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court under this Act or under any law for time being in force, shall lie to and be heard by a Bench consisting of two other Judges of the High Court."
17. The questions under reference considered by the Larger Bench reframed comprehensively in Tammanna4 are as under:
"1. Whether the finding recorded by the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No.1777 of 2001 by judgment dated 1-7-2006 holding that the intra-Court appeal as maintainable, which is contrary to the decision of another Division Bench in Vishnu Ganapathi Naik's Case (ILR 2006 Kar. 1863) requires the reconsideration in the light of the pronouncement of the Full Bench in Gurushanth Pattedar's case?
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2. In view of the amendment made to Sections 9 and 10 of the Karnataka High Court Act, i.e. in terms of Karnataka Act No.12 of 1973, inserting clauses 9(xii)(b) and 10(iv-a) whether an intra-court appeal under Section 4 of 'the Act' is maintainable, on the order passed by a Single Judge in exercise of the power under Article 227 or under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India?
3. Whether the law laid down in Gurushanth Pattedar's case requires reconsideration in view of pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Surya Dev Rai's case?"
In this connection, the Larger Bench has answered as under:-
"9.18 In our considered opinion, what was barred under Section 8 of the Karnataka High Court Act, viz., in the case of civil revision which could be heard by a Single Judge alone and whose orders shall be final, which are traceable to Section 115 CPC as amended by CPC (Amendment) Act 46 of 1999, cannot be revived or made available by resorting to Article 227 of the Constitution of India, nor such order passed by
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Single Judge under Article 227 be appealed under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act. In other words, what was not originally available under Section 115 CPC cannot be made available by invoking Article 227 of the Constitution; nor Section 8 of the Karnataka High Court Act be nullified merely on account of insertion of Section 9(xii) and 10(iv-a) of the Karnataka High Court Act, which were intended for the matters not governed under Section 8 of the Karnataka High Court Act. It is a settled law that every provision of the Act should be given effect to and harmoniously constructed along with other provisions of the Act."
The Larger Bench has examined the issue in the backdrop of the following decisions and has observed in para 5.3.3 as under:-
"5.3.3 We have seen that the backdrop of the decisions in:
(i) Kalpana Theatre Case (AIR 1995 KAR
426),
(ii) Ritz Hotels Case [1996 (7) KAR LJ 600],
(iii) Pattedar Case2,
(iv) Sri Vishnu Ganapathi Naik Case [ILR 2006 KAR 1863],
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(v) Ramaswamy Case (W.A.No.1777/2001,
D.D. 01.07.2006),
(vi) Saraswathi batch of cases
(W.A.No.1078/2007 & conn. matters, D.D. 07.11.2007), and
(vii) Karigowda Case (W.A.No.1957/2006 & conn. matters, D.D. 18.12.2007), are not similar and identical, but apparently differ. While SRI VISHNU GANAPATHI NAIK case and RAMAS WAMY case arose against the awards, orders or proceedings passed by quasi-
judicial authorities, such as, Labour Court , Land Tribunal, Karnataka Appellate Tribunal and Industrial Tribunal, the PATTEDAR case arose from an order deciding an issue in the course of a suit or other proceeding passed by a Court subordinate to the High Court, not finally disposed of and attracted by Section 115 CPC."
5.3.4 In order to apply the ratio laid down in PATTEDAR case on the question of maintainability of an appeal under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act against the order of the Single Judge made under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, it is necessary to satisfy whether the orders of the Single Judge arise out of the orders deciding an issue in the course of a
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suit or proceeding, passed by a Court subordinate to the High Court, not finally disposed of, attracting Section 115 CPC?
5.3.5 The ratio laid down in PATTEDAR case is a binding precedent only in the case of the orders passed under Article 227 of the Constitution which arise out of an order deciding an issue in the - course of a suit or proceeding passed by any Court subordinate to the High Court, not finally disposed of and is attracted by Section 115 CPC, but not otherwise. To be more clear, the appeals preferred against the orders of the Single Judge made under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India which arises from awards, orders or other proceedings of the quasi- judicial authorities such as Labour Court, Land Tribunal, Industrial Tribunal, Karnataka Appellate Tribunal or Tax Tribunal, etc., are not governed by the ratio laid down in PATTEDAR case, as a binding precedent.
5.3.6 Neither the facts in KALPANA THEATRE case, nor RAMASWAMY case nor SRI VISHNU GANAPATHI NAIK case arise out of an order deciding an issue in the course of a suit or other proceeding, before any Court subordinate to the High Court, not finally disposed of, which is
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attracted by Section 115 of CPC, unlike in PATTEDAR case.
5.3.7 Since the appeals preferred under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act in KALPANA THEATRE case, RAMASWAMY case and SRI VISHNU GANAPATHI NAIK case, all arose against the orders, awards or other proceedings finally disposed of and passed by the quasi-judicial authorities, such as, Labour Court, Karnataka Appellate Tribunal and Industrial Tribunal respectively, but not against an order deciding an issue in the course of a suit or other proceeding, before any Court subordinate to the High Court, not finally disposed of, as in PATTEDAR case, we are of the considered opinion that, for want of necessity, there would not be any gainful purpose in answering the question (1) referred to the Larger Bench by order dated 7-11- 2007 in W.A. No. 1078 of 2007 and connected matters (SARASWATHI batch of cases), viz.,"
Regarding the question "whether an appeal from an order or judgment passed by a Single Judge in exercise of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution lies to a Bench consisting of two other Judges of the High Court, in view of
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the provisions contained in Sections 4 and 10(iv-a) of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961 and Article 11(sa) in Schedule II to the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958?" referred to the Larger Bench in Karigowda case, it has been answered that an intra-court appeal would not lie under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act against the order passed by the Single Judge in exercise of Article 227 in the matters arising out of an order made in deciding an issue, passed by the Court subordinate to the High Court, in the course of a suit or other proceedings not finally disposed of, which is attracted by Section 115 CPC and is governed under Section 8 of the Karnataka High Court Act; and in all other matters which are not attracted by Section 115 CPC and not governed under Section 8 of the Act, an appeal would lie under Section 10(iv-a) against the order passed under Section 9(xii) of the Karnataka High Court Act read with Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and Rules 2(1), 26 and 39 of the
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Writ Proceedings Rules as well as Article 11(sa) to Schedule II of the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958.
18. The judgment of Gurushanth Pattedar2 has been extensively considered by the Larger Bench in Tammanna and others4. In the light of the authoritative pronouncement of the Larger Bench in Tammanna and others4, the challenge to the order of NCLT could be construed as the proceedings not falling under Gurushanth Pattedar2 and is not an order passed by the learned Single Judge in exercise of Article 227 in the matters arising out of an order made, in deciding an issue, passed by the Court subordinate to the High Court in the course of a suit or other proceedings not finally disposed of, which is attracted by Section 115 CPC and is governed under Section 8 of the Karnataka High Court Act. Thus an intra-Court appeal would certainly lie under Section 4 of the High
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Court Act, 1961 against the order of the learned Single Judge impugned herein. Accordingly, the preliminary objection raised regarding the maintainability of writ appeal is rejected.
Submissions on behalf of the Urban Infrastructure Trustees Limited.
19. Learned Senior Counsel Sri. K.G. Raghavan placing reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Indus Biotech Private Limited vs. Kotak India Venture (Offshore) Fund (earlier known as Kotak India Venture Limited) and others5 argued that the issue involved herein inasmuch as the maintainability of the application under Section 8 of the Act, 1996 during the pendency of the proceedings with respect to petition under Section 7 of the IB Code is no more res integra. Drawing the attention of the Court to paragraph Nos.26, 27 and 29 of the said judgment, it 5 2021 SCC Online SC 268
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was vehemently argued that notwithstanding the fact that the alleged corporate debtor filed an application under Section 8 of the Act, 1996, the independent consideration of the same dehorse the application filed under Section 7 of the IB Code and materials produced therewith will not arise in view of the position of law that the IB Code shall override all other laws as provided under Section 238 of the IB Code. Even if an application under Section 8 of the Act, 1996 is filed, NCLT is bound to advert to the contentions putforth in the petition under Section 7 of the IB Code. To arrive at the conclusion whether there is default and debt is payable, the defence of arbitration raised by the corporate debtor could be considered as a moonshine defence to delay the process. Thus, the learned Senior counsel argued that rejection of the application filed under Section 8 of the Act, 1996 by the NCLT is justifiable. It was further argued that NCLT has passed a detailed order assigning reasons for arriving at the
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conclusion referring to the judgments cited by both the parties. Learned Single Judge ought not to have quashed the said order as being passed in cryptic and cavalier manner. Referring to the order dated 11.11.2019 passed by this Court, it was submitted that a prima-facie opinion was formulated by the bench, that considering the legal issues, instead of remanding the matter, the learned Single Judge could have heard the matter on merits. It is also observed that the learned Single Judge has not dealt with the objection raised by the appellant regarding the availability of an efficacious remedy of an appeal under Section 37(1)(a) of the Act, 1996 as amended on 23.10.2015.
20. Nextly, it was contended that under Section 61 of the IB Code, appeal lies to the NCLAT against the order passed by the NCLT; an appeal lies under Section 37(1)(a) of the Act, 1996 against the order passed on the application filed under Section 8 of the Act, 1996; but
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without exhausting the alternative and efficacious remedy of appeal available under the said statutes, Writ Petition has been filed. The learned Single Judge ought not to have entertained the Writ Petition ignoring the elaborate reasons assigned by NCLT in rejecting the application filed under Section 8 of the Act, 1996.
Learned Single Judge on an erroneous premise proceeded to quash the said order and remanded the matter to NCLT for fresh consideration. This order of the learned Single Judge is against the well settled legal principles of law inasmuch the maintainability of the writ petition.
21. As regards filing of the writ petition by the respondent herein challenging the orders of NCLAT and NCLT, it was argued that the writ petition is not maintainable in view of the appeal remedy available under Sections 61 and 62 of the IB Code. It was further argued that the interim order of stay granted earlier was not extended from 23.03.2020. In the light of the order
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passed by this Court on 25.11.2019 clarifying that no direction has been issued by this Court to the Adjudicating Authority not to take up the matter till the disposal of the appeal, the NCLAT directing the NCLT to proceed with the petition filed under Section 7 of IB Code cannot be held to be unjustifiable. In the guise of seeking extension of the interim order which has been expired, the respondent herein is making an attempt to seek a fresh interim order. Further placing reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Innoventive Industries Ltd.,1 submitted that the appellant being a corporate creditor has rightly invoked Section 7 of IB Code, it was mandatory for NCLT to decide the petition within a period of fourteen days. On these grounds, learned Senior counsel sought for dismissal of both the writ petitions, allowing the writ appeal.
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Submissions made on behalf of the Ozone Propex Pvt. Ltd.,
22. Learned Senior counsel Sri. S.S. Naganand inviting the attention of the Court to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) dated 29.12.2006 and 12.01.2007 submitted that the appellant has become 50% equity shareholder by way of conversion of Optional Fully Convertible Debentures (OFCD). The appellant is an investor, not a financial creditor. The relationship of the parties has to be adjudicated at the first instance. As per the MOU, the dispute has to be resolved by Arbitration. The appellant suppressing the material facts has filed the application under Section 7 of the IB Code. Indeed, the appellant has confirmed that no interest is receivable by the respondent herein for the Financial Year 2015-16 and similar admissions were made in its letter seeking balance confirmation for the Financial Years 2016-17, 2017-18 and 2018-19. The appellant has unilaterally claimed a sum of Rs.1,164
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crores (approx.) under the OFCD agreements suppressing crucial facts including payments received by it. Learned Senior counsel further submitted that the order of NCLT impugned in W.P.No.41710/2019 is passed in a cryptic and cavalier manner. No cogent reasons were assigned for rejecting the application filed under Section 8 of the Act, 1996. There is no bar to invoke writ jurisdiction notwithstanding alternative remedy available under the statute if the order impugned suffers from arbitrariness for want of reasons. Without going into the genesis of the dispute and examining the relationship of the parties, merely rejecting the application filed under Section 8 of the Act, 1996 is erroneous. Considering these aspects, learned Single Judge has rightly quashed the order impugned in the writ petition and remanded the matter for reconsideration. Had the appellant not filed this writ appeal, the proceedings would have been concluded by this time after remand. The adjudication of petition
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under Section 7 of IB Code if proceeded with, without considering the application filed under Section 8 of the Act, 1996 seeking for referring the matter to Arbitration by virtue of the orders now passed by NCLT and NCLAT challenged in W.P.No.3415/2020, it would prejudice the rights of the respondent herein causing irreversible hardship and damage. Learned Senior counsel further argued that the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Indus Biotech Private Limited5 is indeed in favour of this respondent. The Hon'ble Apex Court has allowed the application filed by the petitioner therein, for appointment of an Arbitrator under Section 11(3) read with Sections 11(4)(a) and 11(12)(a) of the Act, 1996.
Moreover, the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court has to be read in the background of factual matrix of the case. Hence, paragraphs 26, 27 and 29 of the said judgment would not come to the aid of the investor -
Urban Infrastructure Trustees Ltd.
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23. In support of his submissions, learned Senior counsel has placed reliance on host of cases, the relevant of which will be discussed infra.
ANALYSIS:
24. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the material on record.
25. The points that arise for our consideration in the Writ Appeal are:
1] Whether the application filed under Section 8 of the Act, 1996 deserves to be adjudicated upon by the Adjudicating Authority - NCLT prior to adjudication of the proceedings under Section 7 of the IB Code?
2] Whether the learned Single Judge was justified in entertaining the Writ Petition dehorse the alternative and efficacious remedy available under the provisions of IB Code and the Act, 1996?
3] Whether the learned Single Judge was justified in quashing the order of NCLT
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exercising the powers of writ jurisdiction and remitting the matter to NCLT for deciding the matter afresh construing the order of NCLT as cryptic and passed cavalier manner?
26. The points that arise for our consideration in W.P.No.3415/2020 are:
1] Whether Writ Petition filed by the Ozone Propex Private Ltd., against the orders of NCLAT and NCLT is maintainable?
2] Whether the orders impugned passed by NCLAT and NCLT are justifiable in the facts and circumstances of the case?
Re. Point No.1 in Writ Appeal:
27. Point No.1 plays a significant role in deciding the challenge made to the order of the Writ Court in Intra-Court appeal proceedings. Indisputably, the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Indus Biotech Private Limited5, was not available neither at the time of disposal of the Writ Petition by the learned Single Judge on 25.09.2019 nor before the NCLAT and NCLT
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while passing the orders impugned in W.P.No.3415/2020.
28. Section 7 of IB Code reads thus:
"7. Initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process by financial creditor.-- (1) A financial creditor either by itself or jointly with other financial creditors, or any other person on behalf of the financial creditor, as may be notified by the Central Government, may file an application for initiating corporate insolvency resolution process against a corporate debtor before the Adjudicating Authority when a default has occurred.
Provided .....
Provided further ....
Provided also .....
Explanation......
(2) xxxxxx
(3) xxxxxx
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(4) The Adjudicating Authority shall, within fourteen days of the receipt of the application under sub-section (2), ascertain the existence of a default from the records of an information utility or on the basis of other evidence furnished by the financial creditor under sub-section (3).
Provided .....
(5) Where the Adjudicating Authority is satisfied that--
(a) a default has occurred and the application under sub-section (2) is complete, and there is no disciplinary proceedings pending against the proposed resolution professional, it may, by order, admit such application; or
(b) default has not occurred or the application under sub-section (2) is incomplete or any disciplinary proceeding is pending against the proposed resolution professional, it may, by order, reject such application:
Provided .....
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(6) The corporate insolvency
resolution process shall commence from
the date of admission of the application under sub-section (5).
(7) The Adjudicating Authority shall communicate--
(a) the order under clause(a) of sub-
section (5) to the financial creditor and the corporate debtor;
(b) the order under clause (b) of sub-
section (5) to the financial creditor, within seven days of admission or rejection of such application, as the case may be."
29. Section 8 of the Act, 1996 deals with the power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement. A Judicial Authority, before which an action is brought in the matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall on application made, can refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that prima facie no valid arbitration agreement exists.
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30. Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process [CIRP] proceedings were initiated by M/s. Urban Infrastructure Trustees Ltd., under Section 7 of the IB Code before the NCLT on 18.01.2019. In the said proceedings, Ozone Propex Pvt. Ltd., has filed I.A.No.229/2019 under Section 8 of the Act, 1996, to refer the disputes raised in the petition to Arbitration which was contested by M/s. Urban Infrastructure Trustees Ltd. After hearing both sides, NCLT passed order on 26.08.2019 dismissing the said application - I.A.No.229/2019.
31. In the case of Innoventive Industries Ltd.,1 the Hon'ble Apex Court considering the proceedings under Section 7 of IB Code and the scope thereof has held thus:
"27. The scheme of the Code is to ensure that when a default takes place, in the sense that a debt becomes due and is not paid, the insolvency resolution process
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begins. Default is defined in Section 3(12) in very wide terms as meaning non-payment of a debt once it becomes due and payable, which includes non-payment of even part thereof or an instalment amount. For the meaning of "debt", we have to go to Section 3(11), which in turn tells us that a debt means a liability of obligation in respect of a "claim" and for the meaning of "claim", we have to go back to Section 3(6) which defines "claim" to mean a right to payment even if it is disputed. The Code gets triggered the moment default is of rupees one lakh or more (Section 4). The corporate insolvency resolution process may be triggered by the corporate debtor itself or a financial creditor or operational creditor. A distinction is made by the Code between debts owed to financial creditors and operational creditors. A financial creditor has been defined under Section 5(7) as a person to whom a financial debt is owed and a financial debt is defined in Section 5(8) to mean a debt which is disbursed against consideration for the time value of money. As opposed to this, an
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operational creditor means a person to whom an operational debt is owed and an operational debt under Section 5(21) means a claim in respect of provision of goods or services.
28. When it comes to a financial creditor triggering the process, Section 7 becomes relevant. Under the Explanation to Section 7(1), a default is in respect of a financial debt owed to any financial creditor of the corporate debtor -- it need not be a debt owed to the applicant financial creditor. Under Section 7(2), an application is to be made under sub- section (1) in such form and manner as is prescribed, which takes us to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2016. Under Rule 4, the application is made by a financial creditor in Form 1 accompanied by documents and records required therein. Form 1 is a detailed form in 5 parts, which requires particulars of the applicant in Part I, particulars of the corporate debtor in Part II, particulars of the proposed interim resolution professional in
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Part III, particulars of the financial debt in Part IV and documents, records and evidence of default in Part V. Under Rule 4(3), the applicant is to dispatch a copy of the application filed with the adjudicating authority by registered post or speed post to the registered office of the corporate debtor. The speed, within which the adjudicating authority is to ascertain the existence of a default from the records of the information utility or on the basis of evidence furnished by the financial creditor, is important. This it must do within 14 days of the receipt of the application. It is at the stage of Section 7(5), where the adjudicating authority is to be satisfied that a default has occurred, that the corporate debtor is entitled to point out that a default has not occurred in the sense that the "debt", which may also include a disputed claim, is not due. A debt may not be due if it is not payable in law or in fact. The moment the adjudicating authority is satisfied that a default has occurred, the application must be admitted unless it is incomplete, in which case it may give notice to the applicant to
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rectify the defect within 7 days of receipt of a notice from the adjudicating authority. Under sub-section (7), the adjudicating authority shall then communicate the order passed to the financial creditor and corporate debtor within 7 days of admission or rejection of such application, as the case may be.
29. The scheme of Section 7 stands in contrast with the scheme under Section 8 where an operational creditor is, on the occurrence of a default, to first deliver a demand notice of the unpaid debt to the operational debtor in the manner provided in Section 8(1) of the Code. Under Section 8(2), the corporate debtor can, within a period of 10 days of receipt of the demand notice or copy of the invoice mentioned in sub-section (1), bring to the notice of the operational creditor the existence of a dispute or the record of the pendency of a suit or arbitration proceedings, which is pre-existing--i.e. before such notice or invoice was received by the corporate debtor. The moment there is
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existence of such a dispute, the operational creditor gets out of the clutches of the Code.
30. On the other hand, as we have seen, in the case of a corporate debtor who commits a default of a financial debt, the adjudicating authority has merely to see the records of the information utility or other evidence produced by the financial creditor to satisfy itself that a default has occurred. It is of no matter that the debt is disputed so long as the debt is "due" i.e. payable unless interdicted by some law or has not yet become due in the sense that it is payable at some future date. It is only when this is proved to the satisfaction of the adjudicating authority that the adjudicating authority may reject an application and not otherwise."
32. Considering the dictum laid down in Innoventive Industries Ltd.,1 and the other judgments holding the field, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Indus Biotech Private Limited5, has summarized the legal
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principles at paragraphs 26 to 29 and the same is quoted hereunder:
"26. The underlying principle, therefore, from all the above noted decisions is that the reference to the triggering of a petition under Section 7 of the IB Code to consider the same as a proceedings in rem, it is necessary that the Adjudicating Authority ought to have applied its mind, recorded a finding of default and admitted the petition. On admission, third party right is created in all the creditors of the corporate debtors and will have erga omnes effect. The mere filing of the petition and its pendency before admission, therefore, cannot be construed as the triggering of a proceeding in rem. Hence, the admission of the petition for consideration of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process is the relevant stage which would decide the status and the nature of the pendency of the proceedings and the mere filing cannot be taken as the triggering of the insolvency process.
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27. As noted, the issue which is posed for our consideration is arising in a petition filed under Section 7 of IB Code, before it is admitted and therefore not yet an action in rem. In such application, the course to be adopted by the Adjudicating Authority if an application under Section 8 of the Act, 1996 is filed seeking reference to arbitration is what requires consideration. The position of law that the IB Code shall override all other laws as provided under Section 238 of the IB Code needs no elaboration. In that view, notwithstanding the fact that the alleged corporate debtor filed an application under Section 8 of the Act, 1996, the independent consideration of the same dehors the application filed under Section 7 of IB Code and materials produced therewith will not arise. The Adjudicating Authority is duty bound to advert to the material available before him as made available along with the application under Section 7 of IB Code by the financial creditor to indicate default along with the version of the corporate debtor. This is for the reason that, keeping in perspective
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the scope of the proceedings under the IB Code and there being a timeline for the consideration to be made by the Adjudicating Authority, the process cannot be defeated by a corporate debtor by raising moonshine defence only to delay the process. In that view, even if an application under Section 8 of the Act, 1996 is filed, the Adjudicating Authority has a duty to advert to contentions put forth on the application filed under Section 7 of IB Code, examine the material placed before it by the financial creditor and record a satisfaction as to whether there is default or not. While doing so the contention put forth by the corporate debtor shall also be noted to determine as to whether there is substance in the defence and to arrive at the conclusion whether there is default. If the irresistible conclusion by the Adjudicating Authority is that there is default and the debt is payable, the bogey of arbitration to delay the process would not arise despite the position that the agreement between the parties indisputably contains an arbitration clause.
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28. That apart if the conclusion is that there is default and the debt is payable, due to which the Adjudicating Authority proceeds to pass the order as contemplated under sub- section 5(a) of Section 7 of IB Code to admit the application, the proceedings would then get itself transformed into a proceeding in rem having erga omnes effect due to which the question of arbitrability of the so-called inter se dispute sought to be put forth would not arise. On the other hand, on such consideration made by the Adjudicating Authority if the satisfaction recorded is that there is no default committed by the company, the petition would stand rejected as provided under sub-section 5(b) to Section 7 of IB Code, which would leave the field open for the parties to secure appointment of the Arbitral Tribunal in an appropriate proceedings as contemplated in law and the need for the NCLT to pass any orders on such application under Section 8 of Act, 1996 would not arise.
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29. Therefore, to sum up the procedure, it is clarified that in any proceeding which is pending before the Adjudicating Authority under Section 7 of IB Code, if such petition is admitted upon the Adjudicating Authority recording the satisfaction with regard to the default and the debt being due from the corporate debtor, any application under Section 8 of the Act, 1996 made thereafter will not be maintainable. In a situation where the petition under Section 7 of IB Code is yet to be admitted and, in such proceedings, if an application under Section 8 of the Act, 1996 is filed, the Adjudicating Authority is duty bound to first decide the application under Section 7 of the IB Code by recording a satisfaction with regard to there being default or not, even if the application under Section 8 of Act, 1996 is kept along for consideration. In such event, the natural consequence of the consideration made therein on Section 7 of IB Code application would befall on the application under Section 8 of the Act, 1996."
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33. Learned Senior Counsel Sri.K.G.Raghavan appearing for the Urban Infrastructure Trustees Ltd., has placed much emphasis on this decision to contend that the proceedings under Section 7 of IB Code has to be decided first or in other words, application filed under Section 8 of the Act, 1996 cannot be adjudicated independently by NCLT. On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel Sri.S.S.Naganand submits that this judgment is in favour of Ozone Propex Pvt. Ltd.,
34. In order to analyze the arguments advanced by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for both sides, marshalling of facts of the Indus Biotech Private Ltd.,5 is necessary. An Arbitration Petition was filed by Indus Biotech Private Ltd., under Section 11 [3] read with Sections 11[4][a] and 11[12][a] of the Act, 1996 before the Hon'ble Apex Court seeking for appointment of an Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes that had
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arisen between the parties therein, the same being an International Arbitration. The respondents 1 to 4 therein had converted their respective preference shares invested in Indus Biotech Private Ltd., into equity shares. In that process, a dispute was stated to have arisen with regard to calculation and conversion formula to be applied in converting the preference shares of the respondent Nos.1 to 4, into equity shares. The petitioner company - Indus Biotech Private Ltd., contended that the said dispute has to be resolved through arbitration by the Arbitral Tribunal whereas the respondent Nos.1 to 4 therein contended that as the debt had not been paid by the company, it has given a cause of action for them to invoke the jurisdiction of the adjudicating authority, NCLT by initiating the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process provided under IB Code. In the petition filed under Section 7 of IB Code before the NCLT, Indus Biotech Private Ltd., had filed a miscellaneous application under Section 8 of the Act,
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1996 seeking a direction to refer the parties to arbitration which was allowed by the NCLT, Mumbai Bench - IV. As a consequence, the petition under Section 7 of the IB Code was dismissed. Being aggrieved by the said order, the respondent No.2 therein had preferred the SLP. Both these matters were connected and heard together. The Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that in the normal course against the order of NCLT, an appeal would have been preferred to the NCLAT as provided under Section 61 of IB Code. The contention that there is no remedy of appeal against an order disposing of an application filed under the Act, 1996 and an order under Section 61 of IB Code, has been rejected. The Hon'ble Apex Court taking note of the special circumstances where the order was passed by the NCLT while considering the petition under Section 7 of IB Code, in the backdrop of Indus Biotech Private Ltd., seeking for the resolution of dispute through arbitration and the arbitration petition to that effect was
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already pending before the Hon'ble Apex Court as on the date of the order passed by the NCLT, has examined the scope of Section 7 of IB Code. It has been reiterated that in order to trigger an application under Section 7, existence of four factors are necessary, i.e., [i] there should be a debt; [ii] default should have occurred [iii] debt should be due to "financial creditor" [iv] such default which has occurred should be by a corporate debtor; on such application being filed with the compliance required under Sub-Sections [1] to [3] of Section 7 of IB Code, a duty is cast on the adjudicating authority to ascertain the existence of a default if shown from the records or on the basis of other evidence furnished by a financial creditor, as contemplated under Sub-section [4] of Section 7 of IB Code.
35. Further, the scope of application filed under Section 8 of the Act, 1996 before NCLT during the pendency of the petition under Section 7 of IB Code has been extensively discussed in paragraphs 26 to 29 of
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the said judgment. In our considered view, the underlying principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the said paragraphs 26 to 29 are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. In the light of the said judgment, even if an application under Section 8 of the Act, 1996 is filed, the adjudicating authority has to advert to contentions put forth on the application filed under Section 7 of IB Code, examine the material placed before it by the financial creditor and record a satisfaction as to whether there is default or not after considering the defence put forth by the corporate debtor, even if the application under Section 8 of the Act 1996 is kept along for consideration. In our considered opinion, these legal principles cannot be held to be applicable only in the said factual matrix of the case as contended by the learned Senior Counsel Sri.S.S.Naganand. Though the Hon'ble Apex Court has considered the application filed by the Indus Biotech Private Ltd., under Section 11(3) read with Sections
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11(4) (a) and 11[12][a] of the Act, 1996 which was pending prior to passing of the order by NCLT impugned in SLP and appointed the Arbitral Tribunal, but the underlying principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraphs 26 to 29 being the ratio decidendi, the same is binding on this Court as well as the NCLT/NCLAT.
36. Thus, it would be appropriate for the NCLT to consider the petition under Section 7 of IB Code along with the application under Section 8 of the Act, 1996, as observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the natural consequence of the consideration made therein on Section 7 of IB Code Application would befall on the application under Section 8 of the Act, 1996. Re. Point Nos.2 and 3 in Writ Appeal:
37. Learned Senior Counsel Sri.S.S.Naganand has referred to the judgment of K.S.R.T.C. V/s.
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Karnataka State Transport Authority6 to contend that the discretionary powers exercised by the learned Single Judge cannot be interfered with, in an intra-court appeal proceedings. The said judgment was rendered in the context of the refusal of the "STA" to consider the application dehorse the interstate agreement. In the background of failure to exercise jurisdiction vested on the authority, it was held to be a ground for entertaining the Writ Petition. The rule that the Court not entertaining petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when there is an equally efficacious alternative remedy is held to be not the rule or law but is a principle that the Courts have evolved for the guidance of their own discretion. Indeed, the Hon'ble Chief Justice had exercised his discretion in entertaining the Writ Petition. In that scenario, it was held that it would not be appropriate in appeal, to interfere with the discretion, unless it is shown that the exercise of that 6 ILR 1983 Karnataka 436
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discretion is arbitrary. It is true that ordinarily the discretionary power exercised by the Writ Court would not call for any interference but as noticed by this Court in the order dated 11.11.2019, the objection raised by the appellant regarding availability of the efficacious remedy of appeal under Section 37[1][a] of the Arbitration Act, 1996 has not been addressed by the Learned Single Judge. Though the Writ Court has remanded the matter to the NCLT quashing the order impugned as passed in a cryptic and cavalier manner, adjudicating upon this point at this stage would be academic since the legal issue inasmuch as the adjudication of Section 8 application in the proceedings filed under Section 7 of IB Code before the NCLT has reached finality in the wake of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Indus Biotech Private Limited5.
38. Further, the learned Senior Counsel Sri.S.S.Naganand citing the judgment of the Hon'ble
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Apex Court in the case of Secretary and Curator, Victoria Memorial Hall V/s. Howrah Ganatantrik Nagrik Samity and Others7, has argued that the order of the NCLT is not supported by reasons recorded. Reference has been made to paragraphs 40, 41 and 42 of the said judgment.
39. There is no cavil on this legal proposition. Ordinarily, we would have held the Writ Petition as not maintainable, but for the discretionary power exercised by the learned Single Judge. However, in relegating Ozone Propex Private Ltd., to NCLAT at this stage, would further delay the proceedings in view of the settled principles of law in Indus Biotech Private Ltd.5 Since the Writ Court has remanded the matter to the NCLT for fresh consideration, it would be suffice to direct the NCLT to consider the petition under Section 7 of the IB Code along with Section 8 of the Act, 1996. 7 (2010) 3 SCC 732
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NCLT shall decide the same, keeping in mind the legal principles enunciated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Indus Biotech Private Ltd.5. Given the circumstances, it is not necessary for us to delve upon the issue of maintainability of Writ Petition No.41710/2019. Point Nos.1 and 2 in W.P.No.3415/2020:
40. Sections 61 and 62 of the IB Code reads thus:
"61. Appeals and Appellate Authority.-- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained under the Companies Act 2013 (18 of 2013), any person aggrieved by the order of the Adjudicating Authority under this part may prefer an appeal to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal.
(2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within thirty days before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal:
Provided ......
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62. Appeal to Supreme Court.--(1) Any person aggrieved by an order of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the Supreme Court on a question of law arising out of such order under this Code within forty-five days from the date of receipt of such order.
(2) The Supreme Court may, if it is satisfied that a person was prevented by sufficient cause from filing an appeal within forty-five days, allow the appeal to be filed within a further period not exceeding fifteen days."
41. In terms of Section 61 of the IB Code, appeal remedy is available before the NCLAT against the order of the NCLT. Similarly, appeal remedy is available before the Hon'ble Apex Court under Section 62 of the Act against the order of NCLAT. Writ Petition No.3415/2020 filed by the Ozone Propex Private Ltd., circumventing the alternative and efficacious remedy available under the statute merely on the ground that no opportunity of
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hearing was provided by the NCLAT cannot be appreciated. Indeed, the petitioner who was on caveat before the NCLAT was represented by its learned counsel.
42. Learned Senior Counsel Sri.S.S.Naganand has referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Whirlpool Corporation V/s. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others8, in support of his submissions regarding the maintainability of the Writ Petition contending that the order of the NCLAT impugned is in violative of the principles of natural justice as no notice was served on the petitioner. It is borne out from the order that after hearing both the parties, NCLAT has passed the order dated 03.02.2020 impugned herein. In view of the clarificatory order passed by this Court on 25.11.2019 and in the absence of interim order of stay of further proceedings by this 8 (1998) 8 SCC 1
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Court, in terms of Section 7 of the IB Code, NCLAT has held that application under Section 7 of the IB Code could have been decided within fourteen days. Having regard to the said observations, NCLT has rightly decided to adjudicate upon the main petition filed under Section 7 of the IB Code on merits, subject to the Writ Appeal pending before this Court. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Innoventive Industries Ltd.,1 has categorically observed that the speed, within which the adjudicating authority has to ascertain the existence of a default from the records of the information utility or on the basis of evidence furnished by the financial creditor, is important, it must do within fourteen days of the receipt of the application. Further, it is significant to note that the Hon'ble Apex Court in Indus Biotech Private Limited5, in paragraph 13, has categorically held that the IB Code shall override all other laws, as provided under Section 238 of the IB Code. As such, notwithstanding the fact that an application under
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Section 8 of the Act 1996 has been filed by the Corporate Debtor, the independent consideration of the same dehors the application filed under Section 7 of the IB Code and materials produced therewith will not arise. The scope of alternative remedy is also discussed and observed that the appeal remedy under Section 61 of the IB Code is available against the order passed under Section 8 of the Act, 1996. In our considered view, both the orders of the NCLT and NCLAT are well reasoned orders and the same would not come within the parameters set down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Whirlpool Corporation8. Moreover, in view of the decision arrived at by us in the Writ Appeal, this writ petition deserves to be dismissed.
CONCLUSION:
43. For the reasons aforesaid, we pass the following:
ORDER i] Writ Appeal is allowed in part.
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ii] Order of the learned Single Judge passed in W.P.No.41710/2019 dated 25.09.2019 impugned, insofar as remanding the matter to NCLT remains undisturbed.
iii] NCLT is directed to consider the petition filed under Section 7 of the IB Code along with application under Section 8 of the Act, 1996 in terms of Indus Biotech Private Limited5 and shall take appropriate decision in accordance with law in an expeditious manner.
iv] Writ Petition stands dismissed.
v] In view of disposal of the main matters, all the pending I.As are consigned to file.
v] No order as to costs.
Sd/-
JUDGE
Sd/-
JUDGE
PMR/NC.