Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Dr Sadhana Godika vs Managing Committee And Ors on 4 May, 2016
Author: Alok Sharma
Bench: Alok Sharma
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JAIPUR BENCH JAIPUR O R D E R IN S.B. CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.3103/2014 (Dr. Sadhana Godika Vs. The Managing Committee & Ors.) Date of Order : May 4th, 2016 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ALOK SHARMA Mr. D.P. Sharma ] Mr. Vimal Choudhary ] , for the petitioner. Mr. Mahendra Goyal, for respondent No.1 Ms. Arpita Shekhawat for Mr. Manu Bhargava, G.C., for respondent No.2. Dr. Ram Kishan Sharma, for respondent No.3-University of Raj. Mr. Arvind Gupta, for respondent No.4. BY THE COURT
Under challenge is the judgment dated 11.03.2014, passed by the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Tribunal, Jaipur (hereinafter the Tribunal) refusing to interfere with the office order dated 17.01.2014, issued by the respondent No.1Secretary, Managing Committee of Agarwal Shikshak Prashikshan Mahavidhyalya, Jaipur whereby a decision was taken to extend the term of appointment of the petitioner as Principal only till a regularly selected Principal of the College was appointed by a duly constituted Selection Committee or till 31.03.2014 whichever was earlier. And the petitioner was deemed to be relieved automatically thereafter.
The facts relevant to the challenge are few. Vide office order dated 18.01.2007, issued by the General Secretary, Shri Agarwal Shiksha Samiti, Jaipur the petitioner was appointed on the post of Principal of Agarwal Shikshak Prashikshan Mahavidhyalya, Jaipur on a purely temporary basis on a consolidated salary of Rs.18,000/- per month inclusive of all allowances subject inter alia to the appointment as made, being subject to the approval by the Managing Committee of Shri Agarwal Shiksha Samiti, Jaipur. The appointment was terminable on one month's notice from either side. Subsequently vide letter dated 31.01.2008, the petitioner, then continuing on the post of Principal, was again issued an appointment letter afresh with reference to her application for appointment as Principal in the College for one year on a gross salary of Rs.19,690/- per month subject to statutory deductions. The appointment letter however did indeed state that the petitioner's period of probation was further liable to be extended solely at the discretion of the General Secretary, Shri Agarwal Shiksha Samiti albeit during the period of original or the extended period of probation either side could discontinue the employment without assigning any reason on giving one month notice or amount equal to pay in lieu thereof. It was further stated that the probation would continue till the Executive Committee of Shri Agarwal Shiksha Samiti confirmed the service of the petitioner in writing. Thereafter the appointment was terminable, except when occasioned on disciplinary grounds on three months' notice, or salary in lieu thereof. The said appointment was thereafter extended from time to time till the office order dated 17.01.2014 whereunder it was to cease in all event on 31.03.2014. Aggrieved, the petitioner approached the Tribunal stating that the order dated 17.01.2014 was arbitrary, not based on any decision taken by the Managing Committee of the Agarwal Shiksha Prashikshan Mahavidhyalya and was in contravention of Section 18 of the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Act, 1989 (hereinafter the Act of 1989) as also Rule 39 of the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions (Recognition, Grant-in-aid and Service conditions etc.) Rules, 1993 (hereinafter the Rules of 1993).
In defence, the case of the respondent-non-applicant before the Tribunal was that the petitioner was at no point of time selected on the post of Principal by a duly constituted Selection Committee in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1989 and the Rule of 1993. She was merely a temporary appointee on the post of Principal on contract / fixed term which was extended from time to time. As the nature of appointment was not substantive, on the period for which the appointment was made lapsing, she was liable to automatic termination / discharge. Reference was made to the letter dated 20.12.2013 addressed by the petitioner herself to the Managing Committee, Agarwal Shiksha Prashikshan Mahavidhyalya stating that her period of appointment earlier extended by one year and expiring on 19.01.2014 be further extended and her salary also be increased. The respondents stated that Agarwal Shiksha Prashikshan Mahavidhyalya, Jaipur set up in the year 2007 was on provisional affiliation (by the University of Rajasthan) which was extended for a period of one year vide order dated 14.06.2012 inter alia on the condition that a qualified Principal in the College should be appointed by a duly constituted Selection Committee. It was stated that the petitioner with 52.88% marks in M.A. did not have the requisite minimum educational qualification of 55% marks at the Masters level at the time of her temporary appointment on the post of Principal nor was she in fact selected by a duly constituted Selection Committee. It was stated that the respondent-College had in consonance with the University of Rajasthan's letter dated 14.06.2012 invited applications for appointment of a Principal with requisite qualification under its advertisement dated 25.01.2014 published in various newspapers and the petitioner herself had applied therefor. It was further stated that in the context of the appointment of the petitioner being contractual / for a fixed term, it was not an appointment under the Act of 1989 or the Rules of 1993 and consequently the discharge/termination of the petitioner at the end of the fixed term of her employment could not attract the provisions of Section 18 of the Act of 1989 or Rule 39 of the Rules of 1993Nor be impugned for alleged contravention thereof.
The Tribunal vide its impugned judgment dated 11.03.2014 dismissed the petitioners application. It was held that the petitioner was first appointed on a purely temporary / ad hoc basis under the letter dated 18.01.2007 when at the relevant time she had only 52.88% marks to show at the Master of Arts level, whereas under direction dated 30.06.2010 issued by the University Grant Commission, it was mandatory to have a minimum of 55% marks at the Masters level for appointment to the said post. The Tribunal held that the subsequent second Masters degree in Political Science (distant education) as claimed by the petitioner to have been acquired in the year 2013 with 63.55% marks from the Jodhpur National University was of no avail inasmuch as prior thereto the respondent-College had advertised for recruitment of a Principal on 01.05.2013. The Tribunal further held that as the nature of the petitioner's appointment was contractual/for fixed terms, non-compliance with the provisions of Section 18 of the Act of 1989 or for that matter Rule 39 of the Rules of 1993 prior to her termination/discharge from the post of Principal was not illegal. For its conclusion the Tribunal relied upon the judgments of the Apex Court as also the judgments of this Court in Dr. Daya Shankar Sharma & Anr. Vs. Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Tribunal & Anr. [2011 Indlaw RAJ 429]; Agarwal Shiksha Samiti Vs. State & Anr., D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No.549/1995, decided on 04.03.1998; Smt. Kiran Bharti Vs. Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Tribunal & Anr., SBCWP No.1186/1998, decided on 04.12.2006; R.B. Sevakram Maternity Hospital Vs. Veeran Devi (Smt.) & Anr. [(2004) 10 SCC 548]; Swami Vivekanand Society & Anr. Vs. SAV. Prerana Vasant Joshi & Anr. [(2001) SLT 27 SCC] and several other judgments wherein it has been held that no matter how long an employee may have served, but when the employment itself was temporary or founded on a fixed term / contract, the employee concerned did not have any right to continue on the post on the expiry of the contractual period / fixed term and further that where an ineligible employee had been appointed, she would have no right to continue on the post. The Tribunal held that the letters of appointment dated 18.01.2007 and 31.01.2008 as also the petitioner's own letter dated 20.12.2013 were conclusive of the fact that the petitioner's appointment on the post of Principal was to begin with and at all times thereafter temporary / ad hoc in nature with no indefeasible right to continue or be confirmed on the said post. The Tribunal further held that in the circumstances, protection of Section 18 of the Act of 1989 or for that matter Rule 39 of the Rules of 1993 was not available to the petitioner. It was also held that the impugned order dated 17.01.2014 in the facts of the case was even otherwise not stigmatic/punitive and therefore not liable to be interfered with on account of denial of the principles of natural justice. Hence this petition.
Mr. D.P. Sharma, appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the Tribunal has erred in refusing to interfere with the order dated 17.01.2014 despite it being in violation of the principles of natural justice, stigmatic/punitive and contrary to the mandate of Section 18 of the Act of 1989 and Rule 39 of the Rules of 1993. It has been submitted that in terms of the letter dated 31.01.2008, the petitioner was evidently appointed as a probationer. She was then unlawfully continued in that capacity for over six years contrary to the proviso to Rule 30 of the Rules of 1993. The probation period could not have been extended for beyond a period of one year. Thereafter the petitioner was entitled to confirmation under Rule 31 of the Rules of 1993. Non-confirmation despite the mandate of Rule 31 aforesaid for whatever reason including any purported contract was in the cross-hair of Section 20 of the Act of 1989 and hence unsustainable. The petitioner in the circumstances should be deemed to be confirmed or entitled to be confirmed two years following her appointment on probation vide letter dated 30.01.2008. Thereafter the petitioner could only be terminated from service in accordance with Section 18 of the Act of 1989 read with Rule 39 of the Rules of 1993. The impugned order dated 17.01.2014 was accordingly non-compliant with the mandate of Section 18 and Rule 39 aforesaid and was thus plainly illegal as is the Tribunal's judgment dated 11.03.2014 upholding it. It has been submitted that it does not lie in the mouth of the respondent-College to contest/disavow its own appointment letter dated 31.01.2008 describing the petitioner as a probationer and claim that the appointment was a fixed term appointment. Mr. D.P. Sharma submitted that the petitioner's appointment under the letter dated 18.01.2007 as also the letter dated 31.01.2008 is relatable to Section 17 of the Act of 1989 and hence regular, even if not by a duly constituted Selection Committee.
Per contra, Mr. Mahendra Goyal appearing for the respondent-College submitted that the impugned judgment of the Tribunal is well considered detailing all the factual and legal aspects to warrant non-interference with the office order dated 17.01.2014. Mr. Goyal submitted that the petitioner admittedly was not appointed by a duly constituted Selection Committee or following the statutorily prescribed processes under the Act of 1989 and Rules of 1993. Her appointment from the very inception beginning 18.01.2007 was temporary / ad hoc in nature for fixed term and extended from time to time till 17.01.2014 when it was last extended till expiry by efflux of time on 31.03.2014 or on the appointment of a Principal of the College by a duly constituted Selection Committee whichever was earlier. Counsel submitted that the provisions of Section 18 of the Act of 1989 and Rule 39 of the Rules of 1993 attract only to regular appointments made by the duly constituted Selection Committee as mandated by the Act of 1989 and not to temporary contractual/fixed term employeeall of the same genre. It was submitted that aside of the aforesaid, the petitioner's appointment even in the first instance on 18.01.2007 was illegal inasmuch as with 52.88% marks at the Masters level, she did not have the requisite minimum eligibility criteria of 55% marks at the said level prescribed by the University Grant Commission for appointment to the post of Principal of a College. Mr. Goyal submitted that subsequent M.A. Political Science degree allegedly acquired by the petitioner purportedly with 63.55% marks through distant education course offered by the Jodhpur National University is of no avail inasmuch as it cannot relate to the petitioner's appointment in the year 2007 as extended from time to time. Further in any event, the Distant Education Council, Government of India has notified that the Jodhpur National University was not authorized to run any distant education course or award degrees through correspondence. It was submitted that the order dated 17.01.2014 is not stigmatic/punitive as mere recording of the fact that the petitioner in the year 2007 when appointed on temporary basis vide order dated 18.01.2007 did not have the requisite minimum qualification of 55% marks for appointment on the post of Principal was not a condemnation causing prejudice. Counsel submitted that an order can only be stigmatic/punitive when it is a negative reflection of a person's conduct or unsuitably on ground of wrong doing. It was submitted that the argument with regard to the petitioner's appointment being regular is a non-sequitur for the reason that the petitioner vide her own letter dated 20.12.2013 admitted to being a fixed term appointee and also for the reason that pursuant to the advertisement dated 01.05.2013 by the respondent-College for appointment of a Principal at its college, the petitioner herself applied for consideration for selection to the said post. She would have not done so if regular. It has also been submitted that even though the letter of appointment dated 31.01.2008 did describe the petitioner as a probationer, yet that was not so, as probationers, as understood in service law jurisprudence are those appointed subsequent to selection made pursuant to an open advertisement by a duly constituted Selection Committee. The petitioner was admittedly not so appointed. Mr. Goyal submitted that the petitioner thus not having been appointed after following the recruitment process as laid down in chapter V she was not a probationer nor in terms of Rule 31 of the Rules of 1993 entitled to confirmation. Counsel submitted that it is well settled that mere nomenclature of an appointment is not decisive, rather the mode of appointment is the determining factor for ascertaining the nature of appointment. On that test the petitioner's appointment was clearly temporary / fixed term / contractual. Mr. Goyal finally submitted that in the circumstances, no question of the petitioner being entitled to confirmation as a probationer with reference to Rules 30 and 31 of the Rules of 1993 can arise.
The Director, College Education has supported the case of the respondent-College. It has been submitted that the petitioner did not, at the relevant time when first appointed in 2007, have the requisite eligibility to be appointed as Principal of a College having obtained only 52.88% marks at the post graduate level as against the minimum requisite 55% marks at the said level for appointment as Principal. It was submitted that the petitioner was not regularly appointed by resort to the due process of the Act of 1989 on evaluation by a properly constituted Selection Committee considering open market candidates responding to a public advertisement. And in the circumstances, the petitioner cannot have any right to seek protection of Section 18 of the Act of 1989 and Rule 39 of the Rules of 1993 or impugn the order dated 11.03.2014 for reason of alleged contravention thereof. The petitioner's appointment was temporary for fixed term/contractual coming to end on the time expiring.
Heard. Considered.
Section 17 of the Act of 1989 provides that the recruitment of employees in a recognized institution shall be made either after an open advertisement in a local daily newspaper or from amongst the candidates sponsored by the employment exchange in the manner prescribed. Section 18 thereof provides with caveats and conditional exclusions the manner in which an employee of a recognized educational institution may be removed, dismissed or reduced in rank. Chapter-V of the Rules of 1993 relates to general conditions of service. Thereunder Rule 26 provides that recruitment of employees in a recognized institution shall be made on merit, either after open advertisement in a local daily newspaper with a wide circulation or form amongst the candidates sponsored by the employment exchange in the manner prescribed by the said rule. (The manner prescribed if at all has not been brought to the court's notice). Clause (b) of the Rule 26 of the Rules of 1993 provides that qualifications for appointments shall be as prescribed by the Government for similar category of employees in Government educational institutions except for the post of Organizing Secretary. Clause (c) of the aforesaid Rule provides that all applications received in response to the advertisement shall be scrutinized by the Secretary of the Managing Committee who shall prepare a list of eligible candidates and summon them for interview by the Selection Committee constituted as per Clause (d) of the Rule in issue. Rule 27 of the Rules of 1993 provides that the Managing Committee shall forward the list of selected candidates with its recommendation along with information in the proforma prescribed to the competent authority. Under Rule 28 the competent authority after due consideration can either approve the recommendations of the Managing Committee for appointment of an employee or reject the same for reasons to be recorded in writing. Finally, under Rule 29, after having obtained the approval of the competent authority, the Managing Committee can make the necessary appointment. The aforesaid prescribed procedure for recruitment in the rules of 1993 relates to appointments on permanent basis on substantive posts in the non-government educational institution concerned. Contra-distinguished therewith, Rule 33 of the Rules of 1993 provides for urgent temporary appointment. Thereunder a vacancy in the institution, which cannot be filled in immediately by procedure laid down in the rules of 1993, can be filled up by the Selection Committee by urgent temporary appointment for a period not exceeding six months. Rule 39 of the Rules of 1993 provides for the manner of removal or dismissal from service both of temporary employees appointed for a period of six months (quite obviously referable to Rule 33 of the Rules of 1993) and of employees otherwise substantially appointed in terms of procedure set out under Rule 26 to Rule 29 of the Rules of 1993.
The Apex Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Uma Devi (3) & Ors. [(2006) 4 SCC 1] has held that even though regular appointments as per the constitutional scheme for public employment must be a rule, there is nothing in the constitutional scheme which prohibits the Union, the States or their instrumentalities from engaging persons temporarily, on contract or on daily wages without following the prescribed procedure, to meet the needs of a given situation. It has been held that until the appointment made is in terms of relevant rules and after proper competition amongst qualified persons, it would not confer any right on the appointee. It was held that a contractual appointment comes to an end on the efflux of the period set out in the contract, the appointment on daily wages or casual appointment to an end when it is discontinued and a temporary appointment ends on the expiry of its term. No employee appointed either on contractual, temporary or casual basis can claim to be made permanent on the expiry of period for which he was appointed. In Union Public Service Commission Vs. Girish Jayanti Lal Vaghela & Ors. [(2006) 2 SCC 482] the Apex Court held that when there was nothing to show that the appointment of the respondent before it had been made after issuing public advertisement or that the authorized body under the relevant rules governing the conditions of service of Drugs Inspector in the Union Territory of Daman and Diu selected him and when in fact the appointment of the respondent was on contractual basis for a period of six months de hors the rules, the respondent could not be said to be while working as a contractual employee, governed by the relevant service rules otherwise applicable to Drugs Inspector duly appointed inter alia for the reason that a contractual appointment did not confer on the respondent the privilege of availing casual and earned leave, benefit of general provident fund or pension which are normal incidents of Government service nor could such an employee appointed on contractual basis be placed under suspension entailing him to subsistence allowance, nor in fact could he be transferred. It was held that in view of above aspects of the contractual employment, it could not be under any circumstances held to be employment under the Government (in the sense of conferring a status). So holding the Apex Court concluded that the claim of the respondent (a contractual employee) before it for seeking relaxation of upper age limit on the ground of his having been engaged purportedly as a Government employee was not tenable and liable to be dismissed. The principle deducible from the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court thus is that a temporary / contractual / fixed terms employee cannot, for reason of evident differences with a regularly appointed employee on substantive post, be treated to be one entitled to be protection of a statute relevant to governing the service conditions of a regular employee.
In Jawahar Vidhya Peeth & Ors. Vs. Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Tribunal, Jaipur & Ors., SBCWP No.2856/1997, decided on 24.02.2015 [2015 Indlaw RAJ 367] it has been held by this Court that under Section 18 of the Act of 1989 the Non-Government Educational Institution Tribunal can only deal with the questions related to removal, dismissal or reduction in rank of employees of non-governmental educational institutions appointed on regular basis by a duly constituted Selection Committee and cannot be said to have any jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 19 of the Act of 1989 at the instance of an ad hoc employee for alleged contravention of Section 18 thereof. This was for the reason that the appointment not being regular by a duly constituted Selection Committee, no occasion for removal or dismissal or reduction of rank of such a contractual employee arose. While coming to the aforesaid conclusion, the learned Single Judge relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Shri Jain Swetambar Terapanthi Manav Hitkari Sang & Ors. Vs. The Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Tribunal & Ors. [2014 Indlaw RAJ 430], D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.3610/2003 decided on 29.4.2014 which was of the firm opinion that the challenge to the maintainability of the appeal of the respondent No.2 before the learned Tribunal against the order of termination of his services on the ground of ineligibility has to be sustained. As in the present conspectus of facts, the termination of services of the respondent No.2 can by no means be construed to be one of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, having regard to the clearly outlined jurisdictional contour of the learned Tribunal as enjoined by Section 19 of the Act, his appeal was clearly not maintainable in law. By the analogy of reasons, the respondent No.2's appeal before the learned Tribunal against the termination order dated 15.07.1998 is held to be not maintainable in law. The impugned judgments and orders dated 26.03.2003 are thus axiomatically rendered non-est. Similarly in Dr. Daya Shanker Sharma & Ors. Vs. Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Tribunal & Ors., D.B. Special Appeal (W) No.1041/11 and D.B. Special Appeal (W) No.1040/11, decided on 25.07.2011 [2011 Indlaw RAJ 429] another Division Bench of this Court held that as the petitioners before it were not appointed by a duly constituted Selection Committee either on temporary or regular basis, nor the regular recruitment procedure followed for their appointment (as prescribed under the Act of 1989 and Rules of 1993), the contention of the petitioners before it that their termination/removal was in contravention of the Section 18 of the Act of 1989 and Rule 39 of the Rules of 1993 was untenable. It was specifically held that as the petitioners before the Court were appointed on contractual basis, the respondent-College was not required, before their termination, to follow the procedure under the Act of 1989 and Rules of 1993. To buttress this conclusion, the Division Bench reiterated the well settled legal position that those appointed on temporary, ad hoc or contractual basis for specific period/s of time would could not on lapsing of prescribed time, have any right which could be agitated before a Court of law, to continue on such post.
Reverting to the facts of the case at hand, it is not in dispute that the petitioner was appointed by the General Secretary of the Society vide office order dated 18.01.2007 on a consolidated salary of Rs.18,000/- per month subject to the approval of the Managing committee of Shri Agarwal Shiksha Samiti, Jaipur on temporary basis de hors the rules of 1993. He was not appointed by the Selection Committee. The appointment was terminable on the one month's notice from either side. Subsequently the petitioner vide order letter dated 31.01.2008, was appointed afresh for a period of one year with reference to her own application for appointment as Principal of the College on a gross salary of Rs.19,690/- per month subject to statutory deductions. The petitioner was then continued for various terms from time to time thereafter. And under her own letter dated 20.12.2013 addressed to the Secretary of the respondent-College, the petitioner admitted the fact that her appointment commencing 20.1.2007 on the post of Principal had been extended in the previous year upto 19.01.2014 and prayed that the period of her appointment be extended and salary enhanced. It has also been stated by counsel for the respondents and not denied that subsequent to the advertisement with the respondents seeking to appoint a Principal to the College on regular basis in accordance with the Act of 1989 and Rules of 1993, as regard as a condition of affiliation by the University of Rajasthan in its letter dated 14.06.2012, the petitioner applied for the said post. This evidences the fact that the petitioner did not treat herself (and rightly so) either to be a duly appointed Principal by a Selection Committee as mandated under the Rules of 1993 or entitled to confirmation. These, sadly for the petitioner, are hard facts on record.
Counsel for the petitioner has however emphatically submitted that the petitioner's appointment letter dated 31.01.2008 described her as being on probation till the Executive Committee of Shri Agarwal Shiksha Samiti confirms her services in writing. It was submitted that the petitioner thus being a probationer was entitled to confirmation at the end of the probation periodextendable only upto one year, under Rule 31 of the Rules of 1993. The contention is however wholly untenable. For one, Rule 31 of the Rules of 1993 follows both chronologically and schematically Rules 26 to 30. It is thus evident that the confirmation of an appointee at the end of the probation period would only be when the probation followed a regular appointment on a substantive post by a duly constituted Selection Committee complying with the procedure set out in Rules 26 to 29. That said recruitment process has admittedly not been adopted in the case of the petitioner as her appointment was not made on selection on merit following an open advertisement by the Selection Committee. Nor was her appointment by the Selection Committee from amongst the candidates sponsored by the employment exchange. The need of being put through an interview by a Selection Committee applied with equal force as mandated under Rule 26(2) of the Rules of 1993, both to applicants who applied in response to an open advertisement and for those whose names are forwarded by the employment exchange on requisition made. Aside of the aforesaid, it is well settled that the mere nomenclature in a letter of appointment is not conclusive and for considering the nature of the appointment, the method adopted for appointment of the person concerned is to be considered. This has been categorically enunciated in the case of Inderjeet Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. [RLW 2009 (2) Raj. 1848] where it has been held that while considering the nature of appointment, the substance and not the nomenclature used in the order of appointment has to be seen. Mere mentioning of ad hoc, temporary, etc. in the order of appointment would not change the real nature of appointment. The nature of appointment in the case of petitioner was quite evidently for reasons detailed hereinabove contractual/fixed term and not regularnotwithstanding that in the letter of appointment dated 30.01.2008 the petitioner was stated to be a probationer. In A.G. Sainath Reddy Vs. Govt. of A.P. & Ors. [(2003) 4 SCC 65] the Apex Court has held that the question of a person being appointed on probation shall arise only when he has been substantially appointed by due process against a vacant post and not when he has been appointed on ad hoc basis. In this view of the matter the contention of the counsel for the petitioner with regard to the petitioner's purported right to confirmation in terms of Rule 31 of the Rules of 1993 following the appointment under the letter dated 31.01.2008 allegedly on probation is without substance.
It will also now be well to consider the further argument of the counsel for the petitioner that in view of Rule 33 of the Rules of 1993, the maximum limit permitted for an urgent temporary appointment being six months, the petitioner having continued in that capacity for a period of about 7 years, her appointment ought to be treated as regular. I am of the considered view that the petitioner's appointment did not even relate to Rule 33 and was absolutely de hors the Act of 1989 and Rules of 1993 for the reason that albeit appointed on temporary basis for a period of one year and thereafter extended from time to time, the petitioner's appointment admittedly was not made by the Selection Committee as mandated by Rule 33 of the Rules of 1993. The petitioner has indeed continued on the post of Principal for a period of about seven years. But mere period of contractual/temporary/fixed term appointment, even when extended cannot allow circumvention of the operative lawin the instant case the Act of 1989 and the Rules of 1993. I also do not find force in the contention of the petitioner's counsel that the order dated 17.01.2014 issued by the Secretary, Managing Committee of Agarwal Shikshak Prashikshan Mahavidhyalya, Jaipur is a stigmatic/punitive order. The order dated 17.07.2014 only entails mere discontinuation at the end of the contract/fixed term employmentUma Devi (Supra) permits it. The resolution of the Board with regard to the petitioner having secured 52.88% marks and not 55% marks at the Master Level at the time of joining service om 2007 as required under the UGC Regulations, 2000 regarding Minimum Qualifications for Appointment and Career Advancement of Teachers in Universities and Colleges is a mere statement of an undisputable fact and cannot be said to be condemnatory of the petitioners conduct or holding her unsuitable for employment on a post for which she was otherwise qualified. No prejudice flows to the petitioner even remotely therefrom.
In the circumstances of the case, I am of the considered view that the impugned order dated 17.01.2014 passed by the Secretary, Managing Committee of Agarwal Shikshak Prashikshan Mahavidhyalya, Jaipur and upheld by the Tribunal in its impugned order dated 11.03.2014 cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be stated to be perverse, illegal or liable to be set aside.
I find no force in the petition.
Dismissed.
Stay application also dismissed.
(ALOK SHARMA), J MS/-